SPEAKERS

Meirav Almog (PhD, The School of Philosophy, Tel-Aviv University and Post-doc at the program for Philosophy and Literature in the Philosophy department at University of Haifa), is a philosophy lecturer at Kibbutzim College of Education, Technology and the Arts in Tel-Aviv, Israel. She specializes in twentieth century continental philosophy, in particular, phenomenology and aesthetics. Her research interests and publications concern questions regarding corporeality and alterity, dialogue and intersubjective relations, and the relations between style and human existence.

Abstract

The human lived experience in the world is both the source that grounds phenomenology, and its subject of exploration. Yet, phenomenology employs a number of strategies that aim to reorient this lived experience in order to better observe and understand it, such as Husserl's Epoché and Heidegger's Angst. Phenomenologists have searched for an appropriate distance from the lived experience of the world, one that allows to see, describe, and understand a layer of existence that is replete with meaning but is forgotten in the natural attitude. The paper focuses on the experience of urban flâneurism—wandering around—as a unique approach that deepens our understanding of the life-world. It unpacks the nature of flâneurism as a corporeal mood or disposition in the world, in its Heideggerian sense, and shows how the act of wandering situates the body in an intermediate position—not utterly outside the world nor completely within it—which is phenomenologically significant. This precise distance creates an attunement to the world which undercuts, what Georg Simmel calls, the urban blasé attitude, and vitalizes an awareness of the subtle differences and nuances riddled within perception. Thus, flâneurism enriches and intensifies the wanderer's lived perception. As Charles Baudelaire and Walter Benjamin describe, each in their own context, it invites one to see the world in its nascent state—as if for the first time, turning the familiar, blunt, and blasé attitude toward a latent life-world that is ordinarily concealed in urban life. The flâneur, I claim, is a proto-phenomenologist that enables to see the world anew. Drawing on Heidegger's request to see phenomenology as that which can let things show themselves from themselves, some questions will be raised as to whether this lived experience of flâneurism can be understood a legitimate phenomenological method and source of insight.   Bibliography Baudelaire, Charles. "The Painter of Modern Life" in The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays. trans. and ed. J. Mayne (London, England: Phaidon Press Limited, 1964).   Benjamin, Walter. The Arcades Project, tr. H. Eiland and K. Me-Laughlin (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999).   Casey, Edward. S. The World at a Glance (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana Univesity Press, 2007).   Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).   Perec, Georges. Species of Spaces and Other Pieces trans.and ed. J. Sturrock. (London and New-York: Penguin Press, 1997).   Simmel, Georg. "The Metropolis and Mental Life" in Simmel on Culture, eds.D. Frisby and M. Featherstone (London, England: Sage Publications, 1997).

Rachel Coventry holds an M.Litt in the philosophy of economic and a doctorate in the philosophy of art and culture from the University of Galway. Her book Heidegger and Poetry in The Digital Age: New Aesthetics and Technologies will be published by Bloomsbury in December. She has also published two collections of poetry with Salmon Poetry. Her poems and essays are widely published in journals and anthologies.

Abstract

  What does it mean to be a poet in the digital? This paper will argue that Heidegger’s poetics allows poets a new perspective to understand the technological, expressed as the digital. We will consider a case study of Jane Hirshfields eco-poetry to assess whether the poetic perspective is sufficient for the unconcealment of truth in this age and how theory plays a critical role in confronting technology. For Heidegger, poetry is philosophically important because it says something about the nature of reality, in that it is the most authentic truth. This truth-disclosing ability is thwarted by technology, understood by Heidegger as the epoch where everything is enframed (Gestell). Enframement (or positionality) refers to how things are set up or positioned as standing reserve, i.e., as exploitable resources. All things, including language and poetry, are now understood in terms of their potential use; they are understood as products that serve a further purpose, and no other understanding is possible. Furthermore, technology reduces both the subject and object of modernist metaphysics to standing reserve; thus, the poet herself becomes an orderable resource. Given this, the question is, can the enframed poet create great poetry? Contemporary poetry is often set up to fulfil some other function. We can see eco-poetry as an example. Many journals and anthologies are now dedicated to environmental issues. The poet is tasked with writing about the environment in a particular way. We can find accounts of what an eco-poem should be thus, the function of an eco-poem is pre-determined, and it is understood in terms of its utility for social change. While this seems, on the face of it, a noble enterprise, the poetic is lost when its purpose is already set. If the poet does not acknowledge the technological essence of things, she cannot confront technology.

Keith Crome teaches philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University. He is President of the British Society for Phenomenology

Abstract

Contemporary discourse on the state of things oscillates between celebrating the seemingly limitless possibilities generated by the viral explosion of things, and condemning the existential impotence attendant upon it. My aim is to move beyond this oscillation, by showing how it is grounded in a certain conception of possibility. To do this it will be necessary to confront our contemporary nihilism as what determines the possibility of possibility.    To facilitate this confrontation, I will draw on Jean-Francois Lyotard’s writings on infancy (conceived here as a state of radical impotence) as entailing a paradoxical rethinking of the essence of possibility itself. I will then turn to the phenomenon of play to argue that it opens up an alternative, playful experience of possibility.

Dan Degerman is Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bristol. His research interests lie at the intersection of mental health, emotions, and politics. Edinburgh University Press recently published his first monograph on those topics under the title Political Agency and the Medicalisation of Negative Emotions. Currently, he is working on a project about experiences of silence in mood disorders.

Abstract

Silence can be a painful feature of depression. Some previously gregarious conversationalists or prolific writers report that, in the depths of depression, they no longer had anything to say. Yet, silence can also offer respite from self-critical and ruminating inner speech, and some pursue it through meditation. In this paper, I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on speech and silence to explain how silence can have such dichotomous meanings in depression. In particular, I focus on his idea that words ordinarily have a near presence to us, allowing us to reach for them in response to solicitations to speak or think in much the same way as we might reach for our leg when it itches. I distinguish between two different types of silence: barren silence and peaceful silence. The two have some core features in common, including a salient absence of inner and outward speech. But I suggest that a key difference between them is how that absence is structured. In barren silence, the subject registers solicitations to speak from the world, but they are unable to respond to those solicitations because words have lost ‘near presence’ to them. That loss confronts them with a double absence of both inner and outward speech, which the subject experiences as, at least in the moment, inescapable. In rumination, the near presence of words has also been altered. But, instead of being inescapable absent, they are inescapable present; everything seems to solicit words from the subject. In peaceful silence, words have reassumed their near presence; the subject is aware of solicitations to speak but is able to ignore them.

Isaac Duckers is a third-year Philosophy student at the University of the West of England who is approaching graduation. He has an interest in the philosophy of mind and by extension a special interest in the philosophy of altered states of consciousness.  

