Abdel Hernandez San Juan
The world correlate
Interpretant and Structure
In posmodern Cultural Theory
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Author: ©Abdel Hernandez San Juan
The author rights of this book belong to Abdel Hernandez San Juan, its author, conceiver, writer and composer
Title: The World Correlate
Subtitle: interpretant and structure in posmodern cultural theory
Type of Work: Literary of theoretical essays/book
Translated to english by Abdel Hernandez San Juan
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DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.10634.99527
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Contents
Preface: By Abdel Hernández San Juan
Hermeneutic and Culture. By Abdel Hernández San Juan
The Ŵorld Correlate. By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
The Horizonts of symbols: Interpretant and Structure in Postmodern Cultural Theory. By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
The Exegesis of the Texts of Culture. By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
Everyday sublime and the worldneess of discourse. By Abdel Hernández San Juan
Notes
Bibliography
So phenomenology then must be considered as the basis science over which it is needed to build the normative science, it is, in effect, the first positive science
Charles Sanders Peirce
The lowell Lectures
Harvard University
1903
Preface
©By Abdel Hernández San Juan
Written in English and translated to English
by Abdel Hernandez San Juan
In my essay Sobreordination in the world of everyday life I discussed several forms by which the experience of the world of life analyzed in its pure pragmatique become sobreordinated inside the phenomenological and hermeneutic its immediacy. But such sobreordination was yet conceived in a first level of reflecting experience as in the communications with others or in telling a story about something experienced to a thirst one or documenting it.
Both efforts, the former essay on the hermeneutic and phenomenology of the intramundane and the further in question about sobreordinations explained to a certain point the theoretical mode evolved and delivered under my own books on medias, technology as well as under my research and studies of another cultural phenomena’s evolving in certain variate and diverse forms the reflecting’s of the immediacies of the life world. Beside that I must add a comment, that I considered and or I elaborated inclusibly responses to the relation between system and world of life as discussed by Habermas on modernity in advanced capitalism.
I must now however advance to a further level of complexity starting with when the sense of reality and world are mostly effects of textual forms compatible and complementary in between instead of forms of the immediacy.
The present book is a theoretical effort toward such complex forms when our senses of the world’s results from the correlates of text meaning plots of the texts, to such an struggle I have conceived the concept of “world correlate” and its theorization, the retheorization of the Peirce concept of interpretant in its relation with referentiality, ground, representatement, clues, icons and the distribution of language between form and structure in Saussure toward a discussion of cultural theory in a postmodern sense and the proposal of a symbolist retheorization of structure something bring us to the analysis of the phenomenological synthesis of reality, the relation between world itself and the phenomenological world, the internal and the external.
I know of course the Habermas objections to postmodernism and I am generally agreeing with it, but as I have sustained several times, I am committed to attain an intermedia balance, my individual position regarding postmodernism is a methodological and procedimental one.
I consider that avangard and cultural modernism are not the same, cultural modernism was the form of culture regent in the avant-garde period, some vanguardists compromised themselves with cultural modernism another’s rejected it, but in general the avant-garde is related with form and aesthetic while modernism to culture, in the same mode, posavantgard or neoavantgard are not the same than postmodernism, like cultural modernism in respect to the avant-garde, postmodernism might be considered as the regent form of culture during the post and neoavantgard period, but from the moment post and neoavantgard are defined in respect to the former avant-garde, a relation of continuity but also of saturation is evolved within it so that postmodernism is considered from the moment beyond form and aesthetics as its own domain, the posavangard decides or choice to afford culture or consider it, in this sense, seized from form and aesthetic, postmodernism appear as an issue of method.
The purposiveness of this book is not discussing postmodernism, neither post and neoavantgard, but to site the theoretical problems I have priorized as needed to be in the center focus of a postmodern cultural theory. Post and neoavangard are not the same than postmodernism but any form to consider culture within it supposes the assumptions of postmodernism and in this sense we need to discuss the phenomenological, hermeneutic and pragmatic questions this supposes to cultural theory.
Hermeneutic and Culture
©By Abdel Hernández san Juan
Written in English and translated to English
by Abdel Hernandez San Juan
Hermeneutic and exegesis: Differences of the subject positions
The purposiveness of this essay is focused in discussing several theoretical and hermeneutic problems almost undiscussed in the hermeneutic tradition and however crucial to stablish distinctions between hermeneutic and exegesis. Hermeneutic and exegesis are indeed similar concepts, both are immediately related to interpretation but in a subtly differentiated forms, the field of hermeneutic encompass much more issues than just the interpretation or reading of texts while exegesis is more constrained to the interpretation of texts.
Thinking in hermeneutic putting aside exegesis by the moment, as I demonstrated in my essay The intramundane horizont, understanded at a level that presupposes the reestablishment of the phenomenological world of life, or the so-called present of the present in Derrida terms as he discussed it in respect to hurssel, his named “alive present”, as well as presupposing such a world in the context of our decursive experience, meaning the happening of our ordinary quotidian life in a sense that after the Popper distinctions between the concepts of worlds, Shutz and Habermas discussed, hermeneutic fulfill an ontological place.
In fact, in the world of life, when we are not considering pre-texts or texts to be readen under it, but saying hermeneutic as the ways we have to endowed of sense activities by the mean of which we make interpretative senses of our own experiences, hermeneutic is fusioned with phenomenology while paradoxically without losing however its specificities, certainly we continue differencing in the world of life what correspond to hermeneutic and what to phenomenology, the second one is referred to the establishment of the idea itself of world to the body, impressions and subjectivity, while the first one to how that world acquire the weaves creates the relations of sense that endowed that world as intramundane, the meaningfulness interior to our practices.
The ontological comprehension of hermeneutic at this level, however, was not a discernment of Gadamer. Although the Habermas interpretation of Gadamer may leads us to a reinterpretation of Gadamer focusing the attention on the relation between hermeneutic and pragmatism, such a relation, which even is not as such and as much well developed in Habermas as I have focused and developed it in all its consequences in a really elaborated form, was not inclusive to Gadamer himself.
Moreover, outsiding the practical world of life and returning to the issue of pure being considered as an abstract issue out of a world as for example discussed by Hegel, Heidegger or Derrida, Gadamer certainly developed the possibility of a relation between being, aesthetic and interpretation which without a practical world, advanced the possibility for hermeneutic to work in an ontological level. In this sense we should recognize his worthy.
While in both cases, lifeworld and aesthetic, regarding the former distinction Habermas-Gadamer, the subject is positioned in between something that simply is without extrinsecation to it and the self-source of him or her self-perception, in both cases we don’t have yet a subject in front of a text ready to be read, decodified or interpreted. Thus in both cases hermeneutic works ontologically instead of as a form of the subject extrinsecation of a text as something external and outer of his subjective position to be read as in exegesis. Whence, if we are working hermeneutic ontologically in whatever form regarding world of life or through the pure relation between being, aesthetic and interpretation, we should attempt to locate under it the position of the subject as working differently than in exegesis.
This distinction between hermeneutic and exegesis is crucial, although in both cases we are speaking on interpretation, the position of the subject is internally and externally different with independence of the consideration about if such a text in the case of exegesis is considered as already given outside as pregiven, considered as a pre-text, as a language object as in semiotic or as a form of textualization attempting to read as text the non-textual.
Of course, through a kind of alterity of him or herself, or through an alter ego the subject might imagine by the effects of universal presuppositions how that which he or she have experienced in the ontological level of hermeneutic elucidations, explications, makings of sense or interpreting, may be similar or equal to another subject’s experiences, but this is not yet reading.
Under exegesis, the subject is positioned in front of a text produced even sometimes by another subjects.
Someone may argue at this point that in the case of intersubjective communication the hermeneutic elucidation and explicitation process by one of the subjects in respect to another is developed under an interpretation in a form similar to exegesis since something said is being elucidated.
Well, this is an interesting point to be tie up and clarified. In speech act the subject is certainly in front of a certain enunciation to be interpreted but in such a situation the process of making sense, elucidation and explicitation rule over or command the situation, nothing is there as the autonomy or the independence of a text to be considered itself, what we have in any case is far to be exegesis yet.
In this sense we might say that in the ontological hermeneutic level nothing is like exegesis while in the reversal sense we must yes find a certain level of ontological hermeneutic inside certain forms of exegesis, for example, in certain forms of increasing or stricken of hermeneutic ontology into the domains of exegesis as when the elucidation of texts seems to be a part in a weaved or a texere, but in this cases we must not therefore speak of hermeneutic, but instead of hermeneusis meaning as a way to capture or seize under the sis the general sense of the dynamics of culture under senses. The distinction between sis and tic is here pivotal, the later overline the activity of elucidation or making sense by the subject interpretably, the former overline an alive texere or weaves of culture dynamics under micro senses.
In fact, intersubjective communication as well as the contingencies of meaning others continue then working at the ontological level of hermeneutic to the subject, but when such enunciations are not addressed toward him, but toward others and overall when such enunciations acquire the form of outcomes to many subjects at the same time the subject have to interpret a text then we start the readings of exegesis, like it happen under interpreting a literary work, philosophical or of fiction, a novel, a films or a visual art work.
Hermeneutic and Exegesis: similarities of the subject positions/an analysis of religion homology
Now in both cases hermeneutic and exegesis as forms and moments of interpretation we have of course similarities, for example, we have under both a kind of humble position to the subject, a certain discernment of a horizont of humbleness rule over or command the specificities of hermeneutic, even in reading texts when we start to call exegesis also a form of hermeneutic or in reverse hermeneutic a form of exegesis, let explain why, if we said that our attitude in front of the object to be elucidated will be interpretative something presuppose indeed a humble position, if our relation with the text will be interpretative mean accepting a receptive relation, it is less about our pregiven sense of the true and or about our wishes to possess and more about listening something to be comprehended, in this sense the general epistemology of hermeneutic including exegesis is equivalent and similar to the kind of ethical codes we have in front of religion, in a few words, the relation between hermeneutic and culture on the one side and between culture and religion, on the other, is one of an homology.
So we have in hermeneutic a kind of equidistance coincident with the ethic of theology and religion, beyond if we are or no religious in terms of consmovisions or believes in some religion, certainly what characterize the relation between religion and culture is precisely the explicitation about that we don’t have the domain on all the territory of true, that always a part of the true will fall out of our reach.
Thus, this idea of true in theology may be defined as homologue with the idea of true implicit in hermeneutic also in exegesis, if the interpreter don’t have access to comply the intentionality of the author of a text even supposing to have some access, nothing guaranty the same interpretation to many interpreters in a similar situation even in front of the same text or things to be elucidated, the heterogeneous irreducibility of interpretations and polysemy’s in the interpretation of a text certify the fact that nothing might be say on the internal true of the text and nothing on the internal true of interpretation more than accepting that indeed the true of the relation between interpretation and the text is an hermeneutical, interpretive one true.
If god exist as a regent of the source of the world only to god must be conceded a relation to the idea of true beyond us and whence our relation with our own knowledge must start by accepting this humble position, that our relation to what we interpret should cede without voluntarism in favor of accepting us humbles in front of the true, if I accept that the true of my relation with the text will be hermeneutic I accept to said something on it interpretably so that I am not over or upon the text while also the text is not necessarily upon me, my contribution will consist about how rich, versatile or variate, attractive or interesting my interpretation could be and this is something veritable only by the linguistic community, in religion nothing is over or upon the community of believers, in hermeneutic nothing is over or upon the language community, nothing is over the general culture in which my interpretation and the text relates in between.
With this we are not negating or relativizing the scientificity of hermeneutic, I myself had developed scientific essays of hermeneutic demonstrating the reach of an hermeneutical procedure around several phenomena’s in society, culture, language as in the ontology of the life world, but only precising a correlate of ethic position between hermeneutic and culture and religion and culture as an homologous one as well as distinguishing the different position of the subject first and its similarities later characterizes hermeneutic and ontology on the one hand and exegesis and texts on the others.
If we are speaking on the objective space of society understanded as a contingent co-current world of many others with their own interpretations, no one can guaranty the coincidence of various interpretations of the texts, in a similar form within religion it is impossible to guaranty one interpretation of the religious texts and tradition, something Habermas discussed in regard to Gadamer arguing the reason to a criticism beyond just interpretation.
How can we stablish an agreement on the internal true of the text when such countless interpretations are not coincident in between, how to be agree on the ontology of the text?.
The Nudes of Empty immanence
Certainly, and here start the issue discussed by Terry Eagleton we can consider in terms of literary criticism as a Marxist issue.
Eagleton set up a well know example to illustrate the implications of such a relativism, he called out and back Russian formalists question on the ontology of the text about what is it that can we consider literary itself?, how to be agree about what literacy is? and when a text must be defined as literary?.
He choiced and take a way a fragment of text, a phrase from a novel and introduced it to a groups of man’s speaking in a bar asking the question about if that phrase can be considered literary to receive the answer by all the presents that of course it was not to later let them know that it was literary since he take it from a novel.
In a counter critical exercise Eagleton choiced a phrase taked from an ordinary dialogue in a bar an introduced it within a group of novelists and poets asking to them if they consider it literary to receive the answer by all the presents that of course it is literary to later let them know that it was not since he take it directly from a dialogue in a bar.
As we know the Eagleton example was set up to later develop an strong critique to the presuppositions of almost all the epistemologies in literary criticism tendencies to adjudicate immanence and ontology to the texts, phenomenology, hermeneutic, semiotic, pychoanalis and marxism, to made explicit the transference of such epistemological presuppositions to the ontology of the text negating any possibility to adjudicate immanence to the texts itself as his examples made it obvious.
However, at the end, after examining all the consequences of Eagleton objections marxist criticism is also obligated to say something on the text itself other ways is the renounce to interpret it.
Marxist criticism as any other form of criticism have to in a last instance and in an equal form take the text by itself and interpret it choosing to do so certain presuppositions and parameters.
Whence, hermeneutic superates marxism or at least marxist literary criticism, like empiricism and positivism is obligated to be subordinated to hermeneutics. The critical Eagleton nude on the relativism of the immanence of the text is then waited from the other side, immanent or not, the text will have to be interpreted and the hermeneutic true will ever be the winner.
The marxist critical nude at the end fall in an aporía, if our interpretation will be not elucidations on the immanence of the text so that meaning can’t be fixed as a property of the texts itself as demonstrated with the bar example, then everything consist in describing the text without interpreting it but as we well know that is impossible the presupposition about that the text may be described without being interpreted is contradictory itself
Interpretation and description
Let supposes or imagine that we have to describe a novel for example, how to do?, repiting the novel again in the description?: the possibility itself is immediately discarted, we will be obligated to separate the main characters with their characteristics, to set aside the script in a post dimension, to abstract the dramaturgy of the plot, to locate the variations and oscillations of the relation between the voice of the author and the voice of major narrators under the fiction, and to relate those instances according to paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, form and content, style and aesthetic, all this things are already implicated and a soon as attaining such a synthesis we will recognize that avoiding the repetition of the whole novel sentence by sentence as a mode of description is already stablishing a relation between a memory of reading and travels of interpretation.
The same might be sustained about a film, sequences, scenes, frames, cinemas, characters, script, dramaturgy, earlier in the struggle of decomposing the film we are already interpreting in the effort of describing.
If in the description I say that over the bracket there are various objects, a lighter, a book, several letters, a handkerchief and some wheels of bread I say one thing, but if in the description I say that the letters are letters of travel or intimacy letters I add a textual supplement external to the purely visual according to some information I have or an accent I set.
If I choice the perspective of an external observer who can’t differentiate the kind of letters in question I am almost describing, but if I add some additional element such as supplementary information I am interpreting in the description itself, I said, over the bracket there are some intimacy letters or letters of travel, we may try then to difference a simple description of elements without relations in between as a list of successive contiguities, one, the next, the next and sucesibly, but as soon I am defining relations in between the elements or including in the description anything train to relate the elements I am already interpreting.
Of who is the Lighter?, in this about one person or two?, someone was reading the letters alone or was reading it to another person?, the lighter is there because someone was smoking while reading?, or because the subject is anticipating to fire the letters? or to cook the bread?, in a few words there is not in existence a mode to describe without interpreting.
To the phenomenological point of view in the interpretation of the art work according to Eagleton, we require to be in knowledge of the author conscience, thanks to know it directly from the author or if the author is death by reading biographies, speech, interviews, letters, manuscripts, archive materials guesting on his intentions, motivations, reasons, etc., etc. or if we don’t have any of this two ways, we must instead succor to our own acervos about signs, symbols, icons and objects in culture as well as to our cumulated memory and experience through our own conscience on universal principles of conscience as to interpret by clues the author conscience as expressed in the text, thus this one might be considered as the more usual and frequent way of interpreting.
But phenomenology can’t avoid the fact that beyond it the text will be interpreted in a pluralist, irreducible, polisemic form by multiple interpreters, can’t avoid the fact that in any case no one will say the same on the text, even semiotic, the science with basis in phenomenology that more accurately attained to demonstrate codification and its principles of communication, can’t avoid it
The Structural Genesis of Text as Concept
Now the issue of to arrange how must we understand sense and meaning over and beyond polysemy, the semiological elucidation of the principle of codification and the true of communication beyond all that entropy evolved within multiple interpretation is based if we are hermeneutically asking on it in the sense of exegesis on the concept of text and in such a case we need to stablish and define what are we understanding by text.
We should not forget that the concept of text is itself an structuralist concept, without an structural cut of the relation between language and culture it is impossible to obtain and sustain the autonomy and consistency of the concept of text. On the one hand the text is defined by the activity of reading, as soon as we are reading something already everything and anything we read become to us a form of the text, but such a definition based in reading is saying nothing on text itself, it is necessary at the same time to cut structurally the relation between language and culture, and this structural cut allow us to priories’ and focus a major distinction between Saussure and Peirce.
The main differences between Saussure linguistic and Peirce semiotic are not well discussed yet. When we said that the Saussure linguistic is structural we said mainly something, that his theory has separated langue from speech, the langue is a convention collected by the academy of the langue and we understand it by it synchronic stability, meaning, here and now the same langue without variations or with minimum variations in time, speech instead is related with the use of langue as structure which only very slowly received certain modifications.
Deep and superficial structure
Thanks to this structural difference we may then made abstraction of the components of langue as formal facts such as the grammar, grammar is not yet meaning, it is congruence of sense, articulations of coherence, but it is the condition of possibility of meaning. a langue is also a relation of formal elements, the articles entails, the personal pronames defines singularity and plurality, the verbs defines the actions, the place and the to be of the subjects, the adjectives qualify, this is syntax, a superficial structure close to pure form.
Grammar is not like syntax over or thought the surfaces of forms, it is instead while near to forms more precisely between the forms ruling the logical relations in between it, thus, it is on the side of the logical principles belong to the conceptual, meaningfulness and sense level while not as pertaining to the internal level of content, meaning, concept and sense ontologically as semantique do, defined by relations between forms, it is not form itself ontologically as syntax is, how then to define the ontological place of grammar if it is not exactly on the side of content neither of form?, to get it so, we need to figure out the relation between thought and language, grammar is not on the full side of language, it have all its reality in language and as a language matter, but inhabiting the ledges or empty spaces between language and non-language, or language and thought, it is ontologically on the side of logic rising from that relation, it is then in between the forms regulating the rules of relations between forms according to a constant going and returning from thought to language logically, in this sense there is nothing deep in language than grammar to which deep structure belong, in fact, grammar is itself deep structure in language and syntax the superficial structure, in figuring it so we have a triadic relation.
