Abdel Hernandez san Juan
Thinking Science
New Phenomenological avenues between philosophy and sociology
The Lake Circle Editions
Información del libro
FICHA REGISTRO DE ISBN INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
Agencia ISBN Centro Nacional del Libro Torre Norte, Centro Simón Bolívar, Piso 20. El Silencio www.cenal.gob.ve No Radicación 139760
ISBN: 978-980-18-5558-3, Obra Independiente
Título: Pensando Ciencia
Subtitulo: Nuevas avenidas fenomenológicas entre filosofía y sociología
Clasificación Thema: Q Filosofía y religión
Colección: Epistemología
No de Colección 1
Serie: Fenomenología y hermeneutica
Público objetivo: Profesional/academico
Idiomas: Espanol e ingles
Autor: Hernández San Juan Abdel, nacionalidad: Cuba, Rol: Autor
No de edición 3, ciudad de edición: Caracas,
Tipo de contenido: texto (legible a simple vista)
Número de ejemplares: oferta nacional 500, oferta internacional 1000, oferta total 1500, disponibilidad: disponible
Precio en moneda local: 500
Precio en dolar: 30
Tipo de obra: Obra Completa, Volumen
Número de radicación: 139760
Número de páginas: 300
Editorial o Autor-Editor: Hernández San Juan, Abdel Número de identificación tributaria o de ciudadanía : POO1404062 Teléfono: 04265117659
Tipos de acceso: Digital: descarga y online
Fecha de asignación: 2024-12-23
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Contents
Introduction: The Iteration of culture. By Abdel Hernandez san Juan
I-Epistemology, performativity of research and cultural theory. By Abdel Hernández san Juan
II-The Sensible Concept: The Mediation between subject and object. By Abdel Hernandez san Juan
III- The Restauration of World: Presence and phenomenological genesis of the sign. By Abdel Hernández san Juan
IV- The Door swing between self and the symbolic. By Abdel Hernández San Juan
V- The Dialectique of evocation. By Abdel Hernández San Juan
Pure spatiality determine itself in negating the indetermination that constitute it, I mean, negating itself. Negating itself, this negation must be a negation determined, negation of the space by the space. The first spatial negation of space is the dot. The dote is the space without occupying space, a place without a place, it suppresses and substitute places occupying the place of space which at the same time negate and conservate. It negates spatiality the space but at the same time the dote goes to be in contact with itself, meaning, with another dot, and this is a first negation of negation, the spatial negation of the dote is the line, the dot retains and extend, it is sustained substituted by the line which constitute its true, but this negation is in a second level spatial, the dote is the line, the first being other, meaning, the spatial being of the dote. According to the same process of negation of negation the true of the line is the surface but this true of being other is a negation of negation again. The line become a surface which on the one hand is a determination in respect to lines and dotes, in this sense surface in general but which according with the same retained negation suppressed of the space it is at the same time the restauration of the totality of the space, of a space as a whole, the space have become then concrete and in reverse we must demonstrate the opposite that such a movement of producing the surfaces concrete totality of the space is a full circle and reversible. We can demonstrate that a line is composed of negated dots and the suffice of negated lines
Jacques Derrida
The iteration of culture
©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
Written in English and translated to English by Abdel Hernandez San Juan
In a highly pragmatized world of generalized market under neoliberal circumstances of economy, the logics of marketing, control of quality and attention to clients, the rhetoric of comfort generalized from within at least of second half’s of the nineties in the united states as well as in neoliberal capitalist south America, the idea of barters and economic transactions stablishing practical contingencies everywhere derived in two antinomy’s consequences, on the one side, it produced irreducible heterogeneization, pluralism and unlimited polysemy’s in regard to how deliberating senses and interpretations of cultures understanded semantically stimulating the imagination of a return to the idea of sites, while on the other hand it has simultaneously generated its reversals.
In contrast with the profered nature of unsited audiences, the exchange with audiences, publics and collectors created the enthusiasm of a nostalgic of site specifics, while containing the opposite, the uncontrolled iteration of culture.
Such a concept of iteration originally proposed by Derrida when he developed comparative analysis between speech and writing is related with how in speaking there is presupposed a contextual situation of discourses between self-centered speakers defined by their expressive intentions linked through that intensions to counterenuntiations, writing in reverse, supposed to be related with the isolation of inscription on the page when the readers are usually absents of presence, it is defined by a logic of sends since writing can be sended, transported, repited without contextual links to sited audiences.
But the concept of iter in the place of writing have consequences beyond scriptural issues and evolve to be related with general culture, in fact, the idea of proffered audiences, absents of presence, is deeply linked to the complex relation between dissemination and polysemy in culture and it have an impact on the convival of antinomical genesis in this new world if we remember that around 1996 internet was not fully yet generalized and stablished in culture and the culture of marketing was not yet older than a decade since it started to born.
The simultaneity of opposite genesis, intrinsically related with the new velocities and complexities of new technologies have generalized a universe of sociocultural antinomies in contemporary culture on the one side and at the same time, a return to site specifics, on the other and simultaneously the erasing of sited audiences and presencial exchanges dismissed by the prevalence of proffered audiences and the iteration of culture, something needed to incorporate certain elements of psychoanalysis inside cultural theory.
In a few words our ideas of sociocultural environments that we sustained two decades ago seems to be out of date, it seems to be antiquaries when seem from the ultramodern and neotecnological age started since the mid-nineties although at the same time the nineties turn suggest the paradoxical genesis of a new sociocultural environment in which contemporary culture appears to be crossed by this two autonomic tendencies, the return to site beside the emptiness and desapariences of sites by proffered iterated forms of communications.
In this book I explore to rethink and retheorization of a series of major issues in epistemology to be consider under such a new sociocultural phenomena’s mainly proposing new phenomenological avenues between philosophy and sociology to resolve responses around such an antinomic situation rediscussing paradigms of theory and research, how to deal and work with the challenge of the increscent iteration of culture and the paradoxes of site non site antinomic simultaneity in sociocultural genesis related with modern technology and marketing realities?. This challenge allow us to attempt new phenomenological avenues between clasical philosophy and sociology. This current book is devoted to develop that.
Epistemology, performativity of research and cultural theory
©By Abdel Hernández san Juan
Written in English and translated to English by Abdel Hernandez San Juan
It was establishing as a fact that a world of culture should be seen first and before anything as an immediacy world that I written The Intramundane horizont and sobreordination in everyday life. Under such a distinction I proposed several levels or stratus’s to phenomenology and hermeneutic in a world of life.
With this two essays we are among the first stratus or level, the basic one corresponding purely to what I have defined as phenomenological sociology, but in a further level of discussion within my essay the world correlate, we advanced to another level of stratification, toward when now the layers of distance between a language and such an immediacy of the world is less defined by repetitions of experience from experimenting it to telling a story, remembering, speaking or writing down, but rather by the fact that the sense that we have on a world of reality is more an effect of the text than a direct reflected dimension of the senses, indeed moving from phenomenological sociology to language science and semiotics attempts retheorizing phenomenology’s of reality under new forms of classical thinking comparing my theory and analysis with and discussing Hegel, peirce, Saussure and derrida.
There was then above all a worthy challenge, the one about comparing the dissolutions of the phenomenology of the internal and the external in the classical discussion of reality ontology without yet considering language and another usually independent and isolated issue, that one about if there is upon language external levels meaning narrow outsides of language or if everything happen in language itself without outsides to it, in fact, since concepts as relevants as subjects, predicaments, been, self, verbs, qualities, etc, occurs in language level, there is a suspicious question asked by thinkers as derrida and others if there are dimensions of reality outside language or if not, if everything is inside language.
Whether both the internal and the external are at the same time the opposites and the same or distinct moments of the sames as sides like it happen with the distinctions between the world itself and the reflected or phenomenological world in classical philosophy terms which are both opposites and the same or moments of the same inclusibly contained one inside the other, the same can be allow to be attempts at the language level whence such certain relevant concepts are also paradoxically both internals and externals to language or rather neither inside nor outside, toward several stratus of distinction between hermeneutic and exegesis, while all this should be at the same time considered in the light of my essays self and Acervo and after ethnomethodology.
A new conjunction between classical philosophy and sociology is needed at this point, but to do so we must before reconstruct the evolution of this matter in both senses.
With this said we are ready to position ourselves from self and Acervo to a further level of discussion which will be considered here as the relation between subject and object in epistemology, on how to reconsider the place of concepts and the phenomenological genesis of the sign in regard to the issue of presence toward further discussion on methodology of research specially the issue of performativity.
I have realized at least since the late nineties that today there are sufficient reasons to seriously consider performativity inside epistemology and the theory of knowledge, performativity theory in the face of clasical philosophy, epistemology, sociology, semiotic and cultural theory
The current effort is devoted to that
Performativity as I have conceived the concept is related with the issue of the relations between subject and object while not in any form but as it is grounding knowledge in any mundane common sense activity.
If performativity itself, in fact, as I will attempt forward, belong to the ground of common sense ordinary knowledge in such subject and object forms of relations and such forms of grounding take place as part of and as moments of the general hermeneusis that phenomenologically basis the ontology of the intramundane horizont itself it is then clear that the basis of performativity brings us to conditions of conceptual, sense and meanings productions insides elucidation and explicitation which are a part of the general hermeneusis of everyday pragmatics when we can be alones inside silent body activities and or experiencing intersubjective communications as well.
Regarding the ground in common sense of my concept of performativity we should focuses on the fact that human performance including in it all we do with our body between day and night considered in silence without saying nothing such as discourses or phrases of any kind, it as an activity and this activity seen pragmatically presuppose elucidation as a constant hermeneutic and interpretative activity.
Practice as our mundane activity is ordered itself provided by relations of sense, the things we do are intelligible to ourselves, if we go in one direction instead of another inside home or through the city our direction involve inside it relations of sense, some motive internal to our elucidations of sense, to our interpretations of our own experience, provide us with a sense to do certain things instead of another’s, taking a way rather than other.
Mundane activities evolving our human performance supposes hermeneutic illations and elucidations taking form within our phenomenological worlds in which we share relationships of several kinds with ourselves and with others intersubjectibly without yet speaking or writing but silently.
Pertinence organize and give structure to our relations of sense in respect to others, we have and bring with us daily an acervo of overunderstanded meanings and we displace in a world previously meaningful and signified by experience and tipifications of common sense.
Such an amalgamated work of previous meanings attributions of sense to experiences present us as relations of meanings previously shared and new relations of senses mean to us to be available to assign senses to new experiences as something subjected to constant elucidations and explicitations.
With this brighten up and clear away we understand that our performance being a quotidian activity occur without yet evolving speaking, saying or writing.
Hence, with the objective to understand more deeply the richness and specific senses of my theoretical concept of performativity we should imagine a silent world in which speaking and writing are not evolved, a world instead absolutely silent whence the only thing concerning us is about elucidating between us as subjects and the objects surrounding us, between us as subjectivity and the world of things which are objects to us as subject’s.
So that we should figure out or imagine a world, a universe completely unprovided by nothing else than by subject and object.
In this quotidian world we are subjects of our own activities and actions, and the predicaments of such are adjuncts to the subjects we are, our activities are fully defined by objects, and as soon as we decide to do something it become an object to our action, as soon as defining an end toward directing our nexts, the end itself is an object to us and between us and such an end everything is full of and surrounded by objects.
Now when such an object or end of our activity is not something as taking a shower, cooking something, realizing to go to the movie theater at night meeting some other person, preparing a material to our tomorrow job, calling someone by phone or doing something during weekend, but an end of knowledge this relation between us as subjects and objects goes to the forefront.
At the same time, we distinguish mundane physical objects surrounding us from objects of knowledge even when we speaks about knowledge’s around mundane things as when ordinary things becomes objects of knowledge in any case our sense of objects variate or change, the object is now less defined as the looking for or the forward of our activity but as an activity of knowledge, beyond objects as ends and as wishes or intentionality of action, a motive transform it in an object of our curiosity, we want to know something.
As soon as the object is turned in this sense we are no longer thinking about objects as referents of our signs and languages neither as physical objects to be manipulated in the space but as object of knowledge and there is not another form of relation to objects as defined by the contrainedted relation between us as subjects and such an object than when the object turns to be an object of knowledge beyond if this object coincidence to be an ordinary object and or an objects of ends.
A car broken, for example, considered to a mundane owner and or driver in common sense, if the owner or the driver don’t know the reason for the car to be broken he have to learn it, he should know to identify which piece is broken and why, he should start to do inferences about the causes, the mistakes or the necessities provoked it and he should learn to repair the broken piece or know how to substitute it, to do so he will have to stablish a relation of knowledge to its objects which are objects now beyond physical constrains as objects of knowledge even when evolving such a physical dimension of being ordinary objects.
The common sense in fact recognize that certainly nothing is possible to be known without becoming an object of knowledge to us as subjects and to the subject we become as soon as taking away from the object.
Let now be back around this points to the classics to further discussing it in modern terms.
Aristoteles said from his first logical propositions that a perception is always perception of something and that such a something about which perception consist is prior and or before perception, something stays without being affected or modified when our perception is no longer there.
Hegel at the same time said that knowledge is always knowledge of something, however, when he asked on the nature of such a something and or about the nature of knowledge in respect to that he answered himselves that such a something is not always precedent and or before knowledge since when knowledge consist about the knowledge of conscience the subject is in front of himselves and the supposed to be object to the subject appear as a moment of him selves and not as another thing outside and before it, the object considered outside and before is here inside and after, it is a part of subjectivity and under it our sense of subject and object change.
But when such a something is not the conscience which usually evolves a clear sense of reflected and or repetition of the image of the object in representation as coming from sensoriality, but something less representational such as for example being, the issue of subject and object becomes highly complexed.
Let in fact figure out such a complexity of subject and object under being regards.
If we made struggle to make abstraction to consider by a moment that in thinking on being we are indeed a subject attempting to take distance of a moment of ourselves and we try to imagine according to our previous examples –Aristoteles regard of the object as previous to perception and or Hegel complexitation of it according to conscience—we will ask if there are something prior, previous or before and outside us in a being, to forth answer that although being supposed to be a moment of us it can also source as space and time since pure space and time without doubt are with independence to us and beyond our sensible feelings, it is something that becomes itself.
However, at the same time, like space and time also our being become and is in time.
The idea of being itself suppose to be in time and evoque something happening, a movement of becoming. From this point we perceive how the attempt to exteriorize time and space as a prior or previous form of the to be before us as the to be of something external, is relative, it is also in us participating in the becoming that affect our being, once we perceive the paradox we realize to abides to the fact that less representational than conscience, less affected by the repetition of an image in a reflected dimension and less affected by the impression of belonging to a subject, being always evolves a simultaneity between subject and object, perception and the object, the idea of something before or previous outside or inside after as reflected by subject-conscience when the later become to be the object of knowledge, become relative.
Although there is a certain sense of something before us in the idea of being evolved in the to be of space and time, of substance and sources in general as well, we are already there as subjects from the beginning taking abstraction of it, producing it as a sense of our distance as subject itself.
Being itself, in fact is an idea reflected by the subject inside subjectivity an only as such a reflection it certainly exist, the impression, the feeling in sensibility and the abstraction we have and feel of having a being is itself a reflection of the impressions in the subject we are, so that the subject we are was there at the same time with the being we feel to be or suppose to be.
Of course we suppose that such a sense of being is something prior or itself without necessity to think about it, but such a sense is created by the reflexion of it in the subject we are already, in a few words, subject and being, or being as an object to the subject we are, is nothing more than alterity, the subject alter on another moment of himselves, a moment which suppose to be by itself certainly without taking distance to it, but figured out and or recognized only in the reflection of it by the subject simultaneously.
What looks to be outside and before is already inside in a narrow form something allow us to recognize that such a reflexion hende involve "sensible multiplicities", its reflects and its reflections.
Sometimes it seems to be a wonder because of the subtly levels, stratus and or folds by which sensible multiplicity pass by from being as an state of something that simply is –space, time, nature, physical sensations, our five senses-, etc, to an state of feeling sensibly to be a being, to the reflections of it in the subject.
Indeed at this point we are committed with a task to unveil differentiated concepts of sensible multiplicities evolved away needed to be distinguished.
In ancient philosophy it was usual to regard the sensible and overall the idea of "sensible multiplicities" as another name to what we understand as reality, in a few words it was almost a synonym of the so-called universe of the data’s of our physical senses, to see, to listen, to touch, to smile, to taste and it is impressive to see how that meaning of "sensible multiplicity" is yet the same from Hegel to derrida.
Anything far to "palpable sensoriality" was considered by ancient and classic philosophers outside the idea of "sensible multiplicity" regarded as it was to the heterogeneous and irreducible universe of immediacy reality, a reality considered not from representation but from the near sensoriality of the bodies sensations without yet a synthesis image of it substituted by abstraction, concepts, the intellect or conscience, while it seems to be obvious to us too that there is also in it an in material dimension, the one of our subjective sensibility that continues through the logic of being and subjectivity evolved within the process of synthesis operated by abstraction, concept, intellect and conscience.
Another concept of the sensible start to be here far to the idea of "multiple sensibility" as it was understanded as another name to simply said reality or to evoque that irreducible heterogeneity of the palpable sensoriality of our five physical senses.
Whence, such a sensoriality or multisensorial body of experience stay working out through our impressions nor only at the level of physical senses processing but through the whole activity of synthesis evolved in experience, memory and evocation as such an activity of synthesis stablish a continuum of inmaterial and or unmaterialized levels of being, soul and the spiritual even from the abstract dimension of concepts. The distinction between these two ideas of the sensible made is then needed to understand substantial differences between ancient and classics and modern ways to understand this issue.
Certainly moving ourselves from the relation between subject and object in everyday as the relation ground knowledge in common sense, to Aristoteles idea of perception as secondary in respect to objects and further to Hegel idea of conscience as a way to understand that such an object can be also another moment of the subject, to how subject and object become complexized and relativized under being alterity to subjectivity allow us to think that we can’t assume a fixed condition to subject and object relation in terms of what is first and or secondary since the relation itself shows to constantly variate.
Ancient thinkers as Aristoteles and classics as Hegel were far to imagine how such an exteriorized idea of an object to the subject or of a "sensible multiplicity" showed to be a much more intangible dimensions that what they supposed as currently something entirely diluted inside our subjectivity and even within the inmaterial sensoriality of subjectivity without yet considering conscience as an issue, but through the idea of fractal mater eter and inner time evolved in the technology world of cybernetics when the etterious and inner sense of inmateriality showed to be possible outside and in front of the subject gaze as another dimension.
However, at the same time, paradoxically, nothing was near to potentially be adecuated to our current situation on this matter than their usual ways --the classics one-to mix.