Abstract

Redefining Psychedelic Perception Through a Merleau-Pontian Framework   Assessing psychedelic perception from an empirical point of view, as is often the case in biological and social science studies, we immediately notice a disparity between the behaviour and experiences associated with psychedelic perception and those of sober/regular perception. It is tempting from this position to view psychedelic perception as a class of hallucinogenic experience. In attending to the lived experience of psychedelic perception, however, I argue that this classification becomes untenable. The phenomenon of ‘Seeing-In’ demonstrates this effectively. The term ‘Seeing-In’ refers to subjects perceiving patterns, objects, or symbols in the world around them that they may not otherwise have perceived in their sober experience. While ‘Seeing-In’ is ostensibly an experience that is entirely subjective, it is a key feature of this phenomenon that perceptions are generated from the ‘real’ texture of the world.     In this presentation, I contend that ‘Seeing-In’, as a creative mode of perception, indicates not a creative layer located ‘atop’ perception, but reveals instead an exaggerated mode of perception—highlighting the creative and generative nature of perception at large. I draw from the work of Merleau-Ponty to argue that perception always consists in creative and expressive activity. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account rejects the notion of passive perception, wherein perceptual objects are conceived as having direct and constant ‘real-world’ objective correlates-, in Merleau-Ponty’s framework, perceptual character is afforded contextual ambiguity. Furthermore, we find in Merleau-Ponty a notion of the unconscious that, instead of being entirely hidden, is expressed in the experience of the individual. I argue that these two features of Merleau-Pontian perception are consistent with lived psychedelic experience—a creative and expressive experience.        

Independent researcher whose work is grounded in existential phenomenology, with a particular interest in Sartre. I am currently researching shyness and Sartre's concept of 'projects'.

Abstract

I will here go beyond Sartre’s account of ‘a project’ with five things that I take to be either necessary, or contingent yet common, to any project. The first is that the pursuit of a project necessarily involves experiencing a sense of arrival at the situation in which we pursue a project, where states of affairs and others’ projects have been a priori set underway and we arrive at them a posteriori. The second point pertains to situations involving other people, and is that when encountering another person we encounter them as an exteriority of the project or projects that they are pursuing. My third point is that every project necessarily involves the pursuit of at least two strategic projects within, that I will refer to as a strategy of preservation and a strategy of advancement, which differ by their aims: to retain already obtained conditions for the fulfilment of the parent project and to obtain unmet conditions for the fulfilment of the parent project, respectively. My fourth point is that these two strategic projects each have within them a strategy of assessment, which serves to assess past, present or anticipated situations in which we have, are, or will pursue our project(s). My fifth point again pertains to situations involving other people and is that under any strategy of assessment there can be a strategy of tracing projects. The projects we trace can be active or abandoned ones, and of living or dead people. This research aims to benefit any studies concerned with understanding our experiences of, and our motivations for acting towards, the world and other people, such as phenomenology, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, social philosophy and sociology.  

Rachael Gittins is a first year PhD candidate at Manchester Metropolitan University. Her research project looks at the accounts of non-human processes of sense found in the work Uexküll, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, with the intention to bring these three thinkers into dialogue with each other in order to design methods by which to approach non-human experience, and to critique its exclusion from the history of philosophy. Originally trained as a visual artist, she is particularly interested in the role and importance of perception to experience, its theoretical characterisation and its relationship to ontology.     

Abstract

In this paper I propose a close reading of Jakob von Uexküll’s observations on a series of encounters between a hermit crab and a sea anemone and assess their implications for philosophical questions regarding the lived experience of non-human animals. I focus on the ways that this experiment disrupts the standard usage of Uexküll’s concept of the umwelt, the web of semiotic relationships an organism builds with their environment, as a fixed structure, with the conclusions Uexküll draws demonstrating that it is in fact a site of becoming and contingency. In his A Foray Into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, Uexküll describes the different responses a hermit crab has to the same stimulus, a sea anemone, over a series of encounters, using it, for example, as a protective shelter in one instance, and as food in another. Uexküll uses the results of these observations to bolster the anti-mechanistic arguments found throughout his text, claiming that rather than the fixed actions mechanism attributes to non-human animals, where the same objective properties of an object will always invoke the same predetermined response in the animal, we instead see the extent to which non-human behaviour is open to variation and possibility, rooted not in passivity or pre-conditioning, but in a process of semiosis immanent to experience. Rather than classical ideas of consciousness and representation, Uexküll accounts for this process by a combination of what he terms the ‘mood’ of an organism and the ‘tones’ environmental objects have for them. I look at both the problems of this account, namely its reliance on constructivist accounts of the subject, as well as the conceptual tools it offers us to begin to account for non-human animals as beings of meaning, and to enact a philosophical enquiry which includes, rather than excludes, non-human experience.  

Simon Harrison has been Assistant Professor in the Department of English at City University of Hong Kong since 2018. His research explores embodied and relational understandings of language, communication, and culture across diverse settings and scales, while developing multidisciplinary perspectives on gesture. Simon is author of The Impulse to Gesture: Where Language Bodies and Minds Intersect (2018) and Chinese Urban Shi-nema: Cinematicity, Society and Millennial China (2020, with David H. Fleming).

Abstract

In one of the many video clips that went viral during the pandemic, “When you wanna salsa but also socially distance” shows a couple of dancers busting out beautifully coordinated salsa moves to Cuban sounds, avoiding dermal contact and maintaining their distance with what look like strings or elastic bands. It is to ‘lived experience’ that I owe a perceived correspondence (Ingold, 2021) of this scene with the practice in education of language testing online. When the candidates in my comparative study took the Cambridge B2 First Speaking Paper, they said that “distance”, “feeling”, “intimacy”, and “involvement” all change when their examiner is online—as if taking the test over Zoom had introduced a kind of string or elastic band to their relational dynamics. However, this correspondence will seem bizarre to researchers in fields traditionally associated with online language testing. Despite the emphasis in applied linguistics on the meaningful situation of being with others, a close-reading of their concepts like functional output, interactional competence, and multimodality reveals ways of relating phenomena that neglect lived experience. How is it that applied linguistics studies, for example, are finding that our gestures in the online environment are ‘almost non-existent’ (Bobkina et al., 2023) or ‘may simply not be possible’ (Nakatsuhara et al., 2017)? I draw on contemporary phenomenological thinkers (including Di Paolo, Cuffari, & De Jaegher, 2018; Fuchs, 2011; Ingold, 2021; Sheets-Johnstone, 2011; Thibault, 2021) to bring out what intuitively registers rhythmically and bodily in different ways in the online environment, offering empirical examples of ‘kinaesthetic melodies’ and ‘felt-anticipatory dynamics’ (Thibault, 2021). These kinds of gestures would be obvious in the tensions that strings (or elastic bands) generate between dance partners. They can offer ways of rethinking language proficiency in the normative domain of language testing and assessment online.

