The Enigmas of the ground
Introduction to semiological sociology
By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
Book information:
Title: The enigmas of Ground
Subtitle: Introduction to Semiological Sociology
Author: ©Abdel Hernández San Juan, english version manuscript,
Researchgates.com: DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18985.92004
To Vicky, my beloved (wife), partner and life partner
Contents
Preface
Chapter I: The Enigmas of the ground
Chapter II: The Preinterpreted Character of Experience and the World
Chapter III: Dialectics and origins
Chapter IV: Acervos and Codification
Chapter V: Triadic Adequacy
Chapter VI: The Holism of Connotation
Chapter VII: Indexical Readings: Subjectivity and objectivity in social sciences
Epilogue
General bibliography
Preface
Semiological sociology, the subtitle that I announce with this book within the framework of my own phenomenological sociology and culture, is a new form of sociology that makes its own, from its own parameters, significant elements of the program of semiotic theory or semiology, starting from, on the one hand, from philosophical reasons previously explained in my books “Thinking Science” about the need for a return from semiotics to logic and philosophy, which returns the universe of these, the signs, to the scope of what I have called the intramundane horizon in a peculiar and differentiated thrust within what has been a certain criticism of signocentrism from which I at the same time distance myself but which in certain aspects I assume in favor of a comprehensibility in cultural analysis that pays attention to the hermeneusis, hermeneutics, on the one hand, and semiosis on the other, as well as semantics, but within what I have called in this book “The Enigmas of the ground”.
This book continues and leads to more extensive and complex paths at the same time, a chapter on sociology and semiotics “Textual inference: The object language/Semiotics, sociology and semantics of culture” included in my book “Semantic elucidation, theory semiotics, sociolinguistics and semantics of culture.
The effort is twofold; from one perspective, this book involves moving semiotic theory by retheorizing it outside of the reductive constraints of sender/message/receiver to which it was largely subject, although somewhat less so in semiotics such as those of Roland Barthes and Svetan Todorov. , and taking it back to the logic back to Peirce and beyond to philosophy, at the same time that it involves a semiological retheorization of the phenomenological sociology inherited from the social phenomenology of Alfred Shutz, as a sociology of culture or cultural theory.
In this way, not without required reconstructions of philosophical anthropology from classical philosophy prior to its departures towards the study of so-called primitive cultures, semiological sociology is related and draws new interdisciplinary links for a cultural anthropology that as a specialty or area is subordinated to it while offering it empirical content, creating new connections that have been in charge of my own elaborations between phenomenological sociology, sociology of culture, cultural theory and postmodern anthropology.
This book in which I develop my theory of the ground, is a necessary and required step further at the level that is both logical and methodological, initiated in previous efforts that go on the abstract theoretical level from my books "The correlation of the world" and “Thinking science”, to, on the empirical side, my books “Rethinking intertexuality”, “Semantic Elucidation” and “The self and the heritage”.
The enigmas of the ground
©Por Abdel Hernandez San Juan
The notion of ground has a fairly widespread common sense meaning, it is usually understood as a synonym for base, floor, soil, or level of the earth, as when we say, for example, below the ground or above the ground or when it is used conjugated with other words, very common in English, but the notion of ground, in addition to these common sense meanings and its extended uses through figurative meanings, also has a specialized meaning in the philosophy of logic from which semiotics was born and more specifically It occupies an essential place in Peirce's semiotics where it acquires valence, connotations and meanings that are more complex and intricate with respect to those of common sense.
As we will soon observe, the notion of ground, although essential in the theory of the sign, suffers from imprecisions and ambiguities that I am not the first to highlight.
My objective is not, however, to engage in a discussion that objects to Peirce and subsequent semiotics up to the present day to these impressions, but rather to first develop some theorizations exclusively focused on the ground matter that has never gone beyond being in semiotics an epigraph for broader developments. on other matters.
Both in phenomenology, hermeneutics and ontology and in terms of analytical philosophy and language, the concept of reality and the relationship between language and reality are at the center of my attention. On the other hand, I hope to leave a well-complexed theory in linguistic and semiotic terms. and autonomy on the ground that in turn examines the possibilities and possible methodological scope of the concept thus retheorized.
The issue is central to elucidate a dilemma that is at the center of the theoretical discussion on phenomenology, hermeneutics and pragmatism, present since classical philosophy especially in Hegel and Kant, then it was in the diatribes of the analytical philosophy of language, linguistics. theory and semiotics, I refer first to the concept of reality and then to the relationship between language and reality.
What happens with this relationship?, language and reality? When one goes back to the classics one sees that what we understand as palpable sensoriality, the data of the senses, was understood as a diverse, heterogeneous multiplicity, what they called sensitive multiplicity, but see in turn that the universe of perceptions, representations and concepts was understood as an abstractive synthesis of that multiplicity, however, when we called the concept of reality to the foreground, this relationship of abstractive synthetic substitutions was ignored since the It led to the realm of the formation of consciousness, the self and self-representation in self-consciousness separated from that which, considered a heterogeneous multiplicity, could be considered in itself as real or reality.
The analysis of what was considered reality was limited exclusively to how to consider that multiplicity for what it was in itself, but since considering it in itself presupposed the subject who contemplates it, that multiplicity was then distinguished between appearance, presence and relationship. of it as a phenomenon with a substrate or essences, seen this way it did not give way to language and was considered by its phenomenal or own appearance of presence without language in front of it.
What worried or occupied Kant were the abstractive syntheses through which that multiplicity was reduced to a minimum abstracted in the representations-- pierce-- or more precisely not so much those representations in themselves as the subjective intuitions of the subject regarding To that multiplicity that remained heterogeneous or diverse, they were like a prioris abstractive or conceptual syntheses of sensible and conceptual experience.
They wanted to abstract the basic synthetic principles just before they will be formed in subjectivity as something completely separated from that heterogeneity since once separated into a world in consciousness as something else internal to the subject and different from that heterogeneity it leads us to a universe of representations whose pure cognitive conceptual principles we cannot abstract as concepts.
Kant's a priori synthetic judgments were nothing other than efforts to abstract those first abstractive principles on which the separation is then based, which are consciousness, the subject and the representation, the perceptions themselves, stopping first at the entrance just before the separation but from within the subject that understood in that before so close to that sensitive multiplicity although already ready to detach itself from it are still a priori syntheses, that is, a priori concepts abstracted as sensitive intuitions.
In the case of Hegel, it was about capturing that this separate world that makes up the subject and consciousness is a reflected, phenomenal world and that as such the abstractions that make up that world other than that heterogeneous multiplicity are themselves susceptible to a phenomenology in which both things on the one hand we cannot understand that multiplicity without its reflection in consciousness, concepts and spirit and conversely we cannot know the latter without continuing the phenomenology of that multiplicity now reflected in consciousness and representations.
Thus in Hegel the real or reality is not only that heterogeneous multiplicity in its palpable sensoriality considered by itself according to its appearance, its presence and its phenomenon, although also as when he defined reality as something accidental and contingent.
For Kant there was, we could call it, a beginning, a beginning that could be abstracted in its first a priori categories with respect to the subject, a beginning that in Derrida would be the relationship of both continuity and discontinuity between nature and culture,
What Derrida called in his analyzes of the origin of language and languages a rupture through which nature itself is inverted or generates something that makes it strange to itself, we cannot imagine how it could arise from the state of pure nature something like a society without first having a language and speech, but at the same time we cannot imagine how something like a language or speech could have arisen without first having had a society, the principle of the nature-language relationship as this The latter is nature here and now but also culture, it places the contradiction of that beginning that Kant abstracted from which Peirce very accurately defined Kant as a conceptualist.
In Hegel, however, the heterogeneous and multiple world of the palpable continues in the spirit and subjectivity and must be known not only as a world in itself per its representation but also as a reflected world, thus seen in Hegel as nature continues in substance. , the matter and form of consciousness and representations, although from these it is a phenomenological, reflected world, Hegel denies that this multiplicity can be reached in any other way than with concepts and denies that the latter can be anything other than that Without the knowledge of these concepts becoming a knowledge of that reflected multiplicity, the last thing is dialectics-- Hegel-- the first is conceptualism-- Kant, and between the two we see how the same dilemma is expressed in one direction. or the other -- dialectic versus conceptualism when we place language between the two -- Derrida in his discussion of Rousseau, Condillac, Chomsky and the Geneva Linguistic Circle
But here we still do not have the concept of reality nor do we have the relationship between the concept of language and the concept of reality.
We have it, however, as an inextricable relationship in Peirce, who considered himself a neo-Hegelian, in Peirce's semiotics, which is based on asking how this multiplicity reflected here within the subject is nothing other than a semiotics whose phenomenology cannot be other than a phenomenology of language and how reality is represented by it, that is, the relationship between the representation and the objects of the representation through which that multiplicity is nothing other than the object of a sign, a sign that is in the place of that object for someone, for a someone who will be its interpretant, a someone who is first the thought itself, the same subject and then the sign that that thought is for another thought.
In this way, reality is nothing more than a sign, it is a sign since we consider it reflected from the side here, that is, reflected in the subject already separated from that multiplicity insofar as the sign is in the place of the object for an interpretant, but also thought is a sign for an interpretant that is only sometimes as a function another sign sometimes another thought a someone in this way reality or the real is a sign and as such it is language, reality itself is nothing but a semiosis infinite, a chain of signs between which thought and reality become forms of language, however, in this operation it has been passed, going back over the past, directly from nature to culture, the former has ceased to matter in itself and It has come to have its value only as a sign in culture.
But if instead we consider all the dyadic and triadic elements that make up Peirce's semiotics among which the ground is only one more intricate as between a representatement, a correlate and an interpretant that articulate the infinite semiosis analyzed above. We separate in itself the level of the ground devoid of a correlate, a representatement and an interpretant, we find that with the single ground that passage from nature to culture as something that disconnects the latter from the former is not only not assured in advance. but in itself the very idea that culture can be separated from nature in such a way is relativized.
We realize that the concept of ground is the only one that has the characteristic that around it that first dilemma between a heterogeneous multiplicity or palpable sensoriality and a subsequent synthesis for its purpose never ceases to remain constant, whether as a dialectic or as a conceptualism between nature and language first and between a language from which that nature -- heterogeneous multiplicity/palpable sensoriality -- does not emerge and an idea of reality that, understood now from a second sense of language such as this refers, refers or denotes to objects cannot be separated from that multiplicity in the form it acquires with language
In short, what I am arguing here is that if we pay focused attention to the ground that semiotics that was separated around an idea of culture so based on conventions and that componentialist semantics that presupposed such an instituted mode of meanings that culture appeared as an entirely separate universe is implantable.
The above does not have the purpose here, let's call it ecological, of redeeming or invoking a return to nature because although certainly as a neo-romanticist that I am what defined romanticism was precisely not to separate them and I have repeatedly expressed in this sense my sense of ecology, my The objective here is not naturalistic perse - although it is also - but is also motivated by the understanding that the semiotic dimension of the ground has its own scientific value and that as such it must be understood independently of the representatement, the correlate and the interpretants.
In fact, I myself have focused on the latter; my book The Correlate of the World focuses on the correlate and the interpretant, while attention to both dimensions requires us to study the correlations of the world in the text and the methodological understanding of them. cultural theorization.
But, as I have argued elsewhere, we saw in my analyzes of the critique of the sign understood as a closed and separate unit, implicit in Derrida, the development of an analysis focused on the ground is the only one that can allow us to continue the path that never emerges from the relationship between language, nature, reality.
In fact, when we take the path of the correlate and the interpretants we result in a substitution of reality for language, of the object for the sign, of the meanings for the referents, we lose the meaning not only as discussed in the world correlate of that self is self in the two forms outside of language and inside of language according to the relationship being/language and thought/language thus makes it explicit, but now also of that which relates our sense of language to experience, to the world, to nature and to reality.
In fact, a language practice sensitive to nature, reality, experience, the world and empirical dimensions is not conceivable without a philosophical and semiotic sense of the ground.
Only through the ground does language remain in contact with the empirical-sensitive dimensions so that it concerns not only nature but in general everything that involves the life world, pragmatism, reality, and field research.
We therefore return to Derrida in his essay on the origin of language and the way in which the pure state of nature and that of language occur.
How could we in fact accept that an object could be a sign if led by the idea that the interpretant replaces the object, a sign could never be an object in itself, how could we accept that a natural or urban sound of reality taken as is , the steps I hear from the neighbor outside my door, the open or closed door, the town crier's bells, or simply the order of the chairs in the room could be a sign if all of them are rather objects? In them the object It becomes a sign, therefore only in the dimension of the ground can we speak of object languages.
But as we will see, the dimension of the ground is rich and inexhaustible as are the correlate and the interpretant and requires separate attention.
We have located here the point and the precise epistemological axes on which I want to focus, discuss, propose and develop a logical proposition of mine consisting of the following thesis and scientific hypothesis: the concept among those existing that have treated the relationship between language and reality in The past of linguistics, semiotics and the philosophy of language in which what was previously discussed and what was previously situated between heterogeneous multiplicity and abstractive syntheses is expressed is the concept of ground.
When we review the available literature on the relationship between language and reality, paying special and focused attention to how the relationship is collected and logically expressed in concepts, we will observe that the concept of ground appears continually full of constant impressions and variations to the point of often being set aside according to some as imprecise, according to others treated each time in such dissimilar ways that they seem to refer either to different concepts or to something in itself not sufficiently theorized and deepened and therefore left to uncertainty, polysemy or undecidability, this is the concept of ground.
The ground has been an imprecise, multivalent and neglected concept precisely because it is the concept that brings with it and within itself the dilemmas that I have placed before, however not to simply name those dilemmas with the concept of ground but to develop by theorizing the ground. the logical and theoretical problems that have not been theorized.
On the one hand, the ground in semiotics is a quality, that is, a qualification of the substance perceptible in that multiplicity of presences--, something that allows one presence to be distinguished from another according to some quality, whether it is black, red, tall, rustic, wavy, short. , cornered, etc. whatever receives this quality predicate, an object, a piece of furniture, anything red, black, wavy, tall, etc., but on the other hand the ground in semiotics is a point of view as it presupposes a With respect to, quality thus supposes something that is for someone as a quality enclosing the point of view regarding it.
At the same time, the ground refers to that object or something according to some of its aspects and not to all or its entirety, that is, the red, wavy, rustic quality is not only so for someone or according to the point of view of Someone also relates to that object through some aspect of it that would be something like a foreshortening of the object, something that reduces its heterogeneous multiplicity to a synthetic minimum. It is in turn the ground by itself or according to it, a relationship which presupposes a concomitant correlation.
Simultaneously, the ground is the foundation and at the same time it is that through which the object is referred to, indicated or denoted by the sign.
Finally, the ground is sensation, it is an abductive hypothesis, and to top it off with multiple irradiations in the sense of a concept, the ground has been referred to a type of sign that Peirce called an icon, as opposed to the index or indication and the symbol.
How can a concept mean so many things at the same time? Be a quality, be a respect to or point of view, be a foreshortening or synthesis that is related to the object in some of its aspects, be a relation for a correlation, be a foundation, be an indication. , reference and denotation, even being treated by some as synonymous with meaning and at the same time being a sensation, being an abductive hypothesis, being a form of sign, the properly iconic one, as Peirce defined it after some time, calling it simulacrum?
We will discuss all this below, its logical, philosophical and semiotic implications as well as its methodological implications, which is the ground in terms of research.
The first thing we must specify here regarding this supposed multivalence, apparent pluridimensionality and usual complex imprecision that has characterized the few approaches to the ground is that Peirce's semiotics, as in general that of his previous successors, due to its basic substantialism, has lacked a crucial distinction which if we sharpen well we realize that given by inaccuracies in Peirce himself, in reality it does not reflect anything other than a budding knowledge of something that requires a higher level of differentiation and therefore of theoretical development.
The distinctions that Peirce later tried to make between a firstity, a secondness and a thirdness have been considered too lightly as a mere distinction between culture and metaculture, causing the consideration of the sign as a unit closed on itself, that is, composed of all its sides functioning at the same time, from as a matter of logic only to the supposed thirdness of being made up of symbols that are actually formed and with their own articulation regardless of firstity and secondness because they are considered referred to dimensions that are not fully symbolic.
This move to thirdness as the only logical dimension has consumed semiotics in metacultural and conventional theory, ignoring that all the levels assigned to the sign also function in firstity and secondness and that what differentiates one from the other is that in firstity the ground governs, in the secondity the representatement and in the thirdness the interpretant and the correlate, but in the firstity there is also representatement, correlate and interpretant only that these are subordinated in it to the ground, in this way we arrive at the distinction that the What defines firstity, secondness and thirdness is not that what is signified and symbolic are fully formed in thirdness as incomplete as mere indications or icons in firstity.
What separates firstness from secondness and thirdness is not the relationship icon/firstness, indication/secondness, symbol/thirdness, the ground in itself is more than a form of the iconic sign, in the iconic sign certainly the enigmas of the ground are more latent from the moment in which what characterizes the ground is precisely that the empirical dimension prevails in its dimension where the data of that heterogeneous multiplicity, be it nature or social reality of experience, palpable sensoriality, are in such a way that the synthetic dimensions of demonstration or Denotants reveal or carry with them the reflected dimensions of their object, much as in the icon the object seems more reflected, but the ground is not reduced to a form of the sign.
Rather, the ground makes us aware of the fact that sign and object have a common origin in a mutual foundation and that therefore the object can be a sign and the sign an object, in the ground sign and object make explicit their mutual and dialectical relationship originating in a common foundation that makes them contrary but not exclusive and as such mutually necessary to the point that the sign is an illusion without an object something that cannot acquire its identity and the object a delusion without a sign it is not possible for something to acquire the identity of an object Without a sign we saw in my essay the sensible concept, the object is only an object for the subject in a concept, the sign is only a sign for the subject in an object and the object is only an object for the subject in a sign, the dimension of the ground, therefore, it is logically self-sufficient and its firstness corresponds to what Derrida called the origin of language.
What differentiates or rather let's say what is required to differentiate more is our sense of what firstness, secondness and thirdness are, thirdness is not defined by greater logicality nor by being the only dimension in which the sign is a sign completely formed as a unit. and the symbol symbol presupposition according to which firstity and secondness were prelogical dimensions, this conception suffered from a hypostasis, it was presupposed at each level as such according to an idea of a type of sign, hypostasis of an idea of a type of sign by an idea of level or dimension icon/firstness, indication/secondness, symbol/thirdness, we proceeded even theoretically according to an analogical parameter that undifferentiates the field of effect of the levels, if the symbol is more opaque that is to say less transparent on the one hand with respect to its origin and its foundation something given in its convention and on the other towards its denotation, a fully formed sign was given as thirdness with respect to proto signs or proto symbols, to then distinguish firstity from secondness and thirdness.
If only thirdness were autonomous because only in it all the elements of the sign work in unison there would have to be only thirdness which, as in Hegel's example, if you remove the above, there will no longer be a below, this would become the only dimension, but it turns out that although in budding and still undifferentiated, Peirce's distinctions were not gratuitous, but rather necessary and intuitively correct.
It is necessary to distinguish the transparent, the translucent and the opaque, also the tangible from the latent or unmanifest and the intangible, also the present from the stratified and the absent, also the empirical from the conjectural and the abstract, also the inferential of the reflective analytical, also the sensory of the figurative.
Thus, for example, phenomenology and empiricism as well as physics are firstities, hermeneutics, interpretation and archeology are secondities, philology, symbolism, linguistics and anthropology are thirdities, metalanguage is a thirdness, language is a secondness. and the relationship between language and being, language and thought, language and reality, language and nature a firstity, the ground thus corresponds to the firstity, the representatement or representation to the secondness and the correlate and the interpretant to the thirdness.
But icon, indication and symbol function on the three levels in the same way, what defines firstity is that the dimension of the ground governs in it, always object and sign, language and reality, maintain their common origin, belong to the same starting foundation. They originate each other, they exchange their place and their identity, the data of experience are at the same time signs and objects, in which the experience originates and is originated is object and sign, reality and language, sensation and abstractive synthesis.
Denotation cannot be grasped without its foundation in what is denoted, we cannot speak of a referent without referentiality because without the latter it becomes a mere list of contiguous things and objects and conversely without a referent there is no referentiality the signs of a language without a referent are pure empty conventions, opacities, as in the example of a language that we cannot decipher.
Let's say that we see a series of ideograms but we do not understand Thai or Japanese, we barely see obtuse, opaque empty gestures, which do not refer us to anything because we do not have the code that is only acquired by convention, so that what fills us with senses a brushstroke of three vertical dashed lines on a horizontal one that mean descending the mountain is descending the mountain without descending the mountain the ideogram is a mere abstract painting, without the denotation the denotation is a blind man who does not see a deaf man who does not hear.
The example of the staff is good here to illustrate we see some drawings of notes on some lines, only the musician knows that the eighth note accompanied by two dashed lines is a chord or another, one note or another on the instrument, the one who does not know how to read music alone see doodles.
In the ground, unlike this, the world is both significant and signified, it is explicit and tacit, the example of the ideogram and the score therefore only have ground for the Japanese and for the musician, in this sense they are examples of thirdities. in which the interpretant rules and in which the ground is subordinate to the correlate and the interpretant.
When the ground rules, there is no opacity, there is transparency, there is no world as a correlate of the text in the terms in which I discussed it in my book about it, there is instead an empirical and phenomenological dimension according to which sign and object go together or at the same time, It does not mean that there is no representatement, correlative and interpretant, it means that the latter are subordinate to the ground, the ground is a primacy.
At the level of representation, the sign has been separated from the object as something other than that. For example, the self is a firstity and belongs to the ground. Consciousness is a representation. In it, the representation is separated from what is represented. It does not mean that there is no representation. ground in consciousness means that in it the ground does not govern, it is subordinate, consciousness is not empirical, empirical is the experience that is a firstity, which is ground and belongs to the ground
Consciousness is a secondness, self-consciousness a thirdness, without descending the mountain the ideogram is nothing, the ground is required but the convention subordinates the ground because without it the ideogram is a mere scribble, then the correlate and the interpretant govern as the representatement is the last in this example, an ideogram is thus a thirdness in the same way that alphabetic language is, but given that without alphabetic language there is no experience we see that it is not whether or not it is alphabetic that defines whether it corresponds to the ground, the representativement or the interpretant.
The representation is something that is separated in its foundation from the foundation of the object, in the object and representation do not seem to belong to the same source and although this is impossible in some way the ground has to enter for the connection between the sign to be completed. and the object does not govern the ground there, it is subordinate, in the interpretant even less so, in the latter it is already a matter of a substitution, one thing remains in the place of the other, so for example, the espozo is in the party symbolizing its She explains that she could not attend either a meeting at her work because she was traveling or at her son's school where she was the one mentioned.
In the same way, it is not whether it is iconic or not that makes the ground, an icon can be an interpretant not a ground when, for example, we have the traffic light lights that are iconic par excellence, we see that nothing in them brings with it the reflection or the presence of turning left, turning right, stopping or going straight, the sign is mere convention and is completely in place of the exact object as in the ideogram
Green, red and yellow can be mere colors or mere abstract painting, nothing in them descends the mountain or turns left, so it is not the iconicity that makes the ground, nor the symbolicity although and per se that in an icon There is more ground than in a symbol, which makes the interpretant the same Peirce's example makes it clear, a metal beam on the eaves of the roof is an object and yet it becomes an interpretant of the direction of the wind
The dimension of the ground is the phenomenological and empirical dimension/sign and object have in it a common origin and source, they even exchange their places and identities, the object becomes a sign and the object sign remains referred to a phenomenological dimension.
In principle, if the ground is quality, there is a part of it that refers to things, to something, to forms, to nature, to objects, to the image, to matter but also to the world, wherever there is. sensation and palpable sensoriality, there is the ground, regardless of whether that quality is for someone and as such it presupposes a point of view, the ground is ground for someone without a doubt and thus assumes that the quality is according to the quality for a point of view, but a part of it refers to the very quality of that something that can be heterogeneous multiplicity, nature or reality, but can be world, can be experience, can be other subjects and as such continue as ground in everything from speaking. and listening, even the simple course of life, experience, empiry, phenomenon, in this sense the ground refers to a continuity of nature in language and culture and not so much to an interruption in which nature is inverted or becomes strange. itself, as Derrida said, precisely because it is half quality of the thing, half qualification of it, from the point of view, sign and object have in the ground a common foundation and source, they originate at the same time, one for the other, and as such they dialectically become they exchange, only in the ground can an object or anything become a sign and only in the ground can a sign become an object, only in the ground is the concept of object languages conceivable in fact
Although it is a quality for a someone and thus implies a point of view and a relationship, that for someone is what makes it properly ground, a part of it shares a foundation with the forms and phenomena themselves, therefore the ground is also a presence although it is in the way in which presence is such for someone and as such presupposes at the same time that fold in which it is both a moment or something in that something and a moment of the sign in which its heterogeneity is simplified by referring to it or denoting it.
In this way, the concept of ground is the only one that takes the appropriate step between nature, language and culture, the concept, for example, of expressive substance or the expression of substance wanted to capture something of that continuity of nature in language but at the same time being a substance and not a qualification of that made the matter of language, ousia, gram and lexicon appear as an absolute material of language foreign to sensation and palpable sensoriality as well as above all opaque with respect to reference, denotation and the relationship between language and reality that only prevails on the ground, in the substance of the expression the substance is absolute and as such it interrupts with its close presence the communication with the side beyond, there is no sign and object, what engenders or is in the genesis of the sign and language is then the ground that begins the relationship between the whole of something and a part of it that is a quality for someone, the distinction between various presences given in the qualification itself is therefore a beginning of the sign, its first form, although it does not its only beginning or genesis, as I analyzed in my essay the restoration of the world, there is also the genesis of the sign in what Derrida calls the appearance of ourselves before ourselves in language and consciousness, but it remains to be seen to what extent it has not yet opened ground. In that other genesis, without a doubt the ground is also there, although it seems secondary.