On the one hand, seen from our modern perspective, albeit to them everything was undiferienced or seldom rarely differenced and a process of further differentiation was needed to modern concerns on subject and object relations, at the same time the idea of considering everything as moments of the same -usual within classics--is needed today to the struggles involved in the task and the challenge of delivering the contemporary forms of this complexed relation.
Very well, we will need at this point to effazise a little more in certain differences between modern and ancient concerns on this relation. If something arrived to be highly differenced in modern science it was precisely the relation between subject and object in comparison with how that relation was delivered by ancients and classics, the relation itself evolutioned to be during long time much more defined.
Each science and even each tendency inside certain sciences, each even specialty in modern specific sciences was defined by an stable and fixed mode to deliver and stablish how this relation should be considered and work as basis to knowledge.
For example, in modern phenomenology we have two main and enteil forms to establish this relation as fixed, on the one hand phenomenology place itself from the perspective of conscience, meaning from the interiority of it, reflected as self-representation or extended as a form of subjectivity, on the other hand, distinguishing phenomena, from the perspective of appearance and form as presence and appearance in respect to or in contrast with a subtract and or an essence we should look for behind it.
Any inferential Journey of knowledge may be consider as infinity with the condition of stablishing these two main principles to the relation between subject and object in the ways to start and return analysis and inferences.
In hermeneutic we have perhaps two completely different parameters to order this relation, first we are not positioned from the perspective of conscience nor around the superficial and or apareantial expression of a phenomena to a further substrate, but we have something about which we will have to interpret, this something can be a text, a language or even reality and ourselves activities in it but as soon as considering it hermeneutically all the focuss of the relation between subject and object will be positioned around interpreting it, in the same form sucesibly semiotic, structuralism, psychoanalysis and sociology basis in stablishing a certain fix form to this relation with will always ground the forms of knowledge, like it happen also in common sense, each one of this sciences and specialties are themselves constitutionally delivered as autonomies according to how each one have delivered how such a relation is presupposed to work, functionalism, institutionalism, ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism, symbolic structuralism, all this forms of sociology basis their differences in between according to how subject and object are presupposed to be related as an stable and fix form of relation.
Philosophy of language, analytical philosophy basis their differences on it too.
We may even say that the main difference between modern science in comparison to classic and ancients can be defined as a progressive highly differentiated mode to try this relation which as previously discussed even when usually defined by certain exteriorization and distinctions between what is first and what is secondary like in Aristoteles example, was comparably highly undifferentiated between ancient and classic thinkers so that evolution of the relation between subject and object to a progressive differentiation should be consider a condition of modern thought, but there are at the same time several reasons and things today to be recalled and reconsidered in the light and way ancients and classics considered it.
In fact, the theory of performativity as I have conceived and theorized it is focused in this.
That to develop a research and to conduct a science research it is not sufficient to stablish a fix relation between subject and object.
Beyond considering the defined modes that this relation acquired within several modern methodologies, the positioning point of performativity theory consist about the opposite, stablishing the necessity of maintaining this relation open to a research instead of closing it around a fixed presupposition moving to explore questions and answers around the relation itself opened as an extended and or permanent field of research and bringing it to the forefront in the ways to made and conduct specific research’s, this is what define the specificity of performativity theory, performativity itself consist about exploring it, instead of fixing one form of relation between subject and object as a premise, the research on the relation as an open field is then redefined as a telos, as a field of research.
With this said we are ready to statement that the theory of performativity should be considered as part of and or as an specialty inside epistemology, theory of knowledge. However, not in the form of an history of science neither in the form of objectifying science by producing a theory on science, but by defining that a whole area of epistemology should consist about opening the field of subject and object relation as a field of research both theoretically and empirically.
We should of course know well how this relation was delivered by several science tendencies and schools in the past considered as a memory of experiences but not to choice between fixed deliberations of it to work from one science or another one or specialty, but to work in an epistemological research that will consist about unfixing the relation and opening as specificity of epistemology it to the forefront of research.
Performativity as I have conceived and defined this concept is defined as a theory of research related with the ways to conduct a research and mainly to process it during a certain duration from the starting point of beginning to define a research, to taking decisions about how to do it while not as much to do the same we ever usually do in defining research, performativity theory supposes and evolve an specific form in which we can conduct a research when defining how to put in relation subject and object comes to the forefront of the form we have realized to made it, the question about how to relate subject and object become the center of our attention. But this is not as simply as apparently looks to be.
First, it is necessary to brighten up and clear away that I have conceived and I am working with the concept of performativity in terms and in a form that understand it beyond how performative was discussed under Austin theory of performative linguistics even if of course, as any semantique sense of performatives, there are some points of relations.
In contrast with Austin meanings usually regarded to the relation between certain sentences in language when the idea of practice is defined to be considered as an effect internal to language sentences itself, my concept of performativity is far to be subordinated to, originated and or constrained by a sentence effects of the language internals and its implied practical meanings, no longer defined as something internal to sentences and far to be a derivated modal of illocutions, allocutions and perlocutions –see note down--as the Austin sentences are defined by ways of modifying practices from speech act ideal phrases, my concept of performativity inside face to face relations is evolved within intersubjective forms of communication and even through isolated forms of one by one subjects forms of pragmatic elucidations of experiences, are intrinsically related with a more extended and pregiven sense of the hermeneutic activity of the everyday subjects in quotidian word of life.
In fact, the human performance as I understand it take place under an intramundane horizont which evolve all we do between day and night in an ordinary or routine circumstance of life. Now, this is not to say that identifying the whole human everyday routine performance from day to night should be considered performative itself.
The issue in question here allow us to understand that epistemologically the concept of performativity should be cutted and or framed, derived from and or cloused up, defined by and or identified as something that merges from and or that its grounded and basis cognitibly in the activity of elucidation and explicitation which hermeneutically occur through the phenomenological order of quotidian pragmatics outside language instead of as something orthopedically constrained by and or subordinated ontologically to forms of the sentences.
In fact, we should attempt that performativity indeed and or above all instead of pertaining to sentences rather belong to human performance entail in a narrow form inside how hermeneutic considered not as forms of sentences but even as a form of silent elucidation and explicitations by the subject stay yet to be a moment of the phenomenology’s of the pragmatics of quotidian intramundane horizont.
This is not a way to negate that as Austin discussed there are also linguistic performative at the language level of certain sentences in speech act, but instead the reason whence we should recognize that performativity itself can’t be reduced and or defined by being originated in language sentences nor in speech less in writing, but outside alphabetic parameters and outside langue considered as idiom.
Rather and hence, as I understand it theoretically performativity should be considered as evolved in any relation between subject and object as such relation ground the condition of possibility of any form of knowledge first in common sense mundane knowledge and more precisely later recalled as we are focusing it here from the perspective of methodology of research and science of knowledge, inside epistemology.
Whereas the issue in this form we should attempt a double move, on the one hand, assumed performativity as something specifically related with the relation between subject and object, we should show and demonstrate how can we see relations of subjects and objects as a matter of knowledge in everyday activity to which we will immediately attempt that it works usually in our ordinary and routine world in common sense forms of knowledge around ordinary things when relations between subject and object basis and ground any form of daily knowledge on anything all, on the other hand, reestablished the basis of performativity in terms of epistemological grounds in the intramundane horizont hermeneutics and phenomenology’s, we should then fly toward how should it be considered in science forms of research within epistemology.
It is all about the following. First, from the theoretical point of view, the relation itself of subject and object become in an object of reflexivity focused in it and from the empirical perspective the investigation of such a relation entrance to be a part of a theory that go and return from the theoretical to the empirical and in return with the objective on the one hand of enriching theoretical reflexivity with empirical specific issues evolving unique modes of the relations unveiled under the specificities of such an empiricity and in reversal, the theoretical lab of research focused in the relation itself return from theoretical explorations to empírical issues to unveil the way in which research should be developed.
What defines performativity in short is the idea of althernancy, the principle of never fixing the relation exposing it to a research that become itself experimental around how the relation work under certain empiricity in question and in reverse to the theoreticity in question derived and explored around such an empiricitiy.
If to ancients and classical sciences such as arimetics, mathematics, physics, astronomy or chemistry were defined according to pregiven objects, cutted in anticipation and theoretical knowledge was obligated to imbedding that relation to discuss, modern thought is yet much more delimited in that sense. In fact, the ways to arrive and to pass by the relation between subject and object to define specific sciences and specialties as linguistic, semiotic, sociology and some other modern sciences was never arbitrary, but well delimited in anticipation almost as a condition of possibility of this science to have delimited ontology.
For example, semiotic whereas it from the philosophy of science or understanding culture as communication, needed to clearly differentiations of the sign from the objects it denotes, substitute or by the object reflected in the sign to hence afford such a sign as a language object instead of a just an external nonlinguistic object, in a few word turning object in an specific form of the object, a semiological one to the semiological subject, if the sign end to be delimited and cutted as a codified and well defined entity and if the codes end to be stablished as a priories to the subject of knowledge cuts around its objects, then semiotic as science lost its limits and lack self-definition and reasons to be a well differentiated science, equally linguistic is needed of a well delimited distinctions between langue and speech, langue and language to late obtain a well-defined object of study in gramatics, sintacs, lexicon, substance of expression, significants and significance, writing and speech, morphemes and phonemes, semantics and transformations, other ways it lost it boundaries as specific science.
In this form we can clearly see how the autonomy, the boundaries and the ontology of a science is itself possible only by prestablishing a well-defined idea of how to consider the object and how to relate the subject of knowledge with the object of it.
The same is obvious in sociology, it need a thing, an act, an action, a world or an structure as forms of the sociology object defined in anticipation, a minimum unit considered social in difference to individuals, culturals and economics, other ways it lost its boundaries as science being dissolved in psychology, economy, culturology or any other thing.
This is performativity in research, our investigation is defined as both a theoretical and an empirical field of research defined by putting the exploration around the relation between subject and object in the forefront transforming it in an open field of research, we don’t have in performativity theory a pregiven or prestablished shared well defined relation between subject and object, we instead call it to the forefront to generate a theoretical reflexivity around it that will work all the time between theoretical and empirical issues, a phenomenological field, performativity theory task, as an specialty in epistemology, consist about unveil, explore and develop investigative modes based and grounded in working with that relation between subject and object instead of fixing it as something prestablished and it is precisely in this specific sense that performativy not more general and universal in regard to specific sciences and specialties than epistemology is not other thing that a needed new area of epistemology.
This is based on the fact that in logic all the pairs monadics, diadics and triadics are obligated to cross and go by this relation of subject and object in a variety of riches and unpredictable forms something that itself unfold the richness of the field, from the point of view of the phenomenology of research problems whatever themes, topics, issues and matters of research are we considering, subject and object become inexhaustible, endless, never failing among them.
Knowledge itself is grounded in the exploration of the forms acquired by this relation and all the lights of the field of knowledge previously constituted were possible and are constitutionally based in it. All this field of previous constituted forms of knowledge are then a collected memory to the theory of performativy, a collection about previous jornys among that relation even if developed without calling the issue itself to be research and limited under it, it is to the theory of performativity a data bank on explored modes and the commitment of performativity theory is focused in unveiling new inexhaustible, endless and never failing relationships in between, this is to said that performativity theory inside epistemology is nothing more than philosophy of science.
Far to investigate the world of things, objects, reality and "sensible multiplicity" under pregiven parameters of subject-object relations, we go to such sensible multiplicities, realties, objects and things according to a research that return to it with new unveils forms of the relation both theoretically and empirically.
Let then return to ancient and classic inquiries.
We mentioned that the theory of performativity as I understand it is far to Austin theory of phrases and sentences, but the same dilemma allow us to reconsider the logical questions evolved within Derrida objections to Benveniste. According to Benveniste Aristoteles logical propositions at organon endowed categories of thought with categories of language or more precisely that he in working with categories of language believe or imagined to be working with categories of thought and certainly something similar but in reverse can be sustained regarding Austin performatives, by saying that in the opposite sense Austin worked with categories of thought while he believes or imagine to be working as if with categories of language.
Indeed even taking out of language and returning it as questions of thought, performatives as Austin discussed it are not defined in terms sufficiently universals as to work with it in that form to a theory of performativity under knowledge theory.
The field of performativity in fact even considered out of language is not logically organized according to a form which constrain a practice, it is not defined by the ontological constrains of form, but by the relation between subject and object as this relation is itself evolved and implicit in the hermeneusis and phenomenology of pragmatic decurses of life in quotidian environments when saying performance we are evoquing the whole activity of the body between day and night, it is not about constrains but to use an Stephen A Tyler word about "cocurrencies".
The pragmatic field is not understanded here in terms of the economy of action toward ends, but as a phenomenological and hermeneutic one.
But at the same time, however, this more delimited cuts required to understand how subject and object worked in modern science in comparison to ancients and classics, was not only the source of science constitutions but also of its limitations.
Semiotic, for example, is fully based in understanding culture as a whole as communication of codified signs, on this basis there was an enthusiasm to encompass a whole field of issues with semiotic such as iconographic visual communication, function signs in architectural spatial communication, gestural and space distances in cinesis and proxemics, the rhetoric’s of persuasion in publicity, and overall mass medias and fashion as a privilege field, however, by the same reason helped semiotic to afford all this in a semiotical specific form, the pregiven presupposed well defined differentiation between the sign and the object as well as the sign and codes created about its objects the effects and the image of being death, under it objects seems to be empties and afforded as if it death miss understanding how all this is alive in culture and is a part of a culture alive itself.
In front of such kind of dilemmas performativity theory reestablish the alive character of all this in culture, we are not so focused in fact in delimiting and or separating sign and the objects since separating sign from the hermeneusis of an alive culture seems to be a kind of neurotic activity rather, we think that for example, the field of publicities and mass medias is a field of alive sensorialities to the body as well as to subjectivity and that affording it should be considered as a form of multisensorial experience remembering the sensible multiplicities of ancient thinkers and considering it from the intramundane horizont world of life. We are not closed to heritage certain things from the legacy of semiotic, we do so incorporating semiotic and sometimes when pertinent priorizing it, but as soon as we understand it in another form semiotic itself is renewed from phenomenology, hermeneusis, sociology and cultural theory.
My theory for example of intangibility as a phenomenology of the relation between aesthetic and sensibility in between free market and publicity was possible since I conceived the empirical field issue from the alive sensoriality of the body and from the intramundane horizont, to do so it was necessary to abandon certain parameter of semiotic theory usual way to separated signs from the objects affording it simply as codes of decodification and as if death signs rather than as I did as an alive phenomenological hermeneusis in which the signs are to a certain point diluted, this is not a way to say that there is not sign in culture and less that signs are not culture themselves but to renew the ways to redistribute it under a another proportions.
Performativity theory defined inside epistemology and at the same time rediscused in the grounds of phenomenological research between clasical philosophy and sociology under the universes of the intramundane horizont allow us to reassume certain semiological issues as for example the concept of "language object" as well as some other issues but redistributed and reconsidered from another parameters which are not positioned around a fixed prestablished definition of subject and object relations.
The universe of the common sense world play at this point a pivotal and major place.
Without doubt, as previously sustained, mi research positioning is grounded in between philosophy and phenomenological sociology and the world of life which is the same to say my own world of real life.
Bibliography
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The Sensible Concept
The Mediation between subject and object
©By Abdel Hernández San Juan
Written in english and translated to english by Abdel Hernandez San Juan
The issue of this paper on concepts as something itself is focused in discussing and developing my own scientific theory on concepts deliberating it while discussing classics pertains on concept such as Kant and Hegel.
With all certitude clear on the fact that the issue can be considered almost previously undiscussed and disatended I would like to recall in starting with remembering a critique developed by a sociologist about who I have taken distance but who paradoxically was in my concern clear in focusing the necessity to be critics to sustantialism in the evolution of epistemology as Pierre Bourdieu frequently did and advertised.
Certainly, my theory of concept, conceived and developed in a deep discussion with Kant and Hegel may be characterized between several other differences by objections around sustantialists.
The impetus and impulse to commit myself with this theoretical endeavor about a so major issue to us as contemporary thinkers such as the concept of concepts, is motivated by the fact that to me concept can be characterized as the more disatended and even undeveloped issue we have received from tradition, an issue itself almost undiscussed with many zones of unexplored relations yet, a field of crucial things but mostly abandoned.
I will like to start my analysis by discussing some issues around the Hegel logic of concept in his science of logic.
We should not forget chapter by chapter that the Hegel exposition of concept start in the science of logic with a development on what he defined as the genesis of concept and such a genesis was discussed as derived from or having its source in substance, a concept of substance Hegel assumed from the legacy of Leibniz and spinosa.
Hegel visited the issue of the concept not only in his logic of concept tome, but through also the logic of being and the logic of essence and from the introduction between other things because the sustantialist and essentialist basis of his presuppositions as well as his dialectique mode to understand relations between pairs was usually defined by the idea that everything are moments of the same, by this reason, and considering the relevance that in general he assigned to concepts ontologically we should distinguish all the forms through which concepts are disseminated within other things which are not the source of concepts itself from the specific moments when concepts are called as something itself separated from any other thing and discussed in a more delimited form.
In fact, at the end of this paper I reserved a few pages to notes about things Hegel assigned to concepts which to me are not precisely related with it.
The main moment to call concepts can be recognized within ten pages of the tome of concepts near to the beginning of the tome.
By focusing and discussing the main things regarded by Hegel on concepts we will perceive and identify how at the heart of his theory of concept there are several disseminations by which concepts are indistinguished from another series of notions generally related in certain form with concepts but different to it such as the "I", "conscience", perception and representation.
My objective in doing this revisitation of the main moments when Hegel called concepts as something itself is focused in discussing when with precision can we assume that we are certainly near to what is specific to concepts and what is not, moreover, we will recognize the specific zone that correspond to concepts while at the same time perceive that this zone seems to be however unattended and not focused as the main point from which the phenomenology of concepts source and originate and the one around which the theory of concepts should be discussed and developed in a more deeper and attentive form.
This is not a way to say that Hegel approach to concepts is not relevant itself, we recognize his worthy and that under him concepts received an impulse that redefined it to our days as no one thinker before him, but at the same time we will show the need to recognize how even in him the issue was vaguely attended yet and stay untheorized.
Let first see in his own words how Hegel discussed what he himself defined as the genesis of concepts
"From this side concept should be before all considered in general as the thirst one in respect to being and essence, this mean the immediate and reflexión. Being and essence, by instance, are the moment of the concept becoming, but concept is the base the true of being and essence at the same time. Both are contained in concept because concept is the result of both, but both are in the concept non longer as being and essence but without returning yet to the unity of both
The objective logic which consider being and essence constitute by the way the genetic exposition of the concept. In a more exact form, substance which is itself already real essence, essence in the unity of being have penetrated in reality. As result the concept have intself the substance as an immediate presupposition, substance represent itself what concept is as manifested. The dialectique movement of the substance through causality and reciproque action explain the immediate generation of concept, by the mediation of it, the becoming of concept is generated. But the becoming of concept have as always becoming, the meaning of being the reflection of something that trespassed its fundaments and what appear as another crossed is itself the true of concepts. In this form we see that the concept is the true of substance"
We don’t need to much than this paragraph to immediately recognize the sustantialist basis of the Hegelian theory of concepts.
