Loss Aversion (2025)
in: Chuah Swee-Hoon, Robert Hoffmann and Ananta Neelim (eds.), Edward Elgar Encyclopedia in Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Cheltenham,
How to Increase Public Support for Carbon Pricing with Revenue Recycling (2024)
Nature Sustainability 7, 1633-41 (with Andrej Woerner, Taisuke Imai, and Davide Pace)
DOI: 10.1038/s41893-024
A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations (2023)
Journal of Economics and Statistics, 243(5), 543-566 (with Elisa Hofman and Lucas Kyriacou)
How to Regulate Carbon Emissions with Climate-Conscious Consumers (2022)
Economic Journal, 132(November), 2992-3019 (with Fabian Herweg)
DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueac045
Paying for Open Access (2022)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 200, 273-286 (with Lucas Stich and Martin Spann)
Focusing Climate Negotiations on a Uniform Common Commitment Can Promote Cooperation (2021)
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(11), e2013070118 (with Axel Ockenfels)
Das Design von Klimaschutzverhandlungen (2021)
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 22(1), 4-16
Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies (2020)
Management Science, 66(5), 2194-2212 (with Fabian Herweg)
Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem (2020)
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 70, Article 102521 (with Fabian Herweg)
Nature Genetics, 51, 245-257 (with Richard Karlsson Linnér, ...)
You Owe Me (2017)
American Economic Review, Vol. 107(2), 493-526 (with Ulrike Malmendier)
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20140890
Pay What You Want as a Pricing Model for Open Source Publishing? (2017)
Communications of the ACM, 60(11), 29-31 (with Martin Spann and Lucas Stich)
DOI: 10.1145/3140822
Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Role of Inefficient Renegotiation (2017)
The RAND Journal of Economics, 48(3), 647-672 (with Fabian Herweg)
Competition and Incentives (2017)
European Economic Review 98, 111-125 (with Lisa Fey and Carmen Thoma)
Contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström to Contract Theory (2017)
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 119 (3), 489-511
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12245
Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price? (2017)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 136, 125-140 (with Florentin Krämer, Martin Spann and Lucas Stich)
Buyer and Seller Data from Pay What You Want and Name Your Own Price Laboratory Markets (2017)
Data in Brief, Vol. 12: 513–17 (with Florentin Krämer, Martin Spann and Lucas Stich)
Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation (2015)
Review of Economic Studies, 82(1), 297–332 (with Fabian Herweg)
Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets (2015)
Management Science, Vol. 61(6), 1217-1236 (with Martin Spann and Robert Zeithammer)
Best Paper Award of the Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft (VHB) 2015
Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiation (2015)
Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 13(1), 98-129 (with Björn Bartling)
DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12109
Complementary Patents and Market Structure (2014)
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 23(1), 68-88
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12041
Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relationship (2013)
Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 11(4), 711-742 (with Björn Bartling and Ernst Fehr)
DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12017
Discretion, Productivity and Job Satisfaction (2013)
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 169, 4-22 (with Björn Bartling and Ernst Fehr)
Screening, Competition, and Job Design: The Origin of Good Jobs (2012)
American Economic Review, Vol. 102(2), 834-864 (with Björn Bartling and Ernst Fehr)
Social Preferences and Competition (2011)
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 43 (S1), 207-232
Licensing Complementary Patents: "Patent Trolls", Market Structure, and "Excessive Royalties" (2010)
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 25, 1121-1144 (with Anne Layne-Farrar)
DOI: 10.15779/Z38KH5N
On Inequity Aversion: A Reply to Binmore and Shaked (2010)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 73, 101-108 (with Ernst Fehr)
The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories (2009)
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 10 (s1), 14-30
Two Tales on Resale (2008)
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 26, 1448-1460 (with Felix Höffler)
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Property Rights (2008)
Economic Journal, Vol. 118 (August), 1262-84 (with Ernst Fehr and Susanne Kremheimer)
Fairness and Contract Design (2007)
Econometrica 75(1), 121-154 (with Ernst Fehr and Alexander Klein)
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00734.x
Reprinted in Khalil, E.L. (ed.), The New Behavioral Economics, Vol. 1, Chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009
Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines (2007)
American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), Vol. 97(2), 177-181 (with Ernst Fehr)
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.2.177
Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Comment (2006)
American Economic Review 96(5), 1912-1917 (with Ernst Fehr and Michael Naef)
Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Firms (2006)
Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, Special Issue 5, 39-52 (with Georg Gebhardt)
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.911527
The Economics of Covenants as a Means of Efficient Creditor Protection (2006)
European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 7.1 (2006), 89-94
An Economic Approach to Article 82 – Report by the European Advisory Group on Competition Policy (2006)
Competition Policy International, Vol. 2.1, 111-154 (with Jordi Gual, Martin Hellwig, Anne Perrot, Michele Polo, Patrick Rey and Rune Stenbacka)
Reprinted in Spanish as “Un enfoque económico del artícula 82” in El Abuso de la Posicíon de Dominio, ed. by S. Martinez Lage and A. Petitbò Juan, 99-154, Madrid 2006
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model (2004)
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 3, 453-474 (with Ernst Fehr)
Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance (2003)
Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 3, 1139-1166
Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues (2003)
Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 16, No. 2, 473-505 (with Monika Schnitzer)
DOI:
Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 6, 2225-2264 (with Martin Hellwig)
Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen (2002)
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 3, No. 3, 235-256 (with Georg Gebhardt)
Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices (2000)
European Economic Review, Vol. 44, No. 4-6, 1057-1068 (with Ernst Fehr)
The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Threat of Expropriation (2000)
European Economic Review, Vol. 44, No. 2, 393-421
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation (1999)
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, No. 3, 817-868 (with Ernst Fehr)
Reprinted in: Colin F. Camerer et al. (eds.), Advances in Behavioral Economics, Kapitel 9, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004.