I don't think I need much more to make explicit the immense importance of the ground, the ground validates the passage, in fact, between the philosophy of nature, phenomenology, semiotics, hermeneutics and pragmatism and all this without losing the neo-Hegelian dialectic, Therefore, in his opinion, he opened the question of completely rethinking neo-Hegelianism - Peirce, Gadamer and Adornment - which clearly requires an equally immense effort since not everything in Pierce makes that step possible, not everything in Gadamer, not everything in Adornment but certain retheorized aspects, at the same time immense because in this possible articulation semiotics is largely atrophied because the ground was neglected and left aside by convention and metaculture, a new semiotics is required that begins to advance in thinking science one claimed from the phenomenological and comprehensive sociology, and clarifications are required regarding the hermeneutics that I have also advanced.
The enigmas of the ground are thus the opening of a field that, although it coincides with what Derrida calls the origin of language, distances itself from it through a non-interruption between nature and language, between language and reality, between experience and language, not There is therefore neither rupture, nor estrangement nor virtuality nor fiction, but rather continuity of one in the other exactly as the romantics understood it. Here are the theoretical bases of neoromanticism, the enigmas of the ground.
The object/sign dialectic
If the ground is sensation and is foundation then it is also presence with everything that presence as a phenomenon involves, form, appearance, etc. But what I want to discuss in this essay is the genesis of the ground, the fact mentioned before that in the ground the Object and sign are born from a common source and foundation at the same time that they exchange their identity. Let's look at it like this once again, returning to an example that I gave before.
Let's imagine for a moment that you are perceiving a something something, choose it right now in your surrounding environment, a wall, some mosaics on the floor, a shelf in your kitchen, anything like a something that you see out your window or on your bookcase, Right now, notice for a moment that what you perceive is an image in itself regardless of whether you perceive it, perceive it for a while like this, now do the opposite, notice that you perceive it, that your perception is something in itself perse. to that image that you perceive, perceive it for a while, well, you have separated the perception from the perceived
Now do the opposite, try to perceive that your perception and what you perceive are the same thing, integrate them simply perceive what you perceive. Very well, you have noticed that just as perception and the perceived image are separated, they can also be integrated, both things, perceiving that in itself and your perception as separate and perceiving both things integrated are undoubtedly sensations, you are in contact with yourself. itself and things through sensations, we can say that if the ground is a sensation, all of it is ground, it is present in both moments, now even in neither of the two moments of our experimental examples have you perceived it yet, you have not yet had the sense of being in contact neither with signs nor with objects, this is as undoubtable and true as the above.
Very well, let's go back to the same thing, re-perceive what you previously perceived as something in itself independent of your perception, now for a moment disconnect from the fact that it is something in itself independently of the fact that you perceive it to be something in itself and you already know it. You know but before you perceived it as it was something in itself with respect to the fact that you perceived it, now skip this last one just concentrate on what it is in itself, start observing its shape and its textures, start perceiving if it is rough and rustic or light and liquefied, its weight or its lightness, its silhouette, its light and its shadow, if it is the kitchen shelf, observe how it relates to the wall and the space, its height, if it is something on your bookshelf, observe your order, if you are a girl who looks out the window, observe her hair and her gestures, you have begun to see objects where you previously saw images, what makes it an object is above all that you have perceived it in itself but not in relation to that you perceive it.
The object is nothing more than the apperceived sensation of what that thing is in itself, but you have not noticed something, not only did you stop focusing on it as something in itself with respect to your perception but you also began to perceive it integrated into your perception but without notice that it should or should not integrate or separate perception and what is perceived. To observe them in such a way you integrated perception and what was perceived but without noticing what integrated them. While before, when you integrated perception and what was perceived, you noticed the integration, now you did it without noticing it and only then have you begun to see objects where before you only saw images, the apperception is thus then a condition of possibility of the object.
For all this, the object and the object language is nothing more than the language of what that is in itself, what has happened, you have omitted its presence, the world of the natural and the real in itself, that heterogeneous multiplicity of palpable sensoriality has become for you a superobject, to the extent that the subject is omitted even more, even when in the mere retina the subject is just an eye, not even a pure retina or reticule, but the object is increased, far from having it located there or located from The here that perceives it has come to the absolute foreground. What was previously an image for perception is now an object and what was an object has become a superobject.
Now, to the same extent that it is what is apperceived that makes it an object, that is, the assumption of belonging to the integration of perceived perception but apperceived, to that same extent its object dimension is already its sign dimension, not only because it is so with respect to the The fact that he omits that he perceives it, however he perceives it, is thus a sign for that perception, but because as an object in itself it has become the language of the object, that language of the object or object language is at the same time already for itself at the same time and in its same sign genesis.
Let's look at it this way, suppose you wake up in the morning and when you enter your bathroom you notice that the curtain is wet and there is some steam and a damp towel, you infer that your girlfriend, the only other person who lives with you, has taken a bath. , the wet curtain and the steam are objects but they are also signs, signs that refer not only to the referent bathed bride but also to the memory that when she woke up she was not in bed, an object sign curtain and steam has been related to another, absence of body in bed, you can go by inferences in retrospect, remember that yesterday you made love and fell asleep so that you did not have time to talk about mutual individual objectives the next day, if instead of falling asleep If they had talked, you would probably know that she was leaving early for a friend's house and the curtain/steam signs objects had not referred him to the absence in bed that he would have taken as known as spoken and the curtain and the steam had only confirmed what he knew. Far from leading you to continue searching, they only told you what you already knew, but since they didn't tell you, those signs are at the same time more informative. You go to the kitchen, check if there is a message on the telephone answering machine, and look around. trying to infer what his girlfriend has done, but in the kitchen he sees a jug of water warming you, which tells him that she is nearby and he goes to the corner.
Very well, we have just followed a sequence of objects signs where object and sign share and originate from the same ground, in reality where the object itself becomes a sign, now let's do the opposite, let's pay attention to what is seen alone and all the time in relation to what is being perceived.
Suppose that you go through the objects in your living room with your perception but all the time perceiving your perception, that is, noticing that you perceive them one by one, you perceive that you perceive a bookcase in your perception, you perceive that you perceive a sofa in your perception, you perceive that you perceive a window in your perception, between you and that object a kind of intermediate virtual surface has been created, in reality that surface is not virtual, it is simply physiologically your retina, the optical reticule in which you distinguish that although the object is seen there From perception, a kind of replica of the object always occurs on your retina as a kind of duplication, as a repetition of what you see there here, that repetition is a representation because although you have the sensation of the object as its ground, the ground is now within that repetition, according to the most usual meaning of the sign given by the distinction between the sign and its object, that replica that you feel of the sofa, the bookcase or the window in your grid, that specular spectrum, even when it is almost identical to the object, is separated of it as something separate made of another shape, another material and located spatially far from that object.
Before we saw objects that became signs themselves, the wet towel, the steam and the curtain, now we see a sign of the object, in fact the object and its sign are separated and the sign and its object the same, when we notice the subject , now the object is a sign for the subject and the subject is a sign with respect to the object, this separation becomes increasingly greater to the extent that the level of representation that intervenes is higher.
So, for example, a photograph of the sofa, another of the bookcase and another of the window are even more separated because now you not only perceive the object as you perceive it but you see your gaze outside yourself externalized as a sign, you see the see where before he only perceived as a duplication on his retina, he sees how clearly it is the window sign, the bookcase sign, the sofa sign, not the sofa, the bookcase or the window as objects, he sees it more clearly if he replaces the photo with the written word where there is no longer a replica but rather a symbol and convention.
Now, when you see seeing where before you only saw what was seen in relation to what you saw it, you perceive that your seeing, which has become a sign of seeing, externalizes your own gaze for a third party, which is not yet present, and is inclusive of having externalized seeing as a sign. When you only saw objects that themselves became signs, something that you achieved by not seeing what you saw with respect to your perception, you were in full dimension of the ground, when you saw it according to your perception as a constant film that repeated the image like a replica. of the object in your retina you were in the full dimension of the representation, you however realized that all of this is sensation, therefore the ground is still there as if below or behind the representation at the same time in a stratum that goes to the time one in the other, when you realized that this film as a replica on the retina is another surface and space distant from the object and that therefore it can be repeated outside of you through a photograph, you perceived the division of the representation of the representation, the latter is already a text for you and for another with respect to the object, for this very reason it is a correlate, you no longer see what you see in itself but according to a sign, a text of which it is a correlate, but this third still only implicit is in turn an interpretant now more defined as the ground continues as a sensation in the representatement the interpretant is always there equally, once he perceived that as he perceived it, again it was what intervened in the curtain and the vapor were signs of one thing or another according to their previous collections that acted as interpretants, it is thus demonstrated that all parts of the sign function on the three levels, 1- firstness- dimension of the full ground, objects and signs originate mutually, genesis, 2- reticula-secondness, representation where the ground remains as a sensation, 3-repetition externalized as a sign of that separation, photography or writing of the sign, (correlate and interpretants)/thirdness, but semiosis becomes more complex at levels of metatextuality and metaculture that make it infinite by presenting the strata again in new dimensions, let's see it like this
Let us imagine an additional possibility to thus complete the trichotomy of the necessary examples to which I will return repeatedly in this book. Let us imagine that the object also sees you.
Unspoken world and infinite semiosis
For example, let's say that I am from my window looking towards the street while my coffee is being made in the kitchen, I look at the surrounding world, on the sidewalk across the street there is a line of people waiting for the bus, a young girl dressed In black, she waits silhouetted against a wall, the bus is sensorially attractive to me, she wears her hair down and her body posture along with the cut of her clothing, her hair and the style of her posture communicates to me at the same time about her body attitude towards her. in solitude and with people as long as I am surrounded by people in a situation whose practical belonging is waiting for the bus, the sensations of attraction that it provokes in me translate into stimuli in my body that cause me to review my appearance in a certain way. I foresee that she might look at me and I fix my hair while I correct my body position, up to this point all the stimuli that are sensations belong to the ground, but when she has realized that I am looking at her while she looks and types her phone, the coding, we can no longer perceive each other without noticing that we are perceiving it, my gaze follows her movements and hers follow mine, first she must deduce if I am a neighbor in the area at her house or something else, I could be a worker in her office , someone who generally looks at the street or looks at her, in principle I help her interpret initially, I bring a cup of coffee and begin to drink it while I look at the street, when she raises her gaze towards me I try to make her see me distracted looking at the surroundings but when she realizes that I am not looking exclusively at her but at the entire environment, she begins to accentuate body positions to get my attention. When she realizes that she manages to get my attention, she turns off the phone and puts it away while I go to the kitchen and return, from that moment we cannot perceive ourselves without perceiving that we perceive ourselves.
Let's finally imagine a third party who observes how the girl and I see each other.
We thus conclude that the dimension of the ground in which sign and object return to their mutual genesis reappears at a superordinate and metatextual level as semiosis, you are now facing what we could call the tacit world in the natural attitude.
Very good.
From the above the following diagram is derived
Ground in the world
unspoken world
infinite semiosis
From here everything is organized around this main trichotomy
Let us examine the levels and degrees in which we could adduce whether Peirce himself in his philosophizing and in his semiotic logic was close to noticing what I have just theorized as a kind of ontological dualism and dialectic of the ground as that which validates and validates the catwalk and the continuity of nature in language and culture, half quality of something or things in themselves, half reference to them without interruption and without breakage, maintaining its semiological consistency does not speak against it.
Quite the opposite, although we could say that Peirce did not notice it as something commensurable and assignable to the ground in itself as a dimension, not properly taking into account the extent to which it is a logically self-sufficient dialectic, the only one through which it is possible for Any something, thing or object can become a sign and any sign can become an object, exchanging their identities in need of each other to acquire identity, even more determined, we could say that all its successors until semiotics is well established as a science since the 20th century. late, they went in the opposite direction and if anyone was closest to noticing it, it was Peirce himself.
In his important essay, division of the sign, in fact we observe a kind of movement in circular return, that is, returning over and over to the same thing but as if each time dealing not with the same thing but with another level, Peirce never stopped classifying. paradoxes that could be connected with what I call the enigmas of the ground, for example is his definition of the three trichotomies Peirce first says that a sign can be called qualisign, without a sign and legisign, the first is a mere quality that becomes a sign, a without Sign is a real and truly existing thing or event that is a sign and a legisign is a law that is a sign or more precisely that every convention is a legisign, this is therefore its first trichotomy.
In the second trichotomy Peirce says that a sign can be called an icon, index or symbol, in the third trichotomy he says that a sign can be called rheme, decisign or saying sign, all these planes that Peirce strove to differentiate and delimit by ways if The levels that we are distinguishing are even intricate, according to Peirce an icon is a sign that is like its object similar to it and that is what relates it to it, an index is a sign affected by its object and that shares with it some quality, a symbol is related to its object through some law or convention, finally in the third trichotomy the distinction between rheme, decisign and saying sign attempts to distinguish that a rheme is a sign that for its interpretant represents a qualitative possibility, a decisign. It is a sign that for its interpretant represents a real existence and a decisign an intermediate that involves rows.
On the other hand, at one point in his explanation of representation, Peirce differentiates representation from representation, pairing the first with the quality itself of the object and the second with the sign as such.
If we pay focused attention we will notice that there are moments in which Peirce's definition of index or clue is almost the same as what most modern semiologists later identified as ground even though the index or clue in modern semiotics moved away from that proximity that Peirce had to the ground since the indexicality caused from here was empirically separated from the sign and the index that relates it to the object, modern semiotics tending more to refer the ground to the icon.
Meanwhile, in modern semiotics, the representatement, which in Peirce's definition had in itself the dualism of the ground without being properly speaking, since representatement was a quality in the object and representation was the sign, became representation, moving away from the object.
On the one hand, Peirce's distinctions were concerned with distinguishing how qualities could be signs as well as events, real existing things that occur can be signs and conventions can be signs, something that becomes notable above all on an empirical level thanks to the examples that Peirce gave. , but on the other hand, when I had to define sign of object, I did not understand how signs and objects form an identity dialectic in which one is what it is because it is both the other and its opposite at the same time.
With this said, there being in Peirce himself a certain weak basis for my theory of the ground as the basis of the tacit world in the natural attitude that validates semiosis, it is nevertheless necessary, paradoxically, to return to Hegel because in Hegel, although not articulated as a semiotics, we find in terms logical, the dialectic that explains how what I have called works as a way of capturing the gateway between nature and language, nature and culture, experience, world, reality or pragma versus sign and language that only the ground makes possible as a dimension of its own enigmas. , a kind of dual value through which object and sign have a common foundation, the same source in which they mutually originate, thus reaching the understanding of the ground in the world.
I leave my house towards the street, I walk along the sidewalk, when I open the door that separates the front parking lot from the sidewalk, moving towards the left, there are people standing waiting on this side of the street for the bus that will stop on the sidewalk. in front because on the opposite sidewalk where you will make your stop the sun is infernal.
But the people that I see on my left taking the shadow do not all have the same interest in the situations that surround them, in fact the accent that each one places towards the presence of the present is diverse and does not coincide, some are diversely absorbed, for example. For example, a school-uniformed girl, an older man who appears to be going to or coming from work based on his hands full of folders with documents, and a grandmother are concentrated on their cell phones reading an email, responding to someone or playing a solitary game.
The candy seller with his covered cart is sitting on a stool and seems more attentive to who among all those people could buy him a dulce de leche than to the fact that three are reading his cell phone, while behind him just a meter away three young people sitting on the sidewalk talk to each other and a couple rests on each other, or in the fact that in some faces a clear disinterest in the surroundings is perceived, while paradoxically a girl with an umbrella from the opposite sidewalk seems very present In the vital present of presence, he looks with delighted attention at what everyone is doing while he feels the stifling sun on his back, but the shadow of his umbrella offers him the necessary freshness to enjoy the breeze and feel pleasure in the diversity of his surroundings.
The world that surrounds me as I walk towards the corner cafe and come across an attractive girl who has sensual tattoos in erotic spots on her body and lush rings who looks at me as much as I look at her is not a world of subjects or actors alike. incorporated into the meaning of others as pre-given objective idealities.
The accent of reality and the tension of consciousness of individuals alert to common sense is not a world par excellence of subjects occupied with the objectivity of others, the interest in what the presence of others does in a world of other objectives is unequal, some They are depressed, they do not seem motivated towards copresence but rather exhausted by it, others, on the other hand, seem interested but in a different way.
The milk candy seller is motivated to buy his sweets but not towards the objectivity of others, neither as peers nor as contemporaries, the girl with the umbrella enjoys a natural climax according to which the surrounding situations are presented to her as a live pleasantly, the girl with the rings is on top of her skin, the only thing she feels is the narcissistic sensuality of eros when they look at her and the seductive nature of her beauty, the other three are absent from the presence, lost in their phones.
The world of common sense for this and many other reasons cannot therefore be given as a generalized other in the sense of George Helbert Mead, although both Shutz and Mead capture something crucial that is of interest to me as predecessors, what they capture is not only partial. there in the life world but above all it generalizes towards the life world something that is brought from external systemic logics to that life world such as social rules, institutions, norms and classificatory precepts.
The diversity of the life world tells us, on the contrary, of the difficulty of bringing parameters not established from it to this world. Individuals seem to internalize in their own way the world of others as an internalized ideality in Derrida's sense than as generalized others, rather than a predated social world that constitutes the self, it seems to be about the self that, conversely, configures a diversely individuated world in the one that others are idealized reflections in the soil of irreducible monadically interiority, a world of self-absorbed monads that end up stumbling into largely unforeseen situations.
The conception of my predecessor of indisputable merit tends to bring into the world of our relations to others things that were not obtained from that world but brought to it from outside and then confirmed.
In my analyzes on Malinowski and Levis Strauss I explained how both had gathered information in the form of corpuses of narratives about culture that they did not obtain from the visual and then Ivan to the visual and transferred those parameters not obtained from the visual itself, trying to The visual confirmed what they obtained in another way and he argued as if, conversely, they had read the culture from the beginning from those same visualities, what they would have obtained about the culture would have been very different from what they had pre-made.
It is not that Mead's reasons lack arguments, there are undoubtedly many ways to confirm the generalized other, on the one hand we learn a language that is inherited from us, on the other we acquire habits and customs and finally we certainly socialize our person in interaction with others. In a world in which there are norms, but all these things are institutions, if we start from the smallest parameter that makes an institution, speech is the first social institution, at the same time it is worth asking ourselves what is the cut that defines the world of life Because although everything we experience, including institutions, is part of life, the concept of the world phenomenologically proscribes demands to which these strange things are part of life but not of a world that is cut back on itself for subjectivity, for the body and for the pragmatics of daily life as the world of daily life, the latter is defined by a course between day and night and is integrated only by our self-reflective monological soliloquy, by what we do in the day as an activity and by intersubjective communications within a scope of situations and interactions, the life world is synchronic not diachronic here and now at this very moment and its conformation is the habitat, it is a natural world, from that world there is no other generalized one, but proxemics and kinesics , spatial displacements, cuties themselves that interact each time in the face of surprise.
With the same meaning but more pertinent because mead and shutz are about the same type of urban, Western and modern social community that I have between my door and the café, not of aging faces, Boróró villages or Trobriand canoes, the world that I transit from my door to the cafeteria never before better approximated than in both, mead the generalized other, the formation of the self as something social, shutz the objective ideality of the ego of the other and the meanings that the actor assigns to his acts or actions as long as it is more or less accessible, were still transfers of exogenous logics to the life world itself, despite how their understandings are at the basis of the objectification of certain dynamics.
For example, if Shutz had not objectified the objective ideality that configures for the stream of consciousness and the flow of experiences the relationship between an actual present and a retrospection in terms of Hurselian retention and intentionality and then combined this with motivational observation, The motivated understanding or the subjective and objective meaning in Weber as well as the objectivity of the other's self implicit in Mead would perhaps not have placed the understanding of the actor in the terms required for his common sense sociology, but the norms and institutions that undoubtedly exist They are not part of the world of daily life except under very general principles, the traffic light, traffic laws, the differentiation between sidewalk and street, certain orders of coexistence that are an implicit background for daily life, the latter is made of what What each individual does every day on a pragmatic level, in their monologues and dialogues.
As I have shown, the world of everyday life is first and foremost a tacit world made up of a continuity of nature in language and culture, a world where the sensory ground continues in the infinite semiosis that makes both things the hermeneusis of culture. and the metaculture that is semiosis.
Understanding the senses and meanings that people assign to what they do and to their world is of course in continuity with shutz even what interests us most but not to validate there the existence of an idea of the world that is brought preformed from outside in the way of an external insight into what the social is like once and for all, but in the way in which we have accessed it here from the enigmas of the ground towards infinite semiosis, the world of life is a natural world, it is a habitation, not a network. of norms, rules, institutions, generalized others or objectivities of the self of the other.
We have therefore arrived in the appropriate way in which I have theorized and understood what I define as the tacit world, but having felt it and to a certain extent corroborated it is not even having made it explicit, nor even having understood it in all its complexity and richness, is what continues below.
The first thing we will affirm here is that the tacit world is first and foremost a natural world and that this natural world is at the same time an ideal world, ideal not because it is unreal but quite the opposite because what makes it tacit is its unproblematic nature and Therefore, what distinguishes it as something different from what we understand as reality, reality, as I have argued in another essay, depends on our concept of what is real, a concept that, like identity by difference, where what is is defined according to what is not. It is a negative concept, it is defined on the one hand in the face of scrutiny, when saying what is real we say in turn under scrutiny first in the face of the objectivity that authorizes it as such as perception second in the face of the unreal or illusory.
In contrast, the tacit world is beyond scrutiny.
The natural unproblematic character of the tacit world is thus prior to the concept of reality, it refers to an unproblematically accepted world until further notice as a world validated by experience, typification, significance and heritage, it is not a scrutinized world, it is just the world as it is accepted by the natural attitude, this world we affirm here with all the determination of both idealism and romanticism is not only counterproof and factually a natural world is also in itself the only world of common sense in which we live. Everyday life of human beings is actually our habitat and against all scrutiny even our health is part of it and is inscribed in it both for the layman and for us men of science, thought and letters.
This world is ideal in the sense of transcendental idealism for several reasons, but before entering into the elucidation of those reasons it is necessary to expand a little more within the social sciences on the reasons why we consider that the life-world relationship Common sense must be understood from the natural parameter that we have proposed so far with this chapter, which is not a whim or mere preference.
If the man of common sense, we ourselves carry it inside and we are also that man, does not distance himself from things such as what marriage is, because kinship relations are what they are, what makes social institutions, what are the norms? and rules that we follow and because they are anticipated in the value systems that make up the telos of our morality, it is not by choice and it is not merely due to a lack of intellectual curiosity or an uncritical acceptance of the world, to understand it in that way would be to underestimate the common sense, if to be a good cousin or a good uncle it was necessary to know why the relationship is the way it is as much as we need to know in the operating manual of an appliance or technological equipment what the red button is and why the cable enters where He enters and leaves where he leaves as much as we need to know how to use the emergency door in case the plane has problems, there is no doubt that all the cousins and uncles would read the manual on how to make nephews be nephews and cousins be cousins. .
It will be necessary then, once my theory of the ground in the world and the relationship between the tacit world and infinite semiosis has been elaborated, to offer some distinctions with respect to my predecessors in phenomenological sociology.
Of all the perspectives that I have read regarding Alfred Shutz, the one that most adheres to and reflects, the one that most closely approximates those aspects of Shutz's theory that have been of interest and concern to me based on my reading and direct understanding of his work is that of natanson, natanson summarizes very well an understanding of shutz, certainly not the only one as always happens, close to mine, however natanson himself recognizes that the entire theory of shutz dispenses with both sensation and perception , something relative since Hurssel presupposes them although in the mode of consciousness, but it is certainly precisely what Shutz then ignores, two of the central parameters of my semiotic theorizations: sensation and perception, both with respect to traditional semiotics, which depend excessively on convention and the institutionalization of communication, as towards sociology itself.
As far as action is concerned, I do not believe that sociology requires anything more than its law of gravity, enunciated long ago by Parson when he argued that the individual, the social and the cultural were functionally separate subsystems.
I am not a functionalist, among other things, because I start from the clarity that functionalism is a mechanistic mechanism, but the subsystemic functions of action could be understood from the perspective that nothing is possible in practical terms without that separation, the concept of a condition of possibility. He distinguishes between what is possible and what is not necessary and seen in this way, Parson's thesis is as much a law as the law of gravity.
Beyond the distinctions between Popper's worlds I see no reason to go beyond everything we have in the situation, situationality is sufficient for meaningful understanding.
But what for me is crucial about shutz regardless of the path he took to get there are two things, first the theory of common sense that he came to develop with the concepts of significance, typification and heritage at the center and second the way in which shutz It moves Weberian comprehensiveness further, going so far as to propose that what matters to us is the sense and meaning that the actor gives to his actions, I mean to his world and to the preinterpreted character of everything, his own things and those of his peers intersubjectively.
But as I have demonstrated, these articulations work adequately and without setbacks from my retheorizations, both hermeneutic and semiotic. My preferences towards Shutz are thus methodological and less relative to their worldviews.
Throughout my most theoretical books in recent years I have been developing, proposing and opening a series of new theories that develop very theoretical questions between classical philosophy, linguistics, semiotics and sociology.