Now well, we need to set boundaries on certain things precisely related with the indistintions mentioned above.
In fact, when Hegel speak here on concept we can see it in a few paragraphs forth this is not precisely concept what have being clear away –even if he believe it in that manner---but before well to the undistinguished source of several notions related with concepts in diverse forms but different to concept and not related with the true phenomenology that constitute the exact place of concepts.
Certainly Hegel is here speaking on the source of conscience from a substantialist perspective so that he gave to the physical and chemical sources of perception, representation, conscience and self-conscience, the name of concept. The source of concepts as something itself as I will attempt to discuss further is far to correspond to this zones of ontology and is instead related with another zone we will see soon.
In a few words, behind his words we have indistinguished a whole chain of notions related first with the pass by from the so-called sensible multiplicities we discussed before regarding ancient and classics meanings of this concept both to Hegel as before to Kant as another name to what in a modern sense we can identify as sensoriality, the universe of the datas of our physical senses presupposed under an undiferiented storm between world of sense, world of reality, the becoming of palpable sensoriality, etc., this is nothing different than the past by from feeling to perceiving it, the move from the external to the internal, from the previven multiple sensibility—another name to reality, to subjectivity, to the intuition that repit the instincts reflected in a first reflex of sensibility to conscience and from conscience to reflexion, from reflection to representation or in reverse and from representation to the progressive substitution by which things such as conscience, self-conscience, intellect and reason star to take a way, and a distance from such previous palpable sensoriality through synthesis abstractions.
In fact, isofar as discussing his substantialist genesis of the concept a few paragraphs later Hegel start to discuss the synthetic apriori judgement of Kant stablishing his parameters around distinctions between reflexion, representation and abstraction to arrive to the final conclusion that the concept is nothing more than "the I" and is identical to it just when we realize that the German philosopher was thinking in "the I" and in conscience when he used the word concept.
Now well, if from one side in his discussion of the genesis of the concept he was calling concept the conscience, the self conscience and "the I" and to arrive to then he previously afforded the whole chain of intuition, perception, representation and reflexión, from another side far to this ten pages, he was calling concept another chain equally unrelated with the well-defined phenomenological zone, area and or source of concepts by confusing it with judgements and syllogisms, a whole trip between subject and predicament which pertain to grammatology and language issues instead than to the concept as he to a certain point—see discussion around judgements at the end.
What remains then of all this to the concept as something itself distinguished from whatever another chains?. Very far we will arrive through the analysis to the few paragraph in which to me we are sited in the specific phenomenological field that indeed correspond to the concept and nothing else, but before doing so we need to reconstruct yet some aspects of Hegel exposition resumed above. After a long encircle surround of words and arguments Hegel sustained:
"I will limit myself here to an observation that can serve to the comprehension of concepts as developed here and facilitate to guest accurately with it, the concept when it has obtained an existence but itself it is free, and is nothing else by the I, whence it is pure conscience itself. I have without doubt concepts, I mean, some determined concepts, but the I is the pure concept, whence which as concept have reach its existence. According to this representation I have concepts, and even the concept as much as I also have a dress, a colour or certain extrinsique properties, Kant has superated this extrinseque relation of the faulty of the intellect concepts and the concept itself to arrive to the I. One of the more profound and correct opinions we may find in his critique of reason is that which affirm that the unity that constitute the concept have to be recognized as the originary unity of synthetic apperception, meaning, as a unity between I think, meaning, the self conscience. This proposition constitutes the so-called transcendental deduction of categories, but have being always considered as one of the most difficult parts of Kantian philosophy maybe not by another reason than because it requires the superation of the pure relation between I and the intellect, to go outside it toward the thought
Object—the overline is mine we will see soon we—day Kant, is that in cuyo concept the multiple and a given intuition are unified. However, this union of representation require the unity of conscience in the synthesis of it. Whence, this unity of conscience is what constitute the relation of representation with its objects ---overlined is mine—y about which the possibility of understanding is founded. Kant distinguish the subjective unity of conscience, meaning the unity of representation, the fact that if I have a conscience of a coexistent multiplicity or a of a successive, depending on empirical conditions
Through the categories as objective determinations, the multiple of given representations is determined in a manner that it is taken away to the unity of conscience. According to this exposition the unity of the concept is the condition by which a thing is not a pure sensible determination or a pure intuition, or also a pure representation, but an object which objective unity is the I which itself. Conceiving an object, really, consist is nothing more than in the I appropriation of it, the I penetrate it and take it away to its own form. The Object whence have its objectivity in the concept y this one is unity of self-confidence in which the object is received, its objectivity, meaning the concept, is whence nothing else but the nature of self-conscience y don’t have another moments or determinations than the I itself".
We already see how from the substantialist genesis of the concept defined by the union between being and essence from which the concept become to existence the Hegel exposition of the concept continues within a chain of notions without doubt related but to use his own words nothing is being yet sustained about concept by itself and itself, meaning what concepts are as concepts and nothing else, on the one hand, in this exposition the concept become related with the relations between representation and sensible multiplicities as reality and or as datas of the sense and such a sensible multiplicity yet reflected in representation goes toward the formation of an unity defined as self-conscience and "the I" about which the concept consist, to this point nothing is ear yet on the concept itself, it is not yet a concept, but in the last three sentences Hegel mention a few notions around which the phenomenology of the concept is really based and stablished, his distinction between sensible multiplicities and an object as what become something that cant be reduced to such sensible multiplicity and the pure intuition of the senses, this is yet here not sufficiently well defined and less theorized but at least perceived and differentiated.
Let see it overlined again but now with more emphasis in the zones, areas and issues that indeed and really start to arrive to what correspond to the specific phenomenology of the concept:
"According to this exposition the unity of the concept is the condition by which a thing is not a pure sensible determination or a pure intuition, or also a pure representation, but an object which objective unity is the I which itself. Conceiving an object, really, consist is nothing more than in the I appropriation of it, the I penetrate it and take it away to its own form. The Object whence have its objectivity in the concept y this one is unity of self-confidence in which the object is received, its objectivity, meaning the concept, is whence nothing else but the nature of self-conscience y doesn’t have another moments or determinations than the I itself".
Now well, this is precisely the point and the moment when we have the appearing of the object in contrast to the multiplicities and we will attempt to theorize and discuses forward how this phenomenology work and how should theorize and understand it.
In a few words, the subject is positioned in front of the object as his otherness, as his opposite, which the subject want to know as subject of knowledge, but in the concept the object as universal abstraction acquire its true and its objectivity and in this mode the object become to the subject the objectivity of the concept in whose form the subject find not only to know objects but more importantly to recognize itself in between them as an object between the objects.
But indeed, this is not as simply, rather the issue of one of mediation but in a form deeply rich and unexhausted at the phenomenological level without yet and before recognizing the potential of that relation as the main source and condition of the possibility of knowledge.
Before being a matter to the ontological ground of knowledge, the relation between subject, concept and object stablish the richness field of the phenomenological principle by which the concept is the sensible mediation between subject and object.
Let see this step by step.
First we need to might recognize that seldom the concept made pair with the object or the subject as what really made pair with the subject is the object, however, according to Hegel the apparition of object take shape with the unity of "the I" and Self conscience. I consider that this is a defect of Kant system and Hegel assumption of it.
What we have in regard to such an attention of Kant and Hegel is nothing else but the pass by through which "the I" and the conscience become objects to the subject and whence nor only as a matter of self conscience or conscience of the conscience but also and beyond that as the distance according to which the subject start to differentiate itself by layers of the several forms that the object receives.
On one side in respect to the subject we have an object which in respect to the sensible multiplicities –palpable sensoriality—is an otherness to the subject, this is such the world of coexistences and successions evoqued by Hegel, while taking away from the immediacy of the palpable sensoriality of the sensible multiplicities on the way to the process of perception of it as reflected and as representation we have another level or stratus in which the subject start to become object to himself, the subject as object, but in another sense the subject return to positioning itself in front of the object the subject evolutioned to be considered.
In this sense the object might be considered one time as the otherness of the subject, but forth such an otherness object is diluted and or disseminated within forms of the subject as object and at the same time through the layers of self-distance, the object only obtains its objectivity as object beyond be considered subjectivity in the form of the concept to the subject and finally as a mediated abstraction, only in the subject we have a concept of the object.
Given that in Kant as well as in Hegel subjectivity is diluted according to the genesis exposition of conscience and "the I" the pass by of subjectivity is presupposed to bring with inside it the substance which was declared by them as absolute even as reality, under such a form to understand it being and essence appear as interrupting and or obstructing the pass by of non-subject things into the starting of subjective things in respect to it such as perception, representation etc, the possibility of the subject to be constituted, to have its own temporality, spatiality and mobility ontologically.
In a few words, the subject was already there from before in its own ontological serie even before defining "the I" and conscience by which we are meaning that the relation between subject and object is older and originary than perception, representation, intuition, conscience and "the I" and more over that in respect to the concept this is a way to say that what we have is not as much the becoming of a substance through essence and being toward the unity of the I and conscience, but a subject that start the coexistence of two simultaneous becomings from the moment the object is mediated in the subject by the concept.
The object itself, in fact, is nothing else than the so-called "sensible multiplicity" or "palpable sensoriality" world, this sensible multiplicity certainly may be considered as coexisting and it certainly persist later reflected in perception and representation but only in the concept such a sensible multiplicity become an unity and this unity is the object.
The object is itself such a sensible multiplicity but according to how the concept mediate it to the subject, in a few words the unity and the order is operated by the concept and since it happen the main domain of relations in between is defined by the triadic principle of:
subject, concept and the object
Again the object itself is nothing more that the "sensible multiplicity" forming an unity to the subject in the concept and this unity of such a previous multiplicity in the object to the subject is mediated by the concept and only through the concept it have a sensible mediation, the concept in a few word, we will further see this in several forms, is the sensible mediator between subject and object.
Only to a subject something is an object and there is nothing between subject and non-subjects than objects, we are then working here with a-causal notions far to the idea of genesis, this is not a way to say that causality and genesis is not itself a point of departure to the analysis of certain things, but instead to say that such a serie is not logically the one which correspond to concepts.
We are not here in front of the relation between essence and substance because the object itself being nothing else than the "sensible multiplicity" is already an abstraction of that multiciplity in the concept to the subject.
The formation of concepts is then created by the subject in concepts. Whence the Hegel exposition of the genesis of the concept explain other kind of things such as "the I", conscience and self-conscience and how under it essence, being and substance are expressed, this is not the logical serie of the source and phenomenological organization of the concept.
This is a form to finally say that the specific phenomenological order which correspond to the concept is grounded in the relation between subject and object while not in any form, but in specific forms about which we will soon go in deep.
How this happen?
First we should unveil a near relation between nominalism and the concept by the mean of what object and subject seems to be or look to be meeting as abstractions, for example, when we said “being itself” we are speaking at the same time on something that is to our sensibility and feelings and something that is at the same time a concept because while we have a sensible impression about the to be of being itself such a "being itself" is already a concept, the concept "being itself".
Moreover, in saying "being itself" we are saying, on the one hand something about a certitude we have as beings that something is itself and might be feel as such as something simply being in itself, meaning, in its pure sensibility and its pure being without yet having a distance to it more than in the pure becoming of it and its feelings, to this point "being itself" is not yet considered as a concept but as experience, but at the same time this "being itself" designe, denote and or connote such a universe of sensations and assure of experience.
As a word or relation between two words "being" and "itself", the name evolve a synthesis of all that field of senses and as such is a concept, the name, nominalism, and the concept are usually very nears sometimes the same while not always as we will discuss.
From the moment the word as name is a concept all that field que word design to sensibility and experience become to the subject an object, whence what before we designed as experience and sensible assure and self-assure as soon as we see it from the subject as object to the subject, it is already a concept, then, as discussed, the name, such a nominality designing "being itself" with the semantic field of connotation to our experience it evolves is to the subject we are at the same time its object and the concept of that object.
We should said that indeed it is an object from the moment we assure on it but granted that in this case such a something allude directly to our sensibility and experience, it is an object in ourselves, meaning we as individuals as to many individuals who have a similar experience.
We ask if "being itself" being an object only to the subject knowledge can be in itself without the subject to which the word or the name enclose all that field of meanings to sensibility, feeling and sensoriality? and we answer that it can’t, it is both an experience and an object only to us and certainly as soon as we are not only living to be a "being itself" as when experiencing it without assuring on it but assuring it all that field become an object to us but at the same time it can’t become an object without becoming a concept at the same time, the object and the concept meet and share here as the same, nominalism and conceptualism, the same and the abstraction which transform the field of experience into a concept of an object is what make of it a concept and the opposite, the mode how the concept synthesis and resume the field of our experience and sensibility.
Concept, of course, may be not confused with the sensible experience itself, neither the object of that becoming when assuring on it from the subject, but it is the subject the one who give configuration to that experience as object in the concept, only tthe word with all the field of experience and sensibility it suggests is a concept.
As seen whence in naming as a nominal act when we said "being itself" two planes meets in one dimension "object and the concept", but this two planes are interrelated, the object refers to the sensible experience but the sensible experience can’t be the object without being to the subject a concept and it can less be an object without becoming concept, its then the concept the one which made the mediation between subject and object and this mediation is sensible itself in the both senses discussed above about the need to make distinctions between two levels of the sensible.
We ask to some other what it means to you "being itself", how can you explain the consistency of that concept?, and from such a moment we conclude that all concept evolve in itself an explanation hence what make it an object is not simply its reference to an experience but what is synthetized and abstracted under it as concept in regard to an experience becoming object to the subject.
Given than the object is formed in itself on the one hand by the sensible experience it denotes or circumscribe and at the same time it coincidence with the word-name denotating it we said that the concept operates usually in a nominal field, a field in which the name of things and things are related.
Now well, concept in its abstraction evolve nor only an explanation, we should also assure that it evolve and suppose an intemporal dimension, meaning, an stable and continues form which define it as concept, "being itself", for example, as a concept will never be the concept of "time", "being itself" bring us addressing a well define territory of meaning on our feelings and sensations, while time as concept enclose another kind of senses evolved in that concept, each concept is then as an island of circumscribed senses as something relatibly invariable, meaning that it permanence in that form in an stable form without variations while relatibly because we always have semantical variations.
For example, "being itself" is not the same on it as a pure abstraction referential to the pure feeling of being as a being to sensibility or if we are speaking on the "being itself" of a culture or an individual person or about the being itself of science, however, the semantique variations expand around a kernel, nucleus or center to its possible semantic variations relationalities, this is a nucleus of the concept meaning explanation.
This hard nucleus should be distinguishdd from mere words which are not concepts but means something, a cat mean something, a certain quadrupeds animal of certain characteristics, but is neither a concept, running is not a concept and however cognnotate something, breakfast and opening the door are not concepts.
Certainly we can made concepts of simple words and objects by train it "as if" through the relation between name and meaning, but this words and objects are not concepts themselves.
To be concepts it have to acquire an intemporal dimensions and invariability that will acquire independence as abstraction to the mere nominal and will transcend the mere denotation, in a concept something will ever be a corpus of meanings that can operate without a variety of empirical issues.
The concept of time, for example, it is nominally like any name a meeting between the concept and the empirical field of sensoriality and sensibility it evoques or detonates, but it will be something more too, time will ever be time to anyone with any experience and culture calling certain invariability of experience and certitudes to any subject intemporaly, time will ever be a hard nucleus of meanings at the same time conserved under the concept, but time will also be different things, for example, according to Aristoteles time is not a part inside the ontology of being, according to him a being never contain inside its own nature time, time in itself is not of the same nature than being, but from another perspective being mean something that is in movement to be something have to be and becoming, and as such it have to be in time so that time is also inside it, it can’t be defined without time inside it, hence we can sustain on the same concept a definition opposite to the Aristoteles one, he payed attention to certain aspects of the concept but excluding others, his perspective focused in how time is the same to different beings in time at the same time, while excluded considering how being as time is needed for it to be.
While any concept has a hard nucleus explain it the meanings are open to variations and situational modifications and of theories around. Some concepts are more added to their nucleus, other concepts are flexible around it as for example, "being itself" already discussed, we see how it can be about the itself of a person, of a language, of a culture, of a science, etc
A concept for example as inscription supposes the fixation of something on a surface, on a memory retained or in a body, a same general sense to completely different empirical fields, the intemporality of the concept stay the same and its name coincidence in a same surface simultaneously at different phenomena’s, the concept and its objects.
A concept is always the field a name design the reason to recognize the relation between nominalism and conceptualism, a concept is ever be beside what such a designation mean to the subject as otherness when the concept born up as concept, meaning that a concept born up as a concept of its objects.
In fact if we don’t have the concept subject and object are not available to exchange in between, each one stay as the otherness and opposite of the other without any relation in between or rather, in any case related in the alterity because even when the object pass by to be a subject as in the example when we represent our conscience in itself conscience just because in moving from the external to the internal of subjectivity the subject return to alterizice that relation again and transform it even being a moment of himself in an object, only through the concept the object past by to be a subject and become one with the subject inside subjectivity as alterity.
The relation between subject and object hence whatever we are speaking on the object as otherness to the subject or the subject itself becoming object taking distance from that side of himself to turn it an object need the concept to acquire the mediation, only through the concept an object pass by to be one with the subject given that it is in the subject were the concept take shape.
The concept itself is nothing else than the abstraction of the object, only in the concept subject and object are mutuality mediated, it is in fact the sensible mediation of one by the other both inside subjectivity when the object become one with the subject and outside before or simultaneously when the object seems to be a form of the sensible multiplicities.
In such cases as discussed somewhere before like for example in space and time such a before outside is also in the subject in another way and in another form different to the form it acquire in conscience reflexion, or as in the case of "being itself" already discussed, nothing regarding mediations between subject and object such as those required to recognize the subject in the object and in reverse the object becoming one inside subject is possible without the mediation of the concept, and this mediation is not only abstract but sensible in the specific sense we have discussed above about the two dimensions of sensibility the one related with sensible multiplicities involved within palpable sensoriality and the one evolving inmaterialization and dematerialization, by the way only through the concept the subject can also recognize himself as an object between the objects.
Returning to "being itself" as concept as soon as the concept is no longer that object which was by a moment an otherness and or an alterity to the assure of the subject on himself seen from the gazing of ourselves in subjectivity the object end to be by disappearing in the becoming one with the subject, it have passed by to be one and the same with subjectivity or more precisely, it have become to be from our subjectivity and as a concept of "being itself" but in this turning to be one with our subjectivity the substance is no longer there, indeed it had never ceased to be both things at the same time something outside which is itself and something the subject abstract in the becoming of an object created in front of its otherness as self alterization in subjectivity.