I am a postdoctoral researcher starting a one-year Visiting Researcher Fellowship at the University of Sussex (UK) in Philosophy. I am also affiliated to the University of Oulu (Finland), where I defended my PhD in 2022. I earned my MA in Philosophy from the University of Jyväskylä in 2017. I have worked on the applications of classical phenomenology on contemporary political questions as well as on phenomenological and political philosophy of education. In addition to my philosophical work, I have published textbooks on secular ethics and a popular historical book on Ingrians in the Soviet Union.

Abstract

What is the lived experience of the political and social life? How is it constituted? While political phenomenology is sometimes claimed to be a new field of investigation, we can also find analyses of the social and political experiences in the works of the early phenomenologists. In this context, Husserl’s notes on the state and other political and social topics and Schütz’s sociological phenomenology are probably the most discussed. In turn, Stein’s analysis is of the social formations and the state in her early works are underread in the contemporary political and social phenomenological investigations despite their originality and precision. In this paper, I will present the Steinian account of the twofold lived experience of the social and political. For Stein, the social and the political are experienced both internally and externally. These experiences are constituted both by the ontic structures of our social and political life and, roughly put, by the intersubjectivity and (communal) sense perception. I will argue that Stein’s analysis of the lived experience of the social and the political provides a profound manner of analysing the constitution of the political experience. This, in turn, provides tools for further contemporary phenomenological analyses of individual political experiences strongly needed in the age of the “post-truth” and populist politics aiming at appealing to emotions and first-hand experiences of individuals. In phenomenological circles, Stein is mostly known for her investigations on empathy and phenomenology of religion and religious experiences. Her early works nevertheless also include investigations on the social and political life. These works are seldomly cited in social and political phenomenology, even if the research of Steinian social and political phenomenology is slowly growing.

I am a student in Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne with only the validation of my thesis separating me from acquiring my MA in contemporary philosophy. My background is rather singular, since I have a degree in medicine prior to my much-desired move to philosophy. Despite the early stage of my studies, I have already presented in two conferences this year and hope to pursue an academic career in philosophy, working on the intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of mind.

Abstract

The question of the lived experience is deeply intertwined with that of the experiencer, that of the beings we are. I propose, then, to take a step back and focus on an old ontological problem, that of the nature of subjectivity. Specifically, I aim to engage with Zahavi’s theory of minimal self and question some of its key aspects through a return to Husserl’s theory of the (transcendental) Ego to get to a revised ontological proposal of the subject. Zahavi draws from the for-me-ness and mine-ness of experience to affirm the existence of the self, while rejecting any attempt to attribute any cartesian, substance-like traits to it. Not only isn’t the self a cut-off essence, but the self can only be in and through experience and relates to the how of said experience(s) -hence the importance of for-me-ness. Lately, criticism has been advanced against the “thinness” of the above theory, but Zahavi does not budge. Additionally, he often acknowledges the legitimacy of other ‘selves’, such the narrative one, but won’t attempt a unified theory. A key point in all this is how Zahavi affirms that the self is Ego-centric, while reducing the Ego to a mere formality. I want to put pressure on this relation and, traversing Husserl’s moving position on the Ego, demonstrate the necessity of its concreteness. As the ontological line between transcendental and empirical Ego becomes blurred, I work with the Ego as a unified model that integrates multiple aspects of the self. There, the question of fundamentality between Ego and self will arise, only to be again dethroned in favour of an anti-foundationalist proposal influenced by Piccinini’s egalitarian ontology and Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. The goal I am aiming at is, in the end, a theory of subjectivity less plagued by the fragmentation of different selves.

I am a postgraduate researcher and a teacher at the Department of Philosophy at École Normale Supérieure in Paris, currently working on my thesis The Philosophical Significance of Death. My research concerns phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics, as well as 19th-century continental philosophy, with particular research interests that include death and mortality, relation between being and nothingness, and the problem of time.

Abstract

For a long time, Sartre has been considered to be an Epicurean regarding the question of death. I cannot, according to the author of Being and Nothingness, integrate my death into my projects as it puts them abruptly to their end, nor can I merely anticipate it as its moment remains essentially indeterminate, and when it finally comes, it is the Other who is supposed to experience it not myself. My death, therefore, does not concern me, conclude univocally the major commentators Birault, Dastur or Howells. However, in his War Diaries, which are generally underread by philosophers, Sartre remarks that the famous argument of Epicurus vaut rien and delivers a fierce critique of it. Starting from this critique, I will in my paper reevaluate the established reading of Sartre’s classic phenomenological account of death. To make my point stronger, I will first return to Epicurus himself and defend his argument against frequently raised objections. I will show that Epicurus neither overlooks the relation the living have to their death (as argued by Scheler, Levinas and Patočka) nor mistakes what is frightening about the prospect of one’s death (as objected by Nussbaum or Hägglund). In opposition to these efforts, I will then propose a more penetrating critique based on my reading of Sartre: My death concerns me because it affects those I hold dear and care about, it concerns me since it forces me to leave behind the work I am committed to and the world whose state matters to me, and it does so constantly precisely because it is unpredictable in its nature. To conclude my paper, I will turn Sartre’s reflections into a more general investigation of the unique way in which our death profoundly shapes our lived experience, although we will never live it through.

Name: Bence Peter MAROSAN Date of Birth: 01. 04. 1978. Place of Birth: Budapest, HUNGARY BA and MA Studies: Philosophy, Theory of Arts and Media. Institute: Eötvös Loránd University PhD Studies: Philosophy, Phenomenology. Institutes: Eötvös Loránd University (Hungary), University College Dublin (Ireland), Bergische Universität Wuppertal (Germany), Université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, École Normale Supérieure, (France). Affiliation: Budapest Business School. Associate professor. More important publications: 1) “Husserl on Minimal Mind and the Origins of Consciousness in the Natural World”. In Husserl Studies. 2022.   2) “Radical Emancipation: The Theory of Biocentric Ecosocialism and the Principle of Dynamic Equilibrium”.  In Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 2022.