It is not my objective here to explain again the infinity of new issues that I have dealt with, but broadly speaking, among all those that I have developed, there were still two pending further development. These were, on the one hand, the need to renew semiotics, taking it back to its original derivation from philosophy and classical logic, specifically the issues that encompass a contemporary reconsideration of transcendental idealism and the phenomenology of the science of logic from Hegel to Peirce, as well as the need for a On the other hand, open the empirical field of semiotics towards one of the very concrete and specific areas of phenomenological sociology, that which concerns the world of everyday life in its inert temporality here and now accepted as tacit by intramundane common sense in the attitude natural, a problematic world until further notice made up of the collection of typifications and knowledge at hand, both from the perspective of the monologic soliloquy of the individual person and in that intersubjective, thus resituating an empirical field for her different from that which consumed her. in the mere idea of culture as communication and above all in the impossibility of differentiating the answer to the question that is semiotics from what its field is, usually reduced to the answer that semiotics does not have a field outside of it assured other than by filling it with herself when saying the field of semiotics itself as a science, but at the same time the latter phenomenological sociology as derived by Alfred Shutz from his studies of social phenomenology needs to be retheorized from classical philosophy and semiotics in the sense reconsidered here . Of course, I have been doing both things over the years in my books, both at a theoretical and empirical level, resulting in something new, but that did not mean they had been called into the text as a matter in itself to be treated and amplified with focus. criterion, this essay has brought this double innovation and renewal to maximum development, but the effort is not yet concluded, the book aims to demonstrate its scope after taking it to its maximum elaboration with this chapter.
Since my first book in 1992 I have considered it crucial to discuss the panorama of the trends in sociology in relation to it from a much more philosophical perspective, to retheorize sociology itself. Alfred Shutz in fact intuited in his time also the need to take sociology back. towards philosophy in the same sense to which I am referring, just as Shutz, faced with the panorama of the different trends of contemporary sociology, warned that it could not address the new developments required without immersing himself deeply in philosophy, but Shutz's efforts to undoubted importance were reduced only to Hurssel and Bergson, which limited the scope of their developments since it is required, as I have already been doing in several books, to deepen and expand the scope of the effort, as I have said, considering much more complex philosophical issues than those treated by Hurssel and Bergson. bergson without detracting from the significance of their efforts.
This also has as a theme and objective, both theoretical and methodological, to deepen and focus on establishing and enriching as a more exhaustive program the paths of this double renewal that assumes as a result, we have been demonstrating something significantly new in the situated tradition. and resituated heir of course at the same time of her I refer to the to use Peirce's phrase trichotomy hegel, peirce, shutz.
It is true that Hegel debated in his science of logic continually with two schools which he believed to overcome transcendental idealism and the monism of the ancient Eleatics with their usual resistance to accepting that the dimension of being was corrupted by nothingness while by another side I sensed as a path prior to this the substantialist line that went from Leibnis to Spinoza and Kant.
The perspective in which we will return to Hegel here does not in fact consider him as far away as he believed from transcendental idealism and the ancient Eleatics specifically referred to Hegel from the science of logic and the phenomenology of the spirit.
The bases in Hurssel in addition to promoting Shutz's studies towards the intensionality of meanings and above all to accept as given a world in the turn that Shutz undertakes with respect to Weber despite the primacy that Shutz gives to the ways of understanding the self of the another intersubjectively and the bases in Bergson fostered the temporalized attention that gave shutz to the regionalized worlds of meaning that make reality according to the attention to life, tension of consciousness, a rationalized multiple dimension, but in accordance with what for my perspective individual is more crucial in shutz, the formation of the first really demonstrated, although not fully developed, form of a sociology of common sense, the immersion of phenomenological sociology in much deeper, broader and above all previous to Hursel and Bergson philosophical questions is obligatory for its renewal and development as much as it was for Shutz to continue and at the same time imagine new alternatives to Weber's sociology, as much or more so is the determined immersion in semiotics without which, according to my studies, the foundation of phenomenology social in the natural attitude and beyond in nature itself there are not the required springs, just as Shutz's social phenomenology has established the first form of a sociology of common sense, it has not been able with the same determination to defend its axes and limits in the present of the vital present given as a synchronic cut here and now of everyday life, remaining susceptible to diachronicist institutionalisms and historicisms from which I stay away.
The consequences under this program of phenomenological sociology on semiotics and the traditions of classical and logical philosophy that I will deal with here are in turn beyond doubt from my book thinking science, nutrition and enrichment is mutual as well as new. resulting.
Grades
1-At this point, semiotics after Peirce absolutized the convention, giving it an overdose of importance. The same echo, in fact, when talking about the mistake of the referent, maintains that semiotics cannot deal with the pregiven object that the sign denotes, that the relationship of the sign with that object, the reference with respect to the referent, must be avoided as not corresponding to semiotics which should deal only with substitution regarding the language-communication relationship understood as sender-message-code-receiver. And the reason for this omission, for this neglect of the ground, is none other than the logical territory that corresponds to the ground, the fact that it and its enigmas have never been the object of focused investigation.
2-It has taken me so long, thirty years, to have my early sense of one side of reality, of a realia prior to the production of effects of reality according to the effects of representation, I have finally found this discovery, thirty years, It was necessary to separate it and focus on it as a logical dimension in itself, surpassing the substantialism from which I have distanced myself for so long in agreement with Bourdieu. A theory of the world, language, reality and the relationship between the two without ground autonomy is a defective theory, hence not only the aporias of substantialism but also those of its opposites, semiotics for example always resulted in an aporia between the concept field understood as a field of communication and as a science or specialty, that is, a field of semiotics, because leaving aside the ground is denying the logical autonomy of the field, the same as Bourdieu, his visionary critique of substantialism led him Despite its virtues, an absolutization of a field of forces that were externalities between themselves disconnected from experience and the ground, field work in sociology, anthropology and ethnography has suffered from the same defect.
3- Shutz's methodological insights regarding Weber in terms of comprehensive sociology remain as questions of methodology of research in sociology intact in my perspective despite having taken them much further and in new directions, I recognize myself as faithful to Shutz in this sense, recognizing its influence.
Referents
Berger Peter L. and Thomas Luckman, The foundations of knowledge in everyday life, pp, 34-63, The social construction of reality, amorrortu editors
Derrida Jacques, the linguistic circle of Geneva, 175-192, margins
Eco umberto, the ground, The universe of meaning, Pp, 62-136, the absent structure, lumen
Eco umberto, the semiotization of the referent, 77-81, The universe of meaning, Pp, 62-136, the absent structure, lumen
Eco umberto, the mistake of the referent, 66-70,
Eco umberto, interpretant, ground, meaning, object
Eco umberto, The ground, 44-46, Pierce, the semiotic foundations of textual cooperation, 40-72
Eco umberto, Denotation in a semiotic perspective, 94-101, The universe of meaning, the absent structure, lumen
Eco Umberto, Connotation in a semiotic perspective, 101-106, The universe of meaning, Pp, 62-136, the absent structure, lumen
Eco umberto, Dynamic object and immediate object, 46-48, Pierce, the semiotic foundations of textual cooperation, 40-72
Hegel, reality, science of logic, axe
Hegel, the foundation, science of logic, hatchet
Hegel, the living individual, science of logic, axe
Hegel, life, science of logic, axe
Natanson Maurice, introduction, Pp 1-33, the problem of social reality. By Alfred shutz, compiler Maurice natanson, amorrortu editors, buenos aires
Sanders Peirce Charles, Division of signs, pp 21-43, The science of semiotics, collection of semiology and epistemology, Nueva Vision editions, Buenos Aires
Sanders Peirce Charles, Icon, index, symbol, pp, 45-62, The science of semiotics, collection of semiology and epistemology, Nueva Vision editions, Buenos Aires
Sini Carlo, Pierce, 13-81, semiotics and philosophy, axe
The preinterpreted character of experience and the world
By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
Our usual notions of interpretation take it as a fact that when we say interpret there is something that is interpreted one by one, the usual relationship of the concept of interpretation with that of point of view is known, we interpret because we have a point of view, but the Interpretation goes much further than this in a wide variety of directions, I am not referring here to distinctions that I myself have made in the past between interpreting as a point of view, interpreting as an update in which I mentioned the examples of the philosophical interpretation of a text. classic of philosophy, which a contemporary musician does about a classical musician, and interpret as a reading in which he discussed different modes of reading.
Rather, in new directions in which I have taken the analysis of hermeneutics and exegesis, the first with respect to the ontology of the life world, in the monologue of the person or in intersubjectivity, the second with respect to textual forms that we read. , I have been arriving at new conclusions about the scope and true dimension of interpretive phenomena.
My objective below, in fact, begins to distance itself even more than it already had in the correlation of the world and the intramundane horizon, from the usual directions that the theory of interpretation has previously acquired.
I propose two things this time. On the one hand, I have come to the conclusion that within the individuated subjectivity, that is, of the solitary individual alone with himself, interpretation plays and plays a much more significant place than that which has been assigned to it in the traditions previously. known about its study, on the other hand, I have come to the conclusion that interpretation plays a much more relevant place than that which has been previously assigned to it, with respect to the very ontological conformation of culture.
What has been said before, both towards the interior of individuated subjectivity and towards culture, does not refer to the interpretive activity that we carry out knowing that we are interpreting, nor am I referring here for the moment to the activity of interpreting as we understand it when we say interpret a book, a work of art or, as has been usual even in myself, for example my book the interpretation of art, or developments around the concept such as those of gadamer in aesthetics and interpretation, or clifford geertz in interpretation of cultures, although as we will see the theory of interpretation that I am going to develop will later have important consequences also returning to that direction, I am not referring to interpreting something or a thing as for the first time, I am rather arguing that independently of our voluntary interpretive activity, the ontology itself that makes up the inferential, deductive, cognitive, reflective processes, even merely retentive, reconstructive or evocative processes of the individuated subjectivity with respect to itself are interpretive, that in them we essentially interpret, conversely. , I am maintaining with respect to culture not something about how we should interpret it or about the will to do so, but rather that culture itself is already in itself before we come to ask ourselves the question, an ontologically interpretive phenomenon which I will call or I will define how, both in one direction and the other, the individuated subjectivity or internal world of the individual, which Derrida defines as the ground of our interiority on the one hand, and culture on the other, the pre-interpreted character of experience and world.
In my essay self and heritage I have discussed and developed a theory on three main ontological levels that define the specificities of the self with respect to anything else in our subjectivity, the self, consciousness, ego, altergo, etc., etc., recalling these levels we distinguish between the primary relationship individuate/socialize, internalize/externalize, shaping the process of differentiation and symbolization of subjectivity with respect to the interaction between the self and the social, the individual and the social, the secondary or diachronic relationship, simultaneous with the first, but unlike that cumulative and not always current, between experience and heritage, defined by the intrinsicness of the extrinsic where experience and heritage go from being things experienced and become one and the same thing with the self, this accumulation itself shaping what I have defined as the specific phenomenology of the self, it is nothing other than culture expressed and collected as it expresses itself.
and reflects in the experience, and plays in itself a relevant place in the activity of memory, finally a third level through which I have discussed the specificities of the type of self-perception that is proper to the self as opposed to mere self-perception and of self-awareness.
Now I propose to analyze, deepen, develop and elaborate on this phenomenon with its three levels from the ontological point of view relative to the place that interpretive activity plays within it, on the other hand, in my essay on ordination in the worlds of life, I have widely developed my theory on the main notions of common sense sociology, social phenomenology or phenomenological sociology in continuity with the sociology developed in this regard by Alfred Shutz, experience, heritage, typifications, relevance.
Now I propose to analyze the scope, dimensions and significance that interpretation plays in the very ontology of that world, it is my objective to demonstrate that independently and perse of the fact that we interpret we live in a pre-interpreted world and that pre-interpreted character of the world is nothing other than culture itself.
From all of the above it follows that we never interpret as for the first time, but rather we interpret pre-interpretations, culture itself is already interpretation both towards the individual and towards society, therefore interpreting texts, situations, interactions, internal states, experiences. lived, things that others tell us, things that we see or simply something in itself is nothing more than interpreting interpretations, in short, we interpret things previously interpreted, and it is the pre-interpretive character of the world, the individual and the culture, the unique that allows us not only to understand ourselves or understand others, but we cannot even arrive at a medium or moderately accurate understanding without first accessing and before interpreting ourselves to the interpretations that in themselves are already the individual and culture.
Why do I say that the activity we carry out in our monologic soliloquy is interpretive? As I said, it is not about the notion of interpretation understood as a point of view. By saying that we interpret, I do not mean that what we tell ourselves about what we have experienced is something so subjective and so speculative that it must be understood as a whim or a simple ideology so weak or fragile that nothing in it guarantees its determining link between ourselves in our subjectivity and what we live, it is not about relativizing what we tell ourselves about what lived, making it arbitrary, imprecise or capricious, it is rather that the activity of thinking about what we experienced reconstructively and telling ourselves things about it is an activity of elucidation, that is, the things experienced must make sense to us and we elucidate them. .
Elucidating is in itself an interpretive activity, we put things in relation in order to induce internal ties, relations between them, inferences, implications, mutual interrelationships, but not merely as something considered out there in the dimension merely experienced as experienced outside of our own. self, but it is precisely the fact that independently of the relations that things have among themselves, how they take shape out there in what is experienced, it is precisely the fact that we have a self, it is precisely the fact that from a certain moment onwards it extrinsic--experienced there--is inevitably going to become intrinsic, becoming one and the same thing with our self through our retentions, our evocations, our memory or remembrance and the revisiting reconstructions of our soliloquy, which at once inetricably welds it together. with our self in the mode of relationships of meaning, the things experienced from the moment they are integrated into the self immediately become relevant due to the way in which they make sense to our self and from that moment on the relationship that we can maintain with them does not It no longer responds to that external nature in which they were extrinsic to each other, but rather they acquire a new intrinsic order which is by nature itself shaped by an elucidative activity.
To elucidate here would be to interpret but not merely as someone who has an opinion or chooses to choose a point of view, but as someone who must have a meaning or a relationship of senses, this process transforms the relationship between the self and what is experienced through the relationship. between experience and memory, in a continuous exploration through which what we tell ourselves about what we experienced becomes ontological with our self, it is a process of course continuous and inexhaustible in no case homogeneous or linear, but gradual, discontinuous and even repeatedly interrupted, it has in itself a sporadic character, it integrates on the one hand aspects of that elu, idation that we receive from mere retention, that is, not everything experienced from the moment it does not maintain the same extrinsic order What was outside in what was experienced is properly retained, but only certain parts, elements, passages, moments, which acquire in the retention itself an evocative nature where memory intervenes.
The elucidative activity, that is, interpretive in this new ontological sense, is not itself retentionist, retention of course precedes elucidation, if we have not retained we cannot elucidate it but at the same time since elucidation is closely related to giving meaning , to make some things relevant and not others, elucidation also participates in retention since it selects routes, fixes or makes certain inferences significant, chooses certain associations and dispenses with others, thus becoming in a superadded form to the retention of confirmation or validation of what is relevant withheld.
On the other hand, the elucidative activity of our soliloquy not only has consequences or is itself what we tell ourselves about what we have experienced, but from the moment it selects, being the one through which things make sense to us, it becomes ontologically determining. in what we subsequently do or stop doing, thus also acquiring relevance not only for the identity of the self but for the pragmatics of successive experiences.
We never know, now externalizing it socially, nor can we foresee, precisely because of what Shutz said, that we do not have access to the ego of the other, the motivations and intentions of their actions, what direction will take what other people will do or not do, well let's talk about known and close people, well let's talk about people we do not know and observe from a certain exteriority in the succession of their actions, but we can be sure and convinced of something, any step that the people we see will take, any course that the acts of our fellow human beings acquire, from the physical direction that their bodies will take in a trajectory or route, to the significant dimension that their actions acquire in terms of meanings, will be closely related and will be the result of what these people have, on the one hand, said to themselves. themselves about what they experienced and have self-elucidated for the other.
The elucidative activity is also interpretive and crucially because its own nature is inferential and from the moment it is inferential, if we are truly Peircian in our logical/deductive parameters, it is in itself a signifying activity, that is, it works continuously with signs. , these signs do not always and in fact most of the time we cannot and should not usually consider them signs in the mere sense of symbols autonomously constituted by an externalist stimulus-response relationship.
In the universe of self-elucidation as this one acquires its interpretative dimension from the phenomenology of our self, the signs do not have the nature of things extrinsic to each other made up of materialities and conactive or phatic morphologies, nor are they units defined by a reactivist relationship, they are not It deals with signs in the even pragmatic sense where a light tells us whether to turn left or continue straight or where a child's bodily expressions tell us what object it imitates or represents, but rather about inferential signs.
Without inferentiality, in fact, the contiguous exteriority, the mutual externality that defines the way in which things outside are related when we only experience them without having then made them intrinsic to our self, would not be possible, the very process of intrinsicating the extrinsic that transforms the experienced in experience and in the same thing with our self would not be possible without inference because precisely the role that self-elucidation plays in the monologic soliloquy is to make them provided with internal ties between them, ties that they did not have with each other outside, ties that result from attributions of meanings according to that self-reflective soliloquy makes them relevant, this is only carried out through inferences.
Inferential signs are similar to what Peirce called indexical signs in the sense that the object to which they refer is not contained in the sign but rather the latter seems to be a trace of that object, it contains something that is an indication of objects that have been outside of their own, however, even in the indications the relationship between the sign and the object maintains a certain dispositional extrinsication typical of the physical character of the connectivity between things or between somethings, in the elucidative activity that makes up the interpretive mode of our soliloquy, signs are on the one hand immaterial, that is, intangible, they are in a way not exactly replicas, but cognitive schemata through which some things become inferential with respect to others, it is important here to emphasize that the sign has been distributed and disseminated. in hermeneusis, that is, the intra-relationships of meaning coming from the intrinsic relationship that the self maintains with what is experienced through elucidation, it causes the signs to be reunited with the senses through associations that only our self knows and selects. , are not topical or conactive entities, fateful in Jacobson's sense, but rather inferential traces closely related to implication and induction.
It is not my objective here to enter into a reflection regarding the connective process internal to memory and associations since it is not about psychology here, but rather to understand that the interpretive nature at the ontological level of the formation of our experience is inherently yes preinterpretative
Now, the interpretative dimension of the experience is such and it acquires its form above all and in the first place because our self-elucidations do not occur every time as for the first time in the one-to-one relationship between what we experience each time and what we are telling ourselves, but it takes shape against the background of an accumulation that has become one with our own self and that is formed by nothing other than our successively carried out previous interpretations, our self in fact is nothing other than that accumulation, that memory or heritage and is made up of the preinterpretations that we have successively made previously.
In this way the self not only goes to the new lived but at the same time goes to the previous preinterpreted with respect to the previous lived, creating a kind of palimpsest of subjectivity where capable and capable of previous preinterpretations always appear under the horizon of the successive elucidations relating that sedimentation of previous elucidations that is our heritage with the successive continuous following elucidations.
The interpretive nature therefore of our experience is by definition preinterpretive and continually works with what is preinterpreted.
However, the semiotic nature in an inferential logical sense that assigns to the characteristics of our experience a pre-interpretive dimension at the ontological level does not seem as decisive in the order of the soliloquy as relevant it becomes - not because of its greater importance outside than inside but due to the greatest recurrence to it--when we put that accumulation, heritage or memory of our self in relation to intersubjective dimensions that involve either social others or merely processes of cognition, coding and interpretation of social experiences and it is this social dimension but also and at the same time cultural because, as I have analyzed in my essay self and heritage, it is precisely that accumulation that, from the perspective of the phenomenology of self, makes up culture, to which I would like to dedicate my greatest effort below, the preinterpretive character of the formation of experience and the world now in the inferential universe of intersubjective and interactive/symbolic processes.
I have already spoken many times both in chapters of previous books and in video conferences that what gives undisputed stability to our surrounding world are the typifications, Shutz was very clear about this and insisted on it, but at the same time everything is not reduced To typifications, typifications are types of typologizing constructions that summarize the main features of the social situation based on the previous experience on the part of the subjects, whether they are situations that involve oral speech, or merely extraverbal interactions in situations of habitation, coexistence or interaction, but the typifications create a rigid outline or prototype given by its very synthesis of what was learned, it was what Shutz defined as the world out of problems until further notice
Beyond the typifications, it is necessary to elaborate and deepen the fact that it is not properly through typifications that the world and experience are preinterpretive in the terms in which it occurs within situations of social interaction, what I mean is that typifications such as pertinences are memories that are resorted to, memories called by the subject around the situation when this subject must speak to refer to them or when it requires patters or schemes of action in the face of those situations.
The typical dwells in the memory not in the interaction itself and its situation, and as such it acts only within the prestructured or predisposed character of the subject's heritage and experience. It is typical that if I feel some steps on the stairs outside my apartment, they are some things and not others and as such I identify the sound of my staircase with previously attributed typifying meanings, but the interpretive activity itself through which the successive interpretations related to the situation and the preinterpretations are recalled and put into relation, is a more process rich and complex than a mere typification
On the one hand we must grasp that the microsituations themselves are traversed, woven, woven, by preinterpretations, it would be something like what in terms of common sense they mean, what makes them a factual situation in itself is already an inclusive preinterpreted universe. to the very ontology of the situation.
Here it is of course about moving beyond Popper and beyond Parson, but also from mere symbolic interactionism or mere ethnomethodology, although of course it is something discernible only from the parameters or on the background of this tradition in which I place myself. and from which I work
It is about understanding that the micro-actions of situationally situated subjects are themselves acts of significance, acts of meaning and interpretive acts put in relation to ongoing interpretations with pre-interpretations, there is neither an act nor a purely abstract action of an actor intended as a social minimum according to parameters of mere behavior, conduct or performance in terms of stimuli and responses or in terms of a mere theatricality of the action, there are rather already pre-given meanings that cross the situation itself and define it in its internal and As such, the horizon of microaction and microinteraction in situation is itself hermeneutic and interpretive.
A situation is nothing more than a relationship between a current interpretation and a preinterpretation, in this way we must grasp how the preinterpreted world goes beyond mere titification to become a hermeneusis.
The accumulations that make up the typifications do not completely exhaust the universe of the situation, it is true that the latter in a given percentage is itself defined by these accumulations but they are not called or are there simply given if we are referring to a dimension that tries to capture at the same time the subjectivity of the situation and the exteriority of its objectivity, something on these two levels belongs in a certain way to the singularity of the situation as it updates the clusters in its own present through calls, calls that since active memory calls something in passive memory, they do not work all the time with all the passive elements of that accumulation, but only with a certain amount of them governed by the relationship between the relevance of the situation and its novelties or specificities. current.
The accumulations in fact, although they offer the parameters that phenomenologically surround the common sense that regulates the interaction, do not themselves belong to the ontology of the situation as if it were something distributed on an exteriority, they actually live in the subjects in each one. and in all of them, and are distributed in a certain way as idealizations of the situation that are not outside of it as externalized but regulate its relevance, it is true and here it would be good to remember the proxemics, that a man sitting in a bar in a park at The open air is not just that literal seated gentleman, the design of the bar presupposes and anticipates the idealized situation of potential seated gentlemen and as such the paths of walking and looking at each other are in a certain way predesigned by the space itself of civil engineering and architecture, as much as the sidewalk defines the pedestrian in front of the walkable street and the built-in houses or the moles, or as much as the park anticipates couples on the baquitos, there is undoubtedly something about the situation expected by common sense design according to an ideality accumulated that has become an externalized design of an expected typicality, exactly the same that later participates in the definition of the situation and its potential forms in action when acquiring current place
but the concrete situation already in the present act of that man today who is now sitting there at the bar when he is in front of a group of children who unexpectedly play with the roots of the nearby trees to swing always acquires its own interpretative actuality, as much as in the monologic soliloquy What we tell ourselves about what we have experienced can never but presuppose something unique and unrepeatable in what we experience that day or week that is reconstructed, remembered or meditated on.
and the way this works is none other than the one I am explaining here, the situation itself, woven in what defines it by dormant or passive accumulations but activatable around it, are in reality called by the subject around the variations and updates and therefore they are never presented as such since they are like ideal type concepts but are called according to aspects and according to interpretations put in relation to those preinterpreted universes.
The concepts of hermeneusis on the one hand, woven or stitched meanings, and semiosis, are fundamental here, the sociology of common sense as phenomenological sociology cannot thus be fully developed not only as a hermeneutics in the sense that Shutzs attributed to it, it is required assigning greater preponderance not only to the motivated, intentional and oriented nature of a why and why in its subjective dimension, but also understanding that this subjective dimension is itself interpretive at an ontological level and is crossed from side to side by senses and meanings. that make it relevant in terms of hermeneusis and semiosis
It is important here of course to assign greater importance to the ground than that which has usually been attributed to it in semiotics, just as it is important to understand that a phenomenological sociology cannot be developed to its full dimension and in all its possibilities without the exhaustive incorporation of a program semiotic and vice versa
Phenomenological sociology is called upon and in a certain way forced to be a semiotic sociology not only because it no longer or outside of the reductive pragmatics of the semiotic trilogy, sender, message, receiver is not what works here, but because the codes and The codifications function in the situational flow of social action and social interactions in the world preinterpreted in another way that must be understood, analyzed and theorized, let us also call it the world of life and more pertinently let us call it with my concept intramundane horizon or intramunity of the world. , to capture how coding issues are presented to the situation interpretively in the manner of a relationship between ongoing interpretations and preinterpretations.