From this moment essence and substance are no longer there.
In short, concepts are inmaterials, they are like fractal matter and inner time etters in regard to matter by analogy and nothing like substance and essence are longer there.
The genesis of concepts is by the way different than the genesis of conscience, self-conscience and "the I" even when they are related in certain forms inside the general theory of the formation of subject and subjectivity, the concept is already constituted and formed in manner which transform in concept the multiplicity evoqued by the object and only through the formation of the concept the mediation born up and take shape conceal and eliminate both alterity and otherness which oppose as others one and the other, subject and object.
Certainly it can’t be figured out a way to be subjects without having conscience, self-conscience and "the I" but we might said the same in the opposite way that nothing as having conscience, self-conscience and "the I" is possible to be figured out without being subjects to objects
The scientific demonstration about that this genesis is simultaneous, that the subject was already there become tangible when we perceive that it is impossible to figure out a field of sensoriality coming from the palpable sensoritality of the sensible multiplicity if is this is not already as soon as figuring it out and simultaneously a form of the subject assure.
This subject assure in fact is no itself yet a reflect, nor a repetition reflected as a mimesis of the data of senses, no yet, but only a concept, certainly conscience and self-conscience are in general near than the subject and subjectivity to palpable sensoriality because of the reflected forms it have when images arriving from mimesis are there defining a reflexive field, but what happen with the subject in regard to such a previous sensible multiplicity of palpable sensoriality is precisely that to the subject it is not a reflect or reflected dimension, image are in fact no there as in conscience, but only objects as synthesis abstractions made by the concept which mediate sensibly in the both senses of the word tangible and intangible subject and object.
The field of the subject is no one about reflect and reflection as in conscience but one about mediations.
Simply because the subject is no ever and just seldom separated from the object as another thing as conscience are in respect to its images, a conscience will ever be another thing separated from its objects by reflects and reflection, a subject instead can be object and object a subject by becoming one into the other ontologically something impossible to be considered in regard to conscience, in short, we are speaking here on parallel series as well as on a dimension theoretically almost undiscussed which is easily to be demonstrated with my theory of the self, the self itself is located between immanence and exteriorization.
Subject and object are, and here we will now call Hegel in another sense which is that one of his negative dialectiques, the same and the opposite, each one is contained in the other and inclusive to the other, what made a subject is the existence of objects and what made an object is the existence of subjects, something is a subject because it is not an object each one need the other inside it own identity and nature and in this relation subject can be object and object subject but only through the concept.
In a few words, again, the relation between subject and object is a triadic one not a dyadic and triadic principles as for example sign-object and referent, are always of this kind:
subject-concept-object
Both subject and object are themselves only through the concept which mediate them, the concept born up and take shape acquiring its nature to nothing else than to guaranty and made possible this sensible mediation, the field of a concept will be ever the field of this mediation in the source and origination of its own phenomenology, the major kid of comprehension, the concept born up to solve something that can’t be resolve by conscience.
Through some concepts the nominal proximity between naming and things is here very near and certainly this is what distinguish concepts of non-concepts, as explained above, a rose is the name of something, but not a concept, instead in the concept of art, however, in naming it we have the entrance of both things what it is itself and its name, but it is also a concept while in difference with a concept as "being itself" when both sides of the concepts the one regarding itself –sensible multiplicities or palpable sensoriality---and the side of the abstracted dimension which transform it in the concept of an object to the subject—take shape as a mutual intelligibility, something we must call heuristic concepts, in the being itself of art seen as a sensible multiplicity or palpable sensoriality and art as the name whose abstraction is a concept of what the name meet and denotate as its object we don’t have the same kind of exchange of dimensions between ontology, abstraction and concept.
To understand art as concept without confusing it for example with "being itself" which can be the being itself of anything we need to made abstraction of the ontology of it as a substance and as an essence since from the moment asking about art as concept evolve to us a way questions on almost everything, it is not the same thinking about being, self, memory, language, conscience, etc as things itself without art than asking on it through the filter of art since thinking on it from art and to do so the concept of art seems to be seen now as the object the concept mediate as inmaterial and dematerialized while paradoxically art seen as pure matter, as substance, chemistry and physical datas is itself ontologically the opposite of such inmaterialization and dematerialization needed by the concept.
In the concept of art we have something unique to that concept, never as in art we have the counterposition and contrast between ontology as something substantial and the concept as something desubstantiated and inmaterial, this is a way to say that each concept might be considered a universe itself in the way the concept itself call the things to be related.
In fact if we follow substance in art maintaining ourselves near to its palpable sensoriality dimensions we can’t made abstraction of the concept, to made abstraction of the concept we have to stablish a relation between the concept and its object which should be inferred by relating the theoretical and the empirical.
In a few words, we must reserve to each concept different ways to understand how ontology and epistemology relates under it because a concept itself as a mediator between subject and object consist precisely in it, a concept is nothing else, but an specific form to exchange both dimensions sensibly mediating subject and object.
The concept can’t be the true manifestation of substance since a concept precisely consist about deliberating an independent free way to figure out how epistemology and ontology, subject and object, should be exchanged and related, to do so we have to admit a simultaneity between subject and object and a coexistence in a form that the form of the exchange according to the concept eliminate causality, we can’t fix the form of exchange until having defined the way the concept will operate immaterialy on the how the two sides of the field designed by the nominal is asked to be related, such a deliberation draw itself the ways the exchange should be figured out as the concept will ever consist about sensibly mediating both moments.
The concept in fact is nothing more that the stopping of substance, it negates the causality of substance and its manifestations, it is in fact the opposite of substance manifested, on the inmaterial side of meanings it fully made abstraction of substance and works without it in the form of delivering the relation between subject and the object while on the side of the relation between the object as abstraction of a palpable sensoriality and such an empirical field, as when the concept instead of fully abandoning form and matter intervene in taking shape as for example writing or giving form to certain matter, the concept reestablish and direct how, toward what and in what direction substance should be addressed.
As obvious in art matter languages the so called in linguistic and semiotic substance of expression is nothing else but the concept immaterially operating substance towards its own inmaterial determinations of meanings and senses.
Substantialism in ancient, classics and even certain modern epistemologies have confused the physiology of reflects in body and conscience with the concept, it also have in its basis a confusion between conceptualizing and conceiving.
Conceiving can be made without any concept, while in certain kinds of things we conceive with concepts all the field of concepts in is not reduced to conceiving and the later one may occur many times without concepts in it.
In effect, one distinct thing is acquiring a reflect or reflecting in the mode of conscience repetitions of images in reflecting reflected sensible multiplicities something related to perception and representation and another far and different thing is forming concepts, at the same time conceptualizing is another thing different to conceiving.
If concept have to be deduced to the substantiality of a reality in the form of a manifestation the subject appear as a manifestation of the becoming of substance temporality and immanent essence. But that is impossible, the subject is a taking of distance to substance exposing it to be in front and beside, obligating it to be aside in front of the gaze under another different temporality which suppose the disting becoming, the one of the subject, the phenomenology of the concept belong to the subject not to substance.
But it have a more deeper forms
As sustained in my essays "The chrysalides of being" I agree with Hegel idea that in the last instance knowledge and science are a part in the logic of being, meaning, that the becoming of being continues evolving the becoming of thought, but at the same time, as sustained in that essay the becoming of the being of thought have consequences in the temporality of the becoming of being which is not yet the same as soon as thought appear or intervene, both are intratemporals and spatially and subject and object are simultaneous under it they goes at the same time when going and coming from one to the other is presupposing the subordination of substance to its towards.
The event and the becoming of thought certainly involve inside it the event and the temporality of being and the opposite, but both are not the same already as soon as starting to exchange in between not if we try to look to each one being and thought separately in their own purity.
Within its separated purity and abstraction a being can undoubtedly be without thought but such a being as simply purely a being without extrinsecation, it can’t be more that by moments or intervals because to acquire and give direction to its movement it have to assure on itself and to assure is have already to think.
In the opposite sense we can figure out a thought without a being in it, but in such a purity of its abstraction a thought can’t address a movement it will simply stop becoming static, to be a thought have to be dynamic it have to let it be in the temporality of being or if not it will be immobilized, a thought which can’t flux in the becoming of pure being stop but the opposite too a being just being without thought become pure accidents.
This is not a way to say that there is not knowledge in perception and representation, there is knowledge too in it without doubt as well as intellect and reason, but a way to say that concepts have its own specific phenomenology if we are really asking on what made a concept concept itself and nothing else.
As Hegel clearly statement the concept is the apogee of thought in its own phrases something he sustained in debate with those who denigrate concepts but to be certain and proper conceptual thought take shape according to this triadic phenomenological principles as its own zone and field of operations two opposite’s subject and object and a sensible mediator in between the concept from which all the opposites are solved and solutioned, otherness, alterities and contradictions.
From the moment concepts start to operate all exclusions are transformed into inclusions and the externals extrinsiques become transformed into internals intrinsiques becoming one with the other.
It is curious and amazing but at the same time comprehensible in his age, how Hegel, the thinker who more than any one before him advanced the science of concept, was not capable in his age to advertise, recognize and discover this dialectique. His age was not ready yet even in his genius to unveil it.
The relation between subject and object thanks to the concept is generative and productive.
Bibliography
Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Science of Logic London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929, translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, translated by Henry S. Macran (Hegel's Logic of World and Idea) (Bk III Pts II, III only). Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929translated by A. V. Miller; Foreword by J. N. Findlay. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1969, Prometheus; Later Printing edition (December 1, 1991), Humanity books, translated by George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010
Hegel, Cual es el comienzo de la ciencia, Ciencia de la Lógica, Hachete
Hegel, Ciencia de la Lógica, Lógica del ser, Lógica de la Esencia, Lógica del Concepto, Hachete
Hegel, lógica del concepto, Ciencia de la Lógica, Hachete
The Restauration of World
©By Abdel Hernández san Juan
Written in english and translated to english
by Abdel Hernandez San Juan
I want to tie up a series of reflections addressed to articulate analysis and propositions on the relation between what I would like to propose as restauration of world and the idea of plenum presence understanded in the present of the present of presence as well as to come across discussing in contrast with plenum presence several forms of differed presences albeit as well as in relation to appearance, absence, difference and a chain of concepts among which the idea of presence usually braiding need to be unbraided until focusing what must be understanded and I will attempt to discuss as phenomenological genesis of the sign.
All this are things implicit in the first chapter of this book but without focus on it, the effort now will consist about calling it to the forefront to be afforded.
The issue in question revolves as follows, considered as a language matter, meaning, as something inside of language, speech suppose the plenum presence of the others in front of us, a well centered subject with their own intentionality of saying and another one audience counter-enunciations equally plenum in present, while instead writing presuppose the proffered nature of the others absence, differed presence.
But this is so simple yet. The issue of the differences between plenum presence and differed presences is highly complex than that and evolve a whole phenomenological discussion on the several forms of presence.
Before and outside language, within the eidetic and noetic evolved within pre-expressive and expressive levels, meaning the universe located before the taking shape of tangible language while toward it which include the unsaid and unformed, intentionality of sense and wishes to said, we have many complex stratus’s involved in conscience before conscience arrival to acquire presence to us and in front of us, this stratus’s contains themselves phenomenologically several levels of presence, while outside language yet but with conscience already arrived to have presence in front of us, meaning us in front our own conscience as result of the idealization process which create the flour of interiorization, we again have severals forms of presence differents in between, finally we also have forms of presence when the conscience acquire form in front of us but now exteriorized in language as signs outside our idealized interior world of subjectivity.
All this forms of presence from noetic and eidetical pre-expresive levels, to expressive, from the idealization creates the flour of interiority in conscience to conscience exteriorized in signs are stratified forms of presence generally however tangle, embroil, enmesh, ensnase or to put is more clearly undiferiented and by that reasons diffuse with the idea of differed presences in severals forms.
I will define this undiferiented diffusion as an skein and I will attempt to commit myself with to disentangle it.
The general reason for me to do this unbending below is related with the fact that I have realized as major to made differences between plenum presences and differed presences since on the one hand my purposiveness is not as much focused on saying what we already know that speech suppose a certain form of plenum presence but to reestablish and demonstrate the need of a full restauration of world under presence outside language as well, meaning as intramundane horizont quotidian world of life, and on the other hand I have realized as pivotal to differentiate several stratus’s of non-plenum presence in between them which are not always forms of differed presences and or different forms of the differed.
My objective is to give plenty of deeper theorization on an issue as sustained above embroiled needed to disentangle the skeins of presence as to comply with renewed language the comprehension of the former.
To articulate this analysis I will choice as point of references the Jacques Derrida interpretation on Hegel in two of his essays one on the relation between the vulgar conception of time in Aristoteles physics and the continuation of it under Hegel and Heidegger including Kant, the question of Aristotle’s about if time is a constitutive part of ontas and ontology and the elucidation of it around time and space from the perspective of the right now of time, the present of the present and the issue of the relation between the presence of the present and the nun.
Another essay focused in the pass by of the exterior world into the process of idealization which interiorize it and how under it we may recognize as implicit the presence of conscience to us, meaning the presence of conscience in front of ourselves in the phenomenology of the sprit the so-called, according to Derrida, semiology of Hegel.
The reason to focus my attention on this last issue is defined by proposing that what Derrida have discussed around the signs as the first form in which we have an exteriorized image of our conscience in front of us as language, should be theorized and understanded in term of the discussion of presence as a phenomenological genesis of the sign.
At the same time I want to carry out the challenge of demonstrating nor only that this Derrida assumption of the sign as a first from of presence of us in front of us as an exteriorized form of conscience is nothing else but a phenomenological genesis of the sign, but also that this is not the only genesis of the sign. In fact, we should aside several forms of the genesis of the sign and to increase our theoretical distinctions in between.
Let just then do it.
To attain this analysis, we should first seize the sense of appearance from which all the forms of presence source and arise. We should leads the core of the phenomenology of any presence, presence itself in fact is nothing else but a side and an stratus of appearance and appearance is the phenomena or to get it better the phenomenic that which made presence to us, thus we must recognize a chain of related notions so nears and sometimes moments of the same, phenomena, appearance, form and finally presence.
Beyond the former distinctions we had aside as differentiated this several forms of presence in between, this are sometimes stratified, meaning not always immediately in all its sides simultaneously present to us, from plenum presence to presences of us in front of us from the mirror to how the conscience itself is a form of self presence both as an idealization of the interiority and as exteriorized in our signs and languages, listening our voice or reading our writings, to presence as the otherness of absence or as the to be of a mark defined differentially by what it is not, as in the differences between signs that made the presence of each one, all forms of presence are nothing else than appearance and phenomena.
Before presence appear or as through it in a same simultaneous dimension presence looks like, it is yet diluted, distributed, apportioned, allot or disseminated inside appearance, thus it is not a full presence, no yet but only appearance or presence as a form of the sameness of mere appearance undiferiented yet from it, a moment of what made appearance one with itself, of the identity of appearance by all its sides.
Thus understanded the idea of presence is first an expression of a former relation between appearance and phenomena, appearance is itself another name of phenomena and in reverse phenomena another name of appearance.
But the exposition of appearance as the source and rise of presence suppose stratus and stratifications, a subtract which will ever be to be find behind it since presence as a form of appearance evolves that something is not present in all its sides, something is making presence and nothing can be assure on everything about it but only about how it made presence, if this is making presence we can’t knowledge everything about it.
We know, of course, about the existence of things about which nothing is needed to be fund behind, and we even have sometimes doubt about if something must be looked for behind such like for example an essence never fully retained under its phenomenal form or some kind of thing out of just how it made presence, but even in such cases which are seldom as for example in certain form of technologies, beauty, fashion and aesthetics, our knowledge is not fully filled, often our duty is to attain the core by immersing us in a deeper or profound dimension like for example in knowing a person we share with an intersubjective relation of friendship, nothing is given to us by just the mere presence or appearance, or in knowing a new city, a new language or a culture, something is always behind the first impressions and claim to recognize successive stratus’s of explicitations, interpretation and understanding.
However, the paradox is about that even in cases as the former, all we must and may know will ever be available to us each time again by a next form of appearance and presence, in a few words we can’t never advance to successive levels and stratus’s of senses, knowledge and understanding than ever through phenomena’s, the world to be known is available to us always and only again and again through forms, phenomena’s, appearances and forms of presence.
And it is in this sense that we must say that there is nothing to be find behind presence but that all we will ever know will always be through forms of the presence. By this reason the idea of stratus or stratification is not like it happen with the opposite relation between presence and absent, a relation between a surface defined by forms and appearances and a kind of non-formal deeper kind of unpresented or absent dimension, stratus and stratification are nothing else but always new levels of the phenomena itself.
This allow us to understand that everything is beside and aside not necessarily behind and hidden or absent, it is instead under and in the phenomenic of presence but not available in one time. Like for example interpreting the saying of someone addressing us we must elucidate it progresibly making sense of it gradually by successive stratus of hermeneutic.
Or in cooking something from a first level of flavor of the elements to the mixing of it to successive stratus of flavor, this is a way to said that even when we are speaking on forms, the core goes and arrive always through nexts forms of appearance, the substrate in fact is nothing else but the form of becoming of the phenomena, it is in appearance and presence itself making it identical with itself.
To get it fully we should abandon the idea of form and contents as separated and or divided things, there is not a content without form nor a form without contents, the first content of appearance and of presence as form of appearance is defined by its own identity, the stratus arrive through and joined with the phenomena within its own forms of appearing, presence in a few words is a moment of the identity of appearance, form and phenomena and it is appearance itself what is stratified, the sameness and coincidence of appearance is itself the supposed to be essence or deeper and one thing is inseparable from the other, both are moments of the same.
Now, after this general deliberation on appearance as the source of any form of presence let be back in the several differentiated forms of presence committing our task and let attempt to attain the taking shape of each one, its consistency and its consequences. To do so we must have to seize the specific senses of each one and to examine in the light of clear delimitations what should we seeks or not around each one, what must we foreseen in recognizing their differences, when to hesitate to entail and when to entail, what and to what points.