Sequential Investments and Options to Own (1998)
The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, No. 4, 633-653 (with Georg Nödelke)
DOI:
Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition (1997)
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 64, 191-214
DOI: 10.2307/2971709
Incomplete Contracts and Privatization (1996)
European Economic Review, Vol. 40, 569-580
DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00070-4
Reprinted in Czech, “Neúplné smlouvy a privatizace,” Politická Economie, Vol. 44 (1996), 515-523
Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games (1996)
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 69, 387-410 (with Martin Cripps and Jonathan Thomas)
The Costs and Benefits of Privatization - An Incomplete Contracts Approach (1996)
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 12, 1-24
Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem (1995)
The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, 163-179 (with Georg Nödelke)
DOI:
The Interaction of Explicit and Implicit Contracts (1995)
Economic Letters, Vol. 48, No. 2, 193-199 (with Monika Schnitzer)
Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests (1993)
Econometrica, Vol. 61, 325-351
DOI: 10.2307/2951554
Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game (1993)
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 60, 114-139
Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe (1993)
Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 17, 264-287 (with Monika Schnitzer)
Contracts, Competition, and the Theory of Reputation
Habilitation thesis, submitted to the Faculty of Law and Economics at the University of Bonn, October 1994
Commitments in Games with Asymmetric Information
Ph.D. dissertation, submitted to the Faculty of Law and Economics at the University of Bonn, July 1991
Loss Aversion, Edward Elgar Encyclopedia in Behavioral and Experimental Economics (2023)
forthcoming (with Imai Taisuke)
Grenzausgleich und Klimaclub: Internationale Aspekte der CO2-Bepreisung (2023)
VIK Mitteilungen 4/23, 38-39
Nachhaltigkeit in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft
Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol. 102 (5), 328-330 (with Regina T. Riphahn)
Vertragstheorie, Ökonomie Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström (2016)
Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol. 96 (12), 926-931
Some Recent Experimental Evidence on Contracts as Reference Points (2016)
in: Philippe Aghion et al. (eds.), The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 396-399
Vertrauen und soziale Präferenzen: Die Sicht der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung (2010)
in: Annette Kehnel (Hg.), Kredit und Vertrauen, Frankfurt, 225-236
Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools (2010)
in: Arvid Fredenberg (Hg), The Pros and Cons of Standard Setting, Stockholm 2010, 57-79
Vertragstheorie (2007)
in: Köhler, R., Küpper, H.-U. und Pfingsten, A., Handwörterbuch der Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag, 1937-1945
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories (2006) (with Ernst Fehr)
Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Vol. 1, 615-691ed. by. Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier, Amsterdam: Elsevier
A Comment on Gayer and Shy (2005)
in: CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 51 (2005), 491-493
Vom Homo Oeconomicus zum Homo Reciprocans (2004)
Einsichten, 01/2004, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 18-21
Fairness und der Homo Oeconomicus (2004)
München: Thinkers’ Corner
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity – Evidence and Economic Applications (2003) (with Ernst Fehr)
in: Dewatripont, M. et.al., Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 208-257
Efficiency of the Britisch UMTS Auction: A Comment on Börgers and Dustmann (2003)
in: Illing, G. and U. Klüh (eds.), Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT-Press, 159-162
Anreizprobleme bei der Finanzierung von Wagniskapital (1999)
in: W. Franz et.al. (eds.), Ökonomische Analyse von Verträgen, Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 248-84
Contract Renegotiation and Option Contracts (1998)
in: Newman, Peter (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Vol. 1, London: McMillan, 432-436
Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining, and Giveaways (1997) (with Monika Schnitzer)
in: H. Giersch (ed.), Privatization at the End of the Century, Berlin: Springer, 1997, 97-134
Debt as an Option to Own in the Theory of Ownership Rights (1995) (with Georg Nödelke)
in A. Picot and E. Schlicht (Hrsg.), Perspectives on Contract Theory, Berlin: Physica Verlag, 1-15
A Comment on W. Bentley MacLeod, 'Incentives in Organizations: An Overview of Some of the Evidence and Theory' (1994)
in Siebert, Horst (ed.), Trends in Business Organization: Do Participation and Cooperation Increase Competitiveness? S. 43-49, Tübingen: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 43-49
Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (1994)
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 150, 543-546
*Hinweis zu Bildmaterial und Journalnamen:
Die auf dieser Webseite verwendeten grafischen Elemente zu wissenschaftlichen Veröffentlichungen (z. B. Thumbnails mit Journalnamen und Jahreszahlen) wurden eigens gestaltet und dienen ausschließlich der übersichtlichen Darstellung meiner Publikationen.
Es handelt sich hierbei nicht um offizielle Titelbilder, Logos oder Markenabbildungen der jeweiligen Verlage. Alle Rechte an Marken, Logos und Original-Covern verbleiben bei den jeweiligen Rechteinhabern.
Falls ein Rechteinhaber Einwände gegen die Darstellung hat, bitte ich um einen kurzen Hinweis – das betreffende Element wird unverzüglich entfernt oder angepasst.
A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations (2023)
Journal of Economics and Statistics, 243(5), 543-566 (with Elisa Hofman and Lucas Kyriacou)