Undoubtedly, the world of everyday life that we obtain within the frame or logical square, experience, heritage, relevance, significance, typifications, is still a world that is too passive for the subject, they are notions that do not contemplate how the situation is itself constrained by interpretations that They are themselves independent of the specific way in which these concepts are to be considered as recalled by the subject in the case in question.
grades
Alfred Shutz obsessively wondered how we can have access to the self of the other or others if we are not within their consciousness. He asked this question because he was convinced, inspired by Hurssel's motivational and intentional phenomenology, that the actions of the another are internally informed by what he calls the why and the why, it was also asked from the perspective of the one who asks the question, the sociologist, the sociology itself that we want to understand, inspired and influenced by the distinctions of Max Weber between subjective observation and objective observation in order to discern for oneself that social action cannot be understood without these two levels, that is, without precise riddles regarding the meanings and senses that inform the action of the other, as well as without a sense of in what way our observation of it can be more or less subjective or objective, from this perspective given the basic incommensurability that closes our access to the ego of the other and the spatial irreducibilities that define the objective conditions of the interaction between bodies, shutz advance that sociology should be at the same time
Bibliography
Eco Humberto, The Absent Structure, lumen
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Overordination in the worlds of life, The Intramundane Horizon
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Between the Acervo and the backgrounds, Self and Acervo
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The World Correlate, Gyan books, india, new delhi
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Thinking Science, Gyan books, india, new delhi
Shutz Alfred, the formulation of our problem: the methodological concepts of Max Weber, PP, 33-74,
Shutz Alfred, Phenomenology of the social world: introduction to comprehensive sociology, introduction George Walsh, paidos publishing house, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Shutz Alfred, the meaningful construction of the social world, introduction to comprehensive sociology, prologue by Joan Carles Melish, ilse shutz, Paidós, basic, 1993
Shutz Alfred, Phenomenology of the social world: introduction to comprehensive sociology, introduction George Walsh, paidos publishing house, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Shutz, common sense and the scientific interpretation of human action, the problem of social reality
Dialectic and origins
By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
I understand by dialectics, and this in itself presupposes an epistemological position, the relationship of mutual ontological implication between two concepts that derives through their relationships of mutual inclusion in logical developments through which inference, deduction and interpretation are possible. learning.
Dialectical relationships, in fact, are generally dyadic, that is, they are resolved and generated through the relationship between two concepts, although sometimes they can be triadic, at the same time, that relationship of ontological mutuality between two concepts, which explains the relationship of ontological origin between one and the other, and which has consequences for the identity of one in its respect to the identity of the other, assuming mutual denial sometimes even elimination and death, at the same time as mutual conformation, presupposes resulting syntheses, thus For example, there would be no identity without difference and conversely difference without identity, there is difference because there are identities and since each one in itself is different from the other, and conversely, there is identity because there is difference, but this dyadic logical pair whose mutual original deduction is dialectical, they form a triadic third, since it is from their mutual relationship that diversity arises
Now, dialectics is not properly ontology since it does not refer to the passive moment of dissolution in the being itself of one of the concepts at stake, but rather to the logical relationship that abstracts their mutual relations, if it works, without However, with ontological elements and although it shares with epistemology in being a form of logic with all its figures, implication, inference, derivation, deduction, induction, etc., it is not exactly like that a single cut between subject and object that brings in case it presupposes a theory about the conditions of possibility of knowledge.
We well know that trends or schools in philosophical and scientific knowledge usually arise, at least precisely since modern times, from relatively stable cuts that are given as accepted and generally undisputed presuppositions about how a certain way of cutting and presupposing the Relations between subject and object contract positions on knowledge.
In this way, epistemology or science of knowledge supposes the episteme, the latter understood in this way - Derrida reminds us that this is a concept initially of Bachelard -, is nothing other than the delimitation of that cut, although distinguishing between epistemology and episteme also requires distinguishing knowledge understood merely as an abstract and intellectual entelechy--thought--from knowledge in that--that cut that the episteme itself defines and enacts--that links it to a world, to an idea of a world. , to a reality or to what some call a praxis or a praxiological dimension that links that knowledge to a certain idea of the world.
Dialectology thus does not belong to either epistemology or episteme, it neither defines how the relationships between subject and object must occur so that a mode of knowledge becomes possible and stable, nor does it prefigure or presuppose an idea of the world, it rather It must either work with the logical presuppositions that derive from the question about ontic identity, about being in itself or the ontology of concepts. Once we ask ourselves about this ontology, what is the concept? For example, what is the being?, what is identity?, what is difference?, all of them ontological questions about being itself, dialectic arises or begins the dawn of its logical detours, it results from the relationship of mutually implicated concepts, it is that is, what engenders
The logical principle of dialectics is the irreducibility of the sameness or identity of a concept considered strictly from itself to itself as something in itself still undifferentiated or considered in its sameness or identity, in its being in itself for itself still. without otherness or alterity, even without extrisection, when we notice that the ontology of a concept cannot be deduced or inferred from its own terms alone - samemic or identical - since there are not in that undifferentiated sameness all the elements that explain its ontology, once we notice that the identity of a concept requires the recurrence of other neighboring concepts with which it not only has a relationship but to a large extent its own ontology depends on its relations with them, they arise and are they generate properly dialectical logical problems.
In this way, understanding that dialectics is in close relationship with ontological questions although it itself arises from the impossibility of those of finding in the dark, empty, self-absorbed and solitary background of isolated and undifferentiated concepts the answer to what they are, their The same logical reason for being is then referred to its simultaneous negation, resulting in the fact that it is from their mutual implication that the answers to the questions begin to emerge.
The notion of origin and the very idea of origin, shares with dialectics the same dilemmas of the impossibility of the solipsism of the question about the ontological being in itself of concepts.
When we ask about the origin, either about the origin or origins in general, or about the origin of something specific, we think largely about its ontology, specifically about what it is in itself or in its undifferentiated sameness, the question of origin, in fact, shares with the ontological question, the investigation for what it is in itself, more or in addition to its cause, or its derivation.
But given that in the same way that ontological questions there is no answer to the ontology of concepts considered in their undifferentiated solipsistic sameness without reference to neighboring concepts, there is no answer to the question about the origin either, in this way the question about the origin is referred to dialectical solutions, it refers to dialectical thinking, in short, it is precisely that putting into dialectical relationship of the concepts involved that arise from within each other, that is, they originate. Just as there is no answer to the ontological question about the being in itself of one or another concept that can be obtained from the terms that are put on the table in the concept in question, neither do we have one for the origin other than through relations. dyadic and or triadic between neighboring concepts that dialectically originate from each other, the same thing happens with the origin as with the concepts when we ask about their being in themselves, we do not have the answer about their identity from their dark and solitary background other than to through the relationship of its identity with other neighboring concepts, mutually involved
Even, to be more precise, to a large extent the logical problems of a dialectical nature that arise from this relationship of dissimilar concepts themselves explain not only that this and that concept are in a relationship, but above all, that they originate mutually, that The identity of one cannot be deduced without the identity of the other and the negation that the other means, precisely at that point, we understand that we are dealing with dialectical relations of relations of mutual origin, thus, as I said before, the difference originates the identity and conversely, identity gives rise to difference, while the relationship between the two gives rise to diversity.
Now, to think that there is difference without identity is antinomian, it is not possible to find in the dark and solitary depth of difference considered by itself without other terms in its surroundings than those it establishes, the answer to the question about what it is in reality. itself, the latter only begins to be understood when we resort to its opposite, identity, but not because of a mere empty logical relationship between terms considered as external and arbitrarily related by a someone or a thought, but because the one cannot be deduced except in its relationship with the other and in its relationship with the other it originates, thus, for example, what is human can only be obtained from its relationship with its opposites, the non-human, culture, can only be deduced from its relationship with what is not. culture, the language of its relationship with that which is not language, which gives rise to culture, we will never obtain from it itself, considered in its ontology, the answer to this question, since the very concept of culture requires the relationship with what is not culture in this case, nature on the one hand, and language, on the other.
About the properly conceptual development of the implications of this statement you can read my books and essays in which many of these problems are treated, but what I am interested in focusing on here is the very clarification that dialectics is the logical path for research. of the origin or origins and that there is a direct and central relationship between dialectics and origins.
I wanted to discuss here, focus and analyze a relationship that I have found in my research in recent years between dialectics and origins, establishing a certain ontological and epistemological distinction between the concepts of genesis and origin, the problem of genesis, at least as I I have discussed it in other books and essays, it is usually phenomenological in itself, that is, it is discerned and discussed from a phenomenology that is not always or requires to be properly dialectical.
There is, without a doubt, as Jacques Derrida has noted in his studies on Hurssel, an undoubted relationship between genesis and structure, the structure being itself timeless, places us on the timeless synchronic axis from which any question related to genesis is Discernible, however, the question of genesis is not exactly the question of the origin or more clearly of the origins, a genesis, to refer to my own research and studies, when I speak for example of the phenomenological genesis of the sign or when I refer to to the genesis of sense and meanings in the analysis of the passage from thought, to being to writing, is generally only comprehensible captured through phenomenology as a timeless relationship between some type of structure and some type of generativity, productivity or emergence of something, is generally related to something appearing and becoming explicit, being presented, becoming evident, becoming tangible or being diluted, disseminated, disappearing or dispersing behind the forms of presence or of the visible,
Genesis, furthermore, highlights something that arises on a background that has a discrete form or measurable nature, that is, cut out, describable, there is a genesis of something or something that is generally generated, in its difference the question of origin, as we have seen, and as I said I prefer to speak of it in plural, the question of origins can hardly be grasped in all its complexity and dimension from mere cognitive and epistemological principles that organize the phenomenological analytical procedure. Discuss what phenomenology is, something that In recent years I have responded and explained several times both in the face of questions, as well as in interviews and dialogues, it is a topic in itself, and in the generality of my thinking, methodology and research, as I have said, I am mainly a phenomenologist, not properly a dialectologist, such as Adorno, for example, but the question of origins, and of course not only it, requires, in terms of logic, understandings that can only be achieved through a dialectical procedure.
Only dialectics captures and dissects the complex logical problems that are posed to, in and with the question of origins, this question of origins is in itself a dialectical question.
I understand an origin not properly as the engendering or emergence of something or a thing, nor in causalist terms relating to what causes what and what its effects are, but rather in the sense of what causes what and how it causes it, specifically. and in a focused way, I distance myself and distance myself here from any evolutionary or geneticist consideration of the origin, I am not referring diachronically to the origin of a species, a culture, an ethnic group or a society, nor to the origin as when we say, for example, the origins of man or the origin of life, my perspective is rather timeless and synchronic and focuses on paradoxes and antinomies such as in what ways the object and the sign are originally related?, how the object originates the sign?, how the does the sign originate the object? In what ways can the relationships between object and sign correspond to the same origin, to a common source, in what way and how do object and sign originate mutually? I also refer to origin or origins in the sense of how meanings are originated by the relations between inferences and heritages?, or to questions related to whether the part and the whole are originally related, in what way do they originate mutually?, also to how multiple origination is possible?, or to questions such as in what way can we explain that a thing that originates another thing is in turn originated by the latter?, how being originates thought?, how thought originates being?, for example, how writing originates memory, but how in turn is it memory that originates writing, or to go more abstractly, in what ways is identity caused by difference? and the difference due to identity?, the question is even in the terms in which I am formulating it here much more complex, on the one hand it is about terms that in themselves already suppose them, in the very configuration of the questions an elaboration well assuming a relationship between dialectics and origins, that is, placing the question of origin or origins in the very center of dialectized logical pairs is already my original elaboration, let us ask, for example, how and in what ways the senses participate in the origination of our inner world?, or even beyond subjectivity, how and in what ways does the origination of languages originate relationships between nature and culture?, how and in what ways does language originate the subject and conversely in which In what ways does the subject originate language? How and in what ways does language originate culture and, conversely, culture originates languages?
I have come to the conclusion that the place that dialectics plays within the whole of logic refers to the question of origin, that there is a close and inextricable relationship between dialectical logic and origins, the first does nothing other than externalize the logic of origination and at the same time the paradoxes and antinomies of origins are themselves dialectical.
All this leads us to a simultaneously philosophical, semiotic and anthropological understanding of the relationship between dialectics and origins.
Now I would like to refer to a topic not related in any way to what I have discussed before, but which I will endeavor to relate later, I am referring to a certain criticism of anthropolocentrism precisely related to the question of origin, which we can deduce from what for My can be considered the best result of French thought at the end of the century, what is salvageable or respectable in that perse at my distance from nihilism in it, specifically the figures of Derrida and Deleuze are my points of attention here.
Just as I consider that both, like in general other French people at the end of the century, went too far in nihilism, in the same way, I maintain that in terms of moving the parameters required to resituate the questions once considered anthropocentric, they are important.
On the one hand, there is in French thought at the end of the century a renunciation of man or the idea of man that is unsustainable and non-negotiable in my terms, but on the other hand, to the same extent, the anti-anthropocentrism derived from it, advanced significant considerations for a rethinking. of philosophical anthropology that, returning to classical philosophy, largely restores the ways in which, from the very beginnings of anthropology, the ways in which we men of science should deal with the origin of human society, culture and civilizations were imagined.
The criticism to which I refer here deals primarily with the need to return philosophical anthropology to logic in the tradition of classical philosophy, to abandon once and for all the tradition of anthropology that sought to understand man through his called primitive stages as if in those we were to find the answer to the ultimate and primordial question about the origins of man, culture and civilization.
A way or detour to explain this matter more thoroughly may be the discussion and logical analysis of the concept of difference that I have referred to before, in another book I have discussed the relationship between difference and presence, that is, the different concepts. The difference we are talking about, according to them, is a supposed relationship with presence, but here we are dealing with pure difference, with the differential principle itself that will lead us through a complex but necessary detour to the dialectical questions about the origin that I am referring to. referring. If we analyze the theory of the sign especially when we work from a Sausurean parameter, we will notice that the distinction between signified and signifier is none other than on a logical level the distinction between form and content, the first is the content, the second the form, now Well, when we abstract the concept of the signifier and realize that it is spurious morphe, pure matter, pure form, we wonder what place the signifier plays as a side or face of the sign in the latter and why it should be considered as its form.
The answer to this question leads to the logical path that I want to set out.
The signifier is necessary to the sign because without it the signs could not be distinguished from each other, each one would not have a form that distinguishes the presence between one sign and another, we have this same logical problem in the place that appearance plays with respect to presence. Without appearance, we would have no distinction of presence, however, which are in themselves the appearance or the signifier, logically speaking, they are nothing other than zero, the differential value is nothing other than the value that allows us to deduce from a figure whose logical meaning lies in distinguishing one thing from the other by difference but the in itself is null, pure form, pure matter, the difference, let's say it this way, has no ontos, it is at the base of the negative of a statement, it is its otherness or its nothingness, then in a certain way in the logical dyads the place of the dialectical opposite, that is, of the one with which the identity affirmative about which we ask about its identity and its ontology is in relation to the negative that denies it and cancels it
Hegel's examples of which he has used me on other occasions are illustrative, the above with respect to the below, we ask what is the above and we respond in a differential or negative way with its opposite saying the above is what is not below and vice versa, if we remove the below, the above loses its identity that receives it from the difference
The logical question here then is this, should we assume that the difference plays some original place?, in the question of origin or origins.
My answer to this question is no, and yet it is not entirely unrelated.
It becomes obvious that from a highly contrasted synthetic and simplifying perspective the answer to this question could be yes, while undoubtedly if we say that the origin is related to dialectic, that is, the complementary pairs engender each other, each one receives its identity. of the other and as such originate in that relationship, the difference that is required to distinguish or distribute the presence or the ontology or the being in itself of what is with respect to what is not would itself be original or engendering, however , this would imply maintaining that the origin is on the one hand negative or on the other empty, that is, that it would not have its own ontology, and we consider that this is logically defective, we could certainly not deny difference a certain participation in the origin but It would not itself be the starting point, it would not be in any case the source but rather the comparative value, the triadic of dyadic logic, we could say in this sense that the difference does not belong to the negative value as when we say, for example, B does not is A no more precisely B is not A, it would not be B in any case due to the fact of assigning a negative value with respect to A that which would contain the difference in itself, B in any case would be an identity whose negativity it receives from its other , and whose differentiality is presented as a moment of the question but not as its ontological condition, to affirm that A would not have an ontological condition when we know that in the same way we can say A is not B or A is not B would be to maintain that the minimal units , discrete entities, monads, concepts or nouns would not themselves consist of anything and everything would be nothing or zero,
We know that if these nouns are, for example, reality and the phenomenon, we cannot deny consistency and ontology to reality and the phenomenon.
Let us add that even where we ask ourselves the question about what reality is or how it consists of something?, the answer always remains suspended in indeterminacy, not being able to answer about the identity of a term without resorting to its opposite, Its opposite, its other or its complementary, does not mean that this noun lacks ontos, reality, for example, we know that it consists physically as well as representationally for the purposes of the senses and in the same way it happens with any concepts with which we fill A or B.
When I maintain that the relationship between dialectics and origins is one of mutual implication and mutual inclusion, that both come from one another and are related, I say precisely that the place of origin, origins or origination in general is neither It is not A nor in B but rather in the logical dialectical movement itself that requires an oscillating suspension between the two terms, it would be like staying between coming and going, always going and always coming, that is, in movement, a logical movement that knows that The origination of each term will be generated by its opposite and conversely, the sign generates the object in whose place it is. If we do not have a sign, we do not have the object of the sign but at the same time the object generates the sign not only because the sign is its sign. --sign of that object--and requires --the object--to be its sign, but because even where we disseminate the concept of sign by distributing it in the everyday world we see how things that we usually understand as objects can become signs like that as objects that in themselves are signs can become objects or mere signs become objects, not only in the mode of metalanguages when a sign is a sign of another sign but in the mode of exchange of identity between the object and the sign, one engenders and originates the other
However, they are not literally one or the other, sign or object, that on which the source or ontological identity falls, but rather the latter falls on the dialectic itself, it is in it and from it that the dimension of the origin takes shape.
Bibliography
Deleuze, Gilles, the Fold, Leibniz and the Barroque, the university of Minnesota press
Deleuze, Gilles, the fold, Leibniz and the baroque, Paidós studio
Derrida Jacques, Form and Wishes to Said, Note on the phenomenology of language, margins of philosophy, the university of Chicago press
Derrida, Jacques, Form and Meaning, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language, Margins of Philosophy, Cathedra, 1989 Derrida Jacques, Genesis and Structure: Of Phenomenology, Anthropos
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Dialective of evocation, pp, Thinking Science: new Phenomenological avenues between philosophy and sociology, Gyan Books
Derrida Jacques, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language, Pp, 195-212, margins of philosophy, chair
Derrida Jacques, The linguistic circle of Geneva, margins of philosophy, professor
Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Science of Logic London: Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929
Hegel, Science of Logic, Logic of Being, Logic of Essence, Logic of the Concept, Axete
Acervos and codification
By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
The question that is raised here is how we resort to a cultural heritage of knowledge to decode signifying forms inferentially that cannot be recognized entirely as signs encoded by a communicative intentionality of an enunciative order.
The matter understood in this way does not refer, unlike other analyzes that I have made, to the qualities or qualisigns that Peirce, from a logical-philosophical point of view, understood as rhemas, that is, I am not referring to forms that are not properly signs in the sense in which we can speak of semi signs or qualisigns when looking towards the sensory world relative to how nature or reality is presented to us and we process, we try to distinguish the quality of a thing or something and with respect to it the representation that we make. , its perception, its sign or its concept, rather, it is about finding out and paying attention to deductive, inferential and interpretive forms that we could not always call intersubjective because the subject or subjects who utter or indexicalize them have not done so. with communicative intentionality, an area that encompasses, from the point of view of the world of everyday life or intramundane horizon, phenomena that continually appear to us and with which we encounter, through them we make inferences that allow us to interpret our peers and infer the sense or the meaning of their experiences without these senses or meanings having been oriented towards oneself or towards us, without even having been oriented to anyone.
Obviously we are dealing here above all with signs, objects that people leave, placements, distributions, and even non-verbal forms of inference by means of which we can reconstruct, on the other hand, from the point of view of mere consciousness or rather Of what Derrida calls the ground of our interiority, some consist of forms of externalized appearance before ourselves, such as, for example, in the gaze externalized in photographs or in thoughts, through which inferential and meaningful relationships occur in which we interpret or infer and reconstruct.
Notably I am referring to what I myself have called the phenomenological genesis of the sign, this is organized in both directions, the world or universe of extraverbal symbolic interactions including intercorporeal and intergestural communications, the universe of objects, or symbolic interactions. situational, the world of subjectivity, of the appearance of ourselves before ourselves in consciousness and or in its visual, sound, or tactile forms.
This universe that I am referring to, far from those first impressions of the sensible world or palpable sensoriality, and therefore from mere qualities, refers to semiological universes in which the sign cannot be distinguished in its full autonomy but in different directions. different from those in which it is indistinguishable or emerges in proximity to the quality, nor from those relativizations of the sign that are concerned with distinguishing them according to the greater or lesser level of structural organization and separation between the sign and the object that It characterizes in itself the world of symbols or the symbolic.
Distinguishing this area that we could identify in all its generality as the one in which the criticism of signocentrism begins at a philosophical and logical level, I maintain in my meanings the idea of sign there due to the fact that, according to my conclusions, in the same way that Text is everything that we read, that is, we acquire a textual meaning and we read textually where we read per se whether or not we can speak in a highly differentiated textual form, in the same way, we have signs where we make inferences, even when the inferential vehicle cannot be defined as a highly differentiated or autonomous form, at the level of pertian firstness, it is an area that I have arrived at in my theorizations of the ground, in a sense, and of the relationship between the ground and semiosis in In another sense, I have come to the conclusion that there, in that territory, nothing else guarantees codification, elucidation, inference, deduction and interpretation than the heritage.
My conclusion without a doubt, I know, is paradoxical, when we think about the heritage, we usually imagine a culturally shaped and highly interwoven world of signs and coded messages, in the well-established modern theory, in fact, of semiotics, we have generally imagined the heritage as a solid and well-structured reservoir that allows the decoding of intentional messages from a sender to a receiver, that is, we imagine a culture as a fully constituted communication system, however, what I come to point out here is that the heritage is much richer and more complex than these conceptions have led us to suppose.
Indeed, in the existing tradition, timidly attended to if not neglected, which both in humanistic sciences and in social sciences and communication, have dealt with the heritage, no previous use or meaning of this concept is closer to mine, right to the territory which I propose to differentiate from that discussed by Alfred Shutz when he spoke of stocks of knowledge at hand. In general terms we could say that what is relevant about this meaning of shutz is that it places the place of the heritage as something available at the moment when common sense has to explain things that may merely belong to the scope of what happens, of what happens. and what he called the typifications to which the man of common sense resorts to explain things.
Now, the notion of stocks of knowledge at hand is still limited and limited to phenomena that do not always and most of the time do not cover all the problems that are at the center of my attention.
It is necessary to take the theory of the heritage further due to the crucial relevance that it plays in the inferential, deductive, and decoding processes where also, and in addition to intentionally codified languages, we speak of worlds in which there is no communicative intentionality. .
This distancing from intentionality does not mean, however, that I downplay the importance of Hursel's phenomenology of intentionality and Derrida's studies on the matter. It is not to ignore the intention but to understand that the heritage is broader than that.
That we resort to the heritage to encode messages and decode them when these messages are intentional enunciative forms expressed in verbal or extraverbal language is clear and indisputable, the sender and the receiver in this case must be part of an alphabetic or extraverbal culture shared by both, form part of the same culture or the same reservoir of knowledge, but what happens when what is elucidated by the interpreter or the mere inferential decoder is not in front of a message that has been encoded with communicative intentionality or even more so, when we do not speak properly of messages but of situations, facts, experiences, objects, distributions or mere elements ordered according to principles that do not respond to a communicative coding but around which inferences, deductions and assertive riddles can be made?
Undoubtedly, the theory of the semiologically based heritage should not and cannot exclude the aforementioned cases; such forms governed by communicative intentionality are also forms of the heritage or require it, but nevertheless, in this book we have taken charge, through the theoretical research on the specificities of the ground, on the one hand, and through the analysis of how interpretation is ontologically part of the very hermeneutic conformation of the experience, both in the soliloquy and in intersubjective communications and in the understanding of situations and interactions. , of this area that corresponds to the ground and infinite semiosis.
Finally, we have also discussed the understanding of the logical relationship between dialectics and origination of forms that in the end we can recognize as possessing codes, codifications and decodings in which we do not always and most of the time do not speak of a message or statements. ordered with intentionality or propositionality.
On the one hand, situated on the horizon of the life world or intramundane horizon, we have seen how in the transition from first-order communications or natural firstities where the ground is in its pure condition, to the second, second, secondities, and to the third, thirdness, The ground participates in interpretive elucidation in ways unique to natural, cultural and metacultural semiosis.
At the same time we have seen examples where object and sign dialectically respond to the same source of mutual origination where we cannot yet speak of sign and object in terms of relations of mere replacement or substitution, we have given examples where inference shows us the semiological organization of the everyday as well as the thought.
We have seen in summary that in all these ways the heritage plays a determining place in codification.
But what is the heritage? There is no doubt that if it plays such a relevant role, we are led and committed to deepen its theorization and study.
In what ways can we simultaneously capture the specificity, the territories and the ways of working or making the heritage available, unlike equally cumulative concepts such as memory and experience? What differentiates the collection and what does its specificity offer with respect to these two notions, memory and experience?
On the one hand, what differentiates the heritage from memory and experience is not necessarily something that separates it from them.
In fact, we can say that our memory is in a certain way our heritage, in the same way we can maintain it with respect to experience.
Despite this, our tendency is to think that although our memory is an accumulation, the latter includes processes and dimensions that escape it, such as memory, memory also maintains relationships with processes that do not always come to form an active accumulation but before very passive like all those things that are not collected by memory but only when a high level of singularity revokes them, in the same way when talking about memory our emphasis is on retention, on what is retained. Like sound versus silence, memory is defined in contrast to forgetting.
Likewise, experience involves experimental dimensions related to contingencies of occurrence or present and current event or remembered in its exteriority for the subject, the same could be sustained about memory although the latter seems to fall entirely on the internal side of the subject and not so. on the external side of the physical contingencies that encounter or disencounter bodies in the world, while experience shares both the internal world and the external world.