Abstract

Empirical applications of phenomenology (in the Husserlian sense) in consciousness research have a long history. In the last three decades, neurophenomenology (primarily associated with Francisco Varela and his followers) and microphenomenology (as practiced by Claire Petitmengin and her colleagues), as well as applications of phenomenology in the cognitive sciences (notably by Shaun Gallagher, Dan Zahavi, and others) have played leading roles in empirical phenomenological research.  In this presentation, my goal is to propose a very particular sort of empirical application of phenomenology, one which could be highly promising in uncovering the ultimate neurological foundations of consciousness on the minimal level. More specifically, I propose to apply the phenomenological method in experiments based on emergence from deep general anaesthesia.   It should be noted that such experiments have been used to help identify the neurological foundations of consciousness since at least the early 2000s in a systematic way. However, the particular experimental approach that I suggest differs from previous experiments in at least two regards. First, phenomenology serves as its theoretical basis. In other words, it presupposes that consciousness always has a concrete form: it is the conscious expression or manifestation of a concrete, bodily way of being-in-the-world. These bodily neurological foundations of consciousness must reflect – in one way or another – the concrete and coherent character of consciousness. Second, I would like to offer an experimental method to test whether the cortex is necessary for the deepest form of consciousness. To this end, I endeavour to devise an experimental setup that allows the investigation of neural activity and presumable conscious experiences in patients emerging from general anaesthesia – before the full activation of the cortex. 

Ruth holds a first degree from Moi University. She received a Master’s degree in Development Studies from the University of Glasgow, Scotland. She has completed and successfully defended a PhD in Development Studies in February 2023 at Moi University, Kenya. Her doctoral project was on the lived experiences of informal settlement communities and the social sustainability of development projects in Nairobi. Current research interests are in urban citizenship, urban social sustainability, devolution, and urban governance    

Abstract

This paper examines the lived experiences of informal settlement communities at the onset of the Coronavirus pandemic. A lot of research on urban informality in Kenya has involved the application of quantitative and mixed methods research. The strengths of most of those studies was in highlighting the benefits of quantitative research. This that it serves as an anchor for research that expresses the realities of life in the informal settlements quantifiably. This paper, however, attempts to leverage the strengths of qualitative research to study urban informality. Through the lens of a transcendental phenomenological study in Mukuru Kayaba, I highlight the importance of lived experiences that come to light in practice. In 2020, the state instituted containment measures in Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi. The state deployed the Provincial Administration, for control and to enforcement of the measures. Restrictions on movement and the use of excessive force against the urban poor caused distrust in the government. The urban poor earn their livelihood from wage labour and were affected by the closure of businesses in Nairobi’s Industrial Area. Those who offered other services and lived in the slum struggled to meet their daily needs. This is a depiction of the potential to study class at the micro level to examine the lived experiences in theory and practice to highlight the essence of the lived experiences of the poor.      

Claire Oakeley is a doctoral researcher at the New School of Psychotherapy and Counselling/Middlesex University, a UKCP registered psychotherapist and a BACP accredited counsellor with a focus on working with mothers. She is also a lecturer at Regent’s University London where she teaches existential phenomenology approaches to therapy on the MA programme in Psychotherapy and Counselling. She has a keen interest in qualitative research, particularly hermeneutic phenomenology, and is a member of the Society for Reproductive and Infant Psychology (SRIP).

Abstract

  Research has shown that almost one in five women experience considerable symptoms of anxiety in the first month after having a baby, settling at approximately 15% in subsequent months (Dennis et al., 2018). Despite this, anxiety after birth is not listed as a condition on the UK NHS website and does not feature in the principal authority on diagnoses: The Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-V). While much has been written about postnatal depression, comparatively little research has focused on maternal anxiety. Furthermore, there are no studies which examine the phenomenon from an existential standpoint. The aim of this doctoral study was to explore women’s experiences of maternal anxiety from an existential phenomenological perspective. Eight mothers were interviewed to obtain detailed experiential accounts which were analysed using van Manen’s (2016) hermeneutic phenomenological approach. Three emergent themes were identified: 1. Being taken over; 2. Being with uncertainty; 3. Being with others. These themes illustrate the ontological nature of maternal anxiety in it’s embodied, ambiguous and interpersonal dimensions. Existential insights into the relational, transitional, and temporal nature of postnatal anxiety are examined and discussed. The findings of this study have implications for therapeutic practice, proposing that a phenomenological approach has a vital role to play in assisting mothers to explore their maternal identity, choices, uncertainties and anxious feelings. This study reveals that in addition to the considerable distress that anxiety after birth can bring, it also serves a protective function when understood from an existential context. By listening to the lived testimonies of mothers, phenomenological therapists can offer alternatives to a medicalised view of anxiety and shine light on the nature of maternal anxiety through how it is experienced.       Dennis, C. L., Brown, H. K., Wanigaratne, S., Vigod, S. N., Grigoriadis, S., Fung, K., Marini, F., & Brennenstuhl, S. (2018). Determinants of comorbid depression and anxiety postnatally: A longitudinal cohort study of Chinese-Canadian women. Journal of Affective Disorders, 227, 24-30.  Van Manen, M. (2016). Researching lived experience: human science for an action sensitive pedagogy. Routledge.  

Vanessa Ossino studied philosophy and ethnology at the Humboldt-University and Free University in Berlin. She is currently a doctoral candidate at the a.r.t.e.s. graduate school for the humanities Cologne where she is working on her dissertation as part of a cotutelle-de-thèse in association with the University of Fribourg. Under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Thiemo Breyer, Prof. Dr. Emmanuel Alloa and Prof. Dr. Matthias Flatscher, her dissertation is dedicated to the »Mediality of Experience in the Context of its Social Situation«.

Abstract

  The philosophical recourse to lived experience is both highly relevant and controversial. Phenomenology has contributed a great deal to the recognition of lived experiences as an essential gateway to understanding how consciousness can be comprehended otherwise than an epiphenomenal reflection of social being. Already in Wilhelm Dilthey’s work we learn that the conceptualisation of lived experience leads to a relational concept, one that entails something beyond absolute immanence and immediacy. Through analysing our lived experiences, phenomenologists always already look at the way in which these experiences are intertwined in socio-historical, socio-material and socio-cultural contexts. Or so they claim! Do phenomenologists really always already look at the interrelation of social processes and lived experiences? Or do they merely look at an enclosed sphere of individual experience that is solely the ›product‹ of political and hegemonic powers, shaping our lived experiences all along? Is it truly possible to analyse social processes through looking at our lived experiences? Can we work out a critical philosophy on the basis of phenomenological analysis of lived experiences? Some post-modern and critical thinkers particularly deny the latter two questions. For they argue that our lived experience is »ideology’s homeland« (Terry Eagleton) and that in this sense our experiences do not even belong to us (Mark Fisher). Theodor W. Adorno and Joan W. Scott have likewise argued that the wrongful assumption of an »evidence of experience« lies in the illusory claim that we can perceive reality immediately through lived experiences. In my paper, I will address the following question: In what manner can the analysis of lived experience productively contribute to critical theory? My argument is that lived experience resembles a ›mediality‹ that necessarily needs to be analysed in order to engage in a holistic critical theory, one that takes seriously the lived realities of thinking, perceiving and feeling human beings.