Thought sense genesis
Sense/Content=Semantique
Grammar=in between logic Deep structure
Form=Sintaxis Superficial structure
Language meaning
The triadic relation is defined by grammar, syntax and semantique, the first belong ontologically to logic while it is not exactly immaterial as sense and meanings are, instead it is in between forms being a dimension of it something about which we will need later to revise and discuss the relation between form and content, it belong to the principles that relates logically forms in between according to sense and contents, the second live in the surface of forms, it is form itself ontologically, while articulated as language, the last one belong to the immaterial dimension of sense, content, meaning so that ontologically semantique is clouse to thought than to language while located as a phenomena of language, syntax is near to language than to thought and grammar is in between, whence structurally speaking semantique is on the side of genesis, grammar on the side of deep structure and syntax on the side of superficial structure, the triadic principle however explain by itself that the elements are not separated but folded one into and through the other, nothing as grammar is possible without syntax, nothing as semantique is possible without syntax and grammar while syntax’s however as ever form is more independent than grammar and semantique but yet equally affected by it.
The Significant
The significant is by excellence the more well defined intermedia between deep and superficial structure, it is a consequence of the relation of both or in best words located in between, compared with meaning –significance--which is purely immaterial as something without a body, a corpus, a vehicle or a dimension that meet in forms.
Derrida discussed at this point the homology of the relation between body and soul, the body is the significant and soul the meaning—the significance, the significant is thus on the side of forms inside the sign, the material one side, near to syntax than to grammar, it belong more to superficial structure and less to the deep one, but it is incomprehensible if completely diluted or disseminated in pure syntax, the grammar level sake it too or it have its source and rise in between both as an expression more of superficial and less but also of deep structure at the same time.
It is the anticipation in form of meaning toward it, as the word said signicant, ready to mean but without doing it yet, before the taking shape of it yet, in this sense the significant as one of the three main sides of the sign, significant/referent and/meaning or significance and paradoxically is the one side of the sign more related with the structural stability of language, why paradoxically?, well because a word must have many meanings according to how to associate it with other words as well as according to how seize its whole sense, but its form will ever be the same and equal ever
On the other hand, the significant is the side of the sign which allow us to entrance to culture, why?, why the significant and not the significance if as we suppose a culture is nothing but a collection of meanings?, well because under meanings we are already in culture but without an entrance or an exit to it, to entrance and exist it we need in language a pure form from which to go and return inside and outside culture, culture in fact is nothing but a subsystem as parson discussed it, we also have the subsystem of the individual and of the social as well as the economic subsystem, so that to fully entrance in culture we must exit the social, a purely social will never be culture fully, equally with the individual and the economic
And as such to the structural cut between language and culture we need forms, in this sense, structurally speaking the significant is then our way to comply and access culture from language
In a few words, while culture is itself meaning, paradoxically, it can’t be comply and or acceded from language through contents, sense and meaning, but through significance, the surface that belong to syntax is here pivotal, nothing as a relation between language and culture might be structurally sustained than by finding in form the source of that relation, but form itself, is not sufficient to cross to culture, an intermedia one between surface and the immateriality of meanings is need to add and get the touch and pass by between language and culture, of course, language is culture and culture is language already but thus the relation is not structural, to be structural it have to be constant and relatibly invariable so to speak, and here we have the relevance of the significant and of syntax.
When we say that the significant is mainly matter and form we need to figure out in a more deeper manner how matter and form are related in between so to return later to the significant and scrutinize what characterize it in is difference to the immateriality of meaning and significance the reflected, grounded and sometimes representational nature of the referent in denotation.
Let see how Hegel discussed this relation
If we made abstraction in all its determinations, said Hegel—of all the form of something we get then as result indetermined matter. Matter is an abstract in absolute, it is impossible to see or to touch the matter, what we see or touch is ever an specific matter, meaning, the union between matter and form. This abstraction, from were matter source, is not an elimination extrinsique to form, but instead form is reduced by itself, as result to this simple identity
Besides, form presupposes a matter with what it is related. But precisely by that both are not one in front of the other in an extrinseque form or accidental, neither matter or form exist each one by itself, matter is what is indifferent to the determination of the identity with itself from which form return as to its base. Form presuppose matter and reciprocally form is presupposed by matter, form and matter, are thus determined one by the other one, matter contain form inclusive in itself because it is form only itself and just because it have it inside, whence, form have to be materialized and matter have to be formed, meaning
to happen in matter own identity and because form is the absolute identity with itself and contains matter in itself and because matter in it pure abstraction have form in itself the activity of form over matter and the becoming the last one determined by the former is nothing else than the superation of the appearance of indifference and diversity. This relation of determining is thus the mediation of each one with itself by the mean of its own non being but these two mediations constitute only one movement and the reestablishing of its originary identity, Pp, 397.398
The issue of abstracting with Saussure the structural synchronic stability of langue in respect to the diachronic variability of speech might be understanded from the side of how langue is reflected in the academy of langue as a form of institutionalism, meaning, the study of language with basis in its instituted form, but at the same time, beyond institutions in the study of langue’s as available to the world of acquisition and learning, as well as the performance of it as what stablish the patters of convention is here clear as an arrange of meanings around signs, words, sentences and the principles organize it gramatic, syntactic, etc., following the same order which allow us to set aside the structural analysis in formal logics of grammar and syntax, may persuade us that something similar might be possible around meanings and not only around formal issues of deep and superficial structure, meaning that according to a similar principle both the instituted level of language as well as its comprehension from the side of the conventions entrance within learning, allow us to consider if meanings with independency of the issue of polysemy’s, entropies and multiples interpretation, are susceptible to be studied by its stability, meaning structurally.
Well, I have a well-defined individual response to this question and my answer is yes and not. Not because meanings are highly affected by contexts and situations and we can easily demonstrate how the conventions about pre-given meanings which help the subject to acquire and learn a language to be performance, are not as such when that language is performed in a variability of interactive, communicative, situational and contextual circumstances, and yes from the moment the process of learning could be separated and studied as a moment itself.
An studied as such might be for example discussed as papers and books focused in both the teaching and the learning to speak and write a langue in a variety of forms, from the moment of the acquisition of a mother native langue, to the moments of learning a new langue or idiom by those how have a previous acquired native mother langue, might be also developed as theories of the teaching and learning itself, while obviously, the possibilities are limited
Now it is indeed amazing to perceive to what point semantique is based in such an hypothesis, almost all the semantic theories in existence from the starting of semantic studies to our current days are based in a positive answer to that question, the presupposition that as well as the formalism of grammatology and sintaxsis, phonetic and lexicology is possible thanks to the structural cut of the relation between language and culture, semantic, the study of sense and meaning might be set aside and studied structurally too from the stability side as well.
semantiques
I am not so enthusiastic less optimistic with such a perspective which is certainly in the basis of almost all the trips and logical tables of semantic previous theory, simply because sense and meanings are itself inmaterials, related, as Derrida clarified by using the homology of the relation body and soul to separate in language matter and sense, with the soul so to speak and in doing so we are already in a territory outside the synchronic stability of structural cuts which are mainly related with form and matters as discussed above.
Instead of that, my perspective is focused in superficial structure, the possibilities of semantics developed from the study of syntaxes. Instead of a semantic project based in the supposed to be guaranties of convention and pre-given meaning of instituted langue, my focus is turned to the studies and sense and meanings in surfaces interactions
Signifier and meaning are nothing else than in respect to the general logic form and content while in general logic nothing was conceived as a sign in that sense, beside the sign appeared as an issue in Aristoteles organum and later in Hegel, nothing as enteiling sign with that pair was yet suspected less even the Derrida comparison of both sides of the sign with body and soul, it was instead disseminated or dispersed through a whole chain of things such as sensible multiplicities and palpable sensoriality and reflexivity without yet a sense of internal unity to the sign less the internal division of the sign triadic principle of signifier, meaning and referent
Now, revisiting the issue of form and content in general logic might help to go in deep about the ontology of it, how to understand form and matter its tangibility, intelligibility, its presence as something possible to be listen, read or see as readable, graphically written, audible, etc with the intangible, ideal, stereos, immaterial side of meanings?
Content, according to Hegel, have in a first place a form and a matter belong to it as essentials, contents constitute the unity of it. But given that this unity is at the same time determined and putted unity, content is in front of the forms, form constitute in front of content a putted being and as such represent the inessential
Whence, content is indifferent in front of the form, while content have a form and matter itself. Secondly is also the identical in form and matter, so that form and matter are only indifferent and extrinsique determinations
Both are in general a putted being but returning in contents to its unity. The identity of content with itself represent once the former identity indifferent to form, but content is at the same time the negative reflection of this formal determinations in itself, its unity, which firstly is only the indifferent unity in respect to form and whence also the formal unity, content is by the essence identical with itself that evolution to be the fundamental relation, but content is determined in itself not only in the matter of matter, meaning, as the indifferent in general, but as formed matter hence the determinations of forms have a material indifferent subsistence
And continuing with the issue essence Hegel sustained
Essence have a form and formal determinations. It have an stabilitized inmediations, meaning a substrate. But essence as a related substrate, is determined essence, it have essentially form inside it. The determinations of form are now determinations inside essence, it is in the base as indetermined, so that essence is precisely in a essential matter determinated whence represent also another time the moment of the fundamental relation of forms, this is the absolute mutual relation of forma and essence, but in this essence is determined so it is a negative distinguished from form as its basis beside at the same time that essence become itself a moment of form, whence form have in its own identity the essence and essence have absolute forms in its own identity, so that we can’t ask how to add a form to an essence because the former is nothing else that the apparition of the second inside it, form determine essence, besides, form eliminates all that and become in the identity with itself of essence
We have thus seen how form and content are related beside form and essence so that if we bring it from general logic to language in order to elucidate the ontology of the signifier as the formal and material side of the sign as to quest then how is it entailed with the ideal, immaterial side of meaning, we unveil that it work similarly to how form and content are related in between while without discarding the major place of form in respect to the substrates of the so-called essence, however, the sign is not composed only by signifier and meaning, but also by reference and referenciality
In fact, meaning as the immaterial, ideal, intangible side of the sign beyond its relation with convention, is needed of a relation with such a third element of referentiality, since reference or denotatum is at the same time a reflected object by the sign as something that seem to fall out of the sign, but it is at the same time designed or indicated by it and as such is a part of it , meaning instead fall out in respect to the sign as in between significants, form and matter, and the referent so that we have then:
Sing: =significant (form) + significance =meaning (content) +reference, (referent)
Thus, meaning is not cast over or upon not cast inside forms as contained, but it is on the one hand immaterial but on the other it is between form or matter and referentiality, so between significants and reference
How then to relate, entail and comprehend the differences and possible relations between Saussure significants and Peirce interpretants?
The Interpretants
At this point we must distinguish major differences between significants and interpretants as well as between significance or meanings and interpretants, the logic of Saussure as discussed above, is ruled by the structural division between language and speech so that significants and meanings are affected by it, while the Peirce interpretant born and grow as concept from a completely different side of logic, first it born directly from philosophical logic not from linguistic issues, the relation between sensible multiplicities or palpable sensoriality as the datas of the sense and on how representation deal with it were at the Forefront of how Peirce conceived his semiotic.
As a Hegelian, Peirce focused in the paradoxes about how substance name the subject allowing the articulations between subject and predicaments, meaning how the concept as synthetic unity reduce to a minimum such sensible multiplicities of palpable sensoriality and how from that we learn by inferences and deductions in between the properties or qualities of things and the synthesis of representation, so that the interpretants as well as all the triadic principles of Peirce including ground, representatements, correlates and interpretants grow from it on how representation relates with its objects.
If we see from the point of view of how the concept of interpretant presuppose that a sign is in the place of an object and that many interpretants might be related in between translating each one to the another according to an endless semiosis with dispense of the object, by a moment, we may have the impression that significant and Interpretants are similars, at least if we assume the derrida critique of the concept of sign as an enclosed unity, but the Impresión will be futile, nothing as far in between than significants and Interpretants.
The idea of significants source and arises from the structural division of form and contents which was the result of cutting language sincronically, it is nothing else than an abstraction of the static intemporal dimension of a form considered as belonging to a language understanded structurally as ever the same, the idea of the Interpretants instead source and arised from distinguishing the qualities of the objects from the synthesis of its representation, so in respect to referentiality as a cognitive matter.
Hence the possibility of a disseminated theory of the endless chain of significants leads us to a completely different area of ontology than the idea of endless chain of Interpretants
The interpretant is a cognitive unity, something at the simbolic level of representational synthesis replace the object and establishes itself in its place, such a replacement must thus be comprehended by the relation between the ground --the sign toward the object--, the representatements--qualities of the object reflected in the sign --see for example peirce indicial signs in comparition with icons--, the correlates which solves the duality ground/toward-representatement/reflection, in respect to referentiality grounding thus the ontology of the interpretants which start by translations=Interpretants the chain of meaning
We should pay attention here on a major difference as to foreseen, the significantd might work endless in between the dispensing of meanings, while the interpretants may work endless in between dispensing of the objects not precisely of meanings, in a few words the constant infinity endless of the travel through significants is a chain of form without meaning while the constant and infinity endless of interpretants between interpretants is a chain of meanings without objects, what the significants replace or substitute are the meanings which are dispersed through the play of constant differences, what the interprentant replace and substitute are the objects and the references by stablishing a chain of meanings defined by translations between interpretants which are always in the place of the objects, replacing and substituting it.
In this sense the derredean game of significants differences without meaning toward us to the text or to texere as a weave of texts, while the so-called infinity semiosis of Peirce brings us to culture, so that the infinity endless of significants is one of form and syntax with the succor of differences, while the infinity endless of Peirce semiosis is a chain of meanings, in this sense I have a discovered proposal of both reading and epistemology, while the relation with structure of the significants source as well as goes through from Saussure to derrida from the separation of langue and speech and according to a syntactic and formal chain between substance of expression and differences, the relation of the interpretants with structure I want to propose here must be defined is a symbolic one, it might be explained not according to a prestablished cutt in real social space between forms of language use, but in respect to the relation ground, representatement, correlate interpretant which defines the cognitive basis of Peirce theory, while we can also carefully operate methodological cooperation’s between both logics, certainly significants replace meanings opening it to the game of differences but it can’t replace interpretants since interpretants are unthinkable from the significants logic.
The interpretants are cognitive unities relatibly unclosed by principles of relation between representation and the objects of it, the significants are formal unities, the structurally of the interpretants source and arise directly from the cognitive distinction between language and reality, representation and reality, it is based and arises from its own composition and attributes, the representantment,-- the moment of the sign reflecting at the sign level something of its object, the ground, --the moment of the sign addressed to, directed to, toward or indicating the object which should be like the denotation, the correlates and the interpretants which are nothing else than the unities by which representatment and ground establish a correlate.
The interpretants in facts are equivalents in pierce to Saussure meanings, they establish meaning according to a principle of translations between interpretants, but with a major difference, Saussure meaning is thinked as the content of the substance of expression, the meaning of a form as its content, form and matter represented by the significant, significance instead means the meaning of form, and the interpretants instead are far to it.
far to be itself formal expressions of substance –significants--and fully immaterialized contents of that substances, --meanings-- the interpretants are little cognitive unities take shape by a triadic principle by which it is at the same time reference and replace the objects by its meanings, while the concept of meaning here is thinked in a different form, it is not the content of pregiven convention not the contents of a form, but the correlate of a ground and a representatement defines the ontology of the interpretants
The interpretants
Representatement: reflect or a reflected dimension of the object in the sign
Ground: moment of the sign indicating or addressing the object
Correlate: the relation of both reference and replacement establish the basis of the interpretants
Interpretants: synthetic cognitive unities by which the signs translated in between stablishes a chain of meanings
Again, according to the idea of endless circulation of significants without meanings from signicants to significants one may think about a similarity to Peirce endless semiosis but the similarity is only apparent, the circulation through significant goes within forms, it allows us to pure syntaxes and its endless is guaranty by the principle of difference, the identy of each since defined according to what it is not, difference, diffentiality thus activate here a chain of pure significants without meanings, this is the game of the marks, of each sign as pure mark and of difference as unconcient according to Derrida, a negative circulation negates meaning
There is never significant by significant a ground, a representatment, a correlate and interpretants because the significants are not thinked as something between language and reality, representation and its objects as the interpretants are, thus, the endless semiosis of Peirce is of another kind of circulation, here what circulates is far to be a game of marks, of presence and non-presence, of identity and difference between signs and non-signs, or between the identity of what it is and what it is not, but a symbolic circulation of meanings in which the ground, that which toward the object, the representatement that which reflect the object in the sign and the correlate free the interpretants, relations between sign translating one to the other without an end, it is the task, the attempt, and attaining of another way around, the play of meaning independence from the object as a symbolic replacement of the object which inhabit to a certain point as semiosis in the game of meanings, this is why Peirce semiotic had being considered a kind of pragmatism, we should increase at this point in traing to conciliate and understand the point of contacts by which symbolism and pragmatism meet.
We must thus identify here an aesthetic and textual circulation, that of the significants, and a cultural one, that of the interpretants, in fact, according to Eco, the sign in Peirce allow us to think about it as a cultural unity something that allow us to consider in Eco words “the replacement of cultural anthropology by semiotic”, I agree with eco to a certain levels, not necessarily of a full replacement of cultural anthropology by semiotic but about that semiotic theory must rule and control the future of cultural anthropology instead of the opposite as well as on the effort to try to consider the relation between Peirce semiotic and semantique in his discussion of Kats and fodor KF trip as in the analysis of lesemas, lexicology and the quillian model in his essay the universe of sense, but eco himself recognized how the componential semantique is limited by the constant variations of meaning among situations and contexts.
In this sense we might attempt to attain a theoretical semantique conciliated with sintaxsis or developed from it as a matter of surfaces interactions working the interpretants as cultural theory so exploring a cooperation between derridean significants circulations and Peirce interpretants semiosis and retheorizing the possibilities of the interpretants to work in cultural theory.
At this point an interesting quote included by eco at the absent structure might be requoted here
It is a known thing that a whole tendency of transformative grammatical recognize in syntactic structure the objective to stablish the semantic interpretant of the enunciation, establishing in consequence the condition of selection of the itinerary discovered through the component analysis
And quoting Chomsky
As overlined by Kats and Fodor it is evident that the meaning of a phrase is bases in the meaning of its elemental parts and its combinations, it is also evident that the form of combination we may see in superficial structure in general is totally irrelevant to semantique interpretation, whence in many cases the grammar relation expressed at the Deep abstract structure are which determine the meaning of the phrase
But Later Chomsky variate his position as sustained in his essay Deep structure, surface structure and semantic interpretation defining semantique interpretation in a mid-way between superficial and deep structure, another authors as lakoff attempt to constitute a generative semantique overlined the intimacy relation between syntactic phenomena’s and semantique phenomena’s
Telos/non telos
All the previously discussed have an effect and a consequence on the temporality of thought, the issue of telos understanded as both the should be, the duty, and as the question on toward what, implicitit to the activity of theorizing and thinking in both forms as aprioris, meaning the telos evolved within presuppositions and as positioning in terms of the horizonts --tells--while it also have consequences on the issue of non-telos
Telos is by itself at least as discussed by Hegel related with the idea of progression involving the pleasure aesthetically of the style of writing and thinking as well as the content level without excluding the ethical issues evolved around how theorizing realize to be in relation with world of life and the quotidian.