Well, having made these distinctions, we perceive that the first one, memory, refers to a world that the subject does not necessarily share with other subjects; universal or concrete equivalent subjects may have experienced the same or similar things while some remember them and others forget them. , or they may not have shared them or their memories may not be compatible in reference to what is retained or accumulated but corroborable one by one, as a singular experience, or as an experience of several or many, memory thus refers to an accumulation that It does not link one with another in a way that involves their knowledge but rather the passive reception of an accumulation.
Although we could say that where something is memorized it is known, a book, for example, the concept of memory does not specify the way in which it is integrated into a mode of knowledge.
The relationship between the heritage and the learned knowledge seems in this sense to be one of its peculiarities, but nevertheless something similar could be held about experience, the latter being also a form of knowledge.
As I said before, what makes the heritage specific to memory and experience does not necessarily dissociate it from them, but there is undoubtedly a set of things that make the heritage specific.
The objective and purpose of this chapter is to delve into this by maintaining that the specificities of the heritage in the experience of the solitary subject as well as in intersubjective relations and situational symbolic interactions is its inclusive and decisive relationship with the coding processes, semiologically speaking.
As a synthesis or summary in this chapter I propose, on the one hand, to at the same time extend, deepen and develop, but also propose edges, aspects, dimensions, in a certain way inductively suggested and assumed but not completely explicit, of different possibilities and scope to which they point in their own theoretical horizons, several previous essays and incursions of mine regarding the collection, I am referring, on the one hand, to the scope and horizons of my return from the theory of the sign to logic in a philosophical sense and to the examination Of the consequences of this for the theory of the acquis, in one sense we have the world of everyday life, on the other hand, with its levels involved in what I have called the enigmas of the ground, that is, semiosis and hermeneusis as these acquire forms differentiated between the natural, cultural and metacultural planes from the ground to the interpretant, it is required to delve into the intricate place that the heritage occupies in the decoding processes, finally in my analysis of the phenomenological genesis of the sign in relation to my criticisms on the Derridarian perspective on the formation of the ground of our interiority or modalities of a possible or considerable Hegelian theory of the sign around the phenomenology of consciousness and the problem of presence.
In another sense and direction, less related to my studies and theories of the enigmas of the ground as modalities of what I call the semiological organization of the life world, everyday life and the intramundane horizon, and more to what I call the preinterpreted character of the experience and the world, that is, with respect to the very interpretative or preinterpretative configuration of the universe of the monological soliloquy as well as in the intersubjectivity and in the very definition of what are a symbolic interaction and a situation in terms of interacting social actors ideal types or intramundane, at both levels, which I will call first and second, each understood in its three levels, we will also see how the heritage enters and participates in its intricate relationship with decoding.
In a summarized box we would have like this
Level 1
The enigmas of the ground (return to the theory of the sign to philosophical logic)
a) Horizonte intramundano/ground
b) Semiosis and hermeneusis/nature, culture, metaculture
c) Phenomenological Genesis of the sign/inner world, consciousness, presence
Level two
Preinterpreted character of experience and the world
a)- the preinterpretative ontology of the soliloquio monologico
b)- preinterpretive ontology from intersubjectivity
c)- preinterpretive ontology of what defines a situation or symbolic interaction of social actors
In summary, what follows is about deepening, developing and elaborating, making it explicit, the theory of the heritage that is presupposed in my theorization of these three levels as well as at the same time proposing and examining what their relationships are under such conditions with the process of coding and with coding in general in culture.
As is notable, these developments require the articulation of the study of the heritage with semiotic theory in a way not previously articulated either from Shutz's social phenomenology, first in situating the relevance of the heritage in its relationship with typification, or from semiotics, where we have usually represented the collection as a synonym for parameters of a message receiver.
On the other hand, however, simultaneously, according to these semantic meanings constrictive to the theory of culture, we must distinguish these meanings of heritage with respect to others that assign to this notion a meaning relative to "sets of values or cultural goods accumulated by tradition or inheritance” or “property that belongs in common to several people, be they partners, co-heirs, creditors, etc.”
This vision of the heritage as something depersonalized or not relative to the order of experience is excluded from our meanings, although as we will see the compatibility of heritages in the process of communication, situational symbolic interactions and semiological decoding that concerns us does not exclude recognition, as much as We can also speak of a collective memory given, for example, in libraries, bookstores or collections with respect to which no internal ligature threads or links the subjects together from within, a certain objectivity to the collection, we do not see the collection here as an accumulation externalized from an enveloping objectivity, rather as an available reservoir that participates in decoding and makes it possible in communication processes, therefore as a more subjective than objective concept, although we recognize that, situated down to empirical and concrete forms of understanding and communication , the heritage establishes a certain objectivity with respect to the common background that it communicates to social actors while occupying the spaces that go from the conditions of possibility of dialogue to the conditions of possibility of communication or non-communication, the latter case given when the collections are not compatible.
At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish, however, in the opposite direction, that we are not referring to mental processes when we talk about heritage, therefore, undoubtedly, heritage is a notion that refers to objective accumulations of experiences in the subject even when These accumulations occur and become acquis and nothing else in the subjective sense, that is, as codes that the subject has internally.
It is clear then that we are not situated in a perspective of psychology of the mind or psychology of cognitive and much less neuronal processes, but rather in a perspective of cultural theory that validates and recognizes the concept of subjectivity.
The relationships of cognitive linguistics and cognitive semiotics that are of interest to us here exclude neurons, the brain, and mentalized operations, although we are interested in distinctions between semantic and episodic memory for which they are concerned with an understanding of the subjects involved. in processual dynamics in which the process of reading and decoding, understanding and cognition must remain between spatially temporally situated dimensions and deterritorialized conceptual dimensions or foreign to contextual principles. The specificity of cognition, from my perspective, in those aspects that are of interest to me, refers to the fact that the knowledge process takes shape in situated dynamics of learning or spatially temporalized coordination.
The latter, we know, requires of us crucial epistemological distinctions between what we understand by epistemology and what we understand by cognition, between knowledge and cognition.
What interests us about the cognitive process and what not in regards to its specificities?
We are interested in the specificity of the cognitive process that it reports for the analysis of empirical cases in which certain materials obtained from that empiricality have to be considered in a theory.
While epistemology or science of knowledge and philosophy of science, places us on a plane that refers to the conditions of knowledge between subject and object, which leads us to the pure territory of concept where the world of palpable sensoriality is replaced by an object that names that something or thing for a subject in a concept, cognition underlines a process by which the parameters of knowledge are located in a certain spatiotemporality for experience or lacking that spatiotemporality, but unlike physicalist concepts of experience that make the flow of experiences contingent on what is objectively externalized, our emphasis and focus is rather on how these temporal spaces or their absence are reflected in the type of learning and knowledge that is empirically discussed.
A wealth of knowledge at hand, this notion of shutz thus continues to yield its foundations and reasons for being. We will therefore go to certain elements of cognition and language, cognition and semiotics, but without assuming all the parameters of these disciplines. Rather, everything we will resort to will be cut down and called from a theory of semiological and textual culture, sociological in a phenomenological and cultural anthropological sense that establishes its own parameters far from the basis of certain disciplines in neurophysiology that we exclude because we consider them outside the domain. and disciplinary and interdisciplinary specificity of cultural theory as we understand it.
The collection is a singular and singularized accumulation that disposes the subject through the knowledge that this accumulation means to make compatible everything that he experiences and is presented to him, relating it to what was previously learned that this collection accumulates, those things that are presented to the subject can be merely things that happen in front of you, a neighbor who passes by going up the stairs or the elevator of your building and speaks to you or interacts with a dog or another neighbor, a situation that you encounter when leaving your building, such as someone sitting on his motorcycle half lying down as if waiting for something, or two children playing on a dirt bed at the exit of the building, when encountering these situations the solitary individual resorts to his reserve first to make them compatible with his previous accumulation learned about neighbors who climb stairs or elevators at certain times of the day in which certain things tend to happen and certain things do not, about possible people waiting on a motorcycle or about children who are playing, the individual first makes it compatible with his accumulated knowledge of similar situations and puts in relation to what is available in the accumulated collection with the new developments that the situation implies, for example, according to his collection, a neighbor who takes the elevator at seven in the morning if he brings bags from the market, they must not have been bought that day. Because at seven in the morning the markets are still closed, what explains then, according to your heritage, that the pigs look like they were recently bought and came from a recent purchase? Did the neighbor sleep after his purchases the previous day outside his house? and is it arriving the next day with the purchase at your house? In the relationship between its accumulated heritage and the novelty or uniqueness that elements of the situation provide, the individual induces, deduces, infers and interprets, completes the elements of its accumulated heritage. with the novel elements specific to the situation that in turn refer it to other similar situations already experienced before or potentially probable according to inferences and deductions drawn from historical material about dissimilar situations that are called in the accumulated heritage by the contingent external situation.
These examples, however, which explain how the heritage participates semiologically in decoding, refer exclusively to the so-called collections of knowledge at hand that validate an unproblematically accepted world or world of typification; however, they do not contemplate more interpretative processes. complexes where the relationship between interpretations updated to the present of situations and contingent interactions and preinterpretations are woven into complex and rich hermeneutic fabrics that are those that ultimately participate in the entire network of tapestries that make up, on the one hand, the self-elucidation of what was experienced when the Recurrence to the heritage occurs within the internal subjective activity, that is, when the elements recurring to the external experience are only reflected within the soliloquy of the subject, nor do they contemplate beyond immediate mundane situations, symbolic interactions that involve relating more experiences. contrasted, for example, different professional backgrounds, the dialogue between a doctor and a sociologist, between an artist and a hydraulic engineer, or between an inhabitant of a city like Houston, Texas, and one of a city like Caracas in Venezuela, who communicating, they have to resort to their heritage to elucidate what others say or do to them, according to how they know more or less what they are talking about, nor does it of course include what happens in terms of heritage with respect to reading books, reading information, the mastery of languages or idioms, specialized knowledge about plants, medicines, technicalities, terminologies, types of iconography, etc., etc., and even less so the situations that involve relevant semiospheric changes such as not only the encounter of languages in circumstances outside their cultures, but for example, there in situ, required to be learned to communicate in a culture to which one emigrates or under conditions of anthropological studies.
The heritage is, as we said, a singularized accumulation but at the same time, only the heritage allows and makes possible decoding as well as interpretive coding when the message has not been encoded with communicative intentions, the heritage is also a condition of possibility of communication and understanding as well as understanding.
Perhaps it is necessary to understand here the relationship between the heritage and what I have called preinterpretations. While on the one hand one could say that typifications are in some way the result of preinterpretations, the truth is that typification requires a high level of stereotyping and discriminating axiomatization of variables around situations, actions and communications, while preinterpretations do not necessarily and most of the time they do not properly consist of it, we resort to preinterpretations not because they make up clusters of highly stereotyped meanings, when we arrive at a typification, the high level of stereotyping replaces the preinterpretation, it is not necessary to relate a interpretation updated with a preinterpretation because the high level of typification does not require it and therefore the interpretive or hermeneutical work is replaced by a guideline, pattern or model through which the potential interpretation/preinterpretation is replaced by a typification, we say It is already accepted like this and it can only be like this because it is that and not something else and it does not require accommodations, readjustments, updates or putting into intertextual relationships. In fact, the concept of typification is in this sense not decisively related to the peculiarities of the heritage, the latter as an accumulation, is more related to preinterpretations, but at the same time, the preinterpretations are local and the heritage is global to the process. of experience, inference and decoding, functions in a certain way as a background, a background in which contingent verbal or interactive symbolic situational experiences, or thoughts and ideas, are reviewed and checked, that check or review It reviews what is before it, it checks it but not in the way that it is checked by digits in a digital computer or what is checked between a yes and a no to discard, exclude, not include or reject, this type of dynamics is more typical of the way in which typifications work, in typifications there is no background with which to make compatible or update the contingent since it does not come provided with either novelty processes or decoding processes, or interpretive coding, typification seen Thus, they are accumulations of meanings that are not willing to give way or that do not even remember something from which to go back or advance, what is typified is accepted like this and only then is it expected and at the same time verifiable, preinterpretations on the contrary are hermeneutic universes around which processes of semantic elucidation as well as interpretive translation will be delivered, the universe of sense and meaning are in full action and vitality, experiences are loaded with senses and possible meanings, in the collection the subject checks what has been experienced in his collection and It proceeds at the same time by decantation and by translation, it is not something that contributes to an image to turn it into a guideline, but rather something that acts on the subject to elucidate and understand it, something that at the same time is intertwined with what the interpretively motivated subject decants to his course, his moving forward or backward, his taking one path or another in something he says or in something he interprets about what others tell him, in something he reads or in something he sees and means.
In a certain way we could say that in the heritage hermeneutics and semantics are reconciled and even united, however, hermeneutics governs over semantics since the latter presupposes, when it is componential, things that the words in the lexicon already mean or things that actions, situations or forms have already meant, when we say that the collection is like a background we explain well what it is about, the notion of background we know is such for the figures that we place in front of it, we literally have a background of a color or a certain plot and to the extent that we put figures and objects in front of their forms, both the background and the figure vary their meaning and significance, thus from the color itself if the background is black and the figure that we place in front of it is white, if it is a line or a plane, when we place it in front, the black of the background becomes one thing or another depending on the figure, it is no longer the same black in the same way the figure is no longer the same figure If the background is different, this relationship is of course highly simplified. The way in which the collection is a background for what has been experienced is not so simple, but the example illustrates well what check we are talking about, if the background is dark sepia and we place a figure clear sepia we check one thing with the other and choose whether instead the figure should be vermilion red maintaining that background or according to the figure looking for another background or a background that is configured according to the figure, the check searches in a few words that one thing and the other complement each other, understand each other, look good, translate each other, we modify the background and the figure as one and the other modify, in this way the elements of the figure activate in us possible variations in the background which are activated by the elements of the collection that the figure calls and conversely, what the figure introduces even if it comes in its elements is immediately read as or with respect to an updateable background for it that it already brings with it as codified by an interpretation, There are elements of a background that are suggested by what they tell us, insofar as to elucidate it we have to resort to a collection that becomes like a background for what has been said, in the same way it happens with thoughts, some thoughts engender subsequent thoughts as they They themselves bring potential funds wrapped in the hermeneutics that inferentially activates from them their next fund or the mode that it should acquire.
The interpretive activity in the collection is elucidative and decoding, it acts by translation, the meanings are not given in advance as meanings that the words already carry or have, but rather they are always updatable according to how the present and the present are related. its background, in the heritage the elucidable and interpretable elements are less relevant for what they are in themselves and more for what connects them in the hermeneusis to a potential direction, there is thus a determining relationship between the processes of coding and decoding and the heritage. since these first ones are nothing more than background provisions and would not be possible without the background in which they are elucidated, while at the same time, there is a determining relationship between heritage and genesis or generation, the heritage provides the structure here but it is structure is not static, but dynamic and updateable.
The background on which contingent experiences are updated, that is, experimentally current, with their own novelty, their own singularity and their unpredictability, is the heritage itself, formed undoubtedly by a pre-interpretive universe but nevertheless not confusing or susceptible to indistinction with pre-interpretations, the collection is both a background and a background provision insofar as the updateable element just evoked brings with it what an collection means, the latter however is there only signified and as such is not completed without the background on which it is checked, the accumulations of meanings that come in the collection of contingent phenomena provide background and as such this activity that gives or provides background is interconnected with that background that it itself at the same time calls and summons, but also updates it as a fund endowment, the fund endowment calls, revokes, summons, updates the pregiven fund whose singularity is unique to the contingent collection that is updated.
The heritage, at the same time that it encodes and decodes, in that it is the very condition of possibility of the code, is in some way related more to connotation than to denotation, what is meant through the heritage is not meant according to to a reflective, denotative or referential activity, rather it is connotated, the collection is in fact connotative and thus belongs to the territory of the signified not the signifier, of the content not of the form, but at the same time it is linked to presence through of connotation, without the heritage that is given in the meanings of the current and contingent elements there would not then or simultaneously be a background against which to check and review, this background provision is connotative and can at times be confused with the hermeneutic concept of horizon, background versus horizon or background and horizon, I think here of my concept of shared horizons of expectations that play a prominent place in the very conformation of the intramundane horizon as I discussed in my essay on ordination in the life worlds, these shared horizons of Expectations refer, from the point of view of the rationality of communication, as that which cohesives and at the same time provides a stimulus to the continuity and course of meaningful activities, and are supported to the extent possible as a result of interpretive arrangements. , these arrangements are, we know, on the one hand, contingent on the pragmatics of communication, but at the same time they are imbued with meanings resulting from explicitaicon and elucidation, as well as from a certain consensus in dissent or from the very meaning of A certain dissent or, to put it better, a certain dissent may be in another way or understood in another equally legitimate way. The interpretive arrangements are contrasted against this background and as such there is a close relationship between background and horizons, but the former belong to the past and the latter to the future.
Bibliography
Eco Humberto, The Absent Structure, lumen
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Overordination in the worlds of life, The Intramundane Horizon
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Between the Acervo and the backgrounds, Self and Acervo
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The World Correlate, Gyan books, india, new delhi
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Thinking Science, Gyan books, india, new delhi
Shutz Alfred, the formulation of our problem: the methodological concepts of Max Weber, PP, 33-74,
Shutz Alfred, Phenomenology of the social world: introduction to comprehensive sociology, introduction George Walsh, paidos publishing house, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Shutz Alfred, the meaningful construction of the social world, introduction to comprehensive sociology, prologue by Joan Carles Melish, ilse shutz, Paidós, basic, 1993
Shutz Alfred, Phenomenology of the social world: introduction to comprehensive sociology, introduction George Walsh, paidos publishing house, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Shutz, common sense and the scientific interpretation of human action, the problem of social reality
Triadic Adequacy
By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
When Charles Sanders Peirce thought about the triadic principles of the formation of activity, his then phenomenological thinking meant something that in his terms was understood as a positive form of the normative sciences and that was ultimately identified as the foundation of pragmatism, although very far away. of functionalism, it still presupposed, as was later seen from modern semiotics, that such principles occurred within certain signifying forms not only usually separable from their objects, in whose places these were, according to Peirce, as their interpretants, but also classifiable in ways that were later understood as internal structures, that is, as protofunctions of the signs themselves. But the triadic logical organization acquires even greater delimitation on one side in Saussure when the sign is divided into two faces, signified and signifier, but is completed with respect to a third, the object or referent. Peirce, we know, did not confuse the object. with the referent and prior to the first certain estimates of degree and level, immediate object, mediate object, etc., and on the other hand he had acquired it in Hegel for whom notions such as identity and difference, to mention one, were not alone, they were completed and they understood their relationship with diversity.
However, the type of triadic logic that I am going to discuss here, although it maintains and assimilates the logical principles of triadism on a philosophical level, is actually methodological. I call triadic adaptation something that we must do between three forms of the object in the social sciences, particularly in sociology, rigorously speaking in terms of the latter considered as a science.
In the tradition of sociology, we know it, from the great fathers of it, Weber, Durheim and Comte, and the later modes of being taken up by those who study the history or evolution of sociology, as well as, above all, the scientific forms that sociology acquires as a disciplinary science, from the parameters established by Durheim of treating objects as things, defining what is social, as opposed to what is individual, what is cultural, what is economic and what is not social, has been in the spotlight. Every science, presumably, must define its object and only this provides it with specificity, disciplinarity and autonomous rigor: semiotics the sign, phenomenology the consciousness, linguistics the language, speech and writing, psychology the mind, and so on.
The developments and vicissitudes in the definition of what the social is, as I discussed in my first book Albordes del transarte, specify what sociology has been and what its tendencies are, but while this question was at the base of the impulse and stimulus that surrounded the Sociology is a science, the unity act, the social action, the social actor, the social act, the symbolic interaction, the situation, common sense, among other names that have acquired the concepts given to that minimum unit on which the specificities of the social and hence the specificity of sociology, the very question about a base object or starting point, both a source of the social and an object at the same time from which we start, thus considered in the abstract, is not only not enough , both because of its scarcity in one sense, and in another sense because of the effect of profusion that falls on these notions when viewed according to ideological presuppositions about what the individual and the social are dominant in the experience, as well as what the cultural, the economic or what some call historical.
Against this background, leaving my micromethodological positioning in sociology as clear in advance, the turn that we obtain from the macro towards microsociology from Alfred Shutz, passing through symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, presupposes what was said before, asking why it is what social as a minimum unit or engendering source cut out as an object in the aforementioned concepts as well as my epistemological positioning in the tradition of social phenomenology where experience, common sense and the world of life come to the foreground, I want to delve further into some consequences of my sociology in the tradition of this discussion, in what ways and under what parameters hermeneutics and phenomenology enter into my theoretical developments not only in the sense of primary questions about the conditions of possibility of knowledge and questions derived and both teleological about its ethics, but now also from a methodological perspective.
I understand by triadic adequacy not only the fact that this micromethodology around a source or minimum unit of the social, those concepts mentioned before that I assume acquire in me a much more development on the one hand semiological and on the other philosophical logical as notions that require to be understood not only and not so much as things but as triadic relationships, but also in terms of the principles of adequacy that between subjectivity and objectivity must organize the review or check-up, to make use of two concepts that I have placed regarding to my theory of the heritage, of the scientificity of the method. This adaptation, which is between subjectivity and objectivity and which I understand in a sense that is both phenomenological and hermeneutical, that is, we adapt ourselves hermeneutically and phenomenologically, is in turn triadic, it was not verified only with respect to an object given in advance in the world. as an abstractive principle assignable as a source, origin or starting point of that which makes and delimits in itself what is properly social, but also and much more, it must be obtained triadically at the logical level of the relationship between three principles, which I will call the type. ideal, empirical and participant observation.
The ideal type notion as we know we inherited from Weber or more precisely from his discussion or Weberianism in sociological discussions about methodology, is here under consideration although retheorized and its possibilities extended to richer and more abundant possibilities. First, it is necessary to remember that the concept of idea type underwent very important changes in sociology in the transition from Weber to Weberianism and post-Weberianism, in its epistemological matrix it is a concept that reconciles idealism and objectivism, subjectivism and objectivism. Although the notion of idealism places us in the relevance that the self acquired in German philosophy as well as the prevalence of everything that concerns thought over a predated or given world as external, it is not dealt with to a greater extent as we know. of the denial that this world exists or has its own organization and reality, but rather the very idea that everything we are in a position to say about the world or reality we say symbolically through our symbolic representations, of the ways in which it passes idealized into our interiority and by the way in which we cannot and are not in a position to relate to it other than through concepts. The passage, however, of the transcendental primacy that the ego and consciousness acquire in German idealism with its most elaborate culmination in Hegel, acquires with the Weberian ideal types a new dimension, the ideal type, we know, is not merely a abstraction of thought as something that belongs to an internal world without externalized correlates, but on the contrary, it abstracts into the regularities of the world those concepts that can be considered to be at the same time resulting from the fact that abstractive logic always reflects our subjectivity as much as It captures or synthesizes what is objective as universalizable invariances between us and the world. On the one hand, the ideal type undoubtedly captures and summarizes a certain externalization of subjectivity in cultural forms that are, on the one hand, a reflection of the ways of organizing symbolically and logically that subjectivity in its relations to the world, but on the other hand, it also captures how those abstractive forms in which a certain evolution of the forms of subjectivity rests or is collected, coincide without more and without less, with certainly abstractable logical figures as well. in the external or externalized world, in summary, the idea type captures that the external is a form of externalization, that is, that what is given as external has been externalized by a subjectivity, but it also understands that this form of subjectivity has become logically exteriorized by itself a form of objectivity establishing a relationship between two exteriorities, the exteriority of the world presupposed to respond to orders abstractable in their invariance, and the abstractivity of externalizing principles that make the subject and its objects both objective and subjective. For both, it is an ideal type, especially when we move away from the concrete empirical forms that Weber studied, although it is true that Weber already included those modes of subjectivity evolved in the forms of religion, institutionality and economics. , a given, that is, we talk about a social actor who is not a specific actor with biography and life experience, but can be oneself or can be another or can be anyone, we talk about a situation without referring to a or to specific situations concretizable in narratives of life or experience, although as a type of idea, we all have concrete experiences and as such we are continually faced with situations or situationalities, in the same way we presuppose a man of common sense who is situated in front of a unproblematic world until further notice which he has typified and with which he manages to develop ways of knowing that organize his sense of others and their experience, we speak of a self that can be my self or yours, theirs or that of us, as much as it was universal abstractivity, can refer to each one, to you, to me, or to everyone. Ideal types, now far removed from Weberian empiricities, are nothing more than typical concepts that anticipate or presuppose an empirical field of experience but metatheoretically and metaempirically abstractive, their strength is their reach beyond the singular as well as their empiricism in the singular. .