I’m a PhD student at Ruhr University Bochum in the “Situated Cognition” Research Training Group. My research project investigates the situatedness of imagination, by analysing its multifaceted and heterogeneous phenomenology and identifying its constraints. My areas of interest are classical and analytical phenomenology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and cognition.

Abstract

In my paper, I will use the phenomenological concept of lived experience (Erlebnis) to better address and clarify the notion of imaginative immersion, which has recently become the subject of a philosophical debate (see Green and Donahue 2009, Schellenberg 2013, Liao and Doggett 2014, Chasid 2017, 2021, Kampa 2018, Langland-Hassan 2020). According to Chasid 2021, an imaginer is more immersed in her imagining when she “follows the general rule or norm governing imagining (namely, that imaginers are to imagine the propositions presented as fictionally true) without acquiring explicit beliefs about which propositions are presented as fictional truths” (p. 7103). To be immersed in an activity (e.g., engaging in conversation, practicing yoga, playing pretend games, etc.) is to follow the rules or norms that apply to that activity without explicitly thinking about them. The research concerning imaginative immersion, however, appears to have left out a crucial aspect. In general, we say we are “immersed” in a practice, in an activity of any kind, when we think of ourselves as being fully, completely “thrown into” that activity. With regard specifically to imagination, then, it seems necessary to consider the presence and the role of the self in the imaginative dimension, an issue that the current debate on imaginative immersion seems to have overlooked. I will tackle precisely this topic in my paper. My strategy is to use the phenomenological method (drawing particularly on Husserl’s 2005 and Casey’s 2000 investigations of imagination, among others) to clarify the notion of “experiential imagination” (as defined by Peacocke 1985 and reassessed and examined by Dokic and Arcangeli 2015). This will allow me to define imaginative immersion not simply as the re-creation of a sensory experience, but as the re-creation of an Erlebnis, better addressing the fundamental role of the self in imaginative immersion.

I am Giulia Rossi, clinical psychologist graduate from the University of Padova in 2009 with a work on altherity and authenticity at the light of clinical encounter of Ferdinando Barison (italian psychiatrist). In 2013 I hold a maste in intercultural studies with a work on LGBT migration to Italy. In 2016 I worked as researcher associate at Nyu Abu Dhabi on game theory and empathy and since 2018 to 2022 I worked as psychology associate instructor at the same university. In 2018 I gained a fellowship from the University of Berlin to work on the intercconection of phenomenology and anthropology in every day life. 

Abstract

The present project of research is about the phenomenological and anthropological perspective of post-partum depression. What is the reason to merge these two fields of study? Phenomenology is the study of the Erlebnisse (lived experience) of the subject and of his being-in- the world, while anthropology is the scientific study of the man, of his behavior, of his biology, of his immersion in the culture, society and language. Accordingly to Martin Heidegger the language is the place where the Being is revealed, it is the shepherd of the Being, in other words it is its keeper in the authentic sense, but not its owner. Accordingly to phenomenology, depression is the reduction of world of the subject at the hic et nunc of the situation, with no interest for the future, with a lack of planning for the immediate future. Depression develops as a sense of inadequacy for what one could but cannot do, generated by the expectations of others by which to judge one's own achievements. Together with the sense of inadequacy, other symptoms are making more and more space: anxiety, insomnia and inhibition are taking the place of the more classic sadness. In this sense, depression appears to be closely linked to action and inhibition, in a context where acting corresponds to a continuous evaluation of one's own value. In particular, postpartum depression occurs in 10-15% of women after childbirth. although every woman is at risk, women with the following conditions are at higher risk: 1. Baby blues (rapid mood swings, irritability, anxiety, decreased concentration, insomnia, crying spells). 2. previous episode of postpartum depression 3. previous diagnosis of depression 4. significant stressors (for example, marital conflict, stressful events in the last year, financial difficulties, parenting without a partner, partner with depression). Lack of support from partner or family members (for example, financial support or care of children) 5. history of mood swings temporally associated with menstrual cycles or with the use of oral contraceptives 6. history or current problematic obstetric outcomes (for example, previous miscarriage, preterm delivery, neonate admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit, neonate with congenital malformation) 7. previous or continuing ambivalence about the current pregnancy (for example, because it was unplanned or because miscarriage was not considered) 8. problems with breastfeeding The exact etiology of postpartum depression is unknown; however, prior depression represents the greatest risk, and hormonal changes during the puerperium, sleep deprivation, and genetic predisposition may contribute. Postpartum depression in particular affects women who can no longer attach to the newborn, resulting in emotional, social and cognitive problems for the child. Partners may also be at increased risk for depression, and depression can cause relationship stress. Postpartum psychosis rarely develops, but untreated postpartum depression and psychosis increase the risk of suicide and infanticide, which are the most serious complications. Regarding an anthropological perspective, the occidental cultures are individualistic. Generally, the great part of these cultures are also of non religious nature. There is a negative correlation between individualism and society. In these cultures the depression post partum is lived as a stigma, that brings to a level of social and community discrimination. The more the country is individualistic, the most are the levels of depression, accordingly to Geert Hofstede. Anthropology, therefore, helps phenomenology to contribute to a interpretation of psychopathological phenomenon, a symbolic and an anthropological dimension of suffering, an interpretation of the examined subject not as object of a monologue, but as a subject of a clinical colloquium. In this sense anthropology takes on itself a critical reflection upon the epistemological and diagnostically categories of the occidental psychology, of his practices and responsibility as a research field no longer postponeable (Beneduce, 1997) but necessary. This research project regards my personal life experience of post partum depression. By a qualitative point of view it has been registered on my personal diary (self description). The contribution of my original family, of

2023: Delegate at the XXIII EURAM annual conference at the Trinity College, Dublin. 2022: PHD Student at " Scuola Superiore Meridionale" - "Università degli studi di Napoli Federico II" in "Law and Organizational Studies for people with Disability". First classified, name of the project "Phenomenology of the compromise body and social justice. Phenomenological perspectives of public ethic". Associations:PuntOorg International Research NetworkAlumni Percorsi AssisiWinner of three education grants at "Istituto Italiano per gli studi filosofici" to attend three seminar's cycles on political philosophy, theoretical philosophy and theories of justice.Master Degree with honours in Moral Philosophy at "Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II ". Supervisors: professor A.Donise, M.Catena.Thesis: "Between sense and non sense. Merleau-Ponty and the dialectic of the expression".Fellow at the II edition of "Percorsi Assisi" , school of inter-university higher education.Distinguished Delegation Award at "NMUN" 2021 promoted by the "National Conference College Association", New York US.Fields of research: Moral Philosophy, Ethical theories, Applied Ethics, Theories of perception, Disability studies, Organizational theories, Political Economy, Management studies, Structuralism and post-structuralism, Phenomenology (with a specual focus on Husserl's manuscripts of the twenties and Merleau Ponty's flesh theory), Theory and philosophy of Law, Psychopatology, Psychiatric issues.