This is an issue of prior importance today not only in term of fashion but in term of how to deliberate the balance between telos and non-telos, as telos is progression, non-telos remark the simultaneous and synchronic temporality or process evolved in the activity of writing, how much to accent or priorize in the horizonts of theorizing telos as progression evolved in presuppositions and horizonts, and non-telos as the pay attention during the process of thinking to the here and now of the sicronic production of it?
Well, to tell the true, at last telos is method so that under it we deliberate how each book and each essay make system with other books and essays inside a book as well as we deliberate the relation between the parts and the whole of a work in this sense the percent by which we decide to exchange the telos components of the text with the capacity to pay attention to the non-progressive temporality of the simultaneous process, non tells, the last one is nothing else than the ethical dimension of the text in regard to non-text, and in such a sense, such a deliberation of a balance is a part of the methodological results.
As a general comment on this remark I should say that as much as I am agree with the importance attributed by habermas to telos inside theory I am equality agree with the importance attributed by Stephen A Tyler to the non-teleological dimension of the text so like in respect to postmodern, I am exploring an intermedia balance in between both temporal dimensions, telos and non telos.
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The World Correlate
©By Abdel Hernández San Juan
Written in English and translated to English
by Abdel Hernandez San Juan
The center focus of this essays is to solve epistemological and methodological questions belong not only to the theoretical and conceptual contents of the text but also to what I will like to define here as world correlate.
In fact the theoretical and conceptual content of the text understanded as a porposivennes endless in Kantian terms belong to the self-transcendence motivation by the mean of which in theoretical thought one feel himself enchantment by the plenum sense of the said of the theoretical content itself, something usually replaces the effective realization of the relation between that thought and reality,
In the same mode than with Peirce the sign substitutes the object or occupy an space in the place of something else, a substitution of the former by the chain of meanings according to interpretants which translate one to the other, the self-sufficiency of theoretical thinking seems to dispense of a world or a reality.
Also similarly than the formal logic of significants as a signs chain in an incessant succession when it looks to be not exiting to the exterior of language not from the way of meaning, neither from the way of representation, the theoretical thinking looks to be usually enclosed in language insides.
Significants in between them stablish a chain without references to meanings, a kind of another surface we might understated as superficial structure, the decurse of syntax, developing in between them differential relations from which what it is not defines what it is, the starting of the spacialiaition of difference.
Like interpretants and significants the struggle of theoretical thinking use to be limited by a substitution of objects and meanings inhabited by a kind of self-sufficiency, Beth significants endless chan and Interpretants endless semiosis remember the general situation of thought in respect to reality and or a world.
Althouth the Peirce interpretants consistido in signs translating in between each one to the other, nothing as the separations between langue and speech which define the synchronic here and now in front of the diachronic, neither a distintion between writing and speach, a in the basis of The Interpretants sorce.
The structural stability characterize grammatik, syntactic, morphological or even phonetic levels defined how the significants born and grow in structuralist linguistic as result of the sincronic cutted between lingue and speach is far to the principles allow peirce to conceive the interpretants, neither defined by the sentences performance acts of speech in the sense of Austin, the interpretant born directly from a poshegelian philosophical reflection peirce was committed to develop in between language and referente, signs and inferences, qualities of things and sínthesis of representation, a cognitive unity allow some semiologists to derive semiotic from the philosophy of language if we remember how major as this issue of language-eality during the first décades of analítical philosophy, eco for example sustained parental relation between semiotic and the philosophy of langyuage.
The interpretants on the other hands are related with the anticipation of readers and viewers in language building what eco defined as reading if fabulation.
Peirce interpretants as Carlos sini discussed, applies to issues outside alphabetic language as for example spatial signs, a hen iron place in the external outside sealing of a rural house according to how the hen of iron turn in one direction or the other, it helps the village people to recognize the direction of the wind, this are nothing else that the field of indicial signs, the signs as clues.
In the logic at the same time structural of superficial syntax and of pure form by which instead the significants are defined in between by differential relations comes to the forefront the countless level of words needed in the dictionary to surround a word to be defined so that the sense is dispersed in a chain of successive senses to the infinity.
But at the same time theoretical thought self-sufficiency that enclose it without exit to an exterior of language or relation with a world correlate or practicity, presuppose advancing and communicating in the mode of the hypothesis topoi realizing as hypothesis a supposed to be world as it is configured according to theory as world itself while at the same time it seems to fall in the well-known dilemma of symbolism when a recognition was attributed to the symbols, the potential as well as the limitation to solution in a symbolic imagery level what is not solve and or contradictory in reality.
My allusion to this aporetical closed way of theory however is far to be related with the old ideologies separed theory from practice understanding the last one as an application of the former, or the former as subordinated to the purposiveness of the last one since such an ideology derives in antitheoreticism, my precisions are not addressed to priories practice over theory before well to the fact that from theorizing toward its own purposiveness has conducted to a renounce to the relation between pure trues of theory and its correlate of a world and a reality limited by such a replacement of real contradictions by symbolic, imaginary solutions.
Focused in the scientific certitude that the ways of solutions is mainly theoretical and that theoretical trues presuppose an amazing vintage over a naïf idea of practice, an in attention to the ethical, moral and responsibility superiority of theory in front of those who believe in practical solutions, the purposiveness of this essay is about to attempts and attain to discuss a form of theorization more attentive to the world correlates and reality although this world and reality are considered inside theoretical objectives.
This is the question of the relation between theorizing and its correlates of world affect our epistemological priorities since pragmatism, phenomenology, hermeneutic and even logical positivism.
To start my discussion I would like to set aside here a crucial scientific problem, that one of the phenomenology of the real and reality as considered among the classical discussion on phenomena, appearance and presence toward us to the distinctions between world itself and the phenomenological world, to the phenomenological complexion of an idea of reality, to the nominalist issue of the relation between language and reality, language and world the issue which in fact started this essays around the logical query on the relations between a supposed to be absolute inside of language without exit to an exterior, the sign replacement of the objects and references, or the significants replacement of meaning, and on the opposite the several correlates which relativize such an inside placing us between us and language according to which remembering derrida language is again trapped in an exteriority between thought and being, on the one hand, and between the phenomenology of the world of life and reality on the other.
"This unity---sustained Hegel in the science of logic—between the interior and the exterior is the absolute reality, the interior is determined as the form of the inmediation reflected, meaning, of the essence in front on an exterior determined as the form of being, but both are only a unique identity, this identity is in a first place the pure unity of both as a basis full of content
Whence, this identity is continuity and is the totality that represent the interior which become also in an exterior, but in this it is not yet something becoming or trespassing but identical with itself, the exterior according to this determination is nothing else than the interior or equal to it according to a content, both are only a unique thing
However, this thing as simple identity with itself is different to its own determination of form, meaning that the determinations are extrinsiques to it hence it is itself an interior which is different to the exterior, but this exterior consist in that both determinations the interior and the exterior constitute it. Whence given that the interior and the exterior are considered as determinations of form both are first the simple form and second because determined as opposite the unity is the pure abstract mediation from which one is immediately the other in thus the interior is nothing else but the exterior and in reverse the exterior is nothing else but the interior
In fact, precisely in this opposition of both world the difference had disappeared at what supposed to be world itself is at the same time a phenomenological world and in reverse, the phenomenological world in itself is itself an essential world, phenomenological world and world itself, whence, are each one the totality of the reflection identical it itself, world itself and phenomenological world, one would supposed to be reflected and the other in itself, but each one is continued in the other whence each one is at the same time the identity of both moment, a reflected totality and an immediate supposed to be different are as such because each one have inside itself the other. 447-448"
The paragraphs we have rehearse address us to one of the most beautiful, rich and complex passages on the classical phenomenological questions on phenomena, appearance, reality, essence which completion an amazing and perplex synthesis idea of reality, on the relation between world itself and the phenomenological world, however, nothing as a forth issue started since logical positivism about the relation between language and reality, language and world are there yet discerned.
In fact, assumed the complexity of the phenomenological issue of ontology nothing as the exteriority between language and world were required something that arises since beyond the real crystalize in appearance and presence or between what is itself and what is reflected, the question of its representation appear to us, thus that we are concerned here with a language from which an idea of reality is created more or less adequately represented.
Or to advance it in a more developed form on how distinguishing the relation between language and reality omething is evolved in our deliberations about objectivity and subjectivity from which the issue of subject and object source.
It is well known to all of us the usual and generalized suspicious on the more hard side on analytical philosophy and earlier positivism from which a sometimes inflexible idea of distinguishing subject and object as cutted things started, between other things because such an exteriorized form might tend to offer a rigid and over added superposition by which the subject of knowledge appear as a cold observer unrelated with which he or she is observing and the supposed to be relative and discussible idea of objectivity evolved in it, the idea that objectivity, in fact, hesitate in from of subjectivity with the exception of the quantic relativist physicians idea about that the observer is involved in that which is observed much more than as supposed and over the naïf idea of a distant observer whose observation report an objective data without being permeated with the color of subjectivity usually seen as something that never receive the influences of it.
Now the concept of object finds in classical philosophy a certain evolution or ways to be discerned or perceived, from its first forms in the mode of self-assure. The idea of self-assure in fact, presupposed the simultaneity between the ontology of what simply is and become and our assure on it as reflected in the subject, it was the pass by from impressions to the relations between the sensible and the intelligible toward concepts and concepts of concepts, only through the exteriorization between the subject and that ontology allow us to differentiate that such an ontology might be a time pure being understanded as the being of one self, the human being in its becoming, time, but might be too another time the world of another thing distinct of him or her as subjects and not always a simple alterity of him or her in front of him or herself, my discussion of the intermedia space of the self between immanence and reflection, the apparition of us in front of us in conscience.
In preceding such another thing different to us within the impressions of ontology we have on the one hand the relation between substances and being, certainly, that which simply is, looks to be entailed with being by a sensible dimension according to which we perceive time and becoming, it is the logic entail the sensible to the intelligible by which the sensible correspond to our being, the datas of our senses, and the intelligible to the self-assure elucidation of such dates of the sense as reflected in the subject comprehensión.
But on the other hand, when such another thing ontology mean to us and about which the subject take notes in its assure means something radically distinct to the subject, we find the sense of pure becoming without us, time and happens which sometimes is the happening of substance, sometimes pure time, sometimes a pure event or a fall out that seems to pertain to the subject only from the side of the relation between substance and being something leads us to think on how substance is for example present in language --derrida ousia and gramme--or also in the mode of Leibniz, Espinosa and Hegel finded it even in conscience and the organism.
The original conception of Leibniz about the monad in fact, although we understand it usually in a modern phenomenological sense, meaning, without substance, was indeed based in the analysis of substance evolving the chemical and physical world.
While we should return to the question on how the essence of such a supposed to be ontology is divided and superated by the immateriality of concepts and concepts of concepts as well as to recognize that differences between logical positivism in respect to what relate subject and non-subject, conceptualism and nominalism beside also the semiotical perspective as Peirce discussed it since Peirce several decades after based his theory in empirical research around substance, but he later recognized how it is required to erase and or remove substance out of and to work without it something, a later position he defined as positive when he said that phenomenology is the first positive science something about which I am agree with.
Beside that we need distinctions between Peirce interpretation of nominalism and conceptualism because as much as conceptualism and nominalism required apriories also positivism is needed of it.
In the same mode that Hegel about who Peirce recognized himself as a continuator in front of the question about if the world have a beginning he established it as the right now when we well know that there is in the time of now also a past that is not already and a future that is not yet, the apriories of conceptualism and nominalism are not as different as the apriory of positivism as Peirce supposed, at the end, it is about recognizing as much as we recognize the right now of time as beginning of the world, that the subject and subjectivity are also beginnings as much as and at the same time that being is a beginning to science, other ways how to explain the immediate and simultaneous assure or self-assure as reflected in the subject?, we suppose a being that simply is without extrinsecation to it, certainly, but we are already there taking assure of it at the same time so it is already reflected in us as subject as well as already a concept, the concept of "being itself", this simultaneity of the beginning allow us to recognize that subject and object is a source relation and that as an a priory this distinction is the same to conceptualism, nominalism and phenomenology or what Peirce defined as the first form of positive science.
Thus, the question is not as much about the differences in between but about asking why the two firsts, conceptualism and nominalism are not always recognized in phenomenology, certainly, decades after Peirce, some forms of positivism recognized itself in phenomenology while some others not, we might attempt to prub and attain that today the challenge consist about, after the generalized suspicious to positivism, to reconcile phenomenology, conceptualism and nominalism while incorporating in the form of analytical philosophy and philosophy of language positivism into it, as earlier Peirce anticipated.
Such a turn evolves of course certain consequences to conservative positivism which should accept a dissemination of certain of its original purposiveness but without losing the main distinction made equivalence of the aprioris around the distinction of subject and object.
In fact, after derrida efforts to demostrarte the indecidibility between inside/outside language the paradoxes relatives both sides the idea of medlee vice appeared precesilly to try to solution the paradox, but derrida medlee vice, we should not forget it is nothing then return to The relation subjectar-object even if to try to see it in another form or posibilities.
The crucial point of this reflection seize in the fact that all we need is a cut between subject and object sufficient as to maintain the space of a certain exteriorization between language and world, language and eality even if to explore another posibilities far to the earlier positivist cold or objective observer.
Language, of course, is a part of the reflected phenomenological world ontologically speaking as reflected in subjectivity in front of the objectual world of referentiality a distinction after all involved or presupposed in Peirce semiotic from the moment he required to differentiate the sign from the object as well as the reflection of the object in the sign.—the representatement—from the aspect of the sign addressed to or toward the object—the ground, from the correlates in between establishes the interpretants, since certainly nothing as the object reflected in the sign might be considered as the same than the denotative dimension, the first correspond to the representational level the second to the level of meaning.
The difference regarding subject and object in conceptualism and nominalism as in analytical philosophy and the philosophy of language in general consist about that we permanence as subjects exteriorized in front of the object as to return ever on this relation in its various heterogeneous moments, nor only as aprioris of the subject as a beginning in front of being and the couple as to himself alterized not only as well when the object is another thing far to the subject quality but overall as to continue forth both in the synchronic as in the after so that the relation between subjectivity and objectivity stay always under assure.
Once considering the subject directly without language once by the mediation of language a certain extrinsecation is naturally needed to understand how subjectivity and objectivity are working in the several empirical regards since we also have the objectivity of subjectivity and the subjectivity of objectivity, both are at the end correlates of such an assure.
While the Peirce semiotic is more focused in decodification, meaning and interpretation instead of on observation, we might apply the same to meaning and interpretation as well, in one perspective we address the research on this relation subject object toward language and reality, language and world, in the other we seize semantique, meanings, interpretation and communication.
From one perspective we pay attention to knowledge from the other one to communication, while in both we need inference, deduction and induction but besides Peirce semiotic is required of triadic and dyadic principles triadic: sign-representatement-ground-correlate-interpretant, indicial, clues, icons, symbols, etc., dyadic: denotation, connotation, in a similar form we need conceptualization, abstraction, subjectivity, objectivity.
When the subject and subjectivity are more than forms of the subject assure --self perception or alterity-- to become principles of meaning the former are disseminated in the signs and the idea of an outside of language before end, at the same time and an outside after in respect to language, become relative, it is like when reality --the chain of objects out there--is replaced by meaning all the real is thus disseminate inside language as if nothing else as an extrinsecation to it were possible.
But the opposite may be sustained at the same time around the same, one time we recognize subject, predicaments, being, self, etc, etc, as functions of signs trapped in language, verbs, adjectives, substantives, etc, etc, other time we perceive all this as a dimension of the subject outside language, when language itself as derrida demonstrated appears as a form of the idealized flour of interiority through which we have a self perception of ourself exteriorized in language, or trapped between being and thougth --being=wishes to say as eidos and noesis in the origin of the genesis of sense decides the taking shape of language writing or speach--, thought=logic, or simply relativized from everyday pragmatiques and experience.
In a few words the simultaneous affirmation on the same as a duality of the true leads us to the classical discussion of phenomenology on the internal and the external, world it self and phenomenological word are nothing but the same in two different moment, both are inclusive oposites, a pair of both samennes and counterposition, the internal is nothing but the external and in reverse, our quote of Hegel earlier in this chapter.
Under conceptualism indeed we never lost a certain exteriority to language, we continue using language, between us and language noematic relations between thought, being and language rules the mediation.
Thought and language continue extrinseques so as to know its relations, by the way language at this point appear related with the expressive dimensión of being in a form that reality is presented or appear again to language, the moments of reflection between one and the other are internals and inclusive while also extrinsiques to meet in phenomenology as in the quote of Hegel on the internal and the external.
We are far here to negate the importance of Peirce in the discussion of this theme, in fact, the concept of correlate which title this essay and the book was initially proposed by Peirce, we return to Peirce several times in this sense, but the point in question is to say that we need to integrate today conceptualism, nominalism and positivism into phenomenology.
But what I mostly want to point out here is about that the need of the earlier cares of positivism ---analytical philosophy, philosophy of language, etc—even retheorized today after the suspicious objections—is pivotal over all if we are thinking from the point of view of social sciences about objective forms of material and immaterial culture, dealing with a social world of reality and human beings, to recognize the fact that if within the subject of positivism cares we maintain differed what an immanence might be is precisely to ever return on it each time in a distinct mode so as to stay assure between what pertain to us or belong to us as subjects and subjectivities and what belong to another kind of immanence such as substances, time, god, theology, chemical o physical events, etc distinguishing self-alterity from other things like for example when the becoming and the happening pertain to social or cultural, language events instead of another kinds of fall out.
Such a care reconsidered is far to be pointed to be exaggerated or caricaturized in the form of deformed exteriorizations but as I sustained somewhere before if the cold distance of the subject in front of the object we have in earlier positivism is ethically questionable and problematic the opposite is not less questionable, as much as the rigid form of cold distance, the indiferentiation evolved in the unknown of the natural need of extrinsecation unknown by the same reason the exteriority that is required by the natural ethic of relations.
And as well as we know and we are agree on how Frankford school opposite positivism under the objection of the resistance of earlier positivism to let it be meet later by the negation of the negation as a way to solve dialectically the issue of immanence something coincidence with the objections that Hegel addressed to the supremacy of a rigid I in transcendental idealism, the cares and ascetic behavior of the earlier positivist subject was also related with stopping substance.
Stoping an undefined immanence’s such as those evolved in the relation between being and couples since in the simple is of the couple we don’t know to differentiate when it is about us, when on a substance, when about pure time, when about god, when an event of culture, society and language, in such a sense we need to precise each time the consistency of it and stablish in respect the adequate method of relation also ethically and morally speaking.
From the side of the philosophy of language such a discernment obtained significant results because as much as a rigid positioning of subject and object as extrinsique evolve moral deformations the indistintions may leads to no less deformed, ethically and morally bad consequences.