Can we assume the idea of presence at the eidetic and noematic level?, this level as we know is fully dominated by pre-expressive and expressive issues, all that zone related with experience which take place and happen before the taking shape of a tangible language while toward it, by this reason everything at this level revolves around intentionality, motivations and wishes to say as pre-expressive and expressive moments of experience before the tangible arrival to language, we have in a certain level what the subject might say on such an experience, if we are ourselves the subject in question, we must assume that we are the same subject who both have before and remember later the experience, but if we are thinking in another subject we don’t have the enough to comply and accede to it, while even being ourselves, how to made presence of such an stratified level of pre-expressive and expressive moments?, certainly, both levels are always related with a language to come and in that sense we might say that there is from before acceding to a tangible language a previous ontological relation between eidos and morphe, meaning form, if we are ready to bring something to language in the process of taking shape of it all about the non-discourse pre-expressive and expressive level indeed which are rise to be weaved with morphe as a mise in regard of language, from this perspective we can assure agree with Jacques derrida that there is within form a level of presence, according to derrida, in fact, form itself is the ultimate and primer ontological dimension of presence, everything that made presence take shape of it under forms, however, the kind of presence we are here speaking about is intangible and disseminated through a texere between the non-discursive and the discursive, between experience—non language yet and language, this is in a few word, a concept of presence related both with appearing –as the appearing of something in form language—the discursive, and the stratified levels of wishes to say, intentionality and motivation between experience and the mise in regard of form as expressed between eidos and morphe, this kind of presence usually work weaved with both the unsaid and the memories of the wishes to say and allow us to think about that the subject is making presence to himself in a certain form but in an stratified manner.
At this point the task consist indeed about recognizing to what level the subject might have a language ---before the effective born of a final language—to speak on such a non-discourse level of experience, if he or she can recognize pre-expressive and expressive concern in between eidos-noetic and an idealized anticipated idea of form, since form is not yet formed but anticipated from the mise in regard –morphe--and if only in form we may speak on presence such texere of non-discursive issues, need to be recognized in a simultaneous language, a language of process so to speak.
In a few words under eidetic and noetic levels the idea of presence is tangle under complicated stratus, there is certainly presence in form as form is presence itself but eidetic and noetic level of experience as soon as always born toward and addressing to form a language, to take shape under form, it is before the arrival of a final form, and in this sense the subject may recognize the relation between such pre-expressive and expressive contents of motivations, intentionality and wishes to say only as eidetic and noetic source in a memory weaved with a morphe, eidos-morphe, ontologically.
Now, we should recognize this idea of tangle presence as completely different to the kind of presence that we have in the idealization process creates the flour of interiority when conscience may be recognized in front of us through self-conscience.
In the idea of presence we have in self-conscience we have endowed conscience of a sense of a whole of a totality system that reflect another level of reflection, conscience itself is a repetition through reflection of the sensorial levels, and conscience of conscience evolves a seize of sense of the former conscience reflected endowing it with a sense of a whole. Here the idea of presence is regarded to how in self-conscience our conscience made presence in front of us, the relation between wishes to say, intentionality and motivation toward a language is here out of date not in consideration, instead of operating by fragments of experience as in pre-expressive and expressive eidetic, noetic and morphemic level when everything regarding the interiority of conscience by the relation between the animation of discourse from non-discursive contents, here presence is not a considered under the relation form-presence, morphe-mise in regard, but by the totalizing activity within which conscience appear as a representational whole whereas more or less outside objects and or insides reflections of substitutions.
At the noetic-eidetic level presence is stratified and considered according to morphe and form as alive presence in between the weaves of experience and language, the non-discursive and the discursive, while at the self-conscience level presence is reflected, it is not about world itself but about a reflected world when representation and perception dominates the field of presence.
Forth we have another dimension of presence that derrida have regarded as sign, when such an idealization process creates the flour of interiority that creates the sense of conscience in front of us turn to be outside making presence in front of us but now as a language, as sign, according to Derrida the sign in the first objective form through which we have an external images of the interiority of our conscience now outside us as a sign, this time presence is nothing else but a tangible ousia and gramme as Derrida called it, another name of the substance of expression, sign as presence itself.
We have yet in examination three additional ideas of presence completely diferents to the formers, presence in relation to absence, presence as mark in the system of difference and our main focus, plenum presence but let set it seizing the whole sense of our discussion.
We choiced to identified the idea of subtract and stratus between other reasons because the sameness with itself of appearance seen substantially meaning an essence suppose that appearance is itself a form or a moment of essence and we want to reserve an space to phenomena’s needed to distinguish appearance from essence to get the true of appearance as the true of phenomena to which we need to distinguish between world itself and the phenomenological world, because even when both are moments of the same or sides or faces of the same, we also have non-substantive and non-substantial levels when everything’s is inmaterialized and dematerialized like for example in the idea of sensibility considered beyond palpable sensoriality as a form of the spiritual and the soul or moreover when in conscience and the spirit we have another true of form like for example in aesthetics. To do so we deployed the idea of empty forms or forms without contents as merely form since form retains the time and temporality of sensibility, a sensibility far to what derrida defined as insensible sensible, the so-called sensible multiplicity as another name of reality or as pure exteriority of spatiality.
As discussed above everything that made presence in front of ourselves, presence of conscience to us or considered outer as sign made it appearing and appearance presuppose the analysis of phenomena when it is not yet the phenomenic of conscience, before this genesis side, outside and before conscience as éter or inmaterialized, idealized interiority of sprit, soul and subjectivity, something simply appear.
This issue seems to bring us back to perception returning to sensible multiplicities from which everything made presence to us through our five datas of senses and its impressions and by the way the principle of reality itself, but while near to perception this sense of the appearing basis appearance as the source of any presence is doubtless needed of the gaze and the gaze is presupposed under it.
Before understanding presence as a mark inscribed or fixed as an image as well as before recognizing presence versus absence distinguishing it as light on the backgrounds of shadows, before distinguishing absence as the otherness of presence or as non-presence and of identifying what something is in its own identity in difference with what it is not, a sign defined in its own identity by another sign it is not or by the empty space or the sense of nothing mediate in between them as marks, there is a rise and source more general phenomenological sense of presence in general appearance and if certainly this general sense return us to sensible multiplicities, palpable sensorialities and even the principle of reality, this general phenomenological sense of presence allow us to distinguish that there is thanks to reality buy beyond mere reality a plenum presence.
In fact the idea of reality itself following Hegel is nothing else but accident and phenomenic contingency and as such even when less than when considering eidetic and noetic issues, it is yet an idea of presence highly stratified, the idea of reality and reality itself being a pure phenomenon is affected by complex stratifications as I discussed it in my paper "stratus confines" when we can’t separate stratus from progressive hermeneusis.
Certainly to figure out plenum presence a world and a universe is needed to be restaurated, we need the restauration of a micrototality which will be itself beyond reality, even when reality will ever be also inside it, plenum presence need to attain the core of a meaningful world, a world whose stratus’s we already know, a meaningful world is a world that is considered not as seen by first time, not a subjected to the scrutinization and measures of phenomenological perception, but a world which have already signified something to us, a world plenty of sense to us, a world we don’t have to comply by differencing what is real according to several stratus, reality in fact, what is reality?, a world of imagination and fancy in existence under a social reality such as for example the symbols of religions, ceremonies and icons is real without doubt but is it at the same time pure symbol and fancy, fiction for example occur under reality while it is non-real according to defining reality as ontology while real in another sense, reality itself is a concept fully stratified, in difference to that a plenum presence addresses us toward a restored world and universe, an intramundane horizont in which everything is already meaningful to us, a world about which all the stratus must be already knowed to us.
A meaningful world of plenum presence is not a world of countless objects we there fore assign meaning one by one, it is not about meaning something itself, for example, in recognizing perception distinguishing it from the image perceived, the object of perception we usually recognize its separation, perception as something itself and the perceived as independent to perception, an object of perception, the image outside of it, however we seldom note that separation and the reason is because the meaningfulness of the world leads us integrate both things, we abides with the objects of our perceptions as if everything fall out in a chrysalis without ledges or perhaps we integrated ourselves with all that made sense to us, we stricken perception under sensibility to acomply a plenty of meanings.
It is from this perspective that I discussed in the first chapter of this book that separating signs even when it helps our understanding on codes and communication seems to be itself a neurotic activity seen from the hermeneusis that weaves and texere our phenomenological universe of daily life, under the intramundane horizont hermeneutic and phenomenology are integrated to the level of taking shape of its own ontology, a plenum presence allow us to understand that we disallows separations of perception and objects, signs and hermeneusis because things are meaningful to us, hence more than a one by one meaning, meaning in general increase our capacity to disentangle as well as to integrate what is set aside.
It is in general an strong argument to us in phenomenological sociology and hermeneutic to recognize a core issue, the fact that during centuries we in order to know best separated everything, we dissected and operated dislocations of things in elements to the point of the atom as well as we produced an exaggerated disjunction between the observer and the observed, we already know both the positive result and well as the desbastation consequences of such a neurotic procedure, the task of phenomenological sociology and of modern hermeneutic is about to reintegrated again what was excesibly disintegrated, a world of plenum presence is thus by necessity a world of restauration of world and universes of experiences and plenty meaningfully horizonts over reality.
We already know what plenum presence is like, let know attain to discuss its differences and relations with another forms of presence such as presence under difference and presence versus absence. This is not at all as obvious presence as mark, nor a presence thus seen as something by what it is not, nor presence according to difference, neither presence cutted as something according to absence or a sense of nothing, presence according to absence, being versus nothing, A versus no A as difference to B. both kind of presence are figure out negatibly, what is affirmed as presence is defined as such because it is not its opposite, nor a nothing, nor an absence nor a nonidentity which define identity, it is presence figured out according to the thinking of differences and plenum presence is not affected by differences not reduced to the game of the identical versus the non-identical because all its sides around and in its surrounding are restaurated, the substantial relations that made the game of identity as the coincidence with itself of something, as the sameness of something versus what it is not as the system of differences from which the identity receive its affirmation is already ravine, gully, break, smash, crush, annul, bend, fail, bankrupt, we already know in fact as Hegel brilliantly sustained that the game of identity and difference is breaked in diversity, an identity is as such because it is different to another identity, so that it opposite antithesis is already inside it breaking it own supposed to be unity or self-coincidence, a difference might be something as such because it is an identity different to another one and as such it is itself breaked by identity as its own negation and both are breaked and disseminated in diversity.
The game of identity and difference is one of substantialized entities to remember again Bourdieu constant insistence of the necessity to be critics against substantialism.
At the same time the game of pure difference without identity indeed overflows in the relation between mark and the unconcient as Derrida sustained, it is not only breaked in diversity since identity sake the weakening and weariness of difference and difference the one of identity, but as a substantial’s force it also entails the realm of the unconcient, whence it is nothing else but the definition of differed presence paradigmatically defined, the opposite of plenum presence.
This is not a way to negates or say that nothing is yet already to be discussed according to differences, but nothing less than presence correspond to the asistem of difference, what have difference of course around several kinds of issues, for example, difference is a sin equanon to the contemporary discussion on economies overall when we are thinking about capitalized relations as it is almost impossible to figure out the contemporary virtualization of the financial and credits system of economics in capitalism without understanding how difference made under it the form to conceive time and so on, but this is not casual or hazard that difference appear precisely around matters of absence, the idea of differed presences is highly connected with it and is one of the reasons for derrida to connect writing and difference, there are difference in many things, we can’t for example, erase difference when we need difference to be productives or to creates new sense over previous assigned senses to things, but the asistem of difference is always related with emptiness epistemologically, something is needed to be given as empty, difference in a few words is highly weaved with nothingness, absent and affected by marks toward us to think about non-presence or differed and proffered presences.
On the other hand if we attempt to attain in any case to relate difference with presence we will obtain nor only differed forms of presence but also we will recognize us again back to the idea of presence diluted and or not yet separated from appearance since thinking presence according to difference reduced everything to the moment of something appearing, to apparition itself, an certainly, we should recognize that to a certain point any thought on genesis is need nor only of structure but also of a certain difference, so that as soon as the idea of presence is considered within eidetic and noetic levels, pre-expressive and expressive wishes to say toward language as well as under presence in self conscience and in sign as exteriorized image of ourselves in front of us, a certain level of difference is yet there not as much as when difference is stablished as the realm from which everything revolves around negatives forms to define presence according to absences and identities according to non-identities.
There is also under the idea of difference a certain naiveté and a so simple idea of negation. Let just figure out this simplicity by recognizing how a more complex and rich idea of negation such as that evolved within Hegel negation of negation easily demonstrate the general futility of difference and overall the inferiority of the unconscious realm of difference in front of plenum presence by remembering a beautiful paragraph of Derrida when claiming the idea of alive presence as the more transcendental level of thought, the present of the present, discussed a more refined way to understand the superation of difference negation under the relation between negation of negation and the restauration of spacialities. Derrida sustained:
"Pure spatiality determine itself in negating the indetermination that constitute it, I mean, negating itself. Negating itself, this negation must be a negation determined, negation of the space by the space. The first spatial negation of space is the dot. The dote is the space without occupying space, a place without a place, it suppresses and substitute places occupying the place of space which at the same time negate and consevate. It negates spatiality the space but at the same time the dote goes to be in contact with itself, meaning, with another dot, and this is a first negation of negation, the spatial negation of the dote is the line, the dot retains and extend, it is sustained substituted by the line which constitute its true, but this negation is in a second level spatial, the dote is the line, the first being other, meaning, the spatial being of the dote. According to the same process of negation of negation the true of the line is the surface but this true of being other is a negation of negation again. The line become a surface which on the one hand is a determination in respect to lines and dotes, in this sense surface in general but which according with the same retained negation suppressed of the space it is at the same time the restauration of the totality of the space, of a space as a whole, the space have become then concrete and in reverse we must demonstrate the opposite that such a movement of producing the surfaces concrete totality of the space is a full circle and reversible. We can demonstrate that a line is composed of negated dots and the suffice of negated lines"
We are now concerned with the issue of the genesis of the sign by set up in the Forefront the question about if we may assume several simultaneous genesis of the sign.
On the one hand doubtedly the quest of the idealization by which the external pass by to the interiority of conscience and sprit in Hegel is a quest of a certain form of the sign as Derrida did, the sign itself is already in Aristoteles and later in Hegel, but I will attempt to demonstrate that such a form discussed by derrida as first form of presence of us in front of us as an exteriorized image of conscience might be elucidated as one of the phenomenological genesis of the signs.
We are here of course speaking on a certain kind of sign that one originated from the interiority universe of subjectivity and expression while at the same time in saying genesis we are at the same time recognizing a moment in which the sign is not yet as much a sign, the sign is nothing here with its own status yet it is unformed and or undiferiented yet.
On the one hand it is disseminated under conscience as presence of conscience in front of itself, something like saying that a sign is almost a reflected dimension or a repetition of the sensible multiplicity in another level of representation like conscience itself, recognizing the sign under it by identifying the exteriorized level of being inscribed in sound and writing outside the usual immateriality of conscience and or by identifying it among conscience as levels of signing something out is of course an undoubtedly wortly of derrida, while not without recognizing that over there sign is not fully already and not yet a sign, it is neither itself neither not itself, but it is borning, arising, rise, takin shape in its source.
Doubtedly this is an entery phenomenological issue and under an specific form of phenomenology that one revolves around conscience when the sign is diluted among what it is not and discovered within which it is ready to source to rise disseminated yet before and after. It is even less a sign yet when we quest for it within noetic and eidetic levels of stratus in experience.
We may of course do a move of revisiting all this zones after semiology and semiotics arises and merged as science of the sign and in that sense we might give try to work under that zones as if by using our well defined sense of what a sign is revisiting its zones of original phenomenological genesis.
But this is not the only genesis of the sign as soon as we are investigating and discussing the need to renew semiotic in a less separated idea of sign from hermeneusis we should quest for a balance.
Now well, the sign in pierce, also a theoretician based and inspired in Hegel is not as Derrida have assumed the idealization process that creates the flour of interiority, the sign in Peirce is not arising from there, not around conscience and self-confidence, not defined as a form to made presence in front of us, nor an exteriorized form to conscience to perceive itself exteriorized outside as language, this is not the way Peirce choiced and unveiled to seize and rise his theory of sign, far to this way the sign in peirce is unrelated with the progressive process of substitution of the sensible multiplicies and palpable sensoriality to perception, representation, conscience and the i, it is instead figure out according to the relation between language and reality.
According to peirce a sign can be something even physical meaning an object outside our conscience and interior subjectivity for example in identifying indicial signs we have many levels of signs outside subjectivity.
On the other hand he identified how language name the qualities of things and how the relation between names and substance helps to recognize and difference objects in between, his attention was cognitive and as such focused in the coordination process that relates language with reality.
Certainly and Peirce defined it a sign is something in the place of another thing but it doesn’t have to be a word in regard to its referential object, it may be an ordinary object which is in the place of another thing signalizing it.
We have then through peirce another genesis of the sign different to that assigned to Hegel by derrida in defining Hegel system as a semiology.
For example a form of plenum presence in which we have signs in the physical sense Natural and social signs are of major meaning here, for example, a person who I am now earing outside my door through the stairs is to me inside home a sign of someone who will probably call in my door or who will continue through the stair to another flour like a neighbour.
However, I will recognize a wortly to Derrida way to interpret Hegel, according to me and my understanding on this issue, Derrida discussion on Hegel may help to anticipate a well needed philosophical reconstruction today–In habermas sense of the use of this notion—of philosophical anthropology recalling from a new and renewed perspective Cassirer earlier efforts.
In fact, to me, what I am defining here as a phenomenological genesis of the sign might be considered in this book on new avenues between philosophy and sociology as a further possibility for philosophical anthropology.
In Derrida words
"Conscience, the phenomenological is thus the true of the soul, meaning of what constitute precisely the object of anthropology, conscience is the true of man, phenomenology is the true of anthropology"
bibliography
Habermas Junger, Ciencias Constructivas y Reconstructivas: conciencia Moral y Acción comunicativa
Hegel, ciencia de la Lógica, Hachete
Derrida Jacques, La Pirámide y el Pozo: Introducción a la semiología de Hegel, catedra
Derrida Jacques, Ousia and Gramme: Notes on Zeit and seit, margins of philosophy, the university of Chicago press
Derrida Jacques, Form and Wishes to Say: Notes on the phenomenology of language, margins of philosophy, the university of Chicago press
Derrida Jacques, The ginebra Linguistic Circle, margins of philosophy, the university of Chicago press
Derrida Jacques, The Supplements of the couple: Philosophy in front of linguistic, margins philosophy, the university of Chicago press
The Door swing between self and the symbolic
©By Abdel Hernández San Juan
Written in english and translated to english by Abdel Hernandez San Juan
"When the subject is constituted in the mind under the effect of principles, the mind apprehends itself as a self, for it has being qualified. But the problem is this: if the subject is constituted only inside the collection of ideas, how can the collection of ideas be apprehended as a self, how can I say “I”, under the influence of those same principles?. We do not really understand how can we move from dispositions to the self, or from the subject to the self. How can the subject and the mind, in the last analysis, be one and the same inside the self?. The self must be both a collection of ideas and a disposition, mind and subject. It is a synthesis, which is incomprehensible, since it ties together in its notion, without ever concealing them, origin and qualification"
Gilles Deleuze, The Problem of knowledge and of ethics, Empiricism and subjectivity
Once time clear a way the relations between self and acervo –see my book on this title—with its three discussed levels, 1- the relation between the individual and the social, 2- the one between experience, memory and acervo and 3-the self-representation one, clear away too, after untangled the skein of presence plenum presence versus differed presences, thus as the concept sensibly mediation of subject and object, we are ready to return over my theorization of the self now to analyze how work not only the reflect of culture under the phenomenology of the individual self but also the symbolic and symbols in general to the self-interiorized idealizations in regard to the phenomenological genesis of sign and its social exteriorization.