Abstract

The aim of this article is to retrace the ways in which documentary photography succeeds in tracing the changes that have taken place within the organizational and industrial practices that have affected the so-called  fourth industrial devolution and their implications on both sides of lived experience ( Husserl 1901, 1913; Merleau-Ponty 1945). The first section of the research is aimed at identifying the main transformations that have characterised corporate organisation, starting with the increasing digitalisation of its processes and the dislocation of its production units. The second section, on the other hand, aims to thematise the ethical and epistemological implications of the aforementioned transformations. In particular, an attempt will be made to highlight how recourse to the phenomenological concept of  'lived experience' allows us to understand, on the subjective side, the specific intentional activation that such transformative processes bring into being ( Riot 2023), and, on the objective side, to overcome the rhetoric of dematerialisation and dispersion that has characterised the debate concerning the digitalisation of the industrial world in order to understand, rather, their peculiar nature of embodied phenomena (Rosa 2023). In the wake of what has been outlined above, the third section, finally, will be dedicated to analysing the specific case of documentary photography in the industrial sphere. The theoretical conviction that animates this article moves, in fact, from the awareness that the technological devices, as well as the peculiar techniques used by the photographic media, are capable of revealing the peculiar construction underlying the industrial world. In our opinon, in fact, the 'reflective observer' constituted by the photographer of places, whose vision characterised by a strong localisation acts as a counterforce to the progressive deterritorialisation that characterises Industry 4.0. , allow us to understand how organizational and industrial processes can be seen as lived phenomena and as transformatives processes of lived experience.

Sheffer is a new media artist and designer, PhD practice-based researcher in the Art department at the University of Reading, Funded by the AHRC and UKRI. Her research, grounded in art and philosophy, focuses on what might be lost when we examine our lives through the standardised and limited outputs of self-tracking applications instead of experiencing life in all its complexity and richness. Sheffer won prizes, presented at conferences, and published papers. Her artworks were exhibited worldwide. 

Abstract

The blindness and muteness of the data to which positivism reduces the world [are] limited to registering those data. —Adorno and Horkheimer, 1957  We increasingly use technology to track different aspects of our lives and body, measuring everything from steps to ‘likes’; even breastfeeding and our sex lives can be monitored, quantified, and assessed this way. I argue that the digitised outcome presented by infographics is so powerful that, in many cases, we prefer to follow the processed product served by the applications over our bodily experience. This new phenomenon raises essential ethical, epistemological, and phenomenological questions about how we perceive, understand, and evaluate our lives. In my presentation, I will first call attention to a key phenomenological implication of our increased reliance on the graphical representation of ‘life data’: reducing the legitimacy of live experience, limiting deeper, multilayered possibilities to interpret the world, which leads to a loss of options. Then I will trace the development of data visualisation methods rooted in the Vienna Circle’s positivist philosophy into today’s self-tracking applications. Otto Neurath, one of the Vienna Circle’s founders and the co-author of their Scientific World Conception, aimed to ‘conduct unified reduction science for all concepts in personal and public life according to rational principles’. Based on this objectivism and reduction ideology, he established ISOTYPE — a pictorial language system wishing to deliver real life through graphic forms while rejecting ‘unfathomable depths’. ISOTYPE became a cornerstone of contemporary data visualisation. I claim that the Vienna Circle’s positivist philosophy, powered by logocentric views, had developed and influenced, through graphic practice methods, current ways of interpreting the world—strategies which are trying to delegitimate embedded, internal, profound ways of understanding ourselves and our surroundings. I will conclude my presentation by presenting my critical artwork – The Archive of the Lost Embodied Knowledge.

I am a PhD student and online tutor in the Digital Transformative Education department at Leeds Beckett University. My research interests are centred around encouraging more women to pursue Computer Science and other STEM fields by reducing the disparity in secondary school education.  

Abstract

This paper is developed from a study aimed to undertake a critical review of the present pedagogy applied in the delivery of a best practice methodology in teaching the computer science curriculum in UK secondary schools to equalise gender engagement. The gender disparity within Computer Science is a global concern, causing governments and institutions to develop programmes and initiatives that intend on encouraging women to pursue a career in the field. Despite the numerous efforts to increase uptake, the dearth of women in choosing to study in STEM fields could be attributed to negative gender stereotypes that exist regarding the ability of women as opposed to men in STEM subjects. The literature identifies that children as young as primary school age (5-11) are aware of the negative stereotype and believe that boys are better than girls in Computer Science, therefore female students report lower interest and engagement in the subject.   Incorporating evidence from the literature and a study undertaken in UK secondary schools, using Wajcman’s (2004) Technofeminism and feminist theory as theoretical underpinnings, it is argued that the present learning environment is not suited to the way in which female students learn, and using technologies such as Virtual Reality (VR) could provide a de-gendered environment where female students could feel more comfortable and confident, therefore increasing engagement with Computer Science. The primary research comprised year 8 students experiencing h a VR escape game style experience, providing a personal and de-gendered environment for students to experience. The initial findings of the study revealed that the female participants did prefer a problem-solving, task oriented way of learning, which suggests an alternate environment would be beneficial to their learning in Computer Science.   

Shaun is a lecturer in Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University, with a current focus on teaching Philosophy of Religion. His interests include 19th Century German philosophy, 20th Century French philosophy, Stoicism, Epicureanism and subjects including philosophy as a way of life and philosophies of death. Currently, Shaun is working on a manuscript with the working title Positively Dead: Exploring death in Deleuze.  He has a background in Theology and Continental Philosophy and completed his doctorate in Philosophy at the University of Warwick.