Let then speak best on the reincorporation’s under a neo or neo neo in respect to the level of positivity which must be recognized since before as Peirce earlier anticipated it inside phenomenology to in the light of XXI century asimile the best and rejects the remains, we should not forget, in fact, that while the tradition of phenomenological sociology and self-sociology born from phenomenology it is impossible to figure out the grow up and born of it without the previous cares of analytical philosophy and the philosophy of language as well as we can’t simply forget the importance of comte in Bourdieu sociology of taste.
Let then advance to a conclusive closure in our deliberations at the starting of this essay concerning about the relations between an outside of language and an inside of language, on the one hand, and about the relation between language and world, language and reality on the other toward my proposal concept of world correlate.
I would like in fact to call out here and propose my concept of world correlate meeting some sense correlate play in earlier Peirce with a certain sense it acquired within literary criticism especially in the tradition of narratology.
Within Pearce the correlate was an amazing solution to solve the dilemma of the duplicity of the sign defined by moments of the object reflected under it—representatement—a moments of indicating, addressing, detonating it referentially—ground while thought he interpretant taking shape a chain of translations between signs to the order of meaning replace the object, the correlate appeared here to solve that coexistence of something related with the object or the referent but independent to it --so inside/outside at the same time--as well as in the place of it.
In literary criticism this notion was related with the type of narrators from the so-called omniscient narrator who as the author have the domain of the entery world created by the fiction including the characters to the several forms of hexotopies by which such a main omniscient narrator, sometimes the author, sometime a narrator created by the author, distribute the level of distance between type of narrators inside fiction and the production of the idea of world evoqued by the symbolic mimesis of fiction.
I recognized a certain interest in such a differentiation levels between moments of the texts by the effects of distance between omniscience and hexotopia within the text as a form of correlate, but my purposiveness in getting some aspects of the concept of correlate in Peirce semiotic with this meaning of correlate in narratology is defined by a decision to empty certain meaning of the concept erasing from the concept all its relation with fiction and the world of mimesis and dramaturgy to instead understand it as formal concept in term of formal logic.
The procedure at this point consist about recognizing the text as an instance from which the idea of world is a correlate but in regard to the relation between the immediacy of the world of experience more accurately the intramundane horizont and the several levels of sobreordination evolved in the hexotopies of making references to it so that the correlate of the world by the text variete through a diversity of forms travel in between highly levels of sobreordination when the world is an effect of the text as its correlate and highly level of immediacy as when we are directly in life word and the intramundane horizont hermeneutucs elucidations and pragmatics, to solve and get the pass by from world itself to reflected and phenomenological worlds, from the immediacy to symbolism, from experience to inscription.
In this form the concept of world correlate acquire a methodological dimension to both theoretical thinking and empirical research as well as the Peirce interpretant acquire a dimension within the topoi’s of the theoretical text that allow us to increase and enlarge and reach of the interpretant at several levels of correlate, instead of a translation of one sign by the other, here the procedure let us to explore essays as interpretants of another essays, books as interpretants of another books thinking in a same author and mainly in how I conceive as author the relation between my own books
The play with the interpretant retheorized at this level from a textualist reconsideration of the world correlate allow us also to explore the interpretant in empirical research regarding cultures in the sense of cultural theory, one culture as interpretant of another, one structure as interpretants of another toward cultural translations in which the concept of translation is far to mean translating simply idioms, but levels of comprehension and equivalences.
Now the main question defined to attain in this essay is not as much one on how to empty and retheorize a concept but before well about the dilemma and paradoxes of the issue about if there is or not more or less an exit to language and in this sense the concept of world correlate as I am retheorizing and proposing it mediate a solution.
In fact, I am sustaining here that even Derrida cant avoid the exteriority that ever will locate language between external matters such as for example thought and being. While derrida sustained that the subject is a function of language following Saussure, he himself recognized the privilege of both of the conscience, of presence, of thought, of alive present, of being and although his objective was focused in developing a certain idea of text such an idea of texere he sustained revealed that the edge of such a weaves goes enough outside and beyond before and after a supposed to be absolute inside of language something according to which the stratus of expression are extrinsiques to language thus as also the noematic and eidetic stratus of discourse.
Such an outside is even obvious seen from the world of life intramundane horizont as well as under intersubjective communication.
Now well, certainly, each major concept such as self, I, being, etc., ss discussed above, are of course also inside language or to be more précise it also have an expression inside language, in fact everything is inside language as well so that we need to think on this issue as a simultaneity or in terms of too and also, inside and outside, one time we have a self as a function internal to language but another time with have a pure self-outside the system of signs something about which sociology is more attentive than linguistic and the theory of the text.
Now my concept of world correlate as discussed in this paper is precisely the one which mediate both moment solving the contradiction, without a world correlate the purity of concepts outside language and the system of sign is impossible to be figured out also inside language as when the sense of a world is a correlate of the text and in reverse, without a sense of the world correlate it is impossible to figure out how concepts considered inside the system of signs and or trapped inside the text may be at the same time considered outside of it
The dilemma itself leads us to the ontological relation between being, thought and language and as such is an aporetical one if we don’t consider its two forms inside and outside, inside-outside, outside-inside as well as when the inside is the outside and in reverse as Hegel showed, what should we consider as primary or first thought or language is the question here?, the question can’t be answered without affirming both things at the same time something about which derrida realize to let it open.
In front of that my concept of world correlate proposes a new balance, a correlate is here nor only a world in respect to a text a sense more near to my conceptualization of the notion, but also an equivalence between the plots of the symbolic and the plots of the real according to which a translation in between take shape, meaning, on the one hand modes of the immediacy of the world undertanded as quotidian and as culture and modes of symbolism and of symbolic plots relative to a world, both level made correlate in the mode of interpretants and translations.
All the time an idea of world is endowed or expressed in langue is already a correlate of the text, but the level of conceptuality between language and world are differenced in between phenomenologically and hermeneutically from the immediacy to the supradiscourse level of sobreordination and of representational simbolizations as well.
It is not the same the hermeneutic and phenomenology of an ideal of world as expressed in a text than the representation of a world, in the former the ontology is hermeneutical in the last one the ontology is mimetic, in the former there is not a world as the object of a representation which try to bring the law of representation in language to forms of the world as its effects whence when the idea of reality is produced by the control of the effects of representation but intelligible elucidations of the hermeneutics that weaves a world. In the last one there is a symbolization of a world as a replacement of the object by the sign as Peirce showed, the concept of correlate is here semiotically offering the possibility to mediate the contradiction.
Peirce in fact earlier desisted of the immediate datas of the senses thus as to the relation between the sensible and the intelligible so as to take distance far from the point of view of the materiality of the sign as from the process of meaning inclining himself to symbolism, but his semiotic was not mimetic in the sense of repiting in the forms of language the forms of reality, it was instead a sense of replacement.
In this sense my retheorization of the world correlate attain to demonstrate the priority of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity as the final last question evolved in the dilemma instead of the relation between representation and reality so in a form that the idea of world appears as a correlate and not as a prototype of mimesis.
Mimesis in fact dominated in a certain measure a considerable part of poshegelianism as obvious in certain works of Benjamin and adorno and as well as in adorno aesthetic theory which preserve majorly conceptual abstractions as well as the principles of inmaterialization and dematerizalization resulting from it, something about which I am agree with, while the concept of correlate is completely absent from it.
I have preferred in this sense to theorize a concept of world correlate adequate to the phenomenology and the texere and the text as discussed by derrida as well as to the distinctions made by Bourdieu on how the forms of material culture are form of subjectivity and in reverse the forms of subjectivity forms of the objective culture thus as to consider deleuze distinctions between subjectivity and empiricism
We thought that we had located –sustained deleuze on this regard- the essence of empiricism in the specific problem of subjectivity, but first of all we should ask how subjectivity is defined. The subject is defined by the movements through which it is developed. Subject is that which developed itself. The only content that we can give to the idea of subjectivity is that of mediation and transcendence. But we note that the movement of self-development and of becoming other is continuous, the subject transcendent itself but it is also reflected upon. Hume recognize this two dimensions, presenting them as the fundamental characteristics of human nature: inference and invention, belief and artifice, in short believing and inventing is what makes the subject a subject. We are also subjects in another respect, the subject invents, it is the maker of artifice.
Such is the dual form of subjectivity, to believe and to invent …the problem is a follow, how can a subject transcending the given be constituted in the given?. Undoubtedly, that which transcend the given is also given, in another way and in another sense. The subject who invents and believes is constituted inside the given in such a way that it makes the given itself a synthesis and a system, weask, how is the subject constituted in the give?, the construction of the given makes room for the constitution of the subject. But what is the given?, it is say Hume the flux of the sensible, a collection of impressions and images, or a set of perceptions.
Gilles Deleuze
Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essays on Hume theory of human nature
Columbia university press
Only in this form as soon as theorized the relations between interiority and exteriority of us in front of language and of language, world and reality needed to tie up epistemological and methodological issues implicit to my concept of world correlate we may return both theoretically and empirically defined in the research to that calmed reality of a suprasensible world that Hegel so brilliantly synthetized in the quote start this essay on the ontology of reality as a meeting of the inside and the outside, world itself and the phenomenological world.
Bibliography
Bourdieu Pierre, Saussure: Structure and Practice, Cambridge University Press
Derrida Jacques, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press and Cathedra
Eco Umberto, El Universo del sentido, La Estructura Ausente, Lumen
Geertz Clifford, The world in a text: on how to read said tropics, the anthropologist as author, Stanford university press
Geertz Clifford, El mundo en un texto: como leer tristes trópicos, el antropólogo como autor, paidos
Hernandez Sam Juan Abdel, Rethinking Urban Anthropology, Complete works, Tome VII
Hernandez Sam Juan Abdel, Anthropology of Archaeology: A Perspective from Ethnometodology and Cultural Anthropology, Selected Essays, Book
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intramundane Horizont, Complete Works, Tome VI, Book, 2017
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Self and Acerbo: The self and the social Between writing, research and culture, complete works, tome VIII
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Presentational Linguistic, Complete works, tome III, Book, 2005
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Being and Monad, Complete works, tome IV, Book, 2006
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Given and the Ungiven, Complete works, tome V, book, 2007
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, phenomenological Anthropology, selected Essays
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, the indeterminist true, selected essays
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, the constellation of common Sense, sociology of common sense and Anthropology ResearchTheory, selected essays
Sini Carlos, Peirce, Semiótica y Filosofía, Hachete
Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Science of Logic London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929, translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, translated by Henry S. Macran (Hegel's Logic of World and Idea) (Bk III Pts II, III only). Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929 translated by A. V. Miller; Foreword by J. N. Findlay. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1969, Prometheus; Later Printing edition (December 1, 1991), Humanity books, translated by George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010
Hegel, Ciencia de la Lógica, Hachete
The Horizonts of symbols: Interpretant and Structure
in Postmodern Cultural Theory
©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
Written in English and translated to English
by Abdel Hernandez San Juan
In the questions already discussed I stablished on the way of language theory some differences between Saussure and Peirce defining it as one between structuralism and symbolism, but at the same time, I examined the consequences derived from train to set in relation such an structuralism and specific form of symbolism by proposing and discussing the concept of world correlate
The world correlate, as discussed, pertain and belong to the order of the relations between the text and worlds both worlds of reality and of fiction as well as the relation of those worlds as correlates of the text as something that work without a subject who interpret although we will seen it is relative, in a first instance, an interpretant is only nothing else than another sign, a word, for example, which function as an interpretant meaning a translator of the meanings of another word, a sign is translated by another one beyond and independently of the relation of that sign with an object denotably or referentially, to this point nothing as a subject who interpret is included, supposed or evolved, the concept of the interpretant given that suppose similarities with the word interpretation may in fact give the impression of an activity of interpreting by a subject as such, but in a first level it is yet as conceived by Peirce just a function of the signs, a sign is defined as an interpretant because it provide all we need to access or comply the meanings of another sign thanks to another former one
Let then go in deep about this translation function of the interpretant and later figure out how something formally conceived without presupposing a subject might include an operational subject in methodological terms as well as to discuss the differences and points of contact between such a presupposed subject and the one that we have in the activity of interpretation both in term of hermeneutic as in term of exegesis discussed in the first chapter of this book.
An interpretant is the result of a system of inference which have in its basis a cognitive tie up between representation and its objects it have from its basis a distinction between the qualities of things and the synthesis of it at language level, it resulted from a procedure of distinctions included the ground. The ground is a part of the sing defined as that which it indicates, address or toward the object something seems to be similar or the same with another name of the later called referent, referentiality or denotation, the grounds however have an interesting specificity different to referent and denotation, it seems to maintain a certain relation of belonging to the object it indicates, it evolve to a certain point a basis or a support by which the sign and the object arises from a similar source.
This specificity of the ground is almost undiscussed in the criticism about Peirce, the ground is certainly almost the referent, almost denotation, but with a subtly difference, the fact that sometimes the relation between the sign and the object of the sign is not always one of indicating or denoting it, but also of a certain mutual source, for example, in visual signs or even to go more in deep, in natural signs which are majors to understand Under Peirce semiotic, sometimes the sign and the object are related by inferences, clues and several kinds of implications, nothing better to illustrate this than when the sing is defined by the object itself, when it is the object itself the one supposed to be detonated the one which become the sign so to speak, so that as much as the ground is almost or the same of the later so-called referent and denotation, as much as its is complex and rich than that, it evolved several forms by which sign and objects arises and source in their mutual relations
But the system in question basis the interpretant includes also the representatement which is a reflective concept by which there is also at the sign level and surface something about the object reflected by it, finally, we can’t understand the main basis of the concept of interpretant without understanding how this two levels of a sign form a correlate since it is precisely the correlate the level which establish the kind of independence of the sign in respect to the object while at the same time basis the avenue from which through grounds and representatements the interpretants born, start and grow from correlates
But the relation between ground, representatement and correlate is not yet one of meaning, to start the meaning it is necessary another sign which will translate the former one, this another sign is the interpretant and start the interpretants successive process stablish meanings, as discussed above, the interpretant is the result of the relation ground, representatement, correlate, but it start the process of meaning as a semiosis which replace the objects by the meanings
Now, we must pay attention at this point, the pass by from the ground, the representatement and the correlate to the interpretants is at the same time the starting of an infinity semiosis through which reality –by now a reality of objects and objectual one so to speak-- which was grounded, seize at the representatement and correlated entrance weaved to the interpretant or more precisely thanks to the interpretant in a process of meaning, from this moment, the replacement of the object by the sign at the microscopic micro level is increased and enlarged in a form similar to what Derrida defined as texere, a weave of both correlates –the final form of ground and representatement—and of meaning, the endless process of translation the interpretant start to never stop within successive interpretants or the so called infinity semiosis, here reality is weaved as meaningfulness while replaced as the object by language
The world correlate source then from this level. We might in fact made abstraction of this principle to recognize that both level the one detonated according to a first relation sign-object and the one weaved in the replacement of objects by meanings are equally reality in different grades or stratus’s
While the concept of texere discussed by Derrida is more phenomenological as well as overall formal, it is of the same kind but not without pointing out the major differences discussed in the previous chapter on endless of form and aesthetic within text ---Derrida, and endless forms of meaning and culture—Peirce.
Must we try to relates this two differentiated levels?. Well, I think we must as we should explore relations between structural principles and symbolist ones, but not in any form.
The first issue to be out pointed here is about the subject. How to understand the position of the subject regarding interpretants and its possible operational level of work?
We might understand that working with the interpretant is not the same as interpreting, moreover, the hermeneutic activity of elucidation and the exegesis of texts are activities of interpretation between a reader subject and a world or a text to be elucidated or read, instead of that, in working with interpretants we are working with something itself which function as an interpretant of another thing, we set out and aside the relation between things independents to us as we made interpretants one in respect to the others.
From this point we might work with things as interpretants of another’s, books of an author as interpretants of another books, languages as interpretants of another languages, forms of the text as interpretants of another’s forms of the texts, structures as interpretants of another structures, cultures as interpretants of another cultures.
We must then at this point add to the previous chapters deliberations on the differences between the relation between hermeneutic and ontology on the one side and exegesis and the text on the other, a thirst level of method well differentiated to the two previously discussed, the work with interpretants which consist not about elucidating as ontological activity not about reading texts as exegesis activity, but about relating things in between we choice as interpretants one in respect to the others, while we should be attentive on the fact that, as discussed in my chapter the world correlate the levels of working with interpretants as evolving translations and meanings is simultaneously if we follow Peirce distinctions, with correlates and as such with my concept of world correlate.
So that we are here in front of a methodological differentiation, it is not the same to interpret or read that to put in relation things that might be one interpretants of the others. In this sense the concept of interpretant conserve and preserve a certain deontic exteriority from the more simple level, the signs, to the more complex levels, books, structures, languages, forms of text, cultures and as such we are here dealing with what in semiotic is being defined as “languages objects”.
We know that we are moving here beyond Peirce in many senses while based in his legacy we explore an enlarge and increase possibility to the interpretants, to interpret with interpretants is so no interpreting a text directly neither elucidating things as ontologically given but interpreting a text with another text, in both forms considering the texts as already given as well as set aside and building relations of texts that we have made such a for example when we textualize the non-textual, working with pre-texts or with form to construct the textual by textualization procedures, the interpretant is the activity that allow us to make inferences in between, to translate and to work with meanings and semiosis
The Peirce concept of unlimited or endless semiosis is here of a pivotal and major regard, this is the concept that evolving the chain of successive interpretants toward as to culture it leads us to work with the interpretant in the level of cultural theory, while we must at the same time made a major distinction between the chain of interpretants defined by translations and meanings and two other chains already discussed in this book, that of the significants and that which transform hermeneutic in hermeneusis.
Hermeneusis is nothing else than culture itself as we discussed it above but under it we are diluted or disseminated at the ontological level of culture, significant chain toward us to a formalist and at the end textualist level, from significants within syntactic formal chains we may enlarge and increase the textual dimension while there is a point when increased enough or enlarged enough the text pass to be a texere or a weave, in spanish we have a best word which mean the same, tejido, when this happen hermeneusis overflows the textual and the chain of signifiers disappear in hermeneusis as culture.
Semiosis as a chain toward us to a major differentiation in respect to the former, it is not a purely ontological not a purely formal surface, but a deontic succession of translations process with cognitive unities, the interpretants are in fact as discussed above cognitive unities defined by ground, representatements and correlates and as such there is yet or ever a certain exteriorization, such an exteriorization is at the end enclosing reality in language, the reason because the chain is considered semiotical, the enclosing however is nothing else than the replacements of the objects by meanings and as such is a symbolist chain.
This is the reason because to some critics of Peirce the concept of semiosis have pragmatic implications as well is considered related with grammatology and rhetoric while we should not forget that Peirce conceived it also as a cosmology a cosmology of signs so to speak.
In this sense we must take note of the issue of interiority and exteriority of language as discussed in the previous chapter and to know to recognize when are we needed to work with hermeneusis, when with textual form chains and when with deontic semiosis.
While semiosis is deontic it is not however superposed and or juxtaposed to culture in as exogenous form, it is itself also culture even we must said also ontologically speaking but here culture is perceived from the side of the semiological groundings of meanings and as such the interpretants as unities are deontics, we interpret one text with another text or according to another, the reason because the Peirce semiosis was major not only to semiotic theory but also to semantique.
In this sense we may complex and enrich the interpretants by recognizing the cuts of the according to the interpretants that the interpretants itself suppose in term of conducting our research and the towards of it.