Ïn fact, I think that the universe of idealization interiority we will focus in this essay is a universe of symbols more than of signs something required to a differenced distinction between symbols and signs occupied the attention of several semiologists before us.
Differently to signs even after the enlarged of the domains of sign to cover analogic and digital signs in visual levels such as the iconic, signs are usually cutted between the material side of the sign from which denotation arises and the object beyond, no matter if we are speaking on clues, indicial signs and or icons through conventions as it happen in alphabetic language, agreements of prestablished meanings differently even to the relation between name and naming in signs, and considered at the level of the sign seem in derridean terms, as the first form of apparition of us in front of us, an exteriorized mark of our conscience, symbols are not cutted between something and another thing it have taked its place, nor between form and reference, language and referentiality, form and denotation.
Before well seen from the hermeneusis culture is itself we recognize that taking distance of signs by isolating form, reference and code as something itself, is far to understand how the signs are integrated in the general hermeneusis of culture, and only through this recognition we arrive progresibly to the universe of symbols identifying as just a moment of general symbolism defined by more general relations between language and society, language and culture, culture and nature.
This is about connotative relations of meaning and meaningfulness, sintagms and paradigms and less on clues, references, denotations and codes, meaning, that the semantic relations between form and content are more openness and less prestablished in between forms and objects.
But we will not have to extend us much on this distinction of semiotic but instead to stablish the universe of the self to understand how everything corresponding to signs is diluted and or disseminated under a more general symbolism.
Now well, the analysis of this relation between symbolism and the self-bring us to necessarily survey another zones of the symbolic in front of which symbolism and the self as a relation itself might be cutted as specific to it, meaning distinguishing the autonomy of this relation on the background of other kind of exchanges and traffics of the symbolic in culture unrelated with the self-such as on the one hand, intersubjectivity, on the other, symbols seen as socially exteriorized objectivity as well as symbols considered under the general pragmatic of communication defined by emissary, message, envoy and reception, whence the universe of the self and symbolism constitute an specific area separated from such another dimensions.
This idea of cutting the zone and or areas of the self-relation with symbolism is not as much related with my usual concept of cutting since cutting as I use to conceive this notion presuppose cutting in culture things according to parameters stablished by us, in this case the cutting activity is just recognizing something already cutted in the nature of that relation beyond our methodological purposiveness while to a certain point we must identify thus that if we don’t establish in anticipation the autonomy of this cut framed under a microsociology perspective instead of a macro it may also be diffused and or unledged and diffused outside the specific area correspond with a relation majorly and mainly defined by the concept and empirical domain of the individual person.
We are in fact speaking here only about individual persons seen as an isolated monad selfsameness separated from the any other thing in the biological, physical and social world as a single individuality, and considering this notion from two well defined western perspectives, the jean piaget concept of the individual development and learning process as based in process of progressive differentiation meaning that the autonomy of the self-individuation is highly evolutioned since it is differenced from society and the Helbet mead concept of the development of the individual as result of a highly richness relation between the individual self and the social.
We have here between the isolated single individual and the symbolic a relation between its self and his I that work in a micro level and creates a whole avenue and autonomous serie on how the symbols work.
First "the I" is alone with his self and the whole horizont which represent to "the I" the social world of the others had relish to be extrinsique and pass by to be intrinsique reflected under the idealization of the interior world of subjectivity phenomenology, the world of the others is here considered only as individuated image and such individuation has transformed that image.
In the assure process of taking distance on himself "the I" and the self-envoy and receive in between a mutual enrichment and exchange within both, the self-envoy and receive images from "the I" and in reversal "the I" envoy and receive images from "the self" -inside the individual interior subjectivity according to how the self-had individuated the image of the others and created inside that interiority images on how seen himself as if seen by the others, this otherness however is already his own image of the image the others have on him according to how the individuation process processed that images, meaning, on the one hand, that ti is his own image idealized of the others inside his subjectivity as well as the fact that the self is being itself permeated by that relations stablishing the transformation of his alter ego within his self-stim in relation to the social, "the I" envoy to the self a memory image of his own coincidence with himself, meaning a kind of retained, conservated and memorized sense to seize his identity while the self-receive that image and processes it according to how being permeated by a current social environment of culture, the social and values, he has individuated constantly as it is transforming him as single individual meaning the process of becoming.
But this interiority of the individual is fully made my symbols, let see that from the more diminute space understanding how in the process itself of the formation and taking shape of the interiority as result of the idealization process creates its flour the sense participates in defining it as a symbolism by quoting a Derrida paragraph on how the universe of senses participates symbolized in the taking shape of our inside interior subjectivity and its feelings. Derrida sustained:
"On one part, the voice unifies the anthropological naturality of the natural sound to the psiquique-semiotique ideality, it articulates, thus, the philosophy of the sprit on the philosophy of nature, and, in the philosophy of the sprit its concept is thus the The Door swing between anthropology and psychology. Between these two sciences we know is inscribed phenomenology of the sprit or science of the experience of the conscience
On the other part, this phonic relation between the sensible and the intelligible, the real and the ideal, is determined here as a relation of expressivity between an inside and an outside.
Keeping the inside in itself, even when is envoy to outside, it is by excellence what confers existence, presence, the dasein to the interior presentation, it made to exist, the concept, the meaning. But at the same time interiorize and temporalize the dasein, act of spatial sensible intuition, language exalt the existence itself, it set it in its true and produce thus a kind of promotion of presence. It made the pass by of the sensible existence into representative, intellectual existence of the concept, it is a pass by as this one what defines the moment of articulation transforms the sound in a voice noise in language
It is in light, the neutral and abstract element of apparition, pure mean of phenomenality in general how nature is related with itself, in light nature is manifested, we can see it, it sees itself, in this first reflexive articulation, the opening of identity is at the same time the opening of subjectivity. light is the first ideality, the first autoafirmation of nature, in light nature become by first time subjectivity
Correlatibly Sight is the ideal sense, the more ideal one, by definition and as well it indicate its name more than touching and taste
We might also say that sight gives the sense to theory, it suspends the wishes, let thing to be in reserve or prohibit the consummation. The visible have in common with the sign what Hegel expressed that we can’t eat it
However if sight is ideal the hearing is more ideal yet even considering the ideality of the light and of the gaze, the objects perceived by the eye, hearing is more ideal yet, it is the more sublime of the senses, as sight it is a part not of the practical’s but of the theoretical senses, but it is even more ideal that the sight, it is the first and more ideal manifestation of the soul, the sound corresponded to interior subjectivity as sound is itself more ideal than corporality which really exist, it renounce even to that ideal existence and become the expression of the interiority"
Such a quite of Derrida discussion is highly extensive and encompass a discussion about how each one of the sense participates in the taking shape of the idealization process creates our interior subjectivity but following the whole discussion will exceed the focus of this paper task around the relation between the self and the symbols.
Thus, we have symbols in the taking shape of the interiority of the self from the moment what made its identity as single is in a narrow form related with the process of differentiation of himself in front of another singularities, here the concept of difference is not untangled yet in respect to the skeins of it, but assumed in the clear sense Piaget has regarded it under the analysis of the process of learning creates the evolutionary process of becoming self-defined, an individuality become each time more individualized as much as the flour of his interior world of subjectivity become differenced inside itself and regard to the others, this is what made the pivotal place of the self-inside the subject, the process of giving form to both the sameness of the self-identity with itself and the processing inside it of the others world.
Whence, it is on the opposite site of how symbols work among intersubjectivity, in this case the symbols are envoys going and returning in the objective, external interaction of the subjects communication, there is of course a moment in which each individual process what he received as said from the other incorporating it to its sameness interiority, but even in this moment there is no time within intersubjective relation and communication as to process it depperly, intersubjective interactions are defined by the velocities of exteriorized processing’s, in this sense what each subject may do is remembering it later alone while no longer intersubjectibly interacting.
Hence in this case such a memorized later interaction is again incorporated as an image into the idealization process creates the interiority of subjectivity and as such it turns again to be an image the subject creates seen himself as seen by the others or "as if" while through an already idealized image of the alterego, further, "the I" see himself as the self is providing to it a processed image of the interiorized externals interactions with others permeated his becoming, but this becoming are already again transformed from the internal subjectivity, we must probably at this point recognize that through the time usually available during intersubjective interactions, the individual subject fastly incorporates the sayings and reactions of the others, but without a response is required by the contingencies of the pragmatics of the interaction itself and by the way there is not time to the subject to elaborate its responses, within intersubjective communication the subject don’t have the sufficient time to process and interiorize the symbols among the universe of his individuation and this is the main reason to exclude effective intersubjectivity in the analysis of the well-defined zone characterize the relation between the self and the symbols.
Within the self the subject is no longer interacting but alone with itself, he now have all the time needed to interiorize and process the memories of the permeability defined the pass by of the external through the strainer of his internal world, this is now a monologue instead of a dialogue and as such everything regarding others is already transformed in symbols and idealized ideals of the as if.
Within intersubjective communication we have two external dotes, it is like in a ball game one shoot the ball the other one receive it and shoot it again but now with enuntiative sayings as sending and receiving symbols, it is also like in a phone call dialogue, one enunciate a sound and the other one have to response fastly, certainly there is a moment when each one have a certain time to elaborate while listening but as soon as the other silence appear an answer should be foreseen, so that the source, the rise, the genesis that phenomenologically process the symbols is completely different if we compare the time for processing that individuation provide to the subject already alone with his self, now all the experience is no longer interacting outside, but idealized within the interior world, everything regarding symbols start then to be processed under an autonomous avenue to the symbolic and as such the analysis of the weaves between symbolism and the self is required of an attentive focus in its unique phenomenology.
Under this autonomous dimension symbols functions as self-intelligibility addressed toward the sameness of the self-meaning as readings of himself we use to call ways to know best our self or ways to go or visit our self as self-readings, trips, travels or internal journeys or more precisely as travecies or routes to the deep interiority and identity of the self, this work as a recognition by "the I" in front of the social something "the I" receive and process through the self as the self-contain the individuation process which both interiorized but also idealized and transform the permeability of the internal to the external, experience, acervo, backgrounds, social and cultural symbolized universe of the others, here symbols are routes, tours whose task is to attain ways to catch a glimpse, to make out dimly, to search, to discern, to scan, to rummage, to scrutinize or examine carefully, to explore and unveil, something bring us to the relation between hermeneutic, self-psychoanalysis and archaeology.
Hence the cultural contents of symbols through this autonomous zone of the weaves between the self and symbols, usually work in two similar but differentiated dimensions, one of this dimensions can be identified as immaterial from the moment we are not speaking on spell objects or images of the outer work such as for example affective objects, images or icons of affective relevance to the subject, but only with, like in alphabetic language, immaterial symbols of things, like words are, here the symbols are plenty in abstractions, transformed as idealized synthesis of their meanings by the effect of sound spectra’s and or memories of the visual, and usually accompanied by kinds of self-monologues narratives or narrative correlates creates a chain of the meaning associated to such symbols spectra’s, but there is not yet here the recurrence to outer objective objects and icons, perhaps and before well, routes of trips to the self-accompanied by the narrative chain of meanings spectra’s associated to certain symbols, this work similarly to daily soliloquies in remembering and memory, like for example, when the subject narrate to himself the main things done during the day at night in the bed reconstructing by fragments moments of what he said to others, what he hear or what he retained as well as the chain of things it activated within his subjectivity about his memories, experiences and certainties, while not as much reconstructing something but in a similar form revisiting by fragments the self.
Another must be defined as objectual since now the trips are not made with the fancy or the general use of imagination, but in regard to concrete outer objects, each subject usually have a collection of objects, icons, and image he or she associate usually through self-narratives to his own experience, this collection of objects use to have specific affective values, this can happen with ordinary daily objects surround the subject habitat and life, this zone tend to be highly evolutioned and developed when the objects in question are no longer passive objects of a routine surround but mostly objects elaborated expresibly so that the so-called trip or travel to deeper moments of the self can be addressed and explored outside associating narratives of experience with highly elaborated objects, in this case instead of a relation between hermeneutic, archaeology and self-psychanalysis we have the major intervention of semiotic.
From the moment the outer objects are not only related by the subject through self-narrative to his memories and collection but objective meanings under codes in a culture, the trip under the self ever characterized by the world of otherness filtered and transformed by the idealization process of individuation, might be defined as a semiotic trip which consist about relating the semantique levels of the objects, images and icons itself with the semantique levels such objects activates in a associative network with symbolisms of the self, at this point semiotic is encompassed and mixed with hermeneutic, archaeology and self-psychoanalysis in a form that remember ways explored outer by barthers earlier as for example, his analysis of hearing.
Now as obvious we don’t have here a psychoanalyst as an objective person outside the individual person but the individual person itself become his own psychoanalyst, a semiological trip whose task is not about returning someone from a disease to a normal situation, but a normal sane subject with a good health who however is committed to do this travels in order to know himself better, to go in deep about his own symbolic universe, in a few words, a subject committed to be each time more a best person as possible.
This issues I know by experience seems to be sometimes missunderstanded because the pragmatic sense of life contingencies seems to feel it as strange, why to go in deep if all we need as sane persons is to act according to the practical contingencies of our life, well, we believe, as critical subjects, that every person is a collection of experiences and this experiences cumulated during life are not available at the same time to the presence of the subject zone of operations in the pragmatic contingencies of life, in this sense, all that cumulated dimension use to be abandoned by the pragmatically incorporated operational subject and as much as this accumulation is abandoned as much as the subject become unconcient of his own deeper self, but overall the main importance of this exploration is given by the major fact that the self itself reflect a process of constant permeability according to be a subject constantly becoming another so that without this exploration the subject stay at the skin level unknowing himself each time less and less, here we have the ordinary common sense question, who I am?, who I am becoming?, I know myself ? which have as individualized correlate the more general question about who we are?.
This unknown disatended and usually hidden zone to the subject appears in life as limitations of the person when in front of certain challenges he or she recognize to be limited and or uncapable, from interpersonal relations to social work and or situations, by this reason the subject use to be usually limited to comply himself, to have access, to comply this zone, the subject need a language, without a language which can only be obtained through quest the subject can’t indeed to comply it, and to made or take shape of that language there is a hard work to be done.
We are speaking here on an area visited only by those who being persons committed with self superation through reading books and the idea of never stopping the commitment to study outside and beyond formal studies, recognize the necessity of knowing the self as part of life, maybe defined as usual between some kind of artists as those depperly committed with the richness and complexities of process while we can’t forget that it’s a zone that appear as major to any kind of subjects in certain moments of life, something about which there is today a whole literacy even highly commercial of self-help covering areas from how to be efficient regarding business and enterprises, to how to assume pregnancy and the education of our sons, this literature contain a lot of material on self-tripas.
Near to our sense of biography, it is not however biography at all.
It is not in fact biography in the sense of a person collection of experiences organized according to a socially exteriorized list of things done in the social objective world or in terms of the facts of things done understanded as list of contiguities plus to plus collected or juxtaposed, neither biography in the sense of a history of the individual in respect to social general history as a kind of history of the person, but before well as symbols through experience and acervo are constantly actualized by the constant transformations evolved in the taking shape of the self and the permanent modification of the relations between the self and the social, something evolving a unique way of processing inside each single person understanded here synchronically each time again and again when biography appear a something to be gathered again, recollected, retired again from the world, pick up each time again, to lock up, to take shelter, to call, in a few word to meet again with ourselves.
Doubtless we indeed know in our highly pragmatized universe that an individual can experience his whole life stranger to his self, accepting a permanent so to speak ignorance of his self by living in the skin of his practical social interactions alike and in conformity, resigned so to speak with the highly typified world he or she share with others as contingencies in his life, without monological revisitations to his interiority avoiding to know him or herself, but even in this cases, we will ever attempt to identify any individual person defined by a monadic single universe from which his single isolated gaze take shape on his external universe, a self-sameness singularity belonging to his unique processing of symbols under the perspective on his isolated single condition.
On the other side in a level less submerged in the flour of interiority, symbols also translate, far to only be tullfully to the tours through the several stratus and substrates of the self between the know, the unknown and the quest under it, symbols also translate to the self in its own individuated language the meanings implied and supposed to him by the alterity of the social world expressed and symbolized from such individuation.
Here the usual image to us is that one of the mirror, in front of the mirror the individual acquires an image of himself he never has lonely, from his isolation alone the individual never have an image of his own body, he can’t see himself as the others seen him, in the mirror, even yet alone he has a first impression about how others seen him albeit this is nothing more than an illusion still hence he never attain to fully have a complete image of a full surrounding objetibly of his externality as others usually obtain it, seen by the others, he is an object between the objects, but he can’t attain such an image by himself on him, it is always an idealization reflected in his interiority in the mode of an "as if", meaning "as if" seen by the others, but only seen by himself alone again, this is this what the mirror exteriorize to him as a symbolized dimension, and this is of course, before having an effective mirror in front just a teatralization of the others reflected in the self, something that start as a monologue but with time of individuation acquire a highly differentiated level of processing from which such a phenomenology is less an idealization of the other and becomes transformed by the self, here we have what the concept of interiorization mean when we say interiorizing the social world, something that frequently become provided by irrepetible and unique singularity and beside of renewed senses as soon as retuned now socialized under expressions as the products of internal languages elaborations.
Now, when we see from outside exteriorized as socialized languages in the social world the effective objective presentation of such language sake by highly elaborated interiorization we lost in the form of expression—substance of expression—the clues to objectibly connect with precision how this language are exactly connected with such an interiority, it is already outside such an interiority and as such exposed to objective rules of decodification.
But the mirror is also paradoxically the confirmation to the idealized interiority of subjectivity that the coincidence with itself of the identity of the selfsameness monad of the individual and his or her self, is alone again with itself in all its objectivity nor only as confirmed by the isolation of the internal, besides, it is a repetition seen outside reflected in the mirror of exactly what happen regarding otherness as reflected inside internal subjectivity, a way to look to himself "as if seen" by the others, but as something already reflected in the fancy of his own isolation, this now confirmed also as objectivity as the mirror reflect not an immaterial ideal in conscience but a real reflection of the body as objective outside its own.