In sociology the ideal type is therefore considered an essential condition for scientificity, without an ideal type we cannot put sociological knowledge to work if it is scientific, around and around sources of the hypothetical social or what Peirce called the abductive hypothetical . However, precisely because it is only an ideal type, a scientific sociology that only works with ideal types without reviewing them, without checking them, without above all exposing the theoretical and methodological problems that arise around ideal types situated by research in relation concrete empiricities, these meta-empirically considered concrete empiricities can also at times be forms of ideal types, however, they must be considered by themselves as far as the relationships between questions and answers are concerned. An empiricity is exposed here to an assumption of experience that must be considered by itself in all its dimension of imbued and immersive phenomenon. It is true that the relationship between the ideal types with which we work and the empirical dimensions can vary depending on the latter, but insofar as the ideal types themselves can be presupposed as predetermined in conceptual forms of the object, such as those mentioned above, but they can also be constructed based on abductive hypotheses and as such arise both from empirical study results that make them possible, and from new logical hypothetical projections, the relationship between ideal types and empiricities is susceptible to a mutual dialogue, to a back-and-forth. means of which, at the same time that new ideal types are arrived at from empiricities, from the latter one arrives at metempirical knowledge that elaborates the abstractive dimensions of the empirical in a metaempirical way, thus, for example, an ideal type could Being the self as a meta-empirically abstractive empirical form could be the intramundane horizon, that is, abstractable situations as forms of social interaction between social actors in concrete empirical situations, here we have two dimensions, one is the empirical loaded with content, that is, a measurable experience describable as an experience or lived experience, references to specific actors in specific social and cultural realities, a social group, for example, or a cultural group, while at the same time, we can abstract the ideal type of that empiricity For example, as in studies on extraverbal communication, we can refer to the gestural expressions of a specific subject that we have before us and based on this refer to it, but we can also observe the extraverbal expressions of specific subjects and abstract the type ideal to refer to signifying or communicative forms that occur in extraverbal communications in possible or imaginable social actors, or that are there empirically confirmed by experience and abstracted by it without the need to move between concrete subjects, but we can also abstract a situation of social interaction that, taken from the empirical, is not concrete, an example here could be a mundane dialogue between people who converse in a dynamic intramundane horizon, the dialogue, for example, between three vegetable sellers with a group of potential buyers that takes shape in a Market, see, observe and abstract how subjects enter each other's situations and leave them, as well as how they go from the endogenous of a situation that is culturally signified or worldly describable by its typificity, to a exogenous situation of other social actors with whom the former interact and abstract regularities from it on, for example, the relationship between the endogenous and exogenous in symbolic microinteractions. We must therefore at the same time adapt the ideal type to the empiricity in question, whether this is meta-empirical, that is, based on concrete experience but abstracted by its logicality with respect to it for other possible forms of experience, or conversely, adapt the dimension metaempirical and empirical concrete to the ideal type that we have been theorizing. Let us thus speak of the fact that once we work with the ideal type and another time we work with experiences in the intramundane horizon hermeneutically and phenomenologically loaded with metaempirically abstractable empirical contents, and in this way if the source of reasoning leaves and returns to the ideal type the material of the intramundane horizon seen this way is translated by also generating dialectical relations between the ideal type and the intramundane horizon that there are both things, ideal typicities abstractable in that intramundane horizon, that is to say that we do not bring them logically predetermined but that we have them there in the empirical, and vice versa , everyday the ideal type, but the most important thing is not only where we leave and where we return, we leave the ideal type we go to the intramundane horizon but we return to the type of the ideal from which we started or, conversely, we leave the intramundane horizon, We go for a moment to the ideal type and return to the intraworld horizon, but rather how our sense of subjectivity and objectivity must adapt to each other, between one and the other, that is, how subjectivity and objectivity adapt. , when moving from the ideal type to the intramundane horizon we stumble upon how the balance of the subjective and the objective is going, but one, there are conclusions to which we arrive as a result of certain hypotheses on the one hand, and experience on the other, around questions that must be answered with the same results on one side and on the other, if we reach a conclusion about how the relationships between the exogenous and the endogenous occur in a symbolic interaction of the intramundane horizon immersed in the latter at the level of experience or logically abstracting it, the answers to the question about what is endogenous and what is exogenous must be the same both considered in the ideal type and considered in concrete or abstractive empirical experience.
We speak, however, of a triadic adaptation precisely because we do not move solely between abstractive ideal types and empirical experiences in the intramundane horizon and its metamepiricity, we also continue to be participant observers on one side and on the other regardless of the position we assume with respect to the dimensions. immersive spatial and temporal aspects that the concept of participant observation presupposes, even where certain positionings resulting from assumed perspectives involve a critique of the observation as well as the representation to which participant observation is always exposed, being sensitive to the dimension observational participants that is in itself assumed in the relationship between endogenity and exogenity in any type of symbolic, communicative and interpretive situational interaction, is to keep us informed not only of how the relationships between subjectivity and objectivity go in concrete empirical, metaempirical and logical analysis. typical ideal. The adaptation is therefore triadic, it must relate ideal types, empiricities in the intramundane horizon and participant observation, what is concluded in this way regarding specific questions at the level of the intramundane horizon must coincide with what is concluded around the type. idea as much as around participant observation.
This triadic adaptation is of course considered here as hermeneutic and phenomenological, it is not therefore a corroborative or verificationist adaptation but rather an interpretative and reading adaptation, it is however, from my own parameters a scientific or scientific adaptation, we will obtain greater scientificity only where everything is answered equally between the three orders while we calibrate subjectivity and objectivity through that adaptation.
One could argue from what has been said before or rather ask what is about language in such a conception and although up to this point I have remained in the rigorous domain of the scientificity of sociology, not the philosophy of sciences, the philosophy of language or linguistics, in no way exclude the consideration of language in these analyses. On the one hand, we must consider that since the triadic adaptation is, in my own terms, hermeneutic, this already presupposes language as much as seen from the empirical perspective, that is, our experiences in the intramundane horizon also encompass and many times phenomena in which language intervenes, speaking face to face as well as written, therefore we work with it on the plane that we have called empirical in the intramundane horizon as well as individual and intersubjective experience, on the other hand, at the level of types ideals I have already consecrated a book, thinking about science, and also the world's correlation to the dilemma inside/outside language and analyzed how we should work with it, moving between language and non-language, while on the other hand the very principle of adequacy being Hermeneutics presupposes a path in the philosophy of science that privileges the adequacy of scientificity to the linguistic community and therefore to issues related to the hermeneusis of culture with respect to language, but we could even say about the relevant place that the concept of adequacy without a doubt not only phenomenological in terms of worlds, but also hermeneutic in terms of relationships of sense and meaning to the relationship subjectivity objectivity, let us add that in addition to the basis of my own balances in this regard in the tradition of social phenomenology, symbolic structuralism or poststructural neostructuralism, we must consider the issues raised by Stephen A Tyler in cognitive anthropology, philosophical anthropology and postmodernism, relative to the place that what Stephen has called the middle or medial voice acquires precisely in the face of this dilemma of the balance between subjectivity and objectivity, Stephen in fact, initially inspired by the place it acquires in Derrida, has several times pointed out that the middle voice lies precisely in a caligration of it. I assume and recognize myself in my works as theoretical developments that assume the direction initiated in this sense by Stephen, thus distancing myself from certain criticisms made of Stephen by cognitive anthropologists who have considered that just as Stephen was a pioneer and founder of scientism in anthropology by positioning himself later from what I call postmodern anthropology or postmodern ethnography contradicted itself. I distance myself from this precisely because I consider that although the postmodernization of the social sciences, both in semiotics, sociology and anthropology, presupposes a certain suspicion and a move away from scientific authoritarianism towards its relativization, in no way does this mean that our prevalence to middle voice concepts and their consequences with respect to the relationship between language and world, language and reality, objective subjectivity, presupposes an abandonment of the scientific imperative of social science rather than how its hermeneutization is made explicit in me as we obtain not a denial of representation but its complementation and overcoming via evocation.
Bibliography
Bourdieu Pierre, things said, gedisa
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The World Correlate, Gyan books, india, new delhi
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Thinking Science, Gyan books, india, new delhi
Muguenza Javier, Contemporary sociological theory, techno
Shutz Alfred, the formulation of our problem: the methodological concepts of Max Weber, PP, 33-74,
Shutz Alfred, Phenomenology of the social world: introduction to comprehensive sociology, introduction George Walsh, paidos publishing house, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Shutz Alfred, the meaningful construction of the social world, introduction to comprehensive sociology, prologue by Joan Carles Melish, ilse shutz, Paidós, basic, 1993
Shutz Alfred, Phenomenology of the social world: introduction to comprehensive sociology, introduction George Walsh, paidos publishing house, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Shutz, common sense and the scientific interpretation of human action, the problem of social reality
Tyler A Stephen, Then other voices without mirrors, paidemu
Tyler A Stephen, Posmodern Ethnography, from document of the occult to an occult document
Tyler A Stephen, Evocation, The unwriteable, a response to Abdel Hernandez San Juan
The holism of connotation/The division of essence: About Overcoming the deviations of the Mind-Body dilemma
By Abdel Hernández San Juan
According to Hegel, an idea that I share in his science of logic, when we reach the concept the essence is divided.
But it is not any division that Hegel refers to as when we say that a substance is divided, but precisely that division that begins the end of the essence itself as we understood is in accordance with the substance, in the latter what we consider essence. appears as identical to itself, this identity, however, is far from that which we represent when we say that identical to itself can continue to be something that is extrinsic to itself.
In fact, the essence, as we represent it according to the substance, never repairs itself, we say identical to itself in reference to that substantial essence as a way of saying that it does not come out of itself, that it does not repair itself, that does not see that it is, nor does it feel or perceive that it is, it is not therefore something that continues to be even if it notices that it is, like the being, which is and feels that it is, which continues to be as much as it is extrinsic to it, but of that which is not extrinsic to itself, hence the logic of being and the logic of essence remain separated in the science of logic
It is then in this other way that the essence is divided into the concept, it is not another essence that is equally identical to itself as much as that which in the substance is not extrinsic, is now distributed or distributed according to another physical or chemical itinerary, before Well, on the contrary, the essence is divided into the concept because with the latter, the essence is no longer matter but immateriality, it is no longer substance, but desubstantiated dematerialization, it is therefore extrinsication, consciousness, sign, idea.
How can the essence, understood in this way, go from being the essence of a substance to being the essence of an idea without the essence itself ceasing to be a substance?, ceasing to be matter and ceasing to be identical to itself without ceasing to be essential? ?, essential at least in that sense that justified the very idea of essence?.
Indeed we could also say that there is a certain essence of a certain concept or idea, as when we say, the essence of that concept is such and such, or the essence of that idea lies or consists of this or that, but that idea or that concept They can no longer be captured in their essence except through desubstantiated immaterial summaries related to cultural and symbolic senses and meanings. We are no longer referring to the essence of a thing or something but rather to that which best summarizes or captures the semantic meaning of some meanings.
Thus, when we say that the essence is divided into the concept, we are saying that its end begins because the concept itself is not the sensory-motor apparatus that we assume is linked to that place of the body in which, being an organ, ideas occur, in fact, the concept itself. It is not identical to the organ or organs in which we suppose ideas take place and not urine, secretions or locomotion.
We cannot explain or understand a concept through the organ or organs, nor through chemism, physicalism or biologism linked to the areas of the body that we assume are related to conceptualizing activity.
We know that we have concepts and we conceptualize with the head and not with the spine, the knees or the genital organs, but we also know that the concept we have of time or of the being in itself of things or of language or of man, is not identical to a gland nor can it be explained by the mediation of muscles, tendons, by the degree of acid in the food ingested, by the collision of particles or by the atomic composition of the friction or the relationship between these.
When we ask what concept is or what concept is, what conceptualizing is, we are not asking about an organ.
On the one hand, it is required to arrive at the ontology of the concept to have understood something like what Deleuze called the body without organs, but even more so, it is required to dispense with the very idea of body, a concept that supposes a body or the body. , is not in itself a concept as such in its ontological purity.
In the same way, if we try to move outside of organic literality towards the realm of qualities, the signs that we make of the latter or, to be more faithful to Pierce, the signs that those qualities are already “qualisigns” or “rhemes” cannot be explained through nerve endings or properties of the sensorimotor apparatus.
A quality of a sensitive world or of a palpable sensoriality, pale, blackish, acidic, sweet, rough, humid, a detour that takes us away from the organic location back to a relationship with substance or matter, although it refers us to that first essence identical to itself with respect to which the essence was already divided in the concept according to a non-identical immateriality or dematerialization in which the end of the essence and that of substantiation begins, immerses us in the substitution that the symbol or sign begin with respect to that thing or that something that is mere palpable sensoriality, certainly, that something or thing of the palpable sensory world would not be the object of a qualitative stimulation, of perception, or of a representation, without the sign that designates or refers to it. , the blackness, the acidity, the pale, rough or moist are such as distinctional abstractions before the non-blackish, the reddened, the smooth or the dry, for any form of matter or substance because if they remain literal to something or Concrete things are mere names, nominal indicatives, that pale face not reddened, that rough surface not smooth, that wet bread not dry, that black stove not blue, are therefore already when they are internalized as adjectives to the subjective distinction what Pierce called qualisigns or you row.
At the same time, however, neither a rheme nor a name is a concept, any more than a mere name or nominal indication is.
Saying that the word cat as a nominal sign or name of the specific cat is a concept is therefore a semantic license where the notion of concept does not have its own specificity but rather, via synonymies and homonymies, it is put as a word in the place of other more precise words. to say the same thing, such as, the list of more precise notions that concept is long, name, replica, sign, representation, etc. but even more importantly, understood as the mere nominal designative of that something or thing abstracted from its not that or concretized in its that that, that something or thing could never be objects of something else that names it, designates it, It denotes, replaces, adjectives, lists or identifies it, without the sign for which that something or thing is an object.
This is not about a signocentrism, it is about understanding that this something or thing of palpable sensoriality when becoming objects for its symbolic substitute no longer refers to what they are in themselves as qualities of that thing or something according to their essences, but rather to according to the concept that abstracts it for a subject, in this way, a world of palpable sensoriality from the moment it is an object for a subject has passed to the division of the essence in the concept and as such devoid of organs and body, It is not explainable through the mediation of nerve endings, sensory-motor organs, or relationships between chemical particles or their physical events.
Thus, in the same way that calling a mere name a concept is a semantic license, a vague way of giving a name for others, calling mind the subject for which that palpable sensoriality is translated into an object through the mediation of signs and concepts, is a vague way of naming that for which that something or thing is as a subject, subjectivity or non-object, not the thing itself or the something, but its for someone or its according to a someone, the mind, a family concept of the psyche and of other notions, which our friend, the prominent analytical philosopher Alberto Méndez Suarez, has chosen in this book in front of the body to present to us its avatars of the positivist and post-positivist tradition, is a notion through which neither the essence nor the substance have been evacuated from the desubstantiated universe, devoid of organs and body, which in itself defines the immateriality and dematerialization that are characteristic of the subject and the concept.
In it, the mind, not only the organs and substances with their essences have passed, but also all those other synonymies or homonymies that as semantic licenses could be euphemistically called concepts such as mere name, representation, perception. , the imagination and with it the entire list of names that evoke the world composed of images of psychism.
However, the founder of the first circle of Lacanian studies in Cuba, manages in his own way to, through a synonymous and homonymic zigzag of the and in accordance with a certain eloquent and virtuously voluptuous rhetoric expressed throughout its pages, go renaming a variety of forms of someone understood as an abstract universal or a concrete literal, sometimes naming mind, sometimes self, sometimes soul, sometimes psyche, and so on, weaving together a heterogeneity of concepts with synonyms.
This acquires its most attractive moment in one of the most interesting passages of its pages, the introduction, involving all those multiple names as synonyms of the same and unique dilemma that it defines as the mind/body dilemma with its detours that, according to Méndez, goes from ancient representations of the soul to medieval religious ones, from Plato to Freud, in his own words
“The Mind-Body problem has been addressed throughout more than two thousand years of Western thought history. In Homer's time, earlier Greek thinkers thought of the psyche as a life principle that separates from the body at the moment of death and goes to Hades as a shadow (Barresi and Martin, 2011). Plato, the greatest philosopher of antiquity, considered the soul to be the essential self of each person and argued that the immortality of each person's soul was immaterial and divine-like. Plato considers the Person pre-existing before being incarnated in the body. Indivisibility and unity are what explain, however Plato was a dualist. Unlike Plato's dualism, Aristotle pays little attention to individual beings (Barresi and Martin, 2011). He connected the soul with the body as matter is linked with the form integrated into a unified whole, what he called individual organism, expanding this notion even to also consider theater as an organism.”
“During the Christian era, the Fathers of the Church conceived of a resurrected body although identical to the earthly body, but later in some way spiritualized, glorified and purified. With Descartes, modern times were born at the beginning of the 17th century. The word "mind" is used for the first time for one of the greatest philosophers of all time. The self is the main concern about which Descartes asks “how does its immaterial substance fit into a totally material world governed by mechanistic laws?” (Barresi & Martin, 2011)” Descartes was looking for the primary connection between the mind and the body that he believed was located in some area of the brain that he coined as the pineal gland. Dualism in the sense we know in our current times was born. At the end of the 17th century, empiricism arrived with John Locke, who considered that the self and the person related to each other in a way that had two main ideas, positive and negative. The negative idea was that the self and the person cannot be conceived as parasites of the underlying substance, while the positive one was related to the unifying role of consciousness as an executive connection between selves and people (Barresi and Martin, 2011 ). “
“Freud organized a system of personality under three main underlying spheres which he called the id, ego, and superego. Each case has its own function in modern personality development in which Freud provided the now obsolete theory of the mind-body link between passions (impulses) and unconscious thoughts.”
Everything previously discussed distinguishing the ontological divisions between essence and substance, on the one hand, is understood with respect to the analytical positivist tradition to be any form, name or representation that has acquired in it the presuppositions about the ontology of the world, things, facts, reality, or what there is and exists, in Quine's words, and on the other hand, the ontology of the concept, now understand my epistemological denial of what I will then call a non-subsidiationism of the latter, and with that of the ontology of the language, signs and text to the ontology of that reality, a distinction that I have made not without also noting, additionally, the irreducibility of the concept to any form that relates to that sensitive multiplicity or palpable sensoriality given as reality, world, thing, what that there is or exists, look for its traces in language through ways such as mimesis, reflection, refraction, perception, representation or descriptive or non-descriptive observation.
Here, where I introduce or prologue the book by my friend and colleague, the analytical philosopher Alberto Méndez Suarez, about this tradition from its mind-body sieve, my objective is to make it clear that the logical positivist consideration of ontology presupposes, and here it includes not only the consideration of language as a logical proposition, but also the critical revisions and dissents towards it wrapped in the holistic perspective of Quine who, as we know, denies meaning unit by unit to redeem a holism, even where language is considered both parameter and point. starting point of verification, a passive and subsumed subordination of the latter with respect to a supposed ontology of the world, things, objects and reality which ultimately, considered more or less from the language, passes the account to this Lastly, it takes its toll on the language, that is, it demands and subordinates the criteria of assertiveness or incorrectness of a language that must remain semantically constrictive as the world itself, things or reality supposedly require it, including not only empirical semantic accommodation, but also existential quantifiers referred to naive physical collections or supposed states of entities considerable in themselves as facts.
In this way, the semantic instrumentalist model of positivist philosophy with respect to the entire world including all quine, subjects the ontology of language to assumptions about an ontology of reality even where that ontology is considered as relative in quine, as well as the inscrutable reference and translation, he does not seem to have understood what was explained above about the division of essence in terms of how to consider the ontology of concepts with respect to non-concepts.
For the moment I take in a general way the notion of concept, although not in the place of perception and representation, but as a possible nominal of the notions of sign and language, that is, symbolic substitutes, and not reflective or refractory mimetics, assumptions In the stimulative vision of Quine with its basis in the sensory stimulus, we must also develop a similar analysis around the concepts of meaning and semantics presupposed by analytical philosophy and above all in the sensory stimulative conception of Quine who more than other positivists , understands language as physically stimulated by reality and as such even more subordinated to a supposed ontological order in reality, although it is taken as a semantic verifier.
Its own ontology, in fact, that of language, is ultimately conceived as a reflection or refractive mimesis, especially where it is considered observational or protocol in positivism.
The subordinate statements preferred by Quine where the ontology of language and meanings reflect a primary ontology of the order of things in the world, even where the consideration of possible worlds or non-existent worlds is at stake, remain within these assumptions.
Quine's naturalizing operation with respect to epistemology supposes, on the one hand, an idea of natural versus artificial language, as we have to assume understood as this is acquired by a lay subject in a natural native attitude, meanwhile, with regard to Reality presupposes the acceptance of a collection of things that themselves have a physically verifiable ontology, that is, demonstrable by themselves in the order of the world with respect to which language is auscultated with magnifying glasses, especially where it is observational and is subordinated. to what the quantified order is like as the existence of things, facts, a collection of measurable identities.
On the other hand, the semantic adjustment through which language continues to be the parameter of verification and assertiveness with respect to the world subordinates language not only through stimuli to a sensory world of those data but also to a logical or logical assumption. that remains as presupposing a subject external to that language and that has its own, we can understand the above as a semantic naivety in a linguistic and semiological sense.
The most relevant thing here is to emphasize that although on the cognitive side language is in a certain way being returned to its intricacy in experience, the concept of basic experience assumed here reduces experience to a physicalist and biological empyrean, not a culturalist one, the latter provided and formed by interpretive elucidations, accumulations of meanings, collections, accumulations and memory.
Quine's vision, discussed in this way, would fall on the side of what we call experience as an experienced event, contingent experimentation of what makes an idea of natural reality or what happens, without excluding from this naive vision the assumptions about facts and functions. implicit to the basic behaviorist stimulus-response parameter.
This psychologized physicalism of which Pierre Bourdieu so frequently warned that we must take care of ourselves in order to understand culture should call for epistemological prevention in us than the assumption of interpretivism assigned by some to whom given in the naive semantics that the word is not translatable one to one lost as the meaning may be between the native point of view and the culture in which the translator's parameters are given with respect to the holistic factors to be considered, it is not a hermeneutical interpretivism, nourished by a theory of understood cultural meaning or by an understanding exegetical and comprehensive understanding of the semantic framework of experience in culture, it is, rather, behaviorally subordinated to the stimulus-response relationship, it is a physicalist interpretivism governed by a verification parameter subordinated to the physical ontological order of the world of which the language must give accounts regimented observationally in its absence and holistically accommodated to factors of untranslatability and inscrutability.
There is no recourse here to a hermeneutic ontology of language, culture and the world that exists and it confirms the ontologically interpretive character of everything, from the very formation of the self with its retentionist soliloquy, evocative and reconstructive of experiences, its cumulative memory and its heritage, on the one hand, and intersubjective communications, but rather to a constrictive limitation of the ontology of language considered with respect to an irreducible and incommensurable reality and world before whose existentially quantifiable physical firmness, the notion of existence seen here not as sensitive reflection for the subject, but in its physical character of discernment about what exists and what does not exist. The above is not intended to diminish the value of this quine holism considered in the translation in what it implies for a revisionist critique of positivism and empiricism, but rather to anticipate that it is not possible to force who from a hermeneutic and interpretive program in the sense Rigorous semantics considered from cultural theory, sociology and anthropology.
Quine's ontological relativism thus has value for an epistemological revision of positivism and neopositivism, assigning greater value to the indeterminacies of the referential translation and of the reference itself, emphasizing in this case the value of continuity with carnap and the importance of compression of connotation versus denotation seen from the semiological point of view, what we could call a holism of connotation.
We literally cannot bring anything from one territory to the other without these clarifications.
More about this or in this regard, it is also crucial to clarify, in contrast to the subordination of the ontology of language to the ontology of the world in Quine, that paradoxically, while the connotation argument in semiotics gives reason to Quine's holism, in The extent to which we see language and meaning through connotation and not denotation, we subject language less to the world, that is, the latter would not be considered only as observationally or protocolically reduced as homologous to physical quantifiers of existence. , connotation as much as it is holistic with respect to denotation presupposes a world of meanings that are no longer subject to sensory nervous stimuli, but rather formed by preinterpretations, this if we are willing to accept that decoding is carried out with recurrence to a heritage that there is already culturally formed.
It is also necessary to distinguish that although understanding the meaning as something that is completed taking a translation criterion as a parameter, it seems to reconcile or understand in a Peirtian sense according to the meaning made by the translation or that the latter is nothing other than the result of possible translations due to the effect of other signs that translate the first, the ontological subordination of the being in itself of language to the being in itself of things, with its quantifying criteria of existence, is not only representationalist and realistic and as such refractory , reflection and mimetic of language with respect to the world, but translation is appealed not because it forms the ontology itself of semantic meanings but rather on the contrary because translation results in the relativization of language with respect to the ontology of reality, It is not then the ontology itself of reality and the world that is in doubt, this would have to have a language that is better billed according to the ontology of the world, but rather the ontology of language, signs and meanings. semantics, translation is appealed to say, language cannot or is not in a position, other than regimented by the ontology of reality, to adapt to reality rather than being controlled where it can be logically regulated by a certain assertive assent of existing entities and facts, is untranslatable with respect to a reality, therefore in its absence and not a statement about the importance of translation in the very hermeneutical conformation of the meanings that make up culture and its memory or accumulation.
It would also be necessary to recognize Quine not only the relevance of his naturalized epistemology as a critical review of positivism and neopositivism, opening other possibilities for the latter, but also that the fact that he resorts to the native point of view refers certain aspects of his holism to the cultural parameters of departure and translation of both the translator and the native. Now, while I have written this essay reviewing Quine, it is true that his example, although assertive in the sense indicated, seems somewhat isolated in the set of his works, the latter do not seem to walk the cultural path.
It would then be worth pointing out that this quality seems more like a result of the emphasis placed by Alberto Méndez Suarez, who, let us not forget, carried out valuable urban field work experiences in the nineties in Cuba in continuity with social science projects that I started at that time in Havana. and that Méndez Suarez led to subsequent and more extensive possibilities, making theater inclusive in a more determined way as well as, from his own differentiated perspective, leaning first towards Lacan and then towards Quine, two of his main influences.
In brilliant developments by the Cuban analytical philosopher that I have had the gratitude of sharing with him, our compendium of philosophical dialogues Counterpoints and Rumbos: explorations in cultural anthropology, can be followed and understood more clearly than in his book on quine, the ways in which Méndez Suarez has reculturalized quine by searching or exploring in dialogue with me other alternatives and possibilities to this. The efforts made in this sense by Alberto Méndez Suarez are of great value for the future of neopositivism in his own pen as an analytical philosopher, a process undoubtedly initiated by this erudite thinker, as well as in the end possibilities of finding more alternatives, before closed, from culture, as well as examining the concepts of holism at play and its possibilities between holisms.