Abstract

This paper will argue that Deleuze presents us with the limits of the subjective, lived experience. He does this in his definition of the structure of conscious experience as it is found in Difference and Repetition, in what has been termed his “genetic phenomenology” (Hughes, 2009:7). Deleuze describes the Ego as a component of one of three syntheses which form our experiences. The Ego synthesises our past experiences and incorporates them into the present. Through contemplation, the Ego creates a narrative structure. The narrative then underpins our sense of self. Deleuze also compares the activity of the Ego to Narcissus, the prideful character of Greek myth who was doomed to forever stare wantonly at his reflection. Deleuze writes, “we are all Narcissus in virtue of the pleasure (auto-satisfaction) we experience in contemplating” (Deleuze, 2014:99) and he suggests that our self-actualisation requires self-infatuation. As the lived experience is filtered through the synthesis of the Ego, it is reduced to projection. The individual projects one’s subconscious impulses or qualities onto the world, matching it to the narrative the Ego wants to see. In other words, lived experience involves the self gazing longingly at its reflection in the world. The ground of lived experience is, therefore, narcissistic. While being aware of people’s lived experience is useful, Deleuze, it can be argued, addresses the limitations drawn by the egocentricity of experience. Ideally, lived experiences will present us with the limits of our capacity for experience, being so novel that we are forced to create new and innovative concepts from them. Due to the compulsion to discover oneself in the world, lived experience is a limited source of information, but it can be used to identify and push beyond instances of limitation built into one's own narratives. Studying and exploring one's lived experience can lead to meaningful change and growth. Pushing against the boundaries of lived experience means no longer appealing to the inherent narcissism of the ego, but finding alternative narratives to live by.

Dr. Aanuoluwapo Fifebo SUNDAY, is budding academic from the Global South. She is currently a  Landhaus Fellow at the Rachel Carson Centre for Environment and Society, LMU, Germany.  She is also a Faculty member in the Faculty of Arts, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State, Nigeria. Her research focuses on a scrutiny of the inconsistencies and contradictions in environmental ethical contemplations. She is keenly interested in radical environmentalism ingrained in renewed definitions of the relationship between humans and nature. Her areas of research include environmental ethics, bioethics, and gender studies.

Abstract

Human lived experiences have shaped environmental studies in diverse ways. It simplifies the complex interaction between humans and the environment and helps conceptualize the world around us, including how best to live with it. Human lived experiences are an important aspect of environmental studies but not sufficient on their own. There is the question of whose lived experience truly unravels the world around us better. Is it of man, nature, or man with nature? This study from a critical point of view re-images the way environmental studies are about the lived experiences of the people rather than the lived experience of nature. It, therefore, becomes pertinent to ask if humans can truly tell the lived experiences of nature from their own lived experiences. Even when we try to tell the lived experiences of places and objects, how best can we improve our conceptualization of places/objects? While lived experiences provide valuable insights into how individuals and communities perceive and interact with their environment, they may be subjective and limited in space. To make lived experiences further viable in addressing environmental issues, therefore, the lived experiences of humans with nature should be combined with ‘deep mapping’ as an immersive approach that allows nature to reveal itself. Gleaned from Heidegger’s phenomenological approach, while lived experiences contribute valuable qualitative and contextual insights, they need to be integrated with deep mapping that allows nature to unpack its clandestine and dense features to attentive humans.

Csaba Szalo studied sociology in Brno and political theory in Manchester. He he has been working on urban memory, the trans-generational transmission of trauma, and existential spatiality. His recent work focuses on the phenomenology of embodied subjectivity as a part of a research project focusing on lived experiences of road violence events survivors in Wien and Brno. He has published two books, one on critical anthropological theories of transnational migration and one on the intersubjective memory of places and its relevance for embodied self-understanding (both in Czech). His last paper „The existential spatiality of rebellion“ was published in Sociology Compass.

Abstract

The paper offers a critical interpretation of an empirical inquiry focusing on road violence events (accidents) oriented to develop a collaboration between an STS (science and technology studies) perspective and a phenomenology of embodied subjectivity. The research project manifests the need to develop a dialogue between these involved perspectives that helps to articulate the researcher’s thoughtful self-awareness of their epistemological, ontological and ethical commitments. Cultivating a comprehensive concern for lived experiences and their expressions proves to be more than what is required by currently established practices of epistemologically oriented reflection; nevertheless, it seems indispensable for what late Merleau-Ponty calls philosophical self-understanding. In this sense, the continual cultivation of self-awareness leading to re-inspection and redefinition of established commitments can still be grounded in ordinary life without detaching one’s interpretations from lived experience to advance an epistemological standpoint.

Dr Mazal (Miriam) Tasgal passed her Doctoral viva in 2022, has BPS Chartership, has HCPC is registered as UKCP registered psychotherapist and is a BACP-accredited counsellor who specialises in working with mothers. She is also a consultant lecturer at The New School of Psychotherapy and Counselling in London where she teaches existential phenomenology approaches to therapy to PhD students programme in Psychotherapy and Counselling. She is passionate about research and teaches the Overview of Research Methods at the New School. Her research method of interest is Heuristic Inquiry and appreciates the commitment needed to implement this method.

Abstract

  In England, every 1000 babies born 1 will be left with complex cerebral palsy affecting all limbs and internal organs. Of those children by age 12, 43% will have no consistent way to communicate with the world. Empirically, many mothers of these children self-report that they can communicate effectively with their children in these cases in a way that possibly only the mother understands. Understanding the mother’s experience of living with a complex cerebral palsy non-verbal child is important for professionals and the society that supports them. The aim of this research is not to prove or disprove this phenomenon but rather to explore the lived experience of mothers with disabled non-verbal cerebral palsy children, validating and giving a voice to an otherwise isolated abnormal form of mothering. A homogenous sample was collected made up of 8 mothers who had non-verbal complex cerebral palsy as a result of Hypoxic Ischemic Encephalopathy at birth. The age range of the children was not > 3 and not <16. Interviews took place on a video link, semi-structured interviews were done and the six stages of a Heuristic Inquiry were used to analyse the transcribed data. The results produced 7 universal themes: ‘The Choice to Communicate,’ ‘Communication Over Time’, Impediments to communication’, ‘Certainty and Uncertainty’, ‘Embodied Communication’, ‘Being Towards Communication’, and ‘Being in the World with Others’. These themes capture the essence of the experience that mothers have when confronted by a baby that is diagnosed with multiple disabilities and unable to verbalise. The findings that emerged are fundamentally existential and they are examined through an existential lens. 

I am a Ph.D. candidate in Theatre at Goldsmiths College, University of London. My research explores the intersection of film and phenomenology, focusing on the Quay brothers' stop-motion animation through a Heideggerian lens. My interests also encompass puppetry, iconography, and the study of humanoid objects. In 2019, I graduated with a master degree in European Culture and Thoughts from University College London. I also hold a master's degree in Comparative Literature from Shanghai International Studies University.