The more amazing paradox however is what happen outside when highly internalized social or cultural issues transformed inside from the self are back as socialized exteriorized response in front of the real others. Something allow us to say on this matter that the others are never capable to reconstruct and or have access to how such a visibly individuated way to elaborate objective symbols are connected to the internal processing of the individual self, we don’t have in fact a way to comply that inside by just objects, icons and signs outside exteriorized even when phenomenology is precisely the science we have to try it, we can, of course, do several things, we can take note of our own processing’s through the our own sense of the otherness idealized and internalized and as such made use of a certain sense of universality too, by comparition and thus inferences, use the seizes of the sense of symbols under conscience to imagine and figure out how another, which is now by this question reversed, the one who was an internal subjectivity now seen in outside language as otherness while we are the internals, might or must have to relate motivations, intentionality’s and wishes to say with ways of meaning and symbolize.
We can also ask them as to have additional supplementary information on what is simply visually seen or hear in a language as well as we can solicit access to self-expressions and other forms of confidential materials, this is more easy for example through workshops cycles when the subjects in question establish an agreement to exchange speaking on their internals and or therapy sessions while difficult if we are constrained by the usual pragmatics of public and medias communications subjected to message, code, reception modes of semiological communication.
This is in fact a dilemma, symbols on the one hand make sense to the self when reflected into the interiority without yet returning in expressive forms to the outer world, makes sense to the trips of the self through its own stratus and stratifications, but as soon as it is exteriorized as expressive forms as socialized languages to the universe of real others, it starts to be progresibly far to the internal universe sake it. Thus, under intersubjectivity as well as pragmatics of communication of message, code and reception, the symbols lost again that internal source disseminated within polysemy’s and multiple interpretations without a guaranty to be back on the reasons and motives creates it.
According to somes the only way to guaranty such a sense is through the so-called closed doors forms of communications more usual and frequent within settings of pedagogy without external observers, within certain kind of workshops in which the form of communication is stablished by consensus in agreements by each one of the participants prestablished rationality of communication, we say some kinds, because there is as we all well know semantical variations of the concepts as workshops and labs in which directors and or authorities addresses it toward purposiveness, objectives and forms of taking decisions, without agreements with the participants in nothing related with what the participant want, so only seldom through highly rare and unusual forms of communications such conditions of closed doors are really possible with basis in a real agreement between each one of the participants.
But let just forget that by the moment and be back in the phenomenology of the self about which I am proposing the possibility of cultural analysis under individualized phenomenology’s.
One of the major senses of symbols to the self are related with the affective dimensions of it overall if we understand affect from the perspective of fondness related with sentiments, feelings and emotions, something is affective individually speaking when love is the rule of it and when love is the main content evolved in it, the self identify symbols idealized through the inmaterialized form of imagination and according to the affective contents associated with senses and meanings the subject has assigned to it so that the external become interiorized under a certain choice and selective work which usually evolve the habits of the subject in a surrounding affective environment.
In fact a meaningful number of the objects and environments surround the individual world pass by through the affective dimension to the self-phenomenology transformed inside it according to affects, nothing without affects use to be usually accepted by the individual flour of the interiority and we can attempt and attain to even demonstrate that as soon as affectibly identified by sympathy the self-transform everything in symbols, I will even say at this point that what transform it in symbols is precisely the affect.
We must thus at this point made a distinction between my sense of the word affection constrained by relations of love and other uses of the semantical senses of this word.
For example, the spinosa definition of affection is far to our understanding of it.
Let remember by a moment spinosa well know definition of it
"Wishes is the essence of man as much as conceived as determined to work something by any given affection in it
Explanation: he expressed above at the escolio of proposition 9 that wishes is the appetite with the conscience of it and that appetite is the essence of main as much as determined to work what serves to it conservation
By in the same escolio I foreseen that indeed I don’t recognize any difference between the human appetite and wishes. Thus more or less concient the man of its appetite, this appetite remain, however, one and the same, whence, to avoid tautology, I avoided to explain wishes by appetite, but defining it in a manner that all the struggles of human nature designed with the name of appetite, wishes, impulse and volunteer, comprehend both joining it together, I would might say, in effect, that wishes is the essence of man as much as conceived as determined to work something, but in this definition is not supposed as derived that the soul may be conscient of such wishes and appetite. Whence, with the purposiveness to include the sake of this conscience, I considered necessary to include an addition sentence, as much as determined by an affection given in it. Thus by affection of human essence I understand any disposition of this essence, well innate, well acquires, or by extension, referred to both wishes and appetite at the same time, I understand thus under the denomination of wishes all the struggles, appetites and volitions of man which according to the diverse disposition of man are diverse and seldom opposed in between, that man is drag and carry away and don’t know were is going"
Nothing as far to my definition of affect than the spinosa one, to spinosa affect was considered in the sense of everything that affect man so affection was almost diluted by him under the idea of the external world incidence on man as everything affecting man and disseminated under wishes and appetite in regard to man human nature.
When we say affect in contrast to the former, we are meaning something radically different, we are meaning in agreement with Jacques derrida that affect is a selective activity defined by choices and or by preferences constrained and sake, determined and subjected to love, only there were the human being feel love that is transformed into affective and affection in general is nothing else than another name or the more general name we have to define all we choice to be in relation with between those things than mean love to us, anything nor evolving love to the subject is rejected by the self, "the self" is certainly not as selective as "the I" which really reject almost everything, but as belonging to the individual person interior subjectivity and as part of the whole defines the sameness of the person as much as specialized in translating the social world to the internal as much as choosing only what mean love to the subject.
Back then to the former definition, only through affect the extrinsique is transformed into the intrinsique by the self and only through affects anything processed from the external world is possible to be transformed into symbols, internal symbolism in fact is nothing else but affection.
This is not a way to say that I don’t have certain point of coincidences with spinosa, according to him man is carry away as man don’t know to where he is going as according to him dominated by wishes and appetite, this is out of doubt sustained since to spinosa man have to devote his love only to god and let it to god determinations the destine of man, while to me man is certainly wrong in giving so to his intentional and instrumental purposes, but instead of to let his destine in the hands of god, to be open to a plural listening remembering Barthes know phrase, a plural listening is needed when love instead of convenience and lineal purposes, regulates the horizonts of his wishes, in Spanish we have a best word to that which is wrong: voluntarism.
When I recognizer an affective dimensions of symbols to the self I am considering the concept of affect distinguished between fondness and unfodness, affective is that to which we have a fondnesss something that by certain motives we want and is retained as agreeable, pleasant, acceptable, related with a sense of gratitude, something we don’t want to unfasten or to detach or untie as easier, something about which we return to it always with a feeling of love.
However, affect is not an intrinsique propriety of the objects and symbols themselves but before well a feeling of the subject something belong to the universe of subjectivity thus for example let imagine a person not so familiarized with rock as music and culture, not to the rock symbols, faces, hears, dresses, body attitudes , images, words and texts to such kind of persons rock is identified with a chain of things unrelated with affect but all the contrary with unfasten, but to a young girl who thanks to rock culture learned from her earlier life to express herself against the restrains of conservative culture on her body and feeling expressions we might imagine the sense of affect that rock as culture means to her, it probably helped her to meet her first boyfriend and or even starting her sexual life, so that even if later in her life she have take distance from rock environments it will ever be a symbol of affect in her life.
Here we have a clear example about we can’t adjudicate affect to certain things instead of another, affect belong to the subject not to symbols and objects as much.
Another example, to a certain individual the cutted hair of another person seen for example in the flour of a cutting hair shop might have connotative escatological things of bad taste or a sensation of superstition but to another person to which the hair belongs as a memory of the cutted hair when he or she was a child or as the hair of his or her grandmother hair it have an affective content an is provided by a sense of love and fodnees.
We must then extend this to many things from our surrounding environments of life and habitat in which multisensoriality, liveness and experience are evolved, like in the rock example whole even by more reasons things such as television and medias accompanying our everyday life at home such as the internet become symbolized with a sense of affect to the idealization of the interior world subjectivity and its self-phenomenology, this is the case also to free market and publicities surrounds our everyday quotidian cities environments.
Here we have the Bachelard analysis on the house, on the intimacy living room, on the noises of the city which the subject transform in affective symbols as soon as having to experience a convival with it for example during the sleeping moment the noise of the city from another perspective seen as strange become by repetition associated with affective senses of custom.
We have stablishes in the former discussion the self of the individual person seen as a plenum individual and understanding it in piaget and mead sense while discussed how the idealized sense of the social as otherness entrance to isolated and selfsameness monadic interiority of the single subject, how the real others avoided through and transformed by imagination as an alter ego evolving to the self the subject self-esteem, but we must yet be deeper in discussing this sense of the liveness individual by remembering a beautiful definition of it by Hegel
Hegel said:
"Live considered only as such a negative unity of its own objectivity and particularization is a life refereed only to itself, life exist by itself, meaning that it is itself a soul. With this life is essentially an individual who is referred to objectivity as his otherness, the original judgement of life consist hence in that life is separated as an individual subject in respect to the objective. Whence, life is a first place have to be considered as an alive individual which is itself a subjective totality or whole and which is presupposed as indifferent in front of an objectivity which is in front of him or her as indifferent too itself.
In a second sense live is a vital process. In the taking shape of the alive individual itself it is already in tension against its originary presupposition and set itself as subject in front of such a presupposed objective world. The subject is an end in itself which have its means and subjective reality in objectivity, in this form it is constituted as the independent essential in front of the external world which have only to him a negative value which lack of independence. In its own sentiment about himself the liveness individual have the certitude of the nullity of this objective external existence itself since it lack of independence and as such it is to him an otherness in front of him
His impulse is the necessity to the alive individual to eliminate such an otherness to give to himself the certitude of his own certainly, his independence. The individual as subject, its subjective process in itself from which he grow and the immediate objectivity he set as a natural mean adequate to its own concept, is mediated by the process referred to such an exteriority seen as an objective totality outside him as its otherness, an otherness which is joined with him, in coexistence with him and indifferent to him as much as he is indifferent to it
This process start with the necessity, meaning with the moment from which the alive individual thus reference to an objectivity which is an otherness in front of him, this is the impulse to set by himself in that world another to him, to eliminate it and to objectify himself, this is the reason because his self-determination have the form of an external objectivity and by the fact that he is identical to himself at the same time.
However, as such as this negative moment is realized in the form of his own objectivity particularity, meaning, as such as the essential moments of his own unity are realized by itself as a whole, his own independent totality, the concept become itself unfold thus in its absolute inequality with itself and because of the absolute division of this two things, the alive individual is thus by itself this unfold and have as its own sentiment this contradiction
This division of the alive individual in itself is a sentiment interiorized in his sensibility. The identity which is in the impulse of his subjective certitude of himself according to which the alive individual reference to the external world as an indifferent existence, as an appearance or as another reality which is to him inessential and lack of concept. Such an external reality need to receive or acquire a concept that only can acquire in the subject as an immanent end, meaning, the indifference of the objective world in front of the immanent determination of the subject as subjective end
This transformation of the process of the alive individuality constitute the return of such an external objectivity to itself by and only through subjects end and its own end by that reason the production of such a pass by to another the subject of the alive individual versus the objective reality become a reproduction in which the alive individual set himself as identical with itself, he give to himself the feeling and sentiment of himself, in fact, he set himself as what he is meaning as identical to himself being another and or an otherness to such an exteriority, so he set himself as indifferent to it, this is nothing but the unity of the negative of the negative
Through the realized process in relation with the presupposed world at the same time he set himself by itself as the negative unity of his being another, as the base of himself. The individual is thus the reality of the idea in a manner as such that now he produces himself from reality as before produced himself only from the concept, this source before given as presupposed is now transformed in its own production
However, the further determination attained by the mean of eliminating the supposed to be opposition, is nothing more than to be a genre as identity with his previous being indifferent, this idea of the individual being such an identity is his particularization
This division according to the totality from which he is originated, the duplicity of the individual, is itself the presupposition of an objectivity identical with him and is a reference to the alive individual itself, as to another alive individual. The identity with the other, the universality of the individual is whence only internal and subjective".
A part of this symbolic universe is attended by psychoanalysis in the sense of Freud relating such symbolisms with sexuality even in the sense of Jung, but our attention here in not focused in that part of the affective dimension of symbols to the self.
This is not a way to say that we negate the importance of sexuality in life and the affective universe of the individual and the self, in fact, we believe that sexuality is a major very important dimension of affective life as well as to the self-formation and development, we are just pointing that our focus on the issue is not sexological as when sex is the object of analysis, our individual person in fact, we, any of us, me, you, he or her, is not here the object of a science studying him or her as an object, something more accurately related with psychology, our attention is focused instead on how the individual processing the social and cultural world through his or her idealized interiority take shapes of a self and in reverse, on how the self already formed as belonging to the individual, incorporate that world which permeate us from the social and cultural.
I believe certainly that through such phenomenology as a micro perspective seen from the fully individual as totality culture and society are both intelligible, readable and interpretable.
Thus as this sociological perspective evolve cultural analysis as something highly singularized through the individual phenomenology of the self I has called this self-ethnography.
The concept of ethnography however as we well know is also polemic and susceptible of confusions by several reasons, a considerable part of what ethnography was and is was referred to other people and cultures considered from the evolutionist point of view and from our western perspective as primitives and tribals, in this sense ethnography was usually seen as a science of people and societies distinct to us or from another ways as a native ethnology, meaning an ethnology done by ethnologists on their own culture.
My concept of ethnography is radically distant and separated from both senses and meanings of the concept both epistemologically and teleologically, as well as methodologically and ontologically in terms of its scientific basis.
First I am not speaking here on others and otherness considered as a matter of the stranger character of another culture to the culture of the author, nor about relations of otherness involving others defined as culturally differents or as relations between our western culture and nonwestern ones, but from a philosophical and sociological perspective I am speaking on the relation between the individual and the social in our own contemporary western culture in which to the individual any other in society is another and evolve symbolic otherness to the individual self, just like it is considered at the level of intersubjective communication, the one who enunciate is from his own gaze and self an I and the one who listen is another or an otherness to the first one and the same in reverse, the one who counter enunciate from his perspective is an I and a self and the one who first enunciated is now another involving symbolisms of otherness to the second one.
Also as discussed in this chapter at the level of the idealized interiorizations of that social dimension seen from the individual as something reflected under the self-phenomenology the social mean to the self-individual subject a sense of otherness and is transformed by the internal individual self while reflected under it to the point that we can from a plenty individualized sense do cultural analysis on the self-formation and transformations, philosophically and a sociologically around both concrete individuals in the empirical field and abstract individuals as ideals types universalities of the internal phenomenology of the self, developing reflections around experience, acervos, backgrounds, memories and so on, etc.
The individual is then here the I in a singular and a we in the plural universality contained in the I from the moment each individual is at the same time a single one identical with itself while separated from the social and a single of the plural at the social level of multiples ones, while as we well know the relation between the individual and the social discussed through the self-phenomenology is one about the mutual permeability of both sides the permeability of the self by the social and cultural and the socialization returns from the self to the social.
Why self-ethnography then to define a form of cultural analysis that is about ourselves in our own western culture?, instead of a native ethnology as the former mentioned above?, because the so-called native ethnology is about a culture considered as an ethnologically and ethnic constituted collective culture understanded outside of the individual or seen the individual as determined by such ethnological composition of a culture collectively, so from parameters completely outside of the individual.
A self-ethnography as I has defined instead of that it is not about a culture considered as the culture to which natives pertain, but culture is analyzed and discussed only through, from, cutted, framed, theorized, studied and comprehended inside the individual self-phenomenology and concerning only from what is reflected at this level.
This concept of ethnography is then accompanied here by the suffix self not as a native ethnology in regard to a collective culture to which that self-pertain, but from the perspective of the philosophical classical discussion on universal parameters of individuality, one and multiple, being and becoming, self and the social, in this sense we might sustain that here the concept of ethnography is recalled, redefined and retheorized from a discussion in philosophy that relocates epistemologically philosophical anthropology, as discussed in the previous chapter.
It is in fact, a concept belong to philosophical anthropology and as such incorporated into phenomenological sociology, instead of calling ethnomethodology from the tradition of western nonwestern cultures traditional ethnography, instead of incorporating symbolic interactionism of sociology under the inquiries and questions of ethnography in such a tradition referred above I am proposing exactly the opposite, the incorporation of ethnography retheorized from epistemology into ethnometology in contemporary, modern sociology which is in fact phenomenological sociology considering the whole chain of related notions, ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism and so on.
With all this say we understand the objection evolved in the question, if you are practicing phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology in the autonomous disciplinary tradition of sociology as a science on ourself as contemporary western culture, why to use the concept of ethnography instead of just saying ethnomethodology?
Well, I think that this an strong argument to be considered because it is without doubt a true, however, I have a series of questions in regard to this objection.
How to resolve the true that we don’t have in the tradition of phenomenological sociology –including ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism seen from the very autonomy of sociology as science cultural analysis and as soon as e are committed to include cultural analysis under the epistemological parameters of phenomenological sociology how to define and name what results from that?
I don’t have by now another answer to this question than defining it as self-ethnography, if I find in the future a better way less susceptible to semantique confusions about a concept, than this one, I will for sure let know about it to my readers.
By which I mean excluding mixings resulted from the opposite sort of move when ethnomethodology from sociology is incorporated by from and into the kind of ethnography mentioned above since such mixings at the level of this regard on disciplines autonomies might creates a confused image of what ethnomethodology was and is itself seen from and how it born and grow in sociology autonomy before being incorporated into ethnography.
Can we do however re-incorporations might be then the next logical question? by which I mean now asking if can we from phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology at sociology disciplinary autonomy since exploring cultural analysis as something new in this tradition in sociology, re-incorporate into our research references to forms of ethnography that from the old sense of ethnography discussed above had incorporated into it ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism from sociology?. Well the answer to this question must be considered as a matter of both choosing it with pincers when pertinently needed in empirical cases of cultural analysis and considering specific cases epistemologically evaluated from the rules of sociology autonomy.
Bibliography
Bachelard Gaston, La poética del espacio, breviarios, fondo de cultura económica
De spinoza Baruch, Etica, Demostrada según el orden geométrico, fondo de cultura económica
Deleuze Gilles, The Problem of knowledge and of ethics, Empiricism and subjectivity, an essay on Hume theory of human nature, Columbia university press
Derrida Jacques, Introduction to Hegel Semiology, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press
Derrida Jacques, Introducción a la semiología de Hegel, Márgenes de la Filosofía, Catedra
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Self and Acerbo, Pp, Self and Acervo
Hegel. Lógica del concepto, ciencia de la lógica, hachete
The Dialectique of evocation
©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
Written in English and translated to English by Abdel Hernandez San Juan
Evocation is a dialectique concept. It belongs to the kind of logical pairs which are at the same time sameness and opposites each one containing the other it is own identity. It is articulated between a logical pair and a thirst element which is outside it and in respect to what the pair logically go and return from the dyadic to the triadic.