But we can affirm the same about the assumptions about so-called mental images or images projected by the mind, these are considered according to the contingent reality of existing quantifiable physical events, they take their toll as a relevant problem or pseudo-problem irrelevant to language as a mental phenomenon, here it is also understood symbolic if we understand the symbols not as refractory signs of that reality, but as hermeneutically substitutive statements of valence and as such as semantically not naïve due to the way in which they configure the same experience, which is hermeneutic and interpretive as I have argued in my book the enigmas of the ground.
Perhaps one path, among other possible ones, for these efforts of Méndez Suarez, busy as he is in his sieve of the mind-body relationship, can be found from cognitivism in the line that goes from theories such as those of Jean Piaget, on the side of the theory of learning and differentiation, through Chomsky, to cognitivist uses in the cultural sciences of concepts such as mind imbued with a cultural understanding of meaning. But this path that goes from Stephen A Tyler to me requires a step, already discussed by me recently in directions, from hermeneutics. Not without maintaining my already discussed reservations towards the mind in any of its forms from conceptualism.
But beyond these observations and conceptualist care regarding the ontological specificities of the concept as well as the meaning and meaning of the words, let us not forget that to a large extent the turn to the so-called positivist, neopositivist or as Méndez calls it analytical philosophy, Anglo-Saxon post-positivist, has been characterized precisely by establishing the semantic corsets that can make language the measure of all things, well understood as correct or incorrect propositional sentences, or on the other hand as descriptions of existence, observational propositions or protocol sentences about empiricities. real or fictional existences, or facts about the world and reality, and our distinctions with respect to those, the same texts by Carnap on the dismantling of metaphysics, passing through word and object, the extravagance of reference or ontological relativity Examples of which are the distinctions between the science of logic, epistemology as a theory of knowledge, the logic of science or the philosophy of science, on the one hand, and the history of philosophy, on the other.
I have realized that the most original, interesting and valuable thing that Alberto achieves with this way of discussing the analytical tradition, in the context of the mind-body relationship, is to develop his own thinking, that is , develop his own reflexivities, I do something similar in this introduction with respect to his book, discuss it from scientific conceptualism and semiotics to find in Alberto's detours not exactly something to look for with respect to positivism neither in a historiographical nor archaeological nor genealogical, but rather the itineraries of a thought that of Alberto who, on his way from psychoanalysis to analytical philosophy, has found in the mind-body relationship a threshold of possible communicating vessels between philosophy and psychology, a dilemma of crucial relevance for his own conception of theorizing, in fact, I believe and I risk affirming that to a large extent the concept of body that we are talking about here is that of the relationship between theory and body, or more precisely, it would be a reflection on the body or The corpus of the theory itself, and of its mind or subject, is therefore not the literal body understood as for the first time of biology or physical events that is at stake in Méndez's discussion, rather it becomes that what we would call embodiment or enacments, multiple forms in which, at the limits of thinking, a diversity of forms of relationship between the body and the subjectivity of theory are presented. From this perspective, if we are talking about synonymies and homonyms, I would speak, with a sense of semantic responsibility and ethics of discourse, of subjectivity, I would put subjectivity every time where mind has been placed.
Grades
For a critique of psychological physicalism see Pierre Bourdieu, in Things Said
For an analysis of the misunderstandings of the referent, see Humberto Eco The universe of meaning, in the absent structure
For a relativization of observational description from a hermeneutic and interpretive point of view in cultural theory, sociology and anthropologies in linguistic and semiological theory see Hermeneutic and culture, in The World Correlate. By Abdel Hernández San Juan, Gyan books, india, new delhi
For a culturalist and anthropological usage that presupposes cultural meanings and the concept of mind, see Stephen Tyler
Bibliography
Bourdieu Pierre, Things Said, Gedisa
Deleuze Gilles, The Fold: Leibniz and the Barroque, The University of Minnesota Press
Deleuze Gilles, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, Paidos studio
Deleuze Gilles, Logic of Sense, Columbia University Press
Deleuze Gillez, Logic of Sense, Paidos
Deleuze Gillez, Empiricism and subjectivity, an essay on hume theory of human nature, Columbia university press
Eco Humberto, The Equivoque of the referent, 66-70, The universe of meaning, The absent structure, lumen
Eco Humberto, The universe of meaning, The absent structure, lumen
Pierce Charles Sanders, The science of semiotics, collection of semiology and epistemology, Nueva Vision editions, Buenos Aires
Hegel, the logic of the concept, science of logic, axe
Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Science of Logic London: Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929
Hernández San Juan Abdel, Hermeneutic and culture, in The World Correlate, Gyan Books, India, New Delhi
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Sensible Concept, in Thinking Science, Gyan Books, India, New Delhi
Nubiola Jaime, interview with W.V Quine, University of Navarre
Vinao Verónica, Quine, an interpretationist and pragmatic turn in the analytical philosophy of logical positivism, Universidad Nacional del Comahue, Argentina
Tyler A Stephen, The Said and the unsaid, mind, meaning and culture, Academic press
Indexical Readings: Subjectivity and objectivity in the interpretation of material culture
By Abdel Hernandez San Juan
Caracas, 2024
Victoria galarraga, Venezuelan museologist and researcher, La Mata, photograph Abdel Hernandez San Juan, 2024
The problem of objectivity and subjectivity is without a doubt crucial in the social sciences in particular and especially sociology and anthropology, it is clear, also and in a broader sense, a matter of first order in the theory of knowledge and The philosophy of science, as the schemes, starting points and parameters to follow regarding it, will mostly revolve around how to understand the relationship between subject and object.
My starting point in this sense is the maximum proximity to the object in a phenomenological sense to the point that at times the subject becomes an othered object before itself and conversely, the subject object, likewise, as I have argued, my perspective is hermeneutic. , it is from the conjunction between both parameters that my relationship between subjectivity and objectivity has been determined.
However, there are important differences between the parameters we choose when we think about logic and theory of knowledge and those that arise when our questions refer to both theoretical and empirical content of social sciences.
Social science, in itself, submerges us in relationships between subjectivity and objectivity that cannot be disseminated only according to how subject and object are related in an abstract sense, it is required at the same time to dialectize the relationships between the metatheoretical and the metaempirical, as well as, relate experiences and accumulated knowledge about empiricism and its methodological diatribes.
On the one hand, the unprecedented place that the validation of the subjective and subjectivity acquires for the social sciences with social phenomenology is crucial. The important thing about this phenomenological validation of the subjective is that it refers to a relationship between the subjective and the objective in references to how we consider the social actor, the social action, the social act itself, asking about how we know the self. of the other and what is the access we have to their world at the same time as how we should consider the relationship between subjective and objective meanings, thus the naive objectivity of the social sciences is dismantled, and we place the relevant place that the subjective plays for understanding. , the latter in fact, is not possible, desirable or attainable without subjectivity and the subjective.
On the other hand, the structural symbolist considerations in sociology about this relationship are valuable because we explain how the material world can be considered subjective and the world of the subject or subjective can be considered objective in a different way.
Finally, in anthropology, Stephen Tyler initiated a postmodern perspective that tells us about being objective in the subjectivity of others and subjective in our own objectivity, alternating the parameters of subjectivity and objectivity as they are perceived between that relationship as pure philosophical and that relationship. transferred to the scope of an objective culture canceling or relativizing, even denying the otherness of the other, declaring it a pseudo problem, while focusing on the possibilities of what I call the middle or medial voice.
The present effort aims to elaborate and develop consequences, possibilities, ways and alternatives that acquire my own statements on subjectivity and objectivity now analyzed and considered in the discussion of the concept of material culture.
To begin my reasoning I will recall a concept or notion that in recent years I have analyzed related to my theory of how the concept of interpretant articulated from Pierce's semiotic theory regarding the translation between signs and the replacement of the object by the chain of meanings generated by this last or infinite semiosis, treated and understood from questions of cultural theory, now sociological, now anthropological cultural, allows, facilitates and increases the possibilities of cultural understanding
The semiological notion of interpretant covers four dimensions
Interpreting a function internal to a sign (structural)
Interpretant for someone
Interpreter for another sign or another sign as an interpreter (translator)
Interpretant for a thought and of one thought with respect to another
Despite this, assuming the general meaning of Peirce that an interpreter is something that is in the place of something else or its object, I will recall this concept through examples that I have placed on other occasions.
An interpretant, from the point of view of semiological questions of research methodology in sociology and anthropology, would be something like reading a thing or something through another thing or another something to which the first has been linked by logical links. of implication.
These links of implication of a logical nature are inferential, but they offer the sieve or filigree, the interpretant through which one thing is read, interpreted and understood according to another.
Thus we do not reach the same conclusions, the same images or the same representations, nor do we do the same research methodologically speaking, if to analyze and understand tourism we take as its interpreter the process of restoration of a colonial architectural patrimony that, being restored, is at the same time, the staging in which the modes of tourism that are in question and their activity of consumption and self-representation or memory acquire form and place.
The same tourist phenomenon considered there in those locations, if we do not read it from the perspective of the restoration process as its interpretant, acquires images and we represent it in an entirely different way.
I have given other examples based on my own field experiences to illustrate this, the understanding of Wayu culture taking as its interpretant the representations that Hispanics have made of it on the border of their communities and how these representations affect the images of itself that the Wayu culture is made, likewise, the vision that the geek rockers have of the punks in the urban space as an interpretant of the punk culture and how those images affect the image of themselves that the culture makes. punk.
This time, however, I do not intend to delve so much into the theoretical and methodological problems that we must take into consideration when working with the interpretant explained above and its scope for cultural understanding, as much as I want to focus on what consequences are derived from This is for our parameters on what we consider subjective and objective in social sciences, specifically when we analyze and interpret modalities of material culture.
I will thus focus on the problem of the subject in cultural research, examining how we can think about it when our questions refer to specific forms of material culture.
The point in question here must be simultaneously that of the relationship between text and context, on the one hand, and that of the relationship between the subject of the gaze, the cutout or the assumption of objectivity and the object or objectivity itself of something. or something that is looked at, cut out, assumed in its supposed objectivity.
I will provide some introductory examples that explain what it is about.
If we imagine for a moment a pottery that we consider Aboriginal located in the inventoried and classified catalog of the different expressions of Aboriginal artifacts from a given region or culture in its extinct past we see a pottery as far as our sense of its objectivity is concerned, in Whether we choose another parameter to organize, place it in a recess, place it in front of other fences on a glass shelf or display case, we obtain another ceramic that is different in itself. Let's see some images of ceramics in the aboriginal culture of Venezuela.
Pre-Hispanic aboriginal ceramics from Venezuela, courtesy Victoria Galarraga, The Pre-Hispanic Art of Venezuela, book, catalog, national art gallery
The objectivity of the aboriginal piece could be captured if we take the path of a narrative whole that we will call archaeological research or if we take the path of an ethnological notion such as pre-Hispanicity to, according to one parameter or the other, arrange, distribute, classify and understand that piece. of ceramics, as I said, we obtain from one thing or the other two different ceramics in terms of the objectivity that we attribute to it.
In a parameter, for example, of restoration and conservation, or archaeology, we read everything in it, the traces of its corroded or satin porousness, the marks of stylized lines with iconographic motifs, in the level of longevity or novelty that we feel on its surface. , as signs, as vestiges, reminiscences, remnants, remains, fragments of a subjacency that we must go to look for or find as if inside the visible, we read it indexically as if searching in it for the surviving example of an extinct culture or civilization whose sense of everything to which it belongs as something crystallized, is relativized, well exposed to a research that never completely completes it other than as an indexicalized universe always resulting from a reading in capable, successive, we are inducing the possible meanings by capable, interpretation after interpretation of Those signs here seen as traces or indications in a semiotic sense, we thus assume from their meanings that we must go about finding them through that research that places the magnifying glass of a supposed objectivity of theirs on a different side than if, on the contrary, moved by a Ethnological parameters of, for example, pre-Hispanicity, we include the pieces collected, searched, found, inventoried and arranged in the catalog according to criteria of authenticity or purity of those objects with respect to a certain ethnic formation.
Pre-Hispanic aboriginal ceramics from Venezuela, courtesy Victoria Galarraga, The Pre-Hispanic Art of Venezuela, book, catalog, national art gallery
but further, if we place the same ceramic piece in the context of a contemporary art salon in which modern artists of today have been brought together based on the development of a certain technicality such as earth, the use of clay, the of its firing, its glaze, its baking, etc., and its possibility of alluding to telluric dimensions of a living culture and we put together these modern forms of working with clay adjacent to the spatial or cataloged arrangement of aboriginal ceramics we obtain with respect to the latter, and above all, with respect to our chosen singular piece of aboriginal ceramics, an entirely different ceramic as far as our considerations of its objectivity are concerned.
Noemí Márquez, contemporary artist of Venezuelan ceramics
Josefina Álvarez, contemporary Venezuelan ceramic artist
María Esther Barbieri, contemporary Venezuelan ceramic artist
Luis Arroyo, contemporary Venezuelan ceramic artist
Isabel Cisneros, contemporary Venezuelan ceramic artist
Up to this point we have seen our topic from the perspective of the relationship between the subjective that cuts and the objective that cuts in a certain material culture, now let's do the same with the relationship between text and context.
According to the different forms of contextualism that we know, an object of material culture, for example a work of contemporary art or again our aboriginal ceramic vessel, must be surrounded and situated by a context that is in itself presupposed as given in advance, This concept of “given in advance” supposes the realistic and representationalist illusion that the context, like a natural landscape, was already there predetermined in this way, and can be captured in its features by a representation. However, we know that the fact that a certain context is there is not the same as referring to it, as soon as we have to communicate to someone else what context we are talking about, especially if that someone does not share the same sense of the context, we are obliged to represent it, but it happens that unlike a natural context, the landscape, let's say, was already there where we see a chiguire that would be our object this time, when it comes to culture, society, economy and language circumstances, communications and social interactions, is not something that came thus predetermined with a form as if brought to the world for the first time and that has a fixed and invariant characteristic for representation, rather it is about meanings and senses that men have assigned, attributed, produced and generated with its subjectivity and expressivity, meanings and meanings that generally do not have the same value nor are they ideologically understood by all the men who have generated it in the same way, therefore, deciding what we put first and in what order , which we subordinate to what and in what ways we communicate contextualist representations, is in itself a textual practice that can only be delivered textually, on the other hand, it is a practice that refers to changing senses and meanings, thus to pass a context cultural by the landscape of the chiguire we have to imagine that the latter can be located in multiple contexts different from the original one, in a snowy landscape, for example, it would not be the same chiguire, in a museum of natural sciences, or in a zoo in a city in the United States, its chiguire objectivity would undoubtedly not be perceived in any of these contexts such as in the Venezuelan fields, in family yards, or in regional zoos.
Furthermore, given that cultural contexts presuppose ideologies, where do we start? What do we situate? The life biography of an artist as context? Or rather what someone else tells us about their life, such as a known relative? or friends who shared moments of their experience in certain passages of their biography? Or rather, on the contrary, an interview with the artist? Or is it about the aboriginal ceramic vessel? Information about the economy and infrastructure of an extinct society whose economic history we assume from manuscripts and scrolls given in reports from travelers and foreign visitors. ?, or from migrated settlers?, according to documents obtained from archives on the signing of Creole treaties?, or do we imagine, as we see the indigenous people live today, how those, presumably descendants, would live?
Pre-Hispanic aboriginal ceramics from Venezuela, courtesy Victoria Galarraga, The Pre-Hispanic Art of Venezuela, book, catalog, national art gallery
Producing representations of contexts is producing textual forms around the questions about the object or artifact of material culture under consideration, it is also producing images about how we should consider the objectivity of such objects, this objectivity is ultimately a result of subjectivity and that subjectivity is specified according to the cut that establishes the parameters of our gaze.
It is not a question, however, with the above, of advocating a merely anarchic hypothesis that, carried by an extreme relativism of the point of view, declares that objects are nothing in themselves as well as contexts or that what we always have are effects as in the special effects of Hollywood, undoubtedly the recurrence of the change of the context of the chiguire or the aboriginal ceramics is not alluded to here to say that any one could be the context and any one our representation of its objectivity, in the same way and with greater For reasons, even the experiences of a social and cultural nature, which are the ones that interest us here, cannot be considered except for those meanings and meanings and as such, moving the parameters does not correspond here with denying senses and meanings that they bring with them, Rather, it is really about understanding that when we choose parameters we give them as if they were natural or given in advance, ignoring that our parameters involve ways of continuing to attribute meanings and meanings given in our view and in the textual, rhetorical, discursive and representations that we take to put them in relation.
Far from an emptying of meaning, it is rather a much more delicate and complex understanding of the extent to which our representations of objectivity are determined by our subjectivity and that the operations through which we choose to present one side, and Above all, reading and interpreting require these understandings.
Ultimately, it is about elucidating that the problems of cultural understanding are much more semiologically linked to what parameters we take as interpretants of what realities, objects, situations, social actors, interactions and here, this time, what forms of material culture.
These approaches in fact resemble in several ways courses, seminars, conferences and theoretical classes that I taught in the first half of the nineties under the title of “The formation of value in material culture”, which I taught in the first half of the nineties. When, after completing my first book, a significant number of my lectures were situated in the perspective of a sociological and semiological axiology focused on the formation of the value of the work of art.
This time, however, the work of art will not be the only or most privileged focus of my attention, but rather the concept of material culture and its expressions.
Those courses, which largely contemplated semiotic theory content combined with sociology of mediation and value, although they covered the analysis of the influence of the media, mediational processes and the collegiate work that goes into the formation of that value, included significant attention also to the analysis of phenomena such as collecting, museology, museography and restoration, but then still in a way, on the one hand, limited to an understanding of contemporary art located in the cultural dynamisms related to its production and its reception, and less so to the repertoire of cataloged or inventoried objects, which in itself makes up that art as an expression of concrete material culture as the latter must be considered not according to those practices that present it and put it on stage, or comment and criticize it, but rather those who classify it, package it, transport it, preserve it and restore it.
This perspective, more focused on the work of art understood as an object of material culture and less as something to be interpreted, when placing the parameters of preservation, conservation and restoration, looks towards culture as I have done in my essay “Performativity in the research” thus moving away from the axiological phenomena related to when the works are considered when the actors of art and the relationships between its poles, artist, curator, critic, theorist, art market, came to the foreground.
This time we strive to articulate a new section, whose preface we have begun with the examples of the text and the context, subjectivity and objectivity, to obtain a much more extensive understanding of material culture that far exceeds the work of contemporary art, including artifacts and forms of culture both seen in the museology prima of the same in anthropology museums and published archaeological catalogues, and in the living culture where that material culture is produced.
It is not the same to land on museological issues when we come from questions organized to capture the dynamism through which the processes of formation of the value of the work of art are configured, nor do we see the collection or the restoration in the same way as those to be considered as when it is seen from the perspective of a material culture that makes up a heritage.
I will therefore bring my axiological theorizations from the first half of the nineties, transferring them to the heritage parameter, and I will argue that it is precisely this perspective that, situated in cultural theory and less so in art theory, makes it easier to move beyond the understanding of formation. from the value of the work of art towards one of the patronage of material culture.
This is the path that places us within the framework of a cultural theory of cultural artifacts in general, encompassing not only symbolic production, that is, crafts and utilitarian arts, but also material culture in general. This, on the one hand, calls for my essay on the material culture of markets in comparison with forms of ritual crafts and on technological material and immaterial culture and tourism, but a more complete framework of cultural anthropology such as this takes shape in my essay “Performativity in research.”
The above also leads us to a series and systematic reconsideration of the formation of the value of that heritage among a much broader variety of social actors ranging from the collector, through the conservator and the restorer, to the specialist who makes the appraisals or certifications considering the work as that concise material tangibility, on the one hand, on the other hand, leads us to consider a more encompassing radius of forms of sponsorship that, although they contemplate art in one of its poles, also encompasses it in an original and peculiar way. domains that range from what Bourdieu has called symbolic distinction, to what James Clifford discussed in his table on the oscillations of the parameters of authenticity in his essay “The collecting of art and culture.”
I will move thus, from a current perspective revisited with new questions, between theoretical seminars that I gave on the one hand at the Mario Abreu Museum of Contemporary Art in 1993 and on the other at the Museum of Popular Art of Petare on my interdisciplinary developments between semiotics of the art, semiotics of culture and postmodern anthropology in 1995.
I will do it, however, from a current, recent itinerary, related to my recent and current circumstance of experience in Venezuela, taking as a starting point a recent stay that I had with my partner and life partner Victoria galarraga (Vicky), a Venezuelan museologist, (his long years of experience in certifications and appraisals together with Jacquelin), in the home and workshop of two valuable conservators, museologists and restorers, also Venezuelans, Ingrid Lucenas and Jose Luis in La Mata.
In the same sense, considered from my experience even before, I go back to 1998 when my colleague and friend, the Venezuelan researcher Manuel Espinosa, with whom in their early careers both Vicky and Ingrid worked from the National Art Gallery of Caracas, wrote to me at my office in the Department of Anthropology at Rice University, School of Social Sciences, sending me a valuable and unpublished collection of slides of aboriginal art in Venezuela in a museological sense.
Allow me to begin this investigation and the discussion that I propose to place in this regard by distinguishing certain discernible and cut-out sets out there in the culture that pre-exist for us and which we have visually available in different registers of experience, as well as inferring and interpreting certain certainties regarding them. invariances and certain axiological differences or singularities.
Let's go back to some of our examples but now concretized, I am thinking, for example, of a set of material and visual culture that could be cut from various perspectives, although not multiple or infinite, as far as the way of its arrangement is concerned, it is of a set that could be presented to us and that we recognize as our memory and sense of archeology remind us, that is, forms of material culture that do not belong to our present culture, articles, objects, goods, utensils, tools, that we know had some utilitarian function, on the one hand, and symbolic or expressive on the other, in an extinct civilization or cultural stage whose signifying and symbolic forms, however, today evoke in us the inveterate feeling of forms of spiritual life from a remote and distant time.
When I speak here about archeology I do so in reference to a certain purity of what we understand as such, that is, the direct relationship between an inferential interpretation of vestiges, remains, traces, fragments, remnants, reminiscences and or groups that, belonging to cultural groups , civilizations or cultures of yesteryear, no longer circulate in our living culture except through those demarcations that archeology itself establishes when it highlights an area of excavations in a territory, or of museology and museography in a certain way of presenting, expose, arrange, stage or illuminate objects of a certain culture that we assume does not exist today, at least in the way it had to behave in its reconstructed stage.
It is true that as far as the object of material and visual culture as such is concerned, archeology is not alone in these ways of demarcating the object as observing it with a deductive, inferential, reconstructive, interpretive curiosity.
A similar demarcation with regard to the ways of relating to the referent reconstructed by subjectivity and the gaze, with objects in their two dimensions, physical/spatial, and signic/symbolic, we can say that is established by the restoration and conservation of that same material culture now understood as heritage, a point of view that interests us most here.
One of the main if not crucial differences between these disciplines, one considered social science, the other considered museological science, is the way in which they relate to our representations about the whole that induce, deduce, interpret, update or reconstruct, archaeology, as In a puzzle that can never be completely composed, it always maintains an inventive, even creative relationship, if we see it with an updated meaning, with all that have not been crystallized beforehand that archaeological research imagines from fragments that never completely stop being traces or residues. , the work with scattered fragments whose belonging to a whole we can never search for by imagining it rather than having it in its original form, works with a relationship between present and past through which the present is uttered or rather restored by investigations of its origin or a trip to the unknown, restoration and conservation, on the contrary, update by interpreting an idea of everything that should not be searched for through traces or fragments whose heterogeneous and not always coincident cuttings, produce ideas of worlds, they, on the contrary, relate to the past with respect to all that do not crystallize in their own temporality understood as that reconstructed in what was but never now and here again, but in that of a current, current and lasting heritage. For contemporary times, both represent different ideas of memory as well as the meanings that the meanings of that memory make to us today.
But at the same time we know that notions used here with a certain rhetorical license, that is, with a hint of semantic indistinction, such as "inferior", "deduce" or "interpreter", presuppose for these related but different domains, restoration, conservation, archaeology, etc. , underlying epistemological problems in terms of science of science and methodology.
If we take an inferentialist, deductivist or interpretivist path with regard to what we think about the process of elucidation, search, research, analysis and hermeneutic understanding, we take paths that imply different presuppositions about science itself, its method and its conditions of possibility. hermeneutics.
This is not here, however, the territory that I am interested in either discussing or focusing on as far as these sciences are concerned, just my interest here, the focus of my attention is rather the type of demarcation that these presuppose in terms of semiological science, in what it refers to a certain way of looking at objects as signs and especially, in what it refers to a certain way of what I call cutting, for looking towards a certain material culture in terms of How do our impressions of objectivity about that material culture, object languages?, artifacts, redoubts or exemplars of an imaginary take shape?
In the same way that discussing the differences between the concepts of cinema that we have in the visual arts, versus the concepts of cinema that we have since the film tradition, I distinguished between a notion of superobject (what the artist seeks from the cinematic image visual that explores it) and another of supersubject (what the cinematographic artist of cinema seeks), or in the same way that I have discussed very different implications about the effects of reality or the degree of reality with which we consider the presuppositions about what It is considered objective or objectivity with respect to that in different types of realism, the differences, for example, between hyperrealism and hyperreality, or between more real than reality, and real less real than reality implicit, for example, in Levis Strauss's concept of realias, my attention here is towards that material culture, not towards the science that studies it in this specific case, although neither less towards that material culture in itself and more towards the images of it that we make as we cut it out as a mode of symbolic interaction between Subjectivity and objectivity allow us to adduce and interrelate paradoxical axiological parameters that intersect with respect to the senses and meanings that this material culture makes to us, to what it means for us and, most importantly, to what emerges removed from an unconscious or unexplained subjacency. on ourselves by clearing and clarifying what are those intertwinings and what are those evaluative paradoxes that are expressed in the different ways in which we cut out the expressions of material culture.