Thus, we have arrived here to a major theoretical problems which need to go in deep.
As we will seen forth the field of the symbolic or of what we understand as symbolism take shape from the shoots of the interpretants in respect to the objects as replacements toward meanings and the replacement of reality by the symbolism of meaningfulness or reality as symbolically enclosed in the semiosis of meaning as culture, such a sense was in fact recognized by pierce who decided to take distance from the sensible multiplicity or palpable sensoriality, but symbols are less indexical and less deixticals than signs, at the symbolic level the object is far than from the sign as we should not forget that to Peirce even thought and thinking are forms of the sign and of the symbolic, the process of synthesis operated by inferences and replacement of the sensorial datas is evolved in symbolism, the symbols are less reflective and indicatives non-referential than the signs so that from the measure of symbols we perceive that symbols are in another sense and respect also forms and as such also structures or to put it in reverse and paradoxically more clear that structures are symbols
As soon as we understand that structures are symbols we are taking distance from the traditional dilemma of structuralism between operational and ontological structuralism, under the first we consider structures as formal models to work with or according to, at the ontological we suppose to be working with structure as it exists in society, culture and language, but from the moment we perceive that retheorizing the concept of structure symbolically move us out of both poles of the structuralist dilemma, we understand that structures as symbols are nothing else than sinegdoques and metonyms by the mean of which an structure might be an interpretants of another one like a text of another text according to our cuts, structures itself in fact are nothing else that forms of the cutts.
We have said that structures are symbols, but nothing yet about how and in what form
If I cut the relation langue/speech in a synchronic level here and now in the triple present I obtain an structure, this structure take shape from the fact that I recognized that langue as the same always with little variations while speech is the space of that language in a practical mode as reading and writing are but without modification of langue following its rules and gramatics, as soon as obtaining this relatibly static structure I may go to that language an analyze it
The structure we have obtained is both, on the one side, we obtained it thanks to the cut but if instead of that we avoid to separate and distinguish langue from speech in the synchronic cut of the here and now, we lost the structure, as soon as avoiding we will not find an structure neither a way to analyses as such
The cut allow us to be in contact with an objective reality of language, the question is, should we suppose that language itself consist in such an objective reality as an stable structure?, the answer to this question is that as soon as we cut language and the relation between language and culture in another form we will immediately lost an structural sense of language, that language may be symbolized as an structure it is undiscussable as the cut showed it to us, that such an structure lead us to travel or move among language forms structurally it is undiscussable and that according to our cut we might seize infinity of phenomena’s both objectives and subjective it is also out of discussion, but that if we change the cut language might appear in a completely different form arriving even to forms of understanding language in which the idea of structure is diluted, disseminated and even destroyed it is out of discussion too.
We only have to place ourself for example understanding language among the more general culture, or according to how a language is interpreted by a a receptor a reader or an interpret, the same elements allows us to see structures under the former cut as relatibly subtracted from time and space in a synchronic static form, are returned now to be perceived under disseminated and dispersed links when nothing might be fixed, if we for example pay attention not to what each sign is but to what it is not we arrive to the principle of differences so to empty spaces of non-presence or absents from which the relation mark, unmark, empty space, non-sign, difference disseminate the structure to the point of destroying it as derrida demonstrated and eco discussed at the absent structure, from another perspective we may arrive to how language is diluted among thought and being
Thus if we arrive to an structure it was only thanks to out cut and from such a cut the structure is nothing else that symbolization of language endowed by our cut, it is nothing else than a symbol
This symbol, of course, might be comprehended in several aspects with subtly well deferiented senses in respect to our more usual meaning of symbols, an structure is not a metaphor, but an structure is yes a sinegdoque as well as a metonym from the moment its logic presuppose to set in relation two geometrical and arithmetic ideas of surface and space and from the moment we are putting in relation the part of a whole out of it in relation to another whole.
The time of an structure is usually detained and the space transformed in surfaces, lines and dots creating a juxtaposition and superposition between the formal logic of the structure --not matter if we extracted it from a former model or abstracted it from things itself, in any case if I isolate or set aside an structure I am doing a cut putting in relation two planes one is an abstract plane one another one is a concrete one plane, the abstract one will be related with the concrete, empirical one as a model to saw it or as a model to reflect it, one will be in front of the other but never quite unify or united, the relation will always be one of repetition and superposition, a plane stay always relatibly in front of the other.
In general we must attempt to probe that the formal plane will be more near to our gaze, meaning to the subject of knowledge the other one plane will be a kind of adjacent one, the abstract one function as a formal model will be the near one and the concrete, empirical one will be the adjacent, superposed or repited, I am doing nothing that putting in relation two surfaces which lines and axis stay continually in a relation of equidistance but working together and at the same time, I will move from the concrete plane to the abstracting formal model one and from the formal abstracted one I will return to the concrete one retuning to the abstract again so as looking for between one and the other meaningfulness relations
The sinegdoque work is a very similar mode, a plane corresponding to an space is free from the whole it arise and its relation with the next plane of another space will symbolize under the new whole the space of the former whole from which the sinegdoque arise and source even, also metonyms, a metonym is always a relation between two planes, one is the abstract symbolic one the other one seem to be a part of the whole from which it is separated and to which it belong
When we made abstraction of an structure which is not in correspondence by mimesis to that supposed to be the structure of a thing or an object, the figural abstract plane considered as formal model will never might be quite represented, it might be evoqued through drawings and graphics. We will of course try to separe it from the mere drawing or graphic in which the pure structure is abstracted from the real empirical and concrete things and objects it itself, but it will never be quite represented because it is an abstraction and maintain with the object a relation always adjacent, but forth the drawings of those planes, the formal abstract which is not a mere mimesis of the supposed to be structure of the things and the other one supposed to be reflected have will have to be superposed and set in a relation through which moving from a plane to another is a process of unveil, revel, find or discover paradigmatic senses, we create a signedgoques with abstracted aspects of an space adjacent to another space, the related parts of one wholes with another whole
Structure is thus in itself symbolic in the same mode of tropes and the only way to get it is through cutts
The former is no a way to meaning that there are never structures, there are structures without doubt in thought, in language and in culture, but the structure as a trope is a centaur, a half a man and half an animal as in the Grieg mythology figure, meaning, a half referent to the object itself and a half to representation and in a great measure everything belongs to the cutts pertinent to the relations between representations and its objects
We can’t define structure as a sign because an structure is not a dyadic symbol composed only by reflect, reference and object but it is an abstract symbol as for example perspective is an abstract symbol of the same kind, a perspective is also at the same time representation and object, representation and reality, one time it goes through a pure plane of representational perception without reference to the plane of the objects reality and the world, but another time and at the same time it goes quite as perspective in and of the objects itself
Both are concepts, perspective and structure related with mimetical principles more or less subordinated dependent or independent to representation in respect to the represented and as representation is never identical to the represented both are symbols located in an intermedia place of disjunction working according to logical syllogisms
Realized out the tie up or clear away that structures are symbols we are then in conditions to discuss how to relate such forms of retirements to the symbolic in respect to the world of sensible impressions, interpretants and structure
The, interpretants, take shape from triadic and diadic principles,
triadic: sign-representatment-ground-object
dyadic: sign, correlate, interpretants
We should then finish with a precision about which that it is different in terms of cultural theory, sociology, anthropology and ethnography the former discussed from the simple traditional idea of the relation between the culture of an author and another culture about which it is an interpretation or representation, far to entrance in an external culture to another, the one of the author and another one, the work with the interpretants avoid it and stablishes a separation between the subjectivity of the author and the interpretation of cultures, what we relates in between are things in itself so that what we have is a work of unveiling, a quest of search, a research around how an structure may be interpretants of another, how a text, how a book, how a culture
Bibliography
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The Exegesis of the Texts of Culture:
Pre-texts and construction of the text between epistemology and reality
©By Abdel Hernández San Juan
Written in English and translated to English
by Abdel Hernandez San Juan
The purposiveness of this essay is to site and discuss in a mode as open as possible the senses of the concept of text as to embrace a number of possible forms of the textual through which I understand and develop it in my own research both in the sense of sociology as in anthropology of culture and society directly, meaning, from the analysis of social forms according to years of fieldwork and research in the popular markets of Venezuela as expressed in several of my recent years essays and books including the exegesis of pretextual forms as implicit, beyond the kind of performativity of research explored in epistemology, on experiences in my own cultural reconfiguration and transformations, the horizont of my own everyday quotidian environment as expressed in my books on technology environments and urban habitat according to subjectivity, sensibility, the self and other issues within medias in use from a Texas perspective
The relation between the ethic of knowledge and the ways to afford myself reality is here in the forefront since the transformation of my own cultural parameters are in play while also presupposing my research on a variety of phenomena’s of material and immaterial culture, visual culture and imageries of several kinds
It is not my objective however, to discuss my own books and essays, differently to that, the center of my attention is to discuss in an open form and generally from the analytical philosophy of science, how I understand the place, the proportion, the form and the levels of the work of exegesis of culture, in what forms the interpretation of cultures as text might work
Before analyzing it I must advance some distinctions between the concept of text and the concept of pre-text because while both concept share something pre-given to our perception, knowledge and readings, a legible and readable whole, the concept of pre-text evolve a more accurate activity of choosing and selecting, meaning that what made a text a pre-text is overall the selection of it as a motive, reason, pattern and issue of our attention and the concept of text suppose to guaranty as pre-defined an independent or autonomous text in regard to our choices.
Certainly as discussed above a text take shape also from the moment we read anything, everything we read become a text to our activity of reading and we may sustain that at this point it becomes also a pre-text or even sustain that any text we read is a pretext to our reading, under such a sense text and pre-text seem to be the same, but it is obvious that a pretext like topics and themes are, seems to be more near than the idea of text to a certain intentionality, if we choice a pretext we choice another text as the basis for our text to be about while by simply reading something already defined as text we are not necessarily overfocussing it
At the same time we should may distinctions between text, Pretext, construction of the text and textualization
For example, we are in the city and we observe the publicities around us which consist about a universe of colors and kinetic movements surrounding us including images, icons, mobile forms, light, computer languages, we are not committed yet to write an essay about it but just enjoining it as citizens as consumers as side walkers all that universe call our natural attention and as such we start to made it intelligible through our process of decodification while we are not choosing it as pretext to an interpretation
Can we say that from the moment we are decoding it simply as citizens, consumers and side walkers such a publicity environment become a pre-text and or a text to our Reading?
This question on involuntary activity versus intentionality must be asked here if we attain to really be agree on the parameters to be consider to define something as text or as pre-text, I think it is easy to recognize that the answer is yes and not at the same time as well as that to a certain point it is an issue undecidable.
The issue of indecibility by the way is sometimes an option, i am thinking for example in how derrida decided to let the question of what is first thought or language to indecibility since taking a way instead of another evolved unwishable risk in respect to the primacy and privilege of being from the moment the relation itself is impossible to be solved without the pass by of being into both thought and language
In a similar form we must attain to seize both sense at the same time in our definitions of texts and pre-text, a reserve or a conservation attitude should mediate our answer, instead of making both concepts fixed under one or another answer an ethical sense regarding relation persuade us to admit both definitions, a natural, involuntary definition so to speak and an intentional definition must be at the same time complementary
With this tie up a pre-text is a concept both pre-given in culture and society as well as choiced and selected while a text must be defined as a more autonomous phenomena, undoubtedly to read is to read texts, but a text must be something more itself if we establishes the rule of the book of text as the parameter to basis what a text is, a text should be something readable in itself with independence of the activity of reading it or not so that when we are reading things which are not itself text we must speak about building text and sometimes about textualizations of the non-textual
Thus it is needed to clarify or separate that a text must be text itself perse our reading and that a pre-text is defined by an intentional activity of reading, the pretext is a legible form we have choice to be interpreted or read from exegesis a text instead is a form whose decodification don’t need necessarily of our intentional purposiveness of reading.
Besides we required another one distinction between a text that was already given exactly as we perceive it beyond our presence as something legible in society and culture, and forms to increase the textual such as from author works, theoretical Works, book of philosophy, novel, story, report, to form without authors such as ancient forms of the inscritural or iconographic symbols, or as in archaeology and other forms of reading ancient disappeared cultures, or jeroglifs, petroglyphs and other forms of the inscriptural including dictionaries and encyclopedia’s
While beyond writing and inscription seen in Archaeological sense, an additional distinction is required not as much between texts with author and textual form less authorial as artisans and or interior designs or forms of material culture in general but also between as mentioned above text and textualization as to encompass forms of texts as publicity, fashion, scenifications and mise in scenes, ceremonies and rituals, urban popular markets and so on
For example fashion as Barthes discussed it, it is without doubt a legible text in society, we don’t need yet to write a book or a semiotique tractactus on the system of fashion as to as citizens recognize it as a legible whole according to the acervo we have on such forms on the background of former styles we comply and access in our cultural alive memory, however, beyond such a legibility allow us to include fashion in what we may accept as text, a legible whole through which we can read the styles of the customs of a society, meaning to read the social text through the visual text, if fashion, as also publicity, is a text to intramundane legibility’s between persons and visual forms it is not yet text in the sense of making a read more deeper focused in a research addressed to read the social text in the visual and its subyascents senses, a citizen a consumer who transit within the city may find intelligible the forms of fashion by this reason we require a distinction between text and textualization indicating the subsequent and more focused effort to unveil a subyascent cultural text under fashion as a visual phenomena
Another distinction is needed between textualization and construction of the text, in textualization we textualize the non-textual, we try something as text beyond if it is more or less a textual form, in constructing the text, we build a text as it is needed to make intelligible something unreadable without such a building struggle
in term of textualization everything must be textualize, textualization mean to try as text the non textual or any thing, instead of that we can’t construct a text on everything, constructing the text is always an activity addressed to obtain a text were something is unreadable or needed of textual bridges as to be comply
A countless level of phenomena’s in culture and society are not themselves defined as textual forms while susceptible to forms of textual readings while others are needed of constructing the text around it , a system as fashion expressed in visual forms, body and corporal styles, usages, customs is undoubtedly a type of text beyond if to be read the reader should have a significant cultural specific acervo about which such a visuals forms belong, be a part of that society and to know its fashions but a determinate visual cultural conglomerated as for example social ceremonies such as carnivals, parties or a religious liturgy are not themselves properly texts and however susceptible to be constructed as texts
a visual imagery for example is always cuted with precision in the acervos of a culture, for example, the colonial visual imagery it can variete in colors, clothes, court-dresses, vestments, pieces of furniture and architecture characteristics between one culture and another one, but will ever maintain as colonial visual imagery certain uniformity and parameters distinguish it everywhere as one imagery, kinds of to comb, modes of dress, concepts of formal education courtesies, modes of structure architecture such as entrances to horses so that albeit a visual colonial imagery may be different in the readings of Victorian tradition in usa compared with Mexico, it will conservate always a certain delimitation
we can enlarge the parameter of the book of text as to extend it as decodify visual culture, publicity, fashion or the visual culture of television, the internet and some other medias of this same kind, wholes susceptible to be read as texts since something cut it with regularity and stability as patters of legibility so as conditions of possibility for exegesis and hermeneutic, thus that as much as a carnival or a party are not texts around it the text might be constructed
This are not texts in the sense of visual or material expression distributed around the relation between a message envoy with the first and priorized intention to have a destinatary to whose decodification as communication is oriented, but as symbolic expressive wholes through which culture recreate itself in its rituals, in the same mode we might afford a colonial visual imagery as a differentiated whole, around it we might realize interpretative practices and exegesis by the mean of which the phenomenological and hermeneutic analysis might construct the texts, the popular markets of Venezuela entrance under this kind, to work with it is required start from a principle of distinguishing the relation between a certain exteriorization or extrinsecation between epistemology and reality as a cut stablished to the research,
Thus we must cut a determined cultural, symbolic and social well defined expression of visual culture and try it as a text not only by textualizing it but by doing distinctions between pre-text, text, textualization and constructions of the text.
Sometimes the differences between textualization and constructions of the text are bloring or effaced since textualizing mean trying the non-textual as textual it looks to be a construction of the text where a text is not as much a text, the needs to construct the text are not defined by the non-textual, but by cultural and social phenomena’s about which the simply textualizing of it as pre-given is far to comply and access the stratus’s needed to be understanded and to go in deep,
the activity of reading is not a mere physical fact, but a fact of interpreting and meaning and as such we may identify when the textualization of the non-textual offers nothing on the way to understand and comprehend, the construction of the text is thus required to comply something that can’t be legible in its levels of complexity by simply affording it as pre-given, in a few words, the difference between textualizing and constructing the text is based on the fact that sometimes textualizing is all we need but sometimes it guaranty nothing as to comply the complex levels of the stratus’s required to understand a phenomena of material or immaterial culture,
building the text suppose then to goes beyond the pre-given, it goes usually by putting and set aside in relation textual forms of different kinds which are not related in between as pre-given
Stablished and defined to the research we may cutt a determined cultural symbolic and social form of culture with its clear visual expression constructing under it its textuality to later relate the textual aspects with subjacent and stratified levels of meanings
This an stratified and phenomenological concept of text as discussed above the one I usually work with was discerned by derrida in his book Margins of philosophy when he expressed
The inter-tie of language of what may be considered as pure language and of the other thread of experience constitute a weave. The word verwebung leads to this metaphorical zone, the stratus are weaved, the imbrication is as such tan we can’t discern the plot from the urdimbre. If the stratus of logos were only something upon we could rise it and let appear below the subjacent acts and non-expressive contents, but given that such a superstructure act, whence, in an essential and decisive manner, on the unterchichts, we are obligated, from the entrance of description to associate the geological metaphor to a textual one because weave mean text, verweben here mean texere. The discursive is related with the non-discursive the linguistic stratus is mixed with the prelinguistic one according to regulated Sistema as a certain kind of text
Between language as purely language and experience we discern what derrida defined as a weave, a textual weave, the discursive and the non-discursive mix in between with the prelinguistic stratus according to a regulated specie of text, a texere, a plot, this is nothing else but what I discussed in another paper as the pass by between the intramundane horizont and sobreordination and between life word and the symbolic, between reality and language, between text and world which the concept of world correlate try to seize and focus without forgetting my distinctions between the significant chain leads derrida to go that way and Peirce semiosis
What is determinant from my theoretical and empirical experience in respect to this form to understand the text or the textual is that it return the concept of text to a more classical sense near to a phenomenological sense of the relation between genesis and structure in the phenomenological world something we can discern through the world of life toward the intramundane horizont and forth through forms of language and symbols distinguishing the immediacy of culture and the self-representational universe of subjectivity and conscience, thus as to know the differences between the former and the last ones as well as its moments of mix
Whence it let us to move from exegesis of textual phenomena’s where not always and not necessarily we are affording literal textual forms considered as added to the phenomenological world to cultural formations such as enunciations, messages, discourses,
In the field of culture as text we have first the relation between language and world, language and reality, epistemology and world, epistemology and reality, subject and object through which the cutts we do in the research of the forms of societies and cultures analyzed and studied are not themselves texts of the texts as for example a literary work of fiction is a text on the texts it represents
pre-textual dimensions are not yet and probably will never be forms of the critique of the text on the text, for example, in interpreting how in the popular markets as visual conglomerates meet the mise in scene of the vendor and the scene of exchange presuppose a mode of seen and being seen that regulate the phenomenological expression of the forms of body, gestural and spatial interactions as well as the relation between the empirical dimension of the market and the abstract dimension of the market, its concrete level and its symbolic one, to get it so a work of hermeneutic analysis focused in constructing the text is needed with basis in understanding its stratifications
Such a phenomenology of the market abstracted according to the empirical research allow to work later the exegesis of its corporeal and symbolic forms and to set in relation the concrete market here and now with the symbolic representation and the market internal symbolisms.