However, evocation is a dialectique concept not in the sense of materialist dialectique as it is immaterial neither in the sense of a negative dialectique since as Stephen a Tyler said it is nothing entail with positive neither with negative things in respect to an essence or an identity.
If we pay attention to how Stephen A Tyler discussed it we will seen that according to him evocation habilitate language as that without which representation, tropes and writing wouldn’t be impossible. Seen in this sense, evocation is on the side of the genesis of language, on the other hand asking about if evocation pertain or belong to patters or structures susceptible to be manipulated by our concient action he answered that yes and not at the same time, yes because since it habilitate language is located on the side of making possible something to work with and the effective working with it, meaning the genesis of representation, writings and tropes, while not from the moment such languages are always in defect, they are more, to much and excessive or less, to little and limited in respect to what it means to substitute or express on our thoughts, evocation in fact do more than such languages since it flood the silences between the speakers and the nonlinear trajectories of sintagms and paradigms.
Stephen recommend evocation as the necessary mean to work with my concept of non-repetitive repetitions.
Seen in this perspective it is at the same time structure and genesis in regard to such lacks and excess of languages, but on the other side, it is the logical pair of representation, each one, representation and evocation contains the other as inclusive in its own identity, evocation is evocation because it is not representation and representation is as such because it is not evocation, but no one of each can be itself without the other one.
Corresponding to a logic of triadic principles it work in between the pair evocation-representation and a thirst element in between that is external to both, on the one side, the referential horizont evolving things, objects, realities or anything denoted and or connoted such as the objects by which the signs are substitutes and on the other the general sense evolved within the elucidation of it by subjects.
But how can evocation pertain at the same time to the genesis habilitate language and to the effective work with meanwhile it flood the silence of speakers and the linear trajectories of sintagms and paradigms?.
We should yet untangle more in regard to the skein tangle evocation in a comprehensive manner.
Let see it as follow.
The former brings us to differentiate between substantive, adjective, verb and subject distinguishing evocation, from to evoque, the evocative and the evocated.
The last one is in fact an effect not a sake itself, it is an effect of a former sake if we are in front of effective evoqued things.
I am not so addict to think in terms of sakes and effects since it is a logical pair evolving immanence’s and as such related with the physical, chemical and substantial universe defined by sequential relations of essentialism usually not pertinent in the world of language, society and culture, but certainly when defined as substantive it is evocation without a defined time, it is atemporal or intemporal and as such it inhabits all the forms of time and neither one, while considered as adjective it is evocative such as empirically regarding the datas of our senses needed of experiencing something evocative so that the a temporal and intemporal is ready to cede to an effect, in this sense evocation need to be experienced, lived and known as result of a motivated language inside communication or as relations between objects, images or things unmotivated but evocative to a subject from the mode of activating relations through remembering, memory or a more or less complex sense of association.
With this say we may explicit that evocation pertains to the universe of sense, it is maybe not a significants or a meaning, but a relation of senses, to be evocative something has to make a certain sense to us, hence, a sense needed to be evocative or consisting in an evocation.
Considered in this form related with sense, evocation belong to semantiques, but if we ask about what semantique is, the isotopies or trajectories of congruence’s by the mean of which we explicitate things, even regarded to that relations evolved in making sense such as differential relations between significants and significante or the interpretants we realize that evocation presupposes a form of sense nor always reduced to and or originated as source in signs, significants and interpretants while sometimes yes as well.
A sign might be evocative as well as a significant, but they are not evocation themselves thus this last one belong to a more immaterial order of sense irreducible to an specific matter of expression, it is not reducible to lexical, acoustic and graphic forms of inscription and is neither on the side of well precise and or delimited meanings, evocation is an open form of producing sense, a more indeterminate one instead of a highly codified message but at the same time it is irreducible to full openness and indeterminations since evoquing suppose a constellations of sense relatibly constrained by the evoqued and at least in that sense unrelated with entropy, zero degree of codification, polysemy’s and disseminations of senses and meanings.
Such another form of the sense nor limited to a highly codified circumscribed meanings neither to its opposite, entropy, polysemy, etc. allow us to understand that evocation empirically speaking can travel from very concrete mundane things, including sensoritality and sensibility, to very abstracts constellations of sense such as those needed by concepts.
Concepts work under a field of sense ever but at the same time as abstractions they are opens and indeterminated than an ordinary word at the dictionary by which signs means one thing instead of another, beside more closed is the field of senses suggested by a word or relations between words less evocative it results, but at the same time although open and indeterminate evocation is not like polysemy or dissemination when sense is near to approximate zero or diluted within entropy, rather evocation evolve a range of measurable senses constrained by what is evoqued even when indeed we may really ask ourselves to what point can we avoid the fact the any relation of sense is itself always evocation.
Evocation in this sense according to which certain forms of sense are near to than others is an effect instead of a sake which regard us no to simple unities such as the sign, the icon or the meaning, but to more complex relations of senses taking shape from grammars of much related elements.
But the unique of evocation within the richness of its own field of discussion, is about how it might travel from very conceptual complex and theoretical forms of knowledge to sensorial, sensible and even aesthetics ones forms of communication evolving some time plots and how it can travel from pure languages to non or less linguistics phenomena’s such as those defined by images and objects relations far to be ordered according to intentionality, purposiveness or motivational forms of discourses as for example when the associative links of remembering and memory evoques to us or when we relates natural things the effect of raining in front of us through the window and the city perceived behind the waters, or simply when we see a face in the middle of the city and it evoques to us the seize of the sense of a face or gesture we seen some when before, a situation that evoques something to us or a groups of photos as evocation of something experienced.
In this sense evocation inhabit all the moments of form without be reduced or constrained by form as its source.
Undoubtedly being sense evocation is not form nor an specific manifestation of form, but neither, following the logical pairs Hegel assigned to form, essence or content in one or another side. Not absent from representation, writing and tropes as mentioned above the otherness of evocation, its more near pair, its alterity and it opposite is nothing else than representation, it is art and part with evocation, even figuring out any matter vehicle for evocation to have a form, whether in the active form of a builded and composed language of intentionality or either in the passive form of relating things as already given, in both cases something, a language or a non-language such as images, object or extra verbal things must act as representation, meaningful substitution or cuasi representation. A relation of elements, images, objects, etc. as given to us in nature or reality is not representation itself but such as we relates those things in between in a form that evolves associative links of evocation, something act as a vehicle by which another things result evoqued, something has taked the place of another thing evoquing it or thought it, it may happen calling moments of our emotive memory, sensorial memory, from our experience or as Stephen defined it from our semantic and episodic forms of memory.
So that whether in the active form of remembering or in the passive form of memory thus as in memory as a totality which contrains what Stephen defined as zetesis, the logical pair of evocation is representation whether understand in the sense of perception and mimesis when representation is seen as form of reflect or imitations of the real, evocation bring inside itself a relation between an interpretant and a world or reality while without being reduced to the game of the interpretants less originated or source in it.
This is what I called the three thresholds of time according to which evocation can’t be retained nor in one neither in another, past, present or future but inhabiting the three dimensions at the same time something Stephen identified as a principle without sake, telos or origin so dispensing of time and space while working through it, something that undoubtedly link evocation with the main characteristiques of sense, I will even attempt to demonstrate that evocation and sense are almost the same, aspects of the same or nothing else than another name to the same with the exception to recognize that all the forms of sense are not always evocative, while it is difficult to avoid the fact that the idea of sense in itself is a form of evocation and that evocation is nothing else than sense.
Thus evocation is a general form of sense irreducible however to isotopies and semantique explicitation in general even when all this is impossible without evocation, albeit at the end, from the side of language manipulation, evocative sense are obtained from isotopic and semantique explicitations.
Being a form of sense I define as open and indeterminated but capable of traveling between very abstracts and theoretical concepts and very weaved forms of plots in the modes of references to worlds, and being the logical pair of representation, its other, its alter, etc, ti brings us on the one hand to the relation between form and immaterialities characterize the process of meaning while far to the close meanings of a single sign, on the other, to the relations between image and reality, language and reality related to perception and representation in respect to principles by which representation and perception are no longer capable to work with as it is at the same time related, from the side of intentional composition of languages with the relation between part and whole.
All this bring us to the issue of antinomies, on one side the Kantian antinomies between the composed and the simple, between time and space, but also to semantic antinomies and antinomies of representation and it is from this side that my concept of non-repetitive repetitions take shape and grow which Stephen quoted and discussed.
Let then go more deeper on the discussion of this issue.
As a substantive evocation remit us to concepts as what it must be itself, meaning, in its state of thing itself abstracted must be a sense of concepts to be elucidated, as adjective evocation design a being of something, we has passed by then from the concepts to being as soon as asking about it as substantive and as adjective, one time it is a concept, another time, it is a form of being, as a concept evocation is static, intemporal or atemporal, but as a being it is a temporality of being so in the becoming, but as verb it is an action, to evoque, meaning, relating things in a certain form in language composing with elements or relations between parts and wholes.
In some cases indeed we find forms of evocation without a verb as in the case when a relation between things already given in nature or reality are evocatives to us but even in cases as such, we associate things.
From this perspective evocation arises from the usual relations Hegel examined to logic between concept and being, form and contents, but with an additional exclusive and unique characteristic, the fact that evocation differently to the usual logical relations is not about identity or essence nor in a positive nor in a negative and ti is in this specific sense that evocation is related with my concept of non-repetitive repetitions.
As Stephen sustained, representation is itself a repetition under which what is repited is not equal to the represented meaning a nonidentity but at the same time, as repetition, representation supposes the repetition of an identity and a presupposition of identity between representation and the represented , evocation in this sense, encompass and seize in a more complex and richness form the nonidentity evolved within that repetition instead of being in defect as representation in respect to the represented, evocation synchronize an adequative way to work with such non-repetitive repetitions.
Quoting Stephen,
"in fact, I think that you are describing our current situation, evocation is the necessary mean to try and work with your concept of non-repetitive repletion or repetitions without identities and it recommend itself according to reasons I will call the pluralization of discourse".
Now well, precisely by that reason, the discussion of evocation is not limited to only the logical pair with representation, if evocation is the necessary mean to work with non-repetitive repetitions it is related with representation in the sense that representation is itself beyond its illusion of repiting the identity of the represented in it, a non-repetitive repetition without identity in that repetition but without adecuation to that principle which is under representation exceeded and limites.
While in this form, evocation is the opposite of representation, evocation remark the non adecuation of representation to the synchronicity and simultaneity define the principle of non-repetitive repetition and work itself as the only way to mean that adecuation as that which representation can’t solve something according to which it is the opposite of all the mendacity described by Stephen about the current situation.
And in this form evocation is indeed depperly related with the issue of true, understand in the sense of the philosophy of sciences this is about the quest of true both epistemologically as well as ontologically, even methodologically and ontologically, ethically.
Being the habilitation of language evocation need as concept a theoretical more depper reconstruction an effort, endeavor and attain started by Stephen and me in our philosophical dialogue. Why to think that evocation is related with true or at least to consider it more near and adequate to work with it?.
This is not an easy question to answer precisely in the context and by the reasons discussed by Stephen between other things the separation between reason, common sense, aesthetics and politics relativized by rhetoric.
It seems to be obvious that evoquing senses presuppose a relation with contents and meanings less controlled, less authoritarian and linear and certainly of rhetoric had relativized the autonomy of reason, common sense, aesthetics and politic as separated worlds it was because the ideology of contents and meanings, stereotypes and prejudices about what to mean or say has imposed itself over the open spirit of quest, true and the humble sense of learning evolved within heuristics and research, whence evocation since being the otherness and alterity of representation it had avenue the possibility to stop representation showing its limits usually related with dominating, evocation instead free the non-coincidence and solves the inadequacy not in the form of perfecting representation but all the opposite, reestablishing other ways around, ways by which things are not substituted by its representation and the last one is considered inadequate to what it represent.
Under evocation we hesitate and discard the repetition of reality in representation we even discard repiting reality outside it as an identity or a substitution of the world by a language or a delegation, rather, we attaint to seize reality itself and beyond it, considering that reality it self is yet as Hegel sustained contingent and accidental, we attempt to go over reality to find synchronicity and simultaneity as well as what Stephen defined as a sublime of daily life, but even on the side of language, located between genesis and structure, we attempt to seize with evocation another forms of relation between the parts and the wholes of our texts exploring what is proper of evocation, the relations of sense, but evocation is itself sense at the same time and in this respect it is also about the ontology of world and reality itself, evocation return to the identity of repetition while this repetition is already non-repetitive what Stephen defined as the suppression of difference that the fiction of identity suppose.
And see in this sense evocation seems to be on the side of synchronicity and simultaneity also in a form evolving a certain sense of the ritual something brings us to what is experienced and alive habilitating under it our common sense languages as well.
Evocation thus yet need of an immense theoretical effort around epistemology, method, telos.
Evocation is not only a dialectical concept, but also a comprehensive one concept which have adequacy as its main potential.
If an evocation is a form of sense which habilitate language located between genesis and structure and between the part and the whole of an effective language composition its relation with true is whence concerning with the entails between representation and the objects of it and to how we deliver the relation of part and whole in our compositions and discourses, so it concerns with the classical trues rise being, concept, phenomena, appearance, reality, genesis, dialectique, etc.
According to Hegel true is that which can’t be separed from its opposites something derrida defined in regard to Hegel as the true of true, Hegel called true only that which identity and coincidence with itself can’t be comprehended without its opposite, for example, he said, we cant understand what the world is itself without understanding what a reflected and a phenomenological world is and in reverse, to understand the reflected phenomenological world e need to understand how world itself is under it and both are moments of the same while being opposites, is impossible, and to get this duplicitous sense is nothing else but the true.
A father can’t be a father without a son, if we remove the son, the father disappear it become a general man and in reverse, what is upon is upon because some is below if we remover one or the other then upon and belows disappear becoming places in general, this is what true is like.
But representation as the otherness or opposite of evocation is in the same way explained in the former needed for evocation to be and evocation need for representation to be if we remove one or the other both disappear.
Now one thing is to understand representation as a reflected dimension meaning a perceptive related with sensible multiplicities and the datas of our senses and its physiological implications and another thing is representation considered as a language more or less near to what it represents in the form of various modalities of realism in respect to reality, the antinomies of realism so to speak.
In respect to the mere datas of the sense as palpable sensoriality the implications of evocation in front of representation are of distinct results, given that with evocation we are not speaking on substitution or the replacement evolved within referential representation in respect to the objects’ and things evocation adecuation focusses about that it is a process of synchronies and simultaneities irreducible to the linearity’s and sequential characterize the form of representation to reflect it.
In a few words evocation is more sensible and perceptible to the differences, this what is suppose to be reflect in fact are nothing else than evocations itself, the relation between for example a concrete data of the sense, a flavor, a taste, a touch, a sound, there is being itself in palpable sensoriality at the biological sense as well as a kind of retained memory of it under a certain spectral or specular imagine which co-inhabit the mere biological feeling, but in this form ti is only an evocation like when we later differentiate it under a memory.
In this sense the so-called reflects of the senses bring within itself a certain repetition or memory which is itself as alive memory evocation.
Seen in this form evocation comes here to overline that such a repetition is not already the first stimule while it is lively conservated, but an image of a such non-identical to the stimulus itself, something about which we can only evocate, evocation then capture the two senses at the same time, on the one hand the lively nature of it less replaced by something else, and on the other, that the alive spectral memory start a difference from which the illusion of representation as mimesis reflect goes exceeded to a linear form of substitutions, while through synchronic and simultaneity, it is not replaced but different staying however as difference at the level of experience instead of its linear repetition, this another form of repetition start the travel on the way to concepts instead that on the way to the chain of perception, reflects, conscience, and so on, evocation in this sense travel from the avenues of subject and object toward the concept as already discussed in this book.
This is not a way to say that there is not a certain level of representation under it and there is evocation in the ways for representation to be more or less adequate, but to say that the moments of repetition are less representational exactly as the chain sensible multiplicities, object, concept, subject are both at the same time more abstract and less reflected than the chain of the series, perception, representation, reflect, conscience.
Logical pairs need each other, they are inclusives, each one contains the other in its own identity while they eliminate each other too, meaning that without evocation in the repetition from palpable sensoriality to representation, representation itself is eliminated, as Stephen expressed, representation depend on evocation, but the opposite is certain too, without representation inside evocation, evocation stay eliminated.
But only in the separation we perceive the importance of each one and later the mutual need. Within representation we believe in the fiction that the illusion of identity between representation and the represented creates hence believing it as if getting reality in representation when it is an effects of the production of the effects of reality buy the manipulation and control of the special effects of representation, we believe to get reality by indistinguishing imitation with identity, while the illusion of identity created by the effects of imitative mimesis suppress the difference as Stephen sustained, well, evocation we might say is specialized in understanding this difference or in being adecuated to it.
In the reverse sense without a certain percent of representation evocation alone may derive in a drift without retention since being an open and indeterminate form of sense, all that which made codification possible and the constrains of meanings habilitate forms of communication subjected to pragmatic endeavors of reality can be loosed.
References
Derrida Jacques, Génesis y estructura, de la Fenomenologia, Antropos
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Tyler A Stephen, Evocation, the Unwriteable, a response to Abdel Hernandez San Juan, sep 9, rice university, 1997
Notas
1-tranlations of Hegel, derrida and spinoza within the book are also mine
2- I would like to express here my especial acknowledgements and infinite gratitude to Surpik angelini to whom I assign and recognize my learning of English, her translations of several of my essays was major and pivotal to reading her translation learn and interiorize in a more depper form English, while also listening her during several years was pivotal to me, of course, I later continue a more depper learning first as an emigrant in the community of Houston as well as in the usa academy alone without translation during many years, but the Surpik first years was major
3-On Austin performativies I specially recomend the discussion of the issue by habermas at interludio primero, acción comunicativa y actividad teleológica in teoría de la acción comunicativa, Taurus and Jacques Derrida communication on Austin at Margins of philosophy, the university of chicago press y en márgenes de la filosofía, catedra
4-I am agree with quetzil Eugenio development and discussion on the relation beween performativity and fieldwork, undoubtedly the possibilities of performativity theory in fieldwork theory and research is plenty in possibilities both theoretical and empirical, see quetzil Eugenio, the invisible theater of ethnography: performative principles of fieldwork, anthropology quarterly and the open school of anthropology and ethnography, also published at the edition los mil y un textos, introduced and distributed by desiderio navarro
5-Como he dicho en otra parte la teoría de la Performatividad aunque necesaria no es suficiente. Es cierto que ella tiene importancia crítica e inferencial para la teoría del campo como ha sostenido Quetzil Eugenio en su ensayo basado en mi teoría de la Performatividad, asi como también en lo que Quetzil llama la ontología del trabajo de campo.
6-As discussesd in my book the world correalte, cultural theory as i have conceibed it is a new science developed under clasical philosophy and phenomenological sociology.
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