Abstract

With the development of Virtual Reality (VR) headsets, the quest for a "lived experience" has brought the screen closer to eyes, aiming to eliminate screen visibility. VR headsets are not the initial attempts in this trend; from Fulldome to IMAX, whether through larger screen sizes or higher resolutions, the objective is to decrease our awareness of the screen's edges or its visibility altogether. This aspiration to diminish the screen’s presence is widely embraced and seldom questioned.   However, does the screen, as the display surface, truly hinder our perception of images as "real"? Upon reflection, an aquarium does not lead us to believe that the fish inside is merely "projected images," nor does window glass render the outside world as "fake." While the aquarium and window act as boundaries between us and what we see, their existence does not necessarily imply that the non-existence of what lies on the other side.   As early as the late 19th century, the Victorian audience was already pursuing a “lived experience” in cinema. They were captivated by the projection of passing scenery seen through a train window on the screen. These films, known as “Phantom Rides”, became one of the most popular forms of early cinema. The overlapping function of screen and window makes the displayed image feel “real”. Audience feel “moved” when the passing scenery suggests a sense of moving perspective, allowing them to have a sense of immediate experience.   In fact, defining lived experience in cinema is about defining what makes things unreal. I will argue that it is not solely the existence of the displaying surface itself, but rather its “not connecting to an existing space” that creates this sense of unreality.

I am a graduate teaching assistant and second year PhD student in the Carnegie School of Education at Leeds Beckett University. My PhD is focusing on immersive virtual reality and what potential value this technology can bring to the teaching, learning, and experience of English. Prior to undertaking my doctoral studies, I have worked as an English teacher in secondary schools in the ex-mining communities of North Nottinghamshire and North East Derbyshire.  

Abstract

Experience is power. It allows us to access and interact with the cultural and technological ‘out-there’. In the study of English, it is cultural capital that deepens our engagement with and interpretation of texts. In higher education and industry, it is techno capital that enables our engagement with the constantly evolving technological landscape of the future. These experiences can contribute, in the context of the teaching and learning of English, to educative value. Value’ isn’t something that can be quantified, nor is it something that can be self- contained within a single lesson or activity. It also relies heavily on intentionality. What does value mean for the researcher? For teachers? For students? Can one gain a sense of value within their educational experience, based on a 10 minute experience of watching a film in IVR, for example? I propose then, that the value in IVR is not something to be measured and contained in individual tasks assessed within the perimeters of digital pedagogical frameworks, but on the intentionalities experienced by teachers and students in relation to the phenomena over a period of time. It is vital for the researcher to remain open and attentive to the importance intentionalities have in relation to the analysis of potential value. The notion of value in my own research was measured through the exploration of experiences and perspectives and distilled through thematic analysis. Here the value of immersive virtual reality in the context of KS3 English lessons was deemed to exist in terms of: -      Cultural capital -      Techno capital -      Student engagement

Sarah Wood is a 1st-year PhD Researcher in Philosophy at the University of York, working on the phenomenology of dementia under the supervision of Professor Matthew Ratcliffe. She previously obtained a BA and an MA in Philosophy from the University of York. Her current research aims to illuminate certain underexplored and complex subjective experiences associated with having dementia via the utilizing of a phenomenological framework. Furthermore, she is also interested in the ways in which Phenomenology can come to aid psychiatric work, and how it can be utilized to provide a better understanding of mental illnesses.

Abstract

A diagnosis of dementia is inextricably linked to a multitude of heterogenous and idiosyncratic losses. This is exemplified by patients who have expressed concerns over anticipated losses of independence and identity, and the fragmentation of interpersonal relationships, in light of their worsening condition (e.g., Bryden, 2018, Mitchell, 2018). However, while much literature has provided insights into how those who care for people with dementia navigate these losses (e.g., Dekker, 2022, Chan et al, 2013), significantly less attention has been given to how people with dementia navigate the losses associated with their own illness. I examine Dekker’s (2022) position that caregivers experience anticipatory grief for their loved one which is both temporal and relational in that it encompasses present and future losses. Navigating these losses while maintaining a connection with their loved one thus involves a constant process of adaptation which depends on what is currently possible for the person with dementia. Adopting Ratcliffe’s (2015, 2022) stance that the structure of our experiential world is infused with possibilities, I argue that people with dementia undergo an analogous process of adaptation. However, I add that people with dementia experience a significantly more complex sense of ambiguity as opposed to their caregivers concerning i) whether they are correct in anticipating possibilities they currently perceive as viable ii) whether they are correct to be anticipating particular future losses of possibilities and iii) when these losses will occur, combined with ambiguity over when they might lose awareness that these losses have occurred. Finally, I argue that navigating anticipatory and ambiguous losses involves the manipulation of environmental and interpersonal scaffolding so as to maintain possibilities and connections with loved ones for as long as possible. As Dekker likens her view to the ‘continuing bonds’ view of grief (Klass, 2006), I thus posit a ‘continuing possibilities’ view.

I am a PhD candidate in Philosophy and Classics and Ancient Mediterranean Studies at the Pennsylvania State University. My research encompasses the interplay between ancient philosophy, particularly Plato, and 20th-century continental philosophy, with a focus on the phenomenological movement. In my dissertation, titled Eros beyond Ethics—Levinas’ Metamorphosis of Plato in Totality and Infinity, I argue that Emmanuel Levinas reworks Plato’s concepts of eros and the Good within his ethical phenomenology of eros as a concrete response to the other person. I published work on Parmenides and Plato in the Review of Metaphysics and Merleau-Ponty and Lacan in Studia Phaenomenologica.   

Abstract

By offering a provocative characterization of art as evil, Levinas criticizes the compatibility between art and inhumanity that transpired during the human catastrophes of the 20th century. This fundamental unease, driving Levinas’ reservations about art, extends to the aestheticism of phenomenology, which coincides with aesthetics as the art of perceiving (aisthesthai). In addition to his concentrated critique of art in “Reality and Its Shadow” (1948), Levinas further explores this theme in “The Prohibition against Representation and the ‘Rights of Man’” (1984), emphasizing that even the act of perceiving already entails outlining an image and transforming the face into a mere figure; moreover, the very act of existing involves a secretion of one’s own image and self-duplication from within (Aremengaud 2000, 3). I argue that Levinas’ critique of phenomenology and aesthetics implies a certain criticism of Platonism, understood as “the violence of light” (Derrida, 1979/1978, 84–92) and the conception of beauty as a Form. Nevertheless, Levinas’ profound affinity with Plato also affords him the impetus to transcend Plato from within and open up a new possibility of phenomenological aesthetics. This approach turns to “another Plato”— the Plato who advocates for the goodness for the Other that surpasses mere perpetration of being. Levinas’ encounters with artists Jean Altan and Sasha Sosno ushers in his palinode on art. His art criticisms metamorphose the Platonic notion of the totalizing ideal of beauty into the “nudity” of the Other’s face, an “aesthetic tenderness,” an “erotism without concupiscence,” and a “more profound identity” found in “mercy” (Levinas 1986, 510). Levinas admits that artistic engagement can be potent and meaningful by obliterating its form and transporting us to the lived experience of the Other. Deepening the communis opinio that Levinas transcends arts through art criticism, I propose a series of remedies for an ethical-phenomenological aesthetics.