Another example, interpreting how the mode in which the tourists make self-representation of themselves in a culture –photos, videos, etc., is a form to read how the culture in which such images are made is producing mise in scene of itself toward the economy that tourism generate and addressed to the fact that tourists made representation of themselves in a culture.
Both cases are examples of forms of exegesis developed under a modality of constructions of the text, in both cases the construction of the text is made according to how the exegesis build the text that was read under the phenomenological stratus, meaning out of presence, in one case according to the form of seen and being seen regulate body and gestural interactions in the market spacialities, in the other according to set in relation photos and films of the tourists with analysis of the modes of mise in scene addresses to tourism so according to forms of self-representation of certain cultures in between and of each culture addressed to another.
Now well, to resort to an archive material according to with others before us developed interpretations expressed in works of sociology and anthropology on the direct forms of culture we are studding start to approximate the parameter of the critic of the text on the text, however, still the problem in question seen from the relation subject and object, continue taking as parameter an external motive that of the topic or issue
Both the text with resort in archives and our text share a common topic
interpreting it in writing or in fieldwork
At this point a distinction is needed as to separate the direct studies of culture, on the one hand, the study of culture by studding another text previously afforded the same issues in sociology and anthropology on the other hand and finally the study of literary fictions and the art
In a synthesis, the arts are without doubt also susceptible of the textual exegesis it is more textual as we take distance from the genesis créates it, enunciation, emission, and as consider it in its material autonomy, recorded, reproducibly, transported, communicated in distance, conservate, memorized, but at the same time sited upon of those forms of texts as soon as we understand it beyond its autonomy toward nature or toward culture a phenomenological concept of text start to be also needed to replace by stratus’s what was before cutted as an autonomous text according to its material dimension toward sense and meaning in the interpretative work and exegesis
the relation between form and semantique here goes to the forefront when we confront again the necessity of a more extended sense of text such as the weaves and texere
Why this happen?, why a phenomenological concept of geological basis such as stratus and a phenomenological concept as weaves conceived from the immediacy of nature, world life, society and culture may be applies to fictions works of art and even to a certain point some time needed as when we research semantically?,
well it happen precisely according to an issue I have discussed and insisted on many times in several books, even in this one when I discussed the cares of positivism regarding all that which might be considered not as alterity to the subject or as another moment of him or herself, but something related with non-subject issues, like for example when immanence’s is not the self or another moment of the subject existential sensibility, but substance or religion, in fact, the answer to why is easy to be located, it happen because there is a moment in the ousia of gramme, as derrida discussed, when substance entrance from the non-language world to language, in fact, the idea itself of substance of expression presuppose the presence of substance in language and as such we have several forms of the fall out coming from immanence and ontology to the interior of language
as discussed in this book notions such as weaves and texere are the result of significants chains instead of the interpretants, we should then identify at this point that this is not the same weave and texere evolved in the study of the immediacy of the intramundane horizont and world of life, the relation between experience and language considered outside art and fiction, than weaves and texere when we are speaking on the internal mimetic universe of the fiction languages that generally constitute works of literature of fiction, film, theater, body arts and visual arts, over there weaves and texere are affected by substance in language, the socalled ousia and gramme discussed by derrida, out of there, in the immediacy of the world of life as in experience weaves and texere are defined by inmaterial chains of meaning links experience and and non discoursive issues with the way hermeneutic participates in elucidating experience itself, situations in which quotidian languages are sited as islands and or archipelagos in between non-discursive stratus’s and were the islands of language are ruled by the immediacy of experience without resort to mimesis and fiction.
Differently to the direct study of culture without the mediation of art, and differently to the study of culture with resort to previous sociology or anthropology studies, the literary work of fiction and the visual arts replace its references in culture by a prototype declaring unnecessary the resort to culture directly as well as the affording of culture directly as topics or themes, under this fictional kinds of symbolic universes the original referent is unneeded, the art work of fiction in fact offers itself precisely as a substitution of those reality in the mode of signs without exit to an exterior, it offers itself as a prototype which substitute the object by its significations, in this sense the literary work of fiction or of visual art and of any kind of the arts must be considered itself as an interpretation and then our interpretation of the work of art must be understand as an interpretation of the interpretation,
it is a duplicitous work, dual even to a certain level, we can’t say that interpreting art we are interpreting culture directly, such an affirmation is unduly it disatended the mimetic principle by which the work of fiction stablish a replacement of reality that offers itself as what should be considered instead of reality or culture, there is not in the work of art an interest as in sociology and anthropology in the real cultural phenomena that is being under study, research or analysis, nor as topic, not as real phenomena in society, but all the opposite, a processing about that which proposes itself as the ultimate regard from which everything that is not the work of art must be abandoned to be seize according to how fiction deliberate that, the interpretation of the work of art is thus again interpreting interpretation and in such a sense another form of the text on the text and seen from the exegesis of art, a form of the text on text on the text
This fact distinguish and separate forms of the exegesis of the text on the text between those recently discussed about resort to archive materials of sociology and anthropology on a same topic or issue previously afforded to which the things out there in real culture and society stay to be major and pivotal to the reasons, and the forms of exegesis of the text on the text which as a literary fiction and the visual art are duplicitous and duals forms of mimesis regulated by a prototype of replacement with propose itself as what should be considered and as the ultimate elaboration about which everything should be abandoning the world out there from which it is supposed to be source
That the physical autonomy of such Works of art is undiscussable and constitute as Jacobson said something factical and phatic, conative and physically tangible is out of discussion, measure in the cases of the visual arts, duration in the case of films, music and theater, documentary reproducible, when the body is evolved.
But the forms of general material culture outside the arts are also physically tangibles, the urban popular markets, the carnivals, the forms of ceremonial rituals, the mise in scenes of culture are all factic and fatic things.
However, at the same time, as soon as we return to be far from that physical minimum, sides, height, weight, duration, to move among the exegesis of its creation, the authorial conscience when is about communication with enunciations, emisors or authors or in the opposite direction, the point of view of the reader, the receptor, the viewer, as also when we made the exegesis of symbolic productions under less authorial forms of material culture such as artesanies, or simply culture, the group, the community or parties, ceremonies ritual or religious symbols, the interpretation allow us to work with a more phenomenological and extended concept of text far to that physical sense of the measures
This last one phenomenological concept of text is evolved within the continuum of the world of life, the first distinctions between world itself and the phenomenological world, meaning appearance and subtracts, world and language, reality and representation, pregiven world and symbolized one including the pass by between the world of reality and the worlds of representation, the world of the quotidian life with its intramundane horizonts and the world of the sobreordinations that repit the world of life through forms of supradiscourses
Whence, in the literary discourses of fiction and visual art the mimesis in respect to world and reality with its usual oscilations between representational and abstracts forms renounce to the direct representation of reality considered as an object to a subject to instead construct a subject of the object ordered according to in the world of fiction of the symbolic autonomous world
by the way the exegesis of culture through the exegesis of such fictions forms is not about how to put in relation two relations on a same topic in reality like it happen between my research on a direct theme of culture and my references under it to another previous research in sociology and anthropology on the same referent, my sociological or anthropological research on such a referent in culture and a previous research in sociology and anthropology on the same issue are defined and focused equally by that issue out there in the real world call our attention
Differently to that the relation of a work of fiction with such a referent is not , instead defined to be a vehicle on something external to it in the outer world, but all the contrary, such a work of fiction is no passive in respect to the outer world instead it offers itself as a world around which everything should be and to which the referential must be subordinated, it is a replacement of the object by the sign, of the meanings by the referents, of the world of fiction as mimesis over the world of reality, the referent is forgotten under it
If we don’t understand this difference then as such as someone is train to extend the textual model of the work of fiction on the general culture as for example tent to happen with intertextuality conceived from the model derivated, we will not understand how a disjunction is being created between two quite distinct model of phenomenological organization of the world
Culture is itself seen as an alive direct phenomena from the first distinction between subject and object, language and reality, an immediacy of world phenomenologically consist in something quite different to the mimesis principle that organize the idea of world in a form of fiction defined by the replacement of the objects and references by signs and meanings.
What is legible, intelligible and interpretably in culture as a direct alive phenomena is phenomenologically organized exactly as the intramundane horizont is like whence extending toward it a textual parameter extracted from literary or visual Works of fiction is like superposing to quite different phenomenological orders
A writing by an anthropologist on a culture have in a last instance as objective of its investigation or research the alive real culture out there is reality and world so that not matter how much are we paying attention to style and modes of rhetoric’s or the aesthetic as something formal, the referential horizont will ever be the main reason to be of its existence
When the object of an investigation is a form of direct culture I understand by direct the immediacy of the world of life, but also its accessibility outthere in the outer world, so that such a form even supposing it to be an expression of symbolic forms as ritual ceremonies, carnivals, parties, scenifications or cultural patrimonies it is not oriented to destine as an organized forms of discourse in the same terms than we see a discourse, enunciation or writing, so that to comply direct forms of culture as intercorporeal communications, fashion, the codification of mass culture, a village, a community, certain groups or their expressions in forms of rituals, markets, mise in scene or religion are of another kind far to the usual pragmatic of emissary, message, receptor and more fast yet to discourses organized according to fiction
So the point that the critic of form of the text on text require distinctions to separate epistemologically, ontologically and methodologically interpretation and exegesis.
In this sense we must said that no one of the examples discussed of direct exegesis of the texts of culture, exegesis of another texts by an anthropologist or sociologist afforded before the same issue are the same than the exegesis of literature and art and overall, that in not one of the cases we have intertextuality
We might of course do a metaphorical modified use of the concept of intertextuality to make references to it by arguing that all that is concerned with form to set in relation a variety of forms of texts, but such textual forms are not themselves stablishing in between them ones in respect to the others a work of intertextuality, intertextuality start when in the formation of a text considered in its own autonomy another text is intentionally called to the inside of the text to be a part of it and overall when it happen in reference to a single author about another author, meaning, between the text of an author and the text of another author when the former quote in his text a text of another author
It is true that all in intertextuality is not reduced to quotes, for example, is studding literacy works according to the institution of genres we may find intertextuality in the form of clues of another texts in the author text in the forms of reminiscences or clues of the genres, or according to how the literary acervo of the writer in respect to the history of literature may be defined as something that participate in that with which the author was in a certain indirect dialogue, like for example, in the study of a literary work according to its sources, the so-called philological studies of the fountains
But all this are forms if not of quote of examining a literary work of visual art or of any of the arts under fiction. There was also under literary criticism since its first conception a tendency to identify intertextuality by the fact that the subject of enuntiation defines sentences take shape by the author according to an anticipation of an idealized further reader which is yet not a real one but one idealized inside language and as such a prototype which participate in the form to give language or take shape of the form of discourse and a such a kind of dialogicity, this dialogicity, differently to the main dialogic principle as defined by mijail bajtin in the study of novels, the idea of characters in dialogue dialogizing from their controversies the sense of the novel as a generic whole, suggested to kristeva the possibility to replace dialogicity by intertextuality, if the subject of enunciation is addresses to toward an inclusive anticipated idea of reader, then the relation between the author, his subject of enunciation and its toward consist about relating texts in between, she called it intertextuality
Well, still and yet such a kristeva perspective which founded intertextuality in literary criticism is presupposing a work of fiction as the implicit model from which defining such forms of relation between forms of the text as intertextuality and as such it is a matter of literary criticism about which we should attain to identify that any extension of it to the outer culture evolved the disjunction of juxtaposing quite different forms of ontology, on the one hand the ontology of direct culture defined by immediacy and on the other the mimesis of the work of fiction, the consequences of such an extension of the parameter of the work of fiction to general culture is one first of saturation since nothing there is about culture itself or directly but about the culture that the work of fiction creates
In a few words if we are interested in the methodological possibilities of intertextuality as an option to certain moments of a research in sociology and anthropology we must be attentive to recognize that the concept it self should be completely retheorized outside literary criticism parameters
If I am investigating or research a form of direct culture around which I become interested in how another sociologist or anthropology research it before me and as such to make references in my text of such previous efforts on the same themes, topics or motives, we must retheorize there intertextuality, we must even retheorize it more even if the interest on intertextuality is not as much addressed in reference to another sociologist or anthropologist, but to issues of methodology for example within fieldwork in the forms to read textual forms in direct culture, and again, if my text never call inside it a text done by another sociologist or anthropologist nothing as intertextuality is there, it is yet less intertextual. In this last sense only forms to call the text of another inside my text must be defined as such
Let supose for example that we start to use the concept in a form significantly modified in its semantic meanings, but empting it of its meanings in literary criticism and instead using it to define for example, as Stephen A Tyler was the first one to do in a semiotical sense regarding for example translation, well we may do that but not without retheorizing the concept as to inscribe it in an axiological context in which we are speaking about how putting in relation different texts in translations evolve intertextuality in the form to research the cultural basis of those texts or idioms
We must read Derrida margins of philosophy from the perspective of the very classical side in philosophy and phenomenology
Bibliography
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Derrida Jacques, Comunicación sobre Austin, Pp, 349-372, Márgenes de la Filosofía, Catedra
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Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intramundane Horizont, Pp, The Intramundane Horizont, Complete Works, Tome V and Pp, The Constelations of Common Sense, Selected Essays
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Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Hermeneutic and Axiology, Pp, The Subject in Creativity, Pp, The Interpretations of Art: Hermeneutic and Analysis of Visual Discourses and Rhetoric’
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Tyler Stephen, A Point of Order, Rice University studies
Every day sublime and the wholeness of discourse.
©By Abdel Hernández San Juan
Written in English and translated to English
by Abdel Hernandez San Juan
This essay propose a first theoretical approximation to Stephen A Tyler focusing in discussing from certain number of his essays around language. As we stephen is the founder of linguistic anthropology besides his previous cognitive one which ever place lexical, semantique and even pragmatiques in the forefront, the turn linguistic however started started a major change, linguistic started to not used as by analogues or homologies to study non linguistic phenomena, but the study of language started to be priorized.
It adquiered in stephen two form, studies of language to the study of culture and a more contemporary theoretical work less focused in studies of culture and more around discussing language issues as an abstract discussion, this last moment is the one I am more interested about.
This chapter will focuss things related to our philosophical dialogues and overall to his wonderful paper in response to me Evocation: The unwriteable: a response to Abdel Hernandez sj of 97, but also to presenter displays, prolegomena to the next linguistic, them others voices without mirrors, postmodern ethnography and a point of order
Evocation: The Unwriteable might be considered as his essay that more notably represent the Stephen progressive turn to philosophy something to a certain point present in a certain sprit of philosophy and philosophical anthropology precisely in his more theoretical essays such as those of linguistic.
Although the theory of language is yet pivotal in this essay it is free toward philosophizing language making explicit a certain affinities of Stephen to late twenty century European thinkers such as Deleuze and Derrida as well as to expressionism in general
The problem of expression, however, major in that essay, and understanded not as much in the sense of a philosophical style or a position in philosophy respect to the should be or the duty and telos, but as an issue to be discussed is not indeed discussed by deleuze but by derrida in an essay I am constantly making references focused in the relation between form and the wishes to say written around hurssel, Two essays of Derrida, the former mentioned and another one also on hurssel focusing genesis and structure are thus going to be majors to understand my current analysis on Stephen response to me
But besides that essay of derrida on the stratus of expression is developed as a phenomenology of language, the pre-expressive noetic and eidetic in regard to the expressive as to language, the Stephen attention toward expression focused before well in overlining he empties spaces of indetermination that limit language in respect to the expressive intentions result excessive to what it represent or express from our thoughts
(…) Languages are always inadequate in themselves. First, they are excessive. They do more, effect more than their structures or the intentions of their users can account for or desire. Secondly, they are always lacking. They neither adequately express our intentions nor fully represent the things for which they are substitutes. Either too much or too letlee, they are simultaneously more and less than their representations and expressions, as judged either by their failure adequately to express our inner thoughts or represent outer facts.
Stephen assigned on the other hand an ontological place to evocation before outside and after outside language before a language is considered as a complexioned effective and concrete reality in writing or later between its readers and listener’s silences, so as what occupy or inhabit the space that language itself can’t comply
It is about ontology, on the one hand, in terms of expression, the expresably or expressed thanks to evocation, an implicit allusion to the games of words from which take shape some of his man titles such as the unspeakable, the said and the unsaid, etc, something that locate evocation in regard to the space and time of a being ready to express him or herself toward a language, meaning the horizont of what he defined as “The affinities Between being and the timeless time of the present, on the one hand, and between becoming and the present-anticipated future “.
(…) evocation is essential to language. No language could function either as representation or communication without it,
Evocation, in short, is what makes languages work. It fills the spaces and times languages cannot inhabit. It bridges the gaps between words and occupies the empty margins of texts and the silence of speakers and hearers. It connects the meanings dispersed by the lineal trajectories of syntagms and paradigms. It is the unsaid that enables the saying and the said. It is the unspeakable of linguistic, but it is not itself unspeakable. It makes the tropes work but it is not itself a trope. Evocation then, is not about tropes, except in the sense that tropes would be ineffective without it.
But on the other hand he place evocation around what he defined as affinities and differences with the Kantian sublime
(…) The affinities between being and the timeless time of the present, on the one hand, and between becoming and the present-anticipated future, on the other hand, are particularly suspect. Evocation, again as you aver, dispenses with the idea of being-as-present-object and entails instead an idea of becoming that has not temporal locus, but inhabits all determinations of time and collapses within itself the possibilities of cause, origin and telos.
(…) If evocation enables this curious past/present of remembering, but is not determined by or in the past, what is the time of evocation---the present, the future?. It is none of these, for it involves itself as you say, in the eclipse of this threefold time. Recall that time, and also space, are posited by Kant as intuitions because they are the necessary conditions of any representation. Thus, if evocation is not part of the program of representation, it is free of the necessities of both time and space. This does no mean, however, that evocation is somehow excluded from determinations of representation. It is, in fact, also necessary to any representation in order for the representation to be adecuated to what it represents.
(…) It is akin to the Kantian sublime but, unlike that notion, is not restricted to contexts of aesthetic judgment. It is, after all, an enabling condition of the commonsense world, and our everyday discourse would not be possible without it.
(…) It has nothing of the awesome or monstrous about it. It is at the opposite pole of the extreme situations of judgment and perception Kant predicated for the sublime. We might call it an “every day sublime” as a way of capturing both its affinity to and difference from the aesthetic sublime.
