郭銘峰、蔣林秀、黃心怡
反貪研究將陽光(透明)視為最好的消毒劑。然此假設在經驗研究卻呈兩極。究 其要因,文獻未深究如何健全透明機制以抑制貪腐,即使透明具聚光燈效果,其 有效性仍應取決行為者對不同課責途徑風險成本之感知。本文探討透明與課責的 交互影響並提出四大分類,驗證其對個人貪腐與集體貪腐的影響。對象為中國大 陸基層文官,研析在高增長高腐敗困境下之反貪治理成效。結果發現:透明對抑 制個人與集體貪腐皆具成效,惟其效果受不同課責途徑調節;行政課責能增強透明對個人與集體貪腐的抑制作用,而社會和法律課責僅能增加透明對集體貪腐的抑制效果。
郭銘峰、蔣林秀、黃心怡,2021.12,〈妥協的集體還是貪婪的個人:透明、課責與反貪的交織效果〉,《人文及社會科學集刊》,即將刊登。
Wu, Jia-en and Ming-feng Kuo
The debate on universalism and targeting approach in distribution policy leads to intergroup conflict and social categorization. This article proposed a theoretical framework considering the beneficiaries’ demands as a critical part of mitigating intergroup conflict and introduced a new approach – conjoint analysis with a bidding game to help the government better understand citizens’ policy preferences. The effects of six attributes on Taipei’s aging policy preference were investigated using data from 400 elders in Taipei’s heterogeneous administrative districts. The results revealed that, due to their lack of understanding, the elderly perceived the policy change as benefiting advantaged groups, which made them oppose the policy changed and created social conflict.
Wu, Jia-en and Ming-feng Kuo. 2022.4. “How Conjoint Analysis Contributes to Mitigating Intergroup Conflict? A Case Study of Aging Policy in Taipei City (Taiwan).” Journal of Asian Public Policy. online first. DOI: 10.1080/17516234.2022.2072167
Hsini Huang, Kyoung-Cheol (Casey) Kim, Matthew M. Young & Justin B. Bullock
This article tests whether managers and staff evaluate artificial intelligence (AI)-based process innovations differently. Scholars have argued perceptions of innovation vary systematically as a function of an individual’s position within organisations. We test for attitudinal differences between managers and staff via an online experimental simulation fielded among working-age Taiwanese citizens employed in public sector employment (n = 600). Respondents engage in a 12-round simulation. We experimentally vary whether the respondent receives support from an AI decision support tool. We assess pre-intervention and post-intervention attitudes towards the use of AI for a suite of organisational tasks, using a difference-in-difference estimation approach to identify the causal effect of organisational position on innovation evaluation. Our findings suggest managers are more supportive of AI as a decision support tool than staff, and remain so after the simulation. Managers also increased their support of AI tools to a larger degree than staff.
Hsini Huang, Kyoung-Cheol (Casey) Kim, Matthew M. Young & Justin B. Bullock (2022) A matter of perspective: differential evaluations of artificial intelligence between managers and staff in an experimental simulation, Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 44:1, 47-65, DOI: 10.1080/23276665.2021.1945468
Justin B Bullock, Hsini Huang, Kyoung-Cheol (Casey) Kim
Machine intelligence, used extensively throughout modern bureaucracies, is quickly evolving, giving rise to machine agents that accomplish tasks typically reserved for human beings. This shift affects task completion, human/machine coproduction, and the control of the bureaucracy itself. Using Max Weber’s ideal type bureaucracy as a guiding construct, we argue that machine agents may offer technical capacity for task completion beyond that of humans. Furthermore, the technical strengths of machine intelligence, including (1) speed, (2) dispassion, (3) predictability, and (4) rational rule-based functioning, mirror those found within Weber’s ideal type. Through this lens, the evolution of both bureaucratic structures and the decision-making agents within them presents at least three important challenges for modern scholars: (1) deciding the scope of tasks machine agents should complete, (2) adapting the bureaucracy to work with machine agents, and (3) retaining the role of humans and human control.
Justin B Bullock, Hsini Huang, Kyoung-Cheol (Casey) Kim, Machine Intelligence, Bureaucracy, and Human Control, Perspectives on Public Management and Governance, Volume 5, Issue 2, June 2022, Pages 187–196, https://doi.org/10.1093/ppmgov/gvac006