(…) Still, I hesitate to advocate completely the disassociation of evocation and writing, if for no other reason than that evocation is necessary to writing. Evocation that can be written is not evocation, but it is not therefore, absent from writing, for if it were absent there could be no writing. Writing depends on the activity of evocation and cannot found itself without it
The interest on the quotidian is by first time thematized by Stephen with this essay from the moment he discuss our current cultural situation in usa discussing crucial contemporary circumstances in the country such as the theme of the modern hubris spectations of technology solutions, the issue of the virtual, the situation with the rhetoric’s and aesthetics of the modes of discourses of the medias, radio, television, internet, etc, as well as the issue so current of our circunsantance of cultural identity in the united states focused from the perspective of subjectivity of the relations between identity and difference, the issue of the nomadic deterritorialized and hybrid subjectivities major to those of us who are emigrants in the united states, its relevance in the composition of culture, thus as in general our subjectivity in capitalism, the consequences of multiculturalism and the cultural process defined americanicity between anglosajonidad and native cultures such as Amerindians and Afro-Americans
(…) we are daily surrounded, not only in print, but even more in its surrogates, radio, television, cinema, and the internet with presentations that have the form of objective discourse, but whose purposes serve interests that have nothing to do with truth, but are instead toward persuasion, objective and subjective.
(…) There is no technological solution, and it is typical of our hubris that we should think that there is one. We are prone to forget that every technological solution is just another problem, or the same old problem in a new form.
Evocation can be captured neither in the duality of opposition nor in the separated poles of opposition that make the discourse of identity. Evocation is not then, a concept indicating the identity of an essence, positive or negative. We know it neither as an essence nor as the concept of an essence.
However, although Stephen seems to place evocation in a before and an after outside language, meaning, as something external to it by all its side, diachronic, the previous universe or anticipated between being with it expressive motivations toward language, present, the sublime of the quotidian in the triple present and after, the empty spaces of silence let by the readers, listeners and writers, something also confirmed by the relation he stablish between evocation and the semantique memory of the body, the pascheins, the body and its passions, and zetezis, episodic memory evolved in the cognitive processes of memorization and remembering, he also on the other side, recognize that evocation belong or is related to language first through those same empty silence spaces let by readers, listener and writers as to plenty the dispersed meanings of the linear trajectories of sintagms and paradigms, and second, or majorly, since evocation is recognized as that which make possible language to work both in the form of special language and in the common sense one from tropes impossible to be effectives without evocation, to writing and representation impossible without evocation as to be in the case of representation more or less adequate
The former leads us to the fact that Stephen place evocation not only in an ontological level before language between expression and the taking shape of it but also because since evocation determine the adecuation of representation and writing it is evolved also within our organization of discourse
The attention of Stephen to the worldneess of discourse is usually related with the analysis of the constrictions that made a text something clearly discussed in a beautiful paragraph devoted to the analysis of the constrictions of discourse between propositions and concepts, thus as between the author intentions and the text in his essay on India a point of order quoted in one of my books
The fact that Stephen has assigned to evocation a place as determinant in writing and tropes, thus as to representation be adequate to what it represent, leads then to the point that evocation is not only relative to the ontology that made language possible, but also to the analysis of the internal logics of discourse thus that if Stephen said that tropes are not tropes when it is analyzed on the other hand leads us to the internal composition of discourses in between the parts and the wholes
In fact to make work evocation within the relation between the parts and the wholes of a discourse is to make function the relation between propositions and concepts in a way exploring the constriction’s and the horizonts of sense that the text may evoque both in respect to its topics and themes, which patter the whole of the discourse, as in respect to the sense that closure the discourse as a whole and the sense of its parts
Hence. on the other side, this awareness might be apply to our own discourses papers, essays and books, but also to the analysis of any discourse made by another’s. If evocation is at the same time that which habilitate and made possible language including writing and something that rule the adecuations of representation in respect to the represented it must be find in between our effective manipulation of language subjected to patters of language structures and the ontological condition habilitate it as possible on the other
We should not forget that Stephen expressed that evocation fall out of the usual realms of epistemology and ontology while I think that this affirmation is related with nothing else than with the phenomenological relation between genesis and structure again remembering derrida paper on hurssel
But on the other hand it leads us to something I insist frequently, to the relation between that about which we have not yet a language and that to which we already have a language which toward us to a certain phicoanalytical issue, I see some relations between this psychoanalysis issue and the insistence of Stephen in the unwriteable, the unspeakable
If language because of its own limitations offers a resistance given in its grammatical forms and constriction’s to the form of our previous wishes and intentions of expression such as when we want to express ideas, to pay attention to evocation might be also a form to be attentives to the relation between the wishes to say and the taking shape of language, again an issue discussed by derrida and as such attentive to how evocation might solve that problem in the composition of the whole of our discourses both in writing, papers, books as in speech
And this may address us to a question, if Stephen assigned such an ontological play to evocation in respect to both what made possible language and what guaranty the adecuations between representation and the represented we must conclude that it is always present in all the moments of writing each time the relation become adequate so as to suppose then a variety of possible forms and then evocation must suppose the claim of a certain form to that relation so that it is about how are we write.
On this regard Stephen focused my concept of non-repetitive repetition and affirmed that evocation is the concept propitious to work with such kind of non-repetitive repetitions
The kid of this relation is defined as follow, on the one hand representation is never identical to what is represent and in that sense it is non-identical, meaning, non-repetitive, but at the same time representation is associated with the repetition of an identity so that the point of recognizing the non-identity of the repetition is in general unconcient to representation and shows its own limits, its is non-identical but function as if and regulated by a principle that forget that difference, forgetting differences is what made the fiction of the discourse of identity, in this sense the recognition of the non-identity is an overlined we perceive thanks to evocation, only through evocation we can perceive that representation is in defect or in excess and as such a critique of representation is needed, this critique of my concept of the non-repetitive repetition show us how evocation can solve the dilemma
So it must allow us to deliberate how the relation between adecuation and non-repetitive repetitions must work in our papers and books, this are then the main territories of evocation
(…) Evocation can be captured neither in the duality of opposition nor in the separated poles of opposition that make the discourse of identity. Evocation is not then, a concept indicating the identity of an essence, positive or negative. We know it neither as an essence nor as the concept of an essence.
(…) Your idea of non-repetitive repetitions or of repetitions without identity is, on the one hand, a restatement of the idea of representation. A representation is, after all, a repetition of a non-identity. The representation is not the same as, is not identical to what it represents. On the other hand, your idea of a repetition without identity is a refutation of the fundamental function of representation, which is to provide us with the repetition of identities. So, in a sense, forgetfulness is not about the remembered, as you aver, but is a kind of collective forgetfulness in which rather than forgetting differences, we forget identities. Recall that a common definition of the idea of identity in representation is the forgetting of differences. Identities becomes identities when we suppress differences and then forget the suppression. They are fictions whose functionality we have forgotten. In effect, I think you describe our current situation.
One think here particularly of Gergen’s concept of the “fragmented subject” or of Deleuze and Guatari’s idea of the “deterritorialized subject”, and of their notion of “lines of flight” that characterize the constant differentiation of nomadic and hybrid subjectivities.
Ït is nothing else than an analytic of the organization of discourse of oneself, the modes one have to deliberate in its books those things as well as an analytic on the discourse of any one, supposing thus also the hermeneutic and interpretation of it. Thus, this must leads us to a critique on tropes and symbolic forms in general in any discourse because although he say that analyzing the tropes is to be outside the effective function of it the analysis of it is evolved under its negation
The analysis of a trope is always after the fact and largely unconnected to its effectiveness and irrelevant to its understanding. If a trope has to be explained, it isn’t a trope. Evocation then, is not about tropes, except in the sense that tropes would be ineffective without it.
Evocation is sometimes explicitly linked with the past, as memory and remembering, particularly in discussions of poetic effect. In The Remembrance of Things Past fragments of the main character’s current sensory experience set into motion a multitude of dispersed and seemingly forgotten and unconnected scenes and episodes from his past. And yes, evocation can do this, but it is not just confined to the past, either in its passive form as memory or in its active form as remembrance. Nor is it linked exclusively or necessarily to that special form of the past that Aristotle called mnesis, then body’s memory of its own passion (passchein). And yes, evocation does travel in these realms, but it is not originated in them.
Remembrance is concerned principally with the particularities of individual experience and the associative network emergent within the activity of remembering, akin to what some psychologists would call episodic memory. Remembrance, however, is not just the active construction of what are taken to be the subject’s actual past experiences. They are necessarily constructed through the mediation of the totalizing system of memory that is given by language, what some psychologists would call semantic memory. It is tempting to think of remembering as an action directed by the subject as a kind of zetesis, or ratiocination constrained by the logic of inference, implication, and association, and by the traces of the subject’s past experience.
Remembering thus constrasts with the seemingly passive character of the memory system of langue that constrains zetesis by providing it with ready-made likelihoods and schemata whose structures are the necessary form of any possible remembrance. We could call this a forms of evocation in which the searching act of zetesis “calls forth” the traces of past experience, but it would only be as a way of saying that we do not really understand how this zetesis work.
I would like however to add that evocation is something distinguishible also in effective languages as already created outthere and of any kind, so that it can be effective within theoretical discourse as well as within visual and any kind of discourse, on the one hand there is evocation at the level of sense between the concepts and in concepts itself while there is evocation too outside propositional theoretical discourses as well
In this sense I propose distinguishing between sublimes evocations and adyect evocation as both positives and negatives forms of it
Sublime evocation let open the relations of sense between concepts and forms making possible the form by which such discourses close as wholes as evocatives, the relation between the climax of discourse and the aesthetics dimensions of it are in this case subjected to a sublime temporality in which harmony rules and domain the relation between the parts and the wholes in its orders, in the abject forms of evocation all the contrary, the harmony is broken, instead of semantic isotopies of co-currencies well organized between parts and whole in a harmonic and evocative form to play the senses in sublime forms, adyect forms are disordered or as Stephen say out of the effective voluntary control of its creators to generally become in a kind of disjunctive forms of fragments disseminations
Now after calling the attention on the organization of discourse it is needed also to return and pay attention to the fact that evocation also work before and after outside language both between expression and language as between genesis and structure, in such a sense the idea of the semantic memory of the body and its pasheins as Stephen called it are of particular interest, the so-called embodiments and enactions when evocation work in the ledges of discourse or between the discursive and the non-discursive, the body and its semantique memory, the relation between being and becoming, the sublime of the quotidian, the semantique memory, episodic memory and the forms of zetesis so to speak remembering Stephen pointing
What must be crucial at this point is our attention on the relation between subjectivity and objectivity around which we deliberate the relation between subject and object since we can work that relation in a form more or less evocative
This specific issue evolving the body also allow us to consider it under research and fieldwork when evocation is not ever regarded to mere discourse
Although in his analysis within some other of his essays Stephen is not generally focused in aesthetic issues as something to be discussed I would like to tell here that the worldneess of a discourse is always significantly related with its aesthetic, so that what Stephen defined as cocurrencies to understand the constrictions of discourse to examine the text as a whole coincident with the kind of question we should usually pay attention to comprehend aesthetics dimensions
As I have discussed several times the aesthetic of something is always evolved within the temporality of it since our attention is on the how, only as we perceive the how between the present of a part and the sense of the whole, we perceive aesthetically whatever in the sense of taste or of more or less beauty, aesthetic and style are nothing else than also the result of the interaction between the how of the elements and the whole, it require of us a self-representation of time under it and how it is expressed in the mode the discourse or phenomena close
In his essay Prolegomena to the next linguistic Stephen focused himself on the relation between presentations and re-presentations from the point of view he defined as remediations, this concept of remediation seems to pick up and be related with what he discussed in our philosophical dialogues as superobjetifications, but remediation’s is related with the relation between performance and terapon or therapy as well
It is obvious that the repetition of the presentation evolved in the idea of re-presentation is already in a certain form a mode of representation, this tautological principle relates presentation and re-presentation suggest that the concept of remediation might be understand in the following mode
If a presentantion represent from that moment there is already mediation the idea of remediation come to try to unveil how that mediation let allow a remediation, so that on the one side from the moment there is mediation in presentation remediation might be implicit in mediation being nothing else than a redundancy of mediation so to speak on another mediation which mediate the former one but instead that mediation is itself remediational in both senses of the words that solve and solution a problem and remediation in the sense that mediation is remediational
Here we must pay attention to the major play of the concept of mediation in the logic of science as this logic was earlier discussed by hegel when almost all the concepts are nothing else that mediations of another concepts and when this mediation is precisely one of the main ways to solve contradictions or opposites, otherness and alterity between concepts that are inclusive one to the other but at the same time different in between, while there is mediation also not only between concepts but between concepts and ontology, at this level all the previously discussed on presentation, re-presentation, mediation, remediation may be defined in the following form
Presentation: is already re-presentation –a presentation is ever the re-of a repetition that re-present presentation, re-presentation as the repetition that made presentation is already mediation and mediation is already re-mediation
But this although logically attractive in the science of logic among concepts dynamics of self and mutual implications reduce everything to presentation and not always re-mediation is linked to presentation
For example, I discussed and theorized a form of anthropology highly environmental, but to be presented out of his places of developments in communities and villages, this anthropology is obligated—because of the kind of fieldwork evolved in it—to work with references to another anthropologists and archaeologies and as such intertextuality made that anthropology saturated of references far it from its environmental basis and source progresibly becoming unenviromental so losing environment in the pass by from experience in space to representation, from this point, remediation appear as a possibility to reestablish environment within the forms of representation avoiding the effects of intertextuality, such an entrance of remediation is remediational in the sense that it solve and solution problems in a form that might be called therapeutic
It is a clear example of the play of remediation beyond only logical principles between concepts
Thus in the field of sociology and anthropology were everything are not as in philosophy and epistemology regarded to relations between concepts remediation appear as a therapeutical concept
Another example of remediation might be discussed among the universe and the world of technologies and medias were everything is already remediational without our usual attention while paying attention to it may considerably solve and help to retheorize and understand new avenues to the research between technology and culture as I have developed it in several of my books on modern technologies and culture, finally, we have the almost illustrative example I choiced to discuss in one of my book about a television program which present inside it the director of another television program as a redundancy that shows the remediation already evolved in mediation and so on the mediational dimension of remediation when the dialectique between presentation and the presented as discussed in my book the presentational linguistic are of a tautological, redundancy and therapeutical one nature
However it is interesting to note out that while Stephen concept of remediation help to solve contradictions generated by the saturations of intertextuality at the same time Stephen himself have proposed from semiotic intertextuality in ethnography. I already discussed in the previous chapter of this book certain issues on this topic, a definition as such of Stephen intertextuality need a retheorization of the concept beyond literary criticism so as to be re-valuated from sociology and anthropology in new terms
Intertextuality in Stephen is evolved overall at least from my point of view in the sense that his work evolved translating ancient literature from India, sancrit and koya and translation itself evolve to set aside and in between a variety of textual forms in an intertextual manner
If we take a way of a distance from Stephen theorizations on the social order of India and instead pay attention to his analysis of indian cosmology we will perceibe references to phenomenas might be define as alosemiotics in relation with semiospheres something evolving in the case of india correlates of culture and subjectivity difficult to be seize in words and fulfill with relations between hermeneutic, culture and religion, I understand here the concept of cosmology in a phenomenological and semiotic sense near to the infinity semiosis of Peirce, Peirce himself in fact assigned to his infinity semiosis a certain sense of cosmology, a cosmology of signs so to speak
(…) Whether we speak in cold mathematical parables of the myths of modern science or relate those of ancient religion in symbols grown smooth and warm to the tongue through long and familiar use, still we speak a language of metaphor and only spin fables of the birth and death of the cosmos. Where we imagine a difference between the language of science and the voice of religion, the skeptic finds unity; and when we seek to abandon language altogether, seeing it as the last wedge of ignorance separating the structure of mathematics from cosmic order, he reminds us that this is only an ancient urge to compass the cosmos through metaphor and bend nature to analogy, that others have thought their vast, self-confirming systems of knowledge revealed the order of life in the order of the cosmos. Thus reproved, we little care if our object of analysis is a myth of modern science or of ancient religion, for we find in both the same structures of thought, the same dialectical movements, the same metaphors, and the same exalted pride that tempts us to see the order of things in the order of our language.
(…) When we understand the problem in these terms we recognize it as the social reflex of a cosmo1ogical problem whose themes can be found in the earliest speculations in the Rg Veda and traced through the more sophisti- cated philosophical literature of later times. 1 refer here to the well-known lndra myth-a tale of combat belween the gods and demons for control of the life-giving waters which make possible the growth, development, and expansion of the universe. The demons want to bind up the waters, to prevent differentiation or expansion, and the gods of course desire just the opposite. In the later system of Siimkhya philosophy these symbolic values are inverted and the great aim of life is to prevent expansion, to return to an undifferentiated state (cf. Tyler 1973:71-73). The synthesis of these two conflicting solutions constitutes the body of thought that we have come to know as Hinduism. The quest for equilibrium, a dynamic balance between change and permanence, the tyo contending forces of the cosmos, characterizes not only the Dharma Siistras but the whole of Hinduism. What seemed at first a rather simple problem of the social order now stands revealed as a restatement of one of the most significant themes of Indian thought, or for that matter, of any thought, namely, "Can the cosmos expand infinitely without degenerating into chaos?"
(…) If These things appear odd to the empirical understanding because they do not readily respond to material interpretation. They are symbolic values rather than material significances, and as symbols of an idea of order it is no more likely for them to signify its material conditions than it is for those conditions to symbolize the idea of order.
(…) We better understand the symbolic order when we recapture it in the immanent forms of its expression-in the categorial and proposi- tional devices of language and thought. We thus constitute native conceptions by means of native accounts, and we know how the natives conceive of the world when we understand how they account for it in their accounts of it. We now know, for example, that the scriptural varna scheme is a means of accounting for jiitis, not only in the ~~stras but among contemporary Indians as well. The jZitis are homo- Iogously related to the varna categories and both are lexical structures exemplifying the same underlying logical principles (Dumont 1970:67-68; Leach 1967: 10-1 1; Tyler 1973:82-83). Dumont correctly characterizes this logic as one of sequential oppositions of dichotomously contrasted semantic features, the result of which is always a ranking of categories. This logistic system corresponds to a particular semantic structure known as a tree (Tyler 1973:82). What is not clear, or more precisely, what is left to the reader's intuition is how this static structure of features distributed across a set of vocabulary items (the names of varnas) entails a particular and definitive set of relations between categories. That is, "how does the formal semantic structure of a vocabulary set relate to anything other than its own formal properties?"
(…) This The SZistric authors proceed by piling one homology on top of another, stretching the initial root metit- phor of creation to cover more and more conceptual territory, gradually bringing every aspect of the universe into a coherent relation. Underlying this structure is a dominating system of archetypal concepts consisting of key words and symbols whose interconnections provide the ultimate source of structure and whose extensions through metaphoric processes create new structures. AH ordered conceptual domains, whether of religion, science, literature, or myth, operate according to these processes of meta- phoric representation. Scientists and other ideologues share the same ultimate monomaniacal aim-to bring more and more of the facts of the world under the control of a guiding analogy or metaphor. None has yet mat5hed the coherence of the enormous homological structure erected hy the SZstric authors. It is both a tribute and a challenge to the human im- agination. If it is objected that the Indian solution to the probIem of order and change is either incoherent or unpalatable because it contemplates a cosmic condition that is neither ordered nor disordered, a great emptiness that is yet the ultimate source of all things, consider the state of contemporary thought, Modern science encourages us to believe that certain isolated systems become progressively disordered and that certain isolated systems become progressively ordered. The concept of enfropy thus calls for the development of disorder from order while evolution foresees order develop- ing from disorder. Are we to conclude that these two produce equilibrium, or are they conveniently in complementary distribution throughout the universe? Did the universe originate in chaos or is that merely its terminus? If order emerges from chaos, does this not mean that the latter somehow contains and engenders the former and that we may speak of chaos as the fecund repository of order, as the sum of all orders, as that totality of order which is not itself an order, but mereIy the possibility of it? Must we too, then conclude that all possible orders coexist, that past, present, and future are only illusory refractions of the timeless present?
It seems to be a characteristic of Stephen generation in thought a certain esoterism which we might easily recognize also in the gillez deleuze of the logic of sense and the Jacques derrida of Margins of philosophy who explicitly speak of an esoteric in Aristoteles but beyond peircian sense of cosmology as well as this certain spirit of thus more associated with postmodernism the more attractive analysis of Stephen on India from my perspective are precisely those devoted to the symbolic analysis of markets
On the analogy of physics we focus on transactions that signify just the objective movement of things, forgetting that exchange may also affirm the moral basis of society.
Transactions do not just signify~ the movement of goods, they symbolize mutual obligation. The objective movement of goods can only signify the fact of exchange, and because it thus implies nothing more than exchange, it cannot by itself reveal its meaning, cannot speak of what it symbolizes. We must distinguish then, between transactions that merely signify and those that symbolize. Thus, when an Indian farmer, from his hard-won crop, gives a traditional share of grain to the blacksmith who fashioned his implements of production, it is not just a payment for goods and services but an affirmation of a continuing relationship which recognizes the fixed pattern of statuses and symbolizes the performance of mutual duties. His act symbolizes the moral obligations of the social order. It symbolizes dharma in both of its senses as duty and order, The mutually implicated acts of the farmer and the blacksmith are simultaneously expressions of their respective duties (dharma) and affirmations of social order (dharma).
Significantly, economic transactions are but one of the many possible settings in which these group relations may be symbolized. The giving and taking of food, the exchange of women in marriage, precedence in ceremonies, patterns of respect and deference in speech and behavior, and performance of religious observances serve equally as appropriate settings.
in the Dharrna S6stras nothing is more clear than that the moral or cosmic order (dharma) dominates the economic and social orders. This view contradicts our notion that "business is business," the predominant presumption distilled out of the historical circumstances of the Western experience of the industrial revolution.
We first see this conception of society as a transcendent unity created by transactions between egoistic atoms in our idea of the market, and we trace this purely cognitive transformation of the idea of the market from that of a concrete locality to a transcendental abstraction in the writings of proto- economists of the eighteenth century who both effected and documented it. In its earlier concrete form the market was simply a neutral place of ex- change, the brief meeting of strangers solely for the purpose of handing over natural goods, goods which had not been culturally transformed, which had not become symbolic.
They were places set aside, immunized as it were, from the surrounding culture-not just secular places, but places of pure objectivity. They were concrete localities where objects of one kind came together in exchange for objects of other kinds. They were meaningless places where disparate groups could meet without incurring moral obligation, places where citizenship, persona, and soul could be forgotten. Be- cause they implied amorality it is not surprising that they should so often have been associated with carnivals. Fairs were, and anyone who has in his youth walked a midnight midway can affirm that they still are, both places of exchange and settings in which everyday morality is temporarily set aside. Fairs, and early markets too, combined exchange with the atmosphere of a carnival.
This leads us to ask: "What then is the basis for a metaphoric identity between exchange and sacrifice?" There are several, such as for example, the giving of gifts (cf. Tyler 1973:164-165), but more importantly, both sacrifice and exchange imply something about the transformation of one thing into another, the assignment or reassignment of meaning. The root metaphor for this whole process is the idea of creation, that original formation of order out of chaos, that first transformation of the natural world which changed it into a meaningful cultural world. I am suggesting that this process of establishing order out of the disarray of natural phenomena constitutes the basis for the homology between sacrifice and exchange in general.
Stephen A Tyler, A Point of Order, Rice University studies
Thus all this leads us to the focus of Stephen on the quest for solution avoiding the constrasted relations between subjectivity and objectivity something about which we coincident
The active form in sentence one emphasizes the incorporation of the other into my subjectivity in the manner of Descartes or Hegel or Schelling. It characterizes, in other words, the general priority of subjectivity and identity in Western philosophy which converts the other's difference into my identity. In contrast, the passive form in sentence two emphasizes the incorporation of my subjectivity into the other's objectivity.
The subject disappears into the system of signs, into language. This theme occurs in variety of sources, ranging from Blanchot's "I do not write, it writes" to to the more conditioned phrasing of Heidegger's "language is the house of being"(1971:132), but is probably most effectively represented in the works of Derrida where the self is relegated to a kind of illusion of authorship and intentionality. The self is simply in the system of signs, already implicated and provided for there. It is not outside in an exteriority where it could master the signs and govern their concatenations in the fullness of creative spirit. According to Derrida, every text is a double text, but only one of the two is the object of classical interpretation, which always favors presence, meaning, reason, and truth. The second text is never deciphered, but is made at least partly available through fissures and traces in the first. Every reading is thus a double science in which there is no fusion of the two texts into a single, unitary reading that would surmount or resolve all the differences between them. In effect, the first text is only itself-as-other , its own simulacrum. The veil of difference between the two texts signifies both difference and non-difference, which is an identity indistinguishable from the Hegelian identity of identity and non-identity. When difference can thus become identity and identity difference, no one can decide if this is difference or identity. The outcome is undecidable, and no one can master this duplicity.
The third thematization of the other is the middle. It is neither subject nor object and corresponds more or less to the grammatical idea of the middle voice in which subject and object mutually implicate or act inseparably on one another. Derrida, for example, claims that différance is akin to the middle voice. The suffixance in différance is neither active nor passive, nor the action of an agent on a patient nor of a subject on an object., nor does it derive from the positing of these as its sources
(1982:9). This conception of the middle voice differs from most purely grammatical accounts in that it does not posit subject/object, agent/patient, source/goal as existing prior to the action or operation in which subject and object are mutually involved. What the Derridian middle voice says is the non-priority and non-separation of subject and object. Somewhat different is the nomadic subject of Deleuze and Guattari which is constantly being deterritorialized and reterritorialized. It has no permanent character, and no necessary attributes. Always at the mercy of others, the nomadic subject is a structure that is constantly crumbling and remaking itself as the functions of its components cross-cut, overlap, and diffuse over infinite lines of flight that propagate new rhizomatic structures. The subject oscillates between radical difference and radical identity, preserving itself (its past) even as it leaves itself behind when it thinks infinitely of the future, but this preserving repetition is not the return of the same through the reiteration of identity. No experience can confirm a single, substantial self as a totalization and as a cause of its totalization. Repetition is understood instead as the production of difference (1994:207-212). Despite all the talk about difference and the nomadic, non-identical subject, Deleuze is still primarily concerned with the subject as a starting point. His critique of the subject merely dismantles the subject in the same way the Hegelians dismantled the object. Note, particularly in this context, that he locates difference not between the representation and the thing, but between faculties of representation, between the faculty of concepts and the faculty of intuition.
Stephen A Tyler, Them Others- without mirrors, rice university May, 1995
In my previous analysis in this essay i moved myself from Stephen essay on evocation to certain selected passages i choiced from his prolegomena from the next linguistic, A point of order and them others without mirrors, however, i would like to say that evocation is not only his more philosophical paper but a paper in which Stephen advance to propose thinks that transcends his previous ways to discuss a variety of problems
For example, the issue discussed by derrida about if there is or not an outside to language derrida discussed around Saussure idea that the subject is a function of language, within them others without mirrors Stephen maintained himself under the idea that there is not an outside to it while in his paper on evocation in response to me he modified his position by recognizing that evocation shows several dimension which are not originated in language and overall about which language result limited as less and as excessive thus placing avocation before, simultaneously and after in regard to being and the timeless of becoming, in respect to the quotidian, in respect to even the pluralization of discourse
With the sublime of the quotidian in this paper he also explored possibilities outside the parameters of the so-called retrofasism as he called it at them others without mirrors in respect to previous forms of anthropology
He also explore in his evocation response to me a different and new solution to the issue of otherness which was focused at them others, he now fully negated othernnes and the idea of distinguishing we from the others not only with the idea of the meddle voice he discussed but through new proposals
Moreover, the kind of reciprocity entailed here is not expressed in the grammar of differentiated subjects and objects, us and others. It requires instead, something like the idea of the middle voice in which subject and object, us and them, are not differentiated, but are mutually implicated in some ongoing process or performance whose meaning cannot be predicted before hand, but many found simply in the activity itself or possibly in its joint contemplation. The ideas of mutuality and reciprocity conveyed by the middle voice establish a world of participation in which the distinction between us and them no longer function, a world where others are not reduced to objects of our desire and we are not possessed by them.
While to me the issue of subjectivity and objectivity discussed at them others and usually pointed and analyzed by Pierre Bourdieu is one of the main qualities of them others an issue I solutioned at The Subject in Creativity with basis in retheorizing the problem as Bourdieu has sustained subjectivity is a part of material culture and objective material culture a part of subjectivity and the subjective
The main proposal of Stephen in regard is to incorporate the other into my subjectivity and to incorporate us into the other objectivity
The idea of the meddle voice was first discussed by Derrida in his essay diffarence as a meddle voice between passive voice and active voice while we should not forget that this concept was discussed by derrida in a pure philosophical context, not in an anthropological sense and as such its possibilities are philosophicals by which I mean that the issue of subject and object, self and otherness as solutioned under meddle voice is related with otherness in philosophy like for example it might be recognized in Hegel in the discussion of one and multiple, being oneself and being another to the self of another meaning concepts developed outside of the issue of different cultures parameters
While derrida himself was an argelian emigrant to France and as such a France thinker who revisited the tradition since ancient thinkers, his perspective was one of a north African emigrant, the margins of philosophy might be defined in this sense as a self-ethnography, the performative play is in fact evolved nor only in the form of a critique of philosophy that explore its margins but in the performativity of the first chapter developed in two columns with leiris
As Stephen recognize
It is also associated with speech or orality, and thus seems to fall neatly into the discourse about the opposition between orality and literacy. In a way, it is not surprising that evocation should be linked to the voice, since both voice and evocation derive from the same root (latin uoc- “to speak”), but the connection in literature is not really with the idea of speech as sush. The sublte difference between “speech” and “voice” is the source of an equivocation here. Note, first of all, how the idea of voice has been “literalized” as when we speak of the “voice” if an author, invoking by that expression the distinctive and characteristic mode and manner of the author’s written expression. “Voice”, in this context of literary avocation is disassociated from speech, apart from indicating the syntactic role of the semivocal subject as a means of discriminating among the grammatical categories of active, passive, and middle voices. What calls out here is the revocation of speech as the speechlessness of voice, the provocation of voice as writing, as literature and grammar.
The issue discussed above at the same time on the worldneess of discourse and aesthetic understanded from the parameter of evocation suppose at the same time an attention to the ontological principle by which evocation made possible language and the other one relative to the mode of organization of our discourses so as to solve the relations of adecuation something that suggest a relation between the posmodern work, the title of one of my papers, and the open work as eco discussed it from the moment the idea of evocation suggest an space of indetermination in the horizont of the senses so as to let it open at the level of the relation between the parts and the whole, a kind of aleatorism as eco discussed it
While at the same time the effazis of Stephen on the relation between evocation and synchronicity and the simultaneous with connect also with the sublime of daily life and with the timeless time of becoming reestablish parameters that are usually excluded and miss considered within usual or traditional forms to understand the posmodern work if we not forget the habermas objection to postmodernism miss regard and forgetfulness of the major issue of life world
And this is something that remember the discussion of eco and levis strauss, eco remembered the discussion at his book reader in fabula arguing that levis strauss was suspicious and questioned eco idea of the open work claiming instead a closed work
It is then obvious that if we analyze evocation in Deep on the way of sense and by what it supposes to language, it is on the side of the open work and as so very far to levis Strauss, in this sense we may sustain that with his essays in response to me on evocation Stephen notably taked distance from levis Strauss in respect to the point of relation of his earlier cognitive anthropology to levis Strauss beside certainly Stephen focus was on lexical analysis and semantic instead of phonology
Both coincident in the past in the fact of getting the organizational forms of society with basis in linguistic parameters something leads us to the differences between ontological structuralism and operational structuralism as discussed by eco at the absent structure, the first one transfer to the ontology of a culture the structure it find in the logic of forms, the second understand the abstraction formalism as strategic structure to operate analysis without transferences of it to be considered as the ontological structures of society
Between both options I was always on the operational side while today I am beyond both as discussed in this books the structures are symbols and nothing else and as such nothing might be done with it without the work of the interpretants more even yet if we are considering it in a posmodern sense
Evocation, in other words, is not the emasculated other of difference, which serves merely as the means by which the positivity’s of good form construct their identity. Evocation can be captured neither in the duality of opposition nor in the separated poles of opposition that make the discourse of identity. Evocation is not then, a concept indicating the identity of an essence, positive or negative. We know it neither as an essence nor as the concept of an essence. It makes itself available to us as its effects, and these effects are ephemeral, singular, non-empirical, multisensory events.
In respect to posmodern ethnography one of the most beautiful Stephen essays also stylistically my position about is prospective, from my point of view there’s not yet a posmodern ethnography in existence, nothing already done in the field of contemporary anthropology and ethnography might be considered as truly posmodern and as such posmodern ethnography the only paper which really approach it in a convincent manner must be understanded like Stephen did under prolegomenon to a next linguistic, as a paper on a future ethnography so never to be considered as a paper on already done ethnographies
One of my porposivennes in the past was about to explore that future as a contemporary present by focusing curatorial practice of propositional exhibits, but later with the time I take distance from it and I commited by self with instead affording it within author books such as my recent years one rethinking urban anthropology, anthropology of archaeology and the indetermist true
Ethnography is a return to the idea of aesthetic integration as therapy once captured in the sense of proto-Indo-European *ar- (“way of being,” “orderly and harmonious arrangement of the parts of a whole”)...that family of concepts so closely connected with the idea of restorative harmony, of “therapy”...ethnography is an object of meditation which provokes a rupture with the commonsense world and evokes an aesthetic integration whose therapeutic effect is worked out in the restoration of the commonsense world... ethnography captures this mood...for it too does not move toward abstraction, away from life, but back to experience. It aims not to foster the growth of knowledge but to restructure experience, not to understand objective reality, for that is already established by common sense, nor to explain how we understand, for that is impossible, but to reassimilate, to reintegrate the self in society and to restructure the conduct of everyday life.
My former allusion to Peirce cosmology are obviously referred to a sense of the world cosmos semiotically understanded so regarded not to how mans and society explain the origin of the world but in another sense from Peirce infinity semiosis as a matter of inference
In a few words, according to Peirce as to derrida and eco our thought is itself a form of sign, well what I want to point here is that the concept of cosmology understanded outside religion so as discussed by Peirce, explain a kind of cosmological constellations of the signs in between them
And certainly, while Stephen find coherence in the Hindu cosmology, something approximates his position as near to the weber one in the sociology of religion, we should not forget that weber effasis was not in cosmovisión but in discussing another aspects of society according to religion, what to me is relevant again in a sense started by Peirce, is to recognize that under deeper gramatological studies of the signs and the symbols we ever find amazing and sorpresive congruence’s
Perce explained it as speculative grammatology and as pure rhetoric, i understand grammatology scientifically as Chomsky and derrida too, but far to alphabetic languages in the semiotic of visual languages I have find in practicing the semiotic of symbols a kind of cosmology of the signs by which i am meaning a system of inferences which outside and excluding cosmology as an explanation of the origin of the universe, between signs and symbols one ever find again and again new, plenty and amazing new orders of consistency
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Notes
The translation of Hegel and Derrida are also mine, the author
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Eugenio Quetzil, The Neoliberal imperative of tourism, vol 34, no 3, pp 47-51, summer 2012
Eugenio Quetzil, Art Writing in the modern Maya art world of chichen itza, Transcultural ethnography and experimental fieldwork, American Ethnologist, Open School of Ethnography and Anthropology, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 21–42, Universidad autonoma de Yucatan, 2004
Eugenio Quetzil, Between Pure and Applied Research: Experimental Ethnography in a Transcultural tourist Art World, Napa Bulletin, 23: 87-118
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Eagleton Terry, Introducción a la crítica literaria, lumen
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Eco Umberto, Los Fundamentos Semióticos de la cooperación textual, Pp 41-72, Lector in Fabula, Lumen
Eco Umberto, estructura y estructuralismo, Pp, 343-, la estructura ausente, Lumen
Eco Umberto, realidad ontológica o sistema operativo?, Pp, 344-357, la estructura ausente, Lumen
Eco Umberto, pensamiento serial y pensamiento estructural,pp,358-369, la estructura ausente, Lumen
Eco Umberto, la estructura y la ausencia, Pp, 370-39, la estructura ausente, Lumen
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Geertz Clifford, El mundo en un texto: como leer tristes trópicos, el antropólogo como autor, paidos
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Habermas Jünger, pragmática universal, teoría de la acción comunicativa, Taurus
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Hernandez Sam Juan Abdel, Rethinking Urban Anthropology, Complete works, Tome VII
Hernandez Sam Juan Abdel, Anthropology of Archaeology: A Perspective from Ethnometodology and Cultural Anthropology, Selected Essays, Book
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intramundane Horizont, Complete Works, Tome VI, Book, 2017
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Self and Acerbo: The self and the social Between writing, research and culture, complete works, tome VIII
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Presentational Linguistic, Complete works, tome III, Book, 2005
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Being and Monad, Complete works, tome IV, Book, 2006
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Given and the Ungiven, Complete works, tome V, book, 2007
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intangible, The Presentational Linguistic, Complete Works, Tome III
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intangible, the intangible, selected essays
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Exegesis of the Texts of Culture, in Pp, Self and Acerbo: The Self and the Social Between Writing, Research and Culture, Complete Works, Tome IX
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, phenomenological Anthropology, selected Essays
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, the indeterminist thrue, selected essays
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, the constellation of common Sense, sociology of common sense and Anthropology ResearchTheory, selected essays
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Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intramundane Horizont, Pp, The Constellation of Common Sense, Book, The Intramundane Horizont, book
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Hegel G.W.F, Forma y contenido, ciencia de la lógica, Solar, Hachete
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Todorov Tzvetan. Teorías del símbolo, monteavila editores
Todorov Tzvetan. Critica de la Crítica, Editorial Paidós
Todorov Tzvetan, Symbolism and Interpretation, Cornell University Press, Feb 18, 1986
Todorov Tzvetan , Genres in Discourse, Cambridge University Press, Published August 31st 1990 by (first published 1978)
Todorov, Tzvetan Simbolismo e interpretación Todorov, monte avila editores
Todorov.Tzvetan "Los géneros del discurso" (Waldhuter editores, 2012)
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Tyler Stephen, constrains of propositions, context of discourse, semantique analysis, Pp, 116-121, A Point of Order, Rice University studies
Tyler Stephen A., Evocation: The Unwriteable, A Response to Abdel Hernandez San Juan, Sept 9, Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA, 1997
Tyler Stephen Post-Modern Ethnography, The Unspeakable, Discourse, Rhetoric and Dialogue in the Posmodern World, Wisconsin University Press
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