Restoration, conservation and archeology have established for our culture a certain way of paying attention to the objects and images that matter to us here, which, as a way of settling accounts with the three from my sociology of culture, semiology and anthropology, I will call readings. indexicals, something that in turn presupposes what, in my analyzes of fieldwork, and the possibility of bringing these, performatively, there in the field, museological parameters, I have called metonymy in fieldwork.
We know the importance that this notion of metonymy acquired for Jacobson in linguistics as well as its place, no less relevant than that of the indexical sign in Peirce's semiotics, for a certain way of relating to our representations about the whole, a whole that from our perspective It refers to that cultural, semiological or social totality to which the signs, fragments, remnants, residues, indications, are significantly related through senses and meanings with which we work. Let's talk then about indexical readings as a predominant form of research in a metonymic conception of fieldwork.
In the same way as with pop in the visual arts, we have a way of attending to the iconographic image that is far removed from the way we perceive those same images when we are in experiential contact with them on the sensory level of life. everyday life in the city or the mass media, for example, the sensorialism of advertising in the city, exaggerates and accentuates such a relationship with that world of iconic images that empties them of subjectivity, bringing them to an extreme proximity in which they become apparently superobjects. devoid of sensoriality, subjectivity and experience, we obtain through conservation, restoration and archeology a certain way of looking at or cutting out a certain dissection of a certain material and visual culture.
Let us imagine for just a moment here again, ceramic vessels that are either purely utilitarian, more or less decorative, well loaded with some subjective symbolism relative to the transmission and survival of a certain tradition and its rituals in the Venezuelan cultural past in terms of its territorial landscapes. That is to say, the visual framework that makes up the thus understandable material culture of currently non-existent Amerindian peoples that some call with an archaeological touch the aboriginal culture of Venezuela, and others define as pre-Hispanic culture.
Andy Warroll, Campbells tomate
Andy Warroll, Campbells tomate
Two groups cut from the same perspective appear here, one museologized or museographed, the other traversable in natural locations, one treated along classification systems that range from the cataloging and inventory of pieces found in hidden private collections throughout Venezuela, others treasured in museums, which emphasize different forms of utilitarian ceramics, or certain human figures symbolically recreated, the other seems related to forms of pictographic writing, a set that I had the opportunity to visit and tour in person in Carabobo, Puerto Cabello, together with Domingo de Lucia, the first has been reconstructed with high technical precision and symbolist comments by a publication of the national gallery El Arte prehispanico de Venezuela, as well as Traditional Venezuelan Ceramics by the Polar Foundation and the Foundation of Ethnomusicology and Folklore, as well as the other compiled by specialists in museology, museography, conservation and restoration such as Ingrid Lucenas, photographs some of their own production, in conjunction with the efforts of Alesandro Talmonti.
Photography Ingrid Lucenas, courtesy of Ingrid Lucenas of the catalog book written on stone, by Alessandro Talamonti, editorial sanyomit
These two sets of material and visual culture, the first focused on a type of iconography less related to messages, intentional encodings, or cultural communications and more to the religious place that iconographic images play as ritual recreations of the usefulness of these ceramic objects, The second is a type of scriptura and pictographic inscription related to writing and communication, allowing us to distinguish a set or framework of material culture that can be cut into itself.
Photography Ingrid Lucenas, courtesy of Ingrid Lucenas of the catalog book written on stone, by Alessandro Talamonti, editorial sanyomit
The cut, however, it must be pointed out in the form of a question, is properly due to the belonging of these ceramic objects and pictograms, to a certain culture understood as a homogeneous set relatively discernible in terms of cultural stages and eras as all crystallized or before. Well, as I have argued, we must realize the always metonymic relationship between the fragments and the significant construction of an idea of the whole to which they either belong or we produce the meanings and senses as a result of our own investigation.
Are these impressions of all crystallized due to a certain regionalization attributed to them, or is it rather due to the type of view to which they subjectively prepare and predispose us in terms of the meaning of their hypothetical or supposed objectivity?, the relationship to At the same time autonomous and interrelated of these domains related to the conservation, restoration, museology or archeology of these objects, are they not, in the first place, the producers of these images of all cultural?
Photography Ingrid Lucenas, courtesy of Ingrid Lucenas of the catalog book written on stone, by Alessandro Talamonti, editorial sanyomit
When speaking of discernible sets of material culture, we ask, however, whether the type of cutting involved here, involved in our sense of the objectivity of a material culture expressed in our subjectivity, can be equated with the discernments that are possible by the demarcations that we obtain from the material and visual culture itself in its technical dissensions, or through the concepts of imagery and imaginary?
The existing starting publications that we take into consideration here or their mostly spatialized museological forms, especially those related to ceramics, based on technical details on the methods of making, and symbolist inductions, allow us to group these fragments into notions of value for a current sense of the imaginary?
As we should, upon coming into contact with this listed contiguity of visual elements, vases, hieroglyphs, scriptures, pictograms, human figures, with these fragments of all to which we do not have access in our own current culture, put in relation the distinctions made above among the ways in which archeology produces a meaning always attributed to an extinct past reconstructively followed by an inventive search of all imagined, and failing that, the ways in which conservation and restoration museologize the updating of a past into a current and contemporary idea of current heritage in memory, assume the relationship between metonymies and totalities when our questions go from technical continuities, earth, clay, stone, pictogram, baking, to cultural questions of visual culture such as imagery and imaginary?
Should we accept these images as current and valid in our cultural imagination? And are they, if considered part of the imaginary, alive in our current culture even when their geological and cultural stage refers to extinct cultures or dead evolutionary phases?
Pre-Hispanic aboriginal ceramics from Venezuela, courtesy Victoria Galarraga, The Pre-Hispanic Art of Venezuela, book, catalog, national art gallery
There is no doubt that here we have an important distinction in terms of cultural theory, the demarcations that distinguish distinct and relatively autonomous sets of imagery, refer to forms of traditional visual culture that, wrapped in traditions that are alive in our cultural present, what has been said can be established clearly when we understand that the imagery, for example, of traditional, folkloric art, produced by the Venezuelan naive culture, also by many designated as primitive art, refers to celebrations, stagings and subjectivations that can be found in oral traditions today there in the towns, cities and cultural enclaves where the creators of those images and figures live.
Popular art, naife or primitive Venezuelan, Collection Museum of Popular Art of Petare, Caracas
Popular art, naife or primitive Venezuelan, Collection Museum of Popular Art of Petare, Caracas
Popular, naive or primitive Venezuelan art, Ingrid Lucenas and Jose Luis Collection, the mata, photography Abdel Hernandez San Juan, 2024
Should we then deny the meaning of imagery to the two groups referred to above relating to aboriginal ceramics and geological scriptures on stone and natural formations?, due to the fact that the angle view presupposes the archaeological view with everything that in this traces back via remains, remnants, reminiscences, traces, redoubts, fragments, well from the perspective of conservation and restoration, their technical qualities, that is, the fact that they are made of mud and clay, sewn or glazed in some way with certain techniques, which does it allude to a material culture relative to dead cultural forms?
And what can we say about the Amerindian communities living in Venezuelan culture? Should we treat as part of a given material culture the objectivity auscultated or observed with reconstructive magnifying glasses of extinct artifacts only designated by museology, or rather should we look towards these last because they are alive as images?
Would we be willing, for example, to accept as imagery, the material and visual culture alive today, Wayu, their fabrics, their amahacas, their costumes, their backpacks, their ceramics?, and even their facial paintings, or would we rather establish an additional subdivision? to the one already made between material culture and imagery, now between extinct material culture and living material culture?
Are notions such as Aboriginal culture versus indigenous culture appropriate here? From a point of view of cultural anthropology of the contemporary, of the simultaneous present and its contemporaneousness, are they not perhaps the suburban material and visual culture, sometimes urban and sometimes rural, of the traditional, folkloric and naive Venezuelan symbolic production, in a On the other hand, and that contemporary Wayu material and visual culture, more interconnected relatives, more intertwined and interrelated expressions than that which could be established between current indigenous material culture and aboriginal culture?
Wayu culture, la guajira, Venezuela
Wayu culture, la guajira, Venezuela
Wayu culture, la guajira, Venezuela
Wayu culture, la guajira, Venezuela
Here we are not dealing with ethnological distinctions, which would lead us to all refer to metanarratives such as pre-Hispanicity and its racial continuity, indigeneity, so that the latter would have to be seen as a current and evolved form of a continuous diachronic line of the same ethnicity. or race by descent, rather it is about understanding that these indigenous communities today share more elements with traditional, folkloric and naive culture than with that Aboriginal past, but above all, addressing the fact that when we cut back on a certain material culture we do not We only cut out something that it is in itself with what it brings with it on our referential and denotative presuppositions of belonging, region and territory, but above all on what these mean and on the meaning they make to us as well as on how the way in That we cut them speak about ourselves.
Pre-Hispanic aboriginal ceramics from Venezuela, courtesy Victoria Galarraga, The Pre-Hispanic Art of Venezuela, book, catalog, national art gallery
But the question is this, the interactions between the latter and that indigenous material culture, do they support us to declare the latter as an imagery?
Would we be willing to risk the axiological parameter that would declare current indigenous material culture as an imagery? And if so?, what would be their relationship, once accepted as a living culture, in the same way that I have discussed it at a sociolinguistic level between Amerindian languages and Venezuelan Spanish, its place in an understanding of the imaginary?
Pre-Hispanic aboriginal ceramics from Venezuela, courtesy Victoria Galarraga, The Pre-Hispanic Art of Venezuela, book, catalog, national art gallery
We would then exclude from the imagery and the imaginary any form of material and visual culture that is not alive today, for example, in an entirely different direction, the visual iconography of the colonial past expressed in architecture, in heritage, in the city, but also in changing rooms, furniture, spatially evoked customs, etc?
Photography Ingrid Lucenas, courtesy of Ingrid Lucenas of the catalog book written on stone, by Alessandro Talamonti, editorial sanyomit
If we take the path, for example, that, momentarily removed from its museology and its museography for conservation, restoration or archaeological exhibition, it has generalized through the mass media and the standardized and massified educational books a certain image of the Mayan and Aztec codices, should we accept those images that people have made with their stereotypes, as imagery or imaginary?
If we notice that the notion of imaginary refers to what it means for us and the place it has in our cultural subjectivity, we are not talking about something culturally alive in us even when it is not as we assume in the referential culture. To which do those images refer?
Photography Ingrid Lucenas, courtesy of Ingrid Lucenas of the catalog book written on stone, by Alessandro Talamonti, editorial sanyomit
Undoubtedly, no one uses codices to communicate, not even in the indigenous languages that are still alive in current communities. Seen this way, they are extinct cultural forms that are referred to the objectivity of a memory external to that material culture and do not endogenate to current forms. of cultural transmission, but if these images circulate among us through the mass media, do they not become integrated in our imagination in the same way?
Questions like this relativize the fact that the demarcations of the imaginary must be referred solely to the notion of living culture, or rather we would have to say that what is alive in the culture of subjectivity that cuts down on the other objectivity of a material culture does not always necessarily have It has to be in its own objectivity, but the concept of objectivity here goes through an inevitable auscultation. Do we call objective an impression about the thingness or existence of something for our cultural subjectivity or rather do we call objectivity the objective existence of that material culture? , if it in itself no longer belongs to a culture that is transmitted by endogenous ties to existing communities, is it not perhaps the budget cut in what restoring, conserving or archaeologizing means for the subjectivity of our own culture, the way in which than the culture of that material culture that we assume is dead, the one that provides us with a certain idea of objectivity?
And does it not happen when, through a history of the tradition of certain physical technicalities, ways of processing clay and sewing it, baking it, drawing it, etc., artifacts and objects from extinct civilizations are presented, which are communicated via the telluric impressions of the validity of the same material and its uses today in the home, daily life or creation workshops, a connection of those with the current imagination?
Aren't these objects detached as fragments whose new contiguity is none other than that of these sciences as a certain form of vocabulary subject to the types of objectivity effects that we attribute to them according to our presentational and representational rhetorics, our subjective frameworks and the patterns of our gaze, exposed to operations that, semiologically understood, are producing effects in the current semiosis of our culture?
If what makes culture as it begins in language and communication are nothing other than senses and meanings, we are not producing these, perhaps producing aspects of our culture wrapped in the infinite semiosis that spins and weaves senses and meanings. When dealing with images of objects and materials, even when the latter maintain, insofar as referential or denotative idexicalities and deixticalities, a relationship with forms of material culture that we consider relative to extinct civilizations?
What is at stake here about cultural and symbolic, intercultural and transcultural interactions between our current Western stage and the work in cultural semiosis with images of extinct cultures that can be metonymically related in one way or another according to the subjective parameters that weave our representations and presentations at the rhetorical level, it is not much different if we see it with greater distance from the dilemma about primitivism and its debate raised by the well-known exposition of Moma on this topic, something induced or at least, with all the criticisms that have been leveled at it. fact, brought about by that anthological exhibition on primitivism in the Moma.
That exhibition, we asked, revealed true internal links between the visual imagery of the avant-garde in art and ritual expressions of tribal material culture, or was it merely comparative observations on similarities, similarities and analogies, did it produce in us that image that altered by means of senses and meanings wrapped in the mode of its museological and museographic rhetorical presentation, that new image of both the early avant-garde in the arts and the ritual art of tribal cultures?
Exhibition on primitivism in the Moma, catalogue, thanks to the courtesy of Alberto Mendez Suarez, Fundación Caminos: advanced sciences theories, cultural anthropology, museology and art, Florida and Caracas, (Abdel Hernandez San Juan and Alberto Mendez Suarez), 2024
Undoubtedly, in the same way that for the conservator and restorer, restoring a heritage of material and visual culture, and let us now think not only of artifacts of tribal culture, but also of colonial architectural heritage and the reference to other religious cultures, becomes significant. Due to the meaning that it has for the culture that restores, conserves, classifies, reconstructs, searches for an original or its versions, or archaeology, attention to tribal artifacts has meaning and meaning for the representations that we have wanted to make through the exhibition. about primitivism in moma around these possible relationships.
On the one hand, we know that in light of a certain disillusionment of modernity due to everything that, from Heiddenger himself, it implied such as existential emptiness or emptying of being, hostility to sensitivity, the departure of many avant-garde artists towards tribal cultures towards the sense and meant for that modern urban or suburban culture a certain ritual idea of the human, a certain sense of communion that it idealized and sought for and from its own subjectivity.
Exhibition on primitivism in the Moma, catalogue, thanks to the courtesy of Alberto Mendez Suarez, Fundación Caminos: advanced sciences theories, cultural anthropology, museology and art, Florida and Caracas, (Abdel Hernandez San Juan and Alberto Mendez Suarez), 2024
Whether the reception of tribal art had greater or lesser impact or was more or less inspired by avant-garde art, the truth is that whatever the answer, the question, influence, mere analogy, the search, the interrogation, the investigation. and the analysis of how to understand the relationships between subjectivity and objectivity, understanding our subjectivity and what we understand by the objectivity of the material culture in question, oscillates as a component of the interaction itself and less as something given in advance according to an order separable from the budget cut by the gaze and the modes of inference, deduction, attention, focus, sensoriality, culture
.
Exhibition on primitivism in the Moma, catalogue, thanks to the courtesy of Alberto Mendez Suarez, Fundación Caminos: advanced sciences theories, cultural anthropology, museology and art, Florida and Caracas, (Abdel Hernandez San Juan and Alberto Mendez Suarez), 2024
A highly precise investigation there in culture and here in our demarcations of that, if we think of an endogenously alive culture within the imaginary of our own Western and modern, contemporary society, leads us, as I have pointed out elsewhere, not to let go of the notion of imaginary. Detaching it from the notion of imagery, the first appears as an immaterialized expression in our culture of the latter, but a research that seeks the objectivity of the latter as if we were trying to define them by themselves according to lines drawn by their own taxonomic characteristics. It leads us to questions.
Exhibition on primitivism in the Moma, catalogue, thanks to the courtesy of Alberto Mendez Suarez, Fundación Caminos: advanced sciences theories, cultural anthropology, museology and art, Florida and Caracas, (Abdel Hernandez San Juan and Alberto Mendez Suarez), 2024
The imagery, for example, of the carnival is thus presented as visually delimited and unmistakable with respect to other imagery; we could say that vernacularized symbolic representations are inserted within it resulting from profane assimilations of popular aesthetics in which the grotesque, the exaggeration and even the Sometimes it parodies the meaning of certain symbols, but such images given in the carnival physically expressed, we know how to delimit and separate them from how those same images are expressed in other forms of celebration and ceremony less autonomous from religious rituals such as parades, parties, anniversaries of virgins. or saints, processions and other expressions of folklore in which music, dance and a similar material culture also appear.
With a similar criterion we learn to separate Afro-Christian and Afro-Caribbean or simply African-American imagery attached to African religions reinscribed in the Americas, when we perceive it as directly linked to religious or magical practices linked to religious initiations or to altars and reliquaries of attention to orichas. than when we see some of its elements expressed in a material and visual culture that incorporates the African American in the theatricalized expressions of folklore or tourism.
It is true that keeping the concepts of imagery and imaginary together subjects the latter to certain expressions of visual material culture when we know that their immaterialization can acquire in the spiritualized dimension of the former a relative non-subjection to material culture, but the imaginary does not can become independent of visual imagery only through forms of expressive imagination that, subject to recreations of the individual imagination or the unconscious, no longer refer to those sources or starting points, so, for example, we could analyze how the images of religion or cultural traditions in the expressions of surrealism, as well as pointing out that to a large extent the limits between what we consider surrealism from the point of view of the aesthetic avant-garde and what we consider a surreal, magical or imaginary imagination of culture popular ones tend to be very similar and even at times the lines between one thing and the other are not always completely clear.
I would like to give empirical examples here, distinguishing between surrealism as an avant-garde aesthetic and surrealism as an expression of an imagination of popular culture in terms of the way in which certain symbolic images of tradition appear, definable as surreal, but what I am interested in highlighting is that even Once the domains are separated, the intricacies between subjectivity and objectivity in the analysis of any form or expression of material culture are not so referable to the objectivity of a measurable and tangible physical appraisal, with respect to the latter they become the senses and meanings that for subjectivity Those images make us and, above all, the way in which we cut them from our subjectivity, those that play a greater place of relevance in the type of objectivity that we attribute to them.
Thus, returning to my previous examples, we can put aside here the ceramics considered or thus classified by conservation, restoration and archaeological museography, as relating to extinct peoples united to us by the same region or geography, such as the objectivity that We attribute it to aboriginal ceramics, but if our emphasis is on clay, sewing and enamel techniques, or methods of decoration, we cannot remove these images from their relationship with the museological imagination that cuts them from and for our own subjectivity, of phenomena for example installations of modern ceramics, nor can we simply declare them pre-Hispanic and as such separated from a post-Hispanic imaginary, perhaps declaring them imagery could remain in doubt since they are not part of the material culture of a form of living culture seen archaeologically, but if from the moment in which according to the museology of conservation and restoration we see them as heritage for their meanings for memory and their evocative force, we could not completely separate them from our imagination which here would be made up of which means we treasure them, look at them with the magnifying glasses of museology, inventory them as heritage or read them as we conserve or restore them.
Likewise, we cannot so clearly separate the aboriginal scripturalities from our own images of what writing is and its origin or genesis, our own writing, and as such, separate it from our imagination about the latter if we see it in the sense that I have discussed. , after a great effort of semantic theory in my analyses, for example, of how to read the scriptural in the work of a contemporary artist like Luis Alberto Hernandez, (A Scriptural Reading).
The question about the origin of writing in its relationship with the concepts of scriptura and inscription could be suggested here.
According to our most common meanings, such as those that we obtain from this type of attention to the pictographic script on stones in the Carabobo landscape by aboriginal artists or writers, as well as those images that we have obtained about the pictogram and its relationship through the script through civilizations such as the Mesoamerican Mayan, Aztec, or Mesopotamian or Egyptian, even if we don't go that far, in the very contemporaneity of the hexagram as a non-alphabetic pictographic scriptural form in languages and scriptural forms of writing such as Japanese, Chinese and that of other current cultures of the East, writing as a form of language was due to greater progressive differentiation, more highly differentiated cultures arrived at writing before those less differentiated ones. This hypothesis, based on the one hand on the significant complexity of writing in terms of convention, its graphemic distance from oral spontaneity or the speaking voice, and the link to be assumed by the latter to the extraverbal universe of gestures, these latter and their pictographic visual expressions have been assumed to be primitive.
Supposedly the first culture was expressed in gestures and images according to which the principles of mimesis or mimetics through which we represent things with gestures and images by analogy must have preceded writing.
However, the increasing propensity of alteredly differentiated modernity as expressed in new technologies tends again to gesture and the pictogram over writing, the latter, from the greater parameter less differentiation awarded to its non-imitation and its independence. conventional of the referent, seemed more differentiated.
Nowadays, however, this supposed high differentiation of writing is presented as atavistic, exposed to mechanisms that are too slow and elaborate according to the high differentiation of culture that, through technology, tends to make our civilization increasingly iconic and pictographic. modern as well as less scriptural our culture of high speeds of communication.
Here we have again the question of subjectivity and objectivity that has focused my attention. Is it perhaps that technologies mimic elementary principles of communication given in the technical nature of their basis as much as they represent a certain return to the ritual dimension of the experience? Many things speak in favor of this last hypothesis, minimalism itself and the return to a certain simplification attest to this, but what is here at the center of my attention is nothing other than once again the question about how the parameters that They organize the ways of cutting our subjectivity, they decisively color what we consider objective and subjective. Questions such as what is the origin of writing, or those of Derrida in his writings on the linguistic circle of Geneva on how a culture can have been born without first having a language, or of that return implied by language with respect to nature and conversely, how something like language could have arisen without culture, are, without a doubt, ultimate questions, something that is not the focus of my analysis in this essay. The question addressed here does not refer to there being an ultimate truth such as response to ultimate questions, undoubtedly our considerations of objectivity have frequently been associated with what we understand as scientificity or demonstrability that our developments are not speculative but closer to the truth, meanwhile, paradoxically, when we come across examples like this of writing and the pictogram, we ask ourselves in what ways we can assign or accept our representations of objectivity as belonging to the objects of our attention and not as implied in the subjectivity of our representations.
If the answer to the question that came first, the visual image as occurs in the oriental hexagram or alphabetic writing, were so simple to answer, we could perhaps know on which side a sense of the objective attached to an idea of truth or truth would be here. truly assignable to the objects of our questions, but because taking as objective a criterion of differentiation based on limited assumptions, or on the contrary one of mimesis based on its gestural analogism and oral extraverbality, leads us to conclusions that return to be the object of questions again, we know that the objective in some cases can be to understand how writing emerges from the image as much as the latter could emerge from the former.
Is this perhaps how the relationship between all or that of space and time is a Kantian antinomy?
If we pay attention to the semantic and conceptual differences between the concepts of scriptura or scripturality and that of inscription or inscripturality, perhaps we will have answers to these last questions if at least relevant distinctions about presupposed differences in our parameters of subjectivity to take paths that are more certain. of its measurable eloquence and as much as possible of how subjectivity and objectivity are exchanged or related dialectically. Indeed, both inscriptions of inscriptura and scriptura emphasize different things in relation to the same referent, the first emphasizes that this grapheme or that mark is a memory that fixes something, which undoubtedly fixes whether that mark is alphabetic and not a hexagram or pictogram, it comes in the inscription via convention, that is, via a substitutive symbolism that does not bring with it mimetic analogies of its object in terms of images of that object, which requires more than in the case of refractive, reflective, refractory or iconic reflective languages. , master the symbolic conventions of that language semantically intricate in senses and meanings, but the inscription as such is nothing other than the memory of a language that also has a verbal experience in what the relationship with that memory is concerned, thus the Differentiation criterion here would be more associated with how that culture is memorized and memorized through that language and its writing, while undoubtedly at a cognitive level remembering orally is not the same as doing it through writing, the latter can travel alone without the displacement of bodies, it can be transported and sent, while such a memory presupposes at the same time an evacuation of meanings associated with contextual and situational networks implicit in oral speech that would in a certain way go to minimalization or oblivion when a transmission is carried out. cultural memory in this way, the inscription, even, considered in this way, also leads us to the idea of annotation, leaving a record, retaining what is proper to the ethnographic understanding of language and writing here understanding ethnography as a science in the work of field not in reference to ethnology or the ethnic.
Scripturality, on the other hand, refers more to a certain visual economy. The inscription is textual, the scriptura is visual and iconic, in this way scriptura refers us to those aspects of writing that are linked via grapheme to the mimetic and iconic content of writing as inscription to its textual content related to the non-visual memory that It is supposed writing. Seen in this way, the scriptura or script to which these aboriginal drawings refer us tells us about the connection of writing with the gesture and the imitative or iconic image, the inscription to its relationship with voice and memory.
The examples that I am giving up to here still remain within a certain endogenous purity in terms of the parameter of internality to a culture that we take into consideration to evaluate it for what it is in itself as a material culture, but our analyzes on subjectivity and objectivity They become even more subtle, refined and subtle if, far from considering all relatively crystallized cultural material according to a region or the effects of texts and contexts resulting from the subjective parameters that angle and structure our ways of looking at what These we produce a certain idea of objectivity subjectively produced by senses and meanings, we think for example about how these things are presented and represented in different ways in spatial scenes of the city that involve consumption activities closely related to tourism, or if we think in ways of collecting that cannot be referred, from the consideration of the objects themselves, to totalities supposed to be assured by regionalities or established cultural subjects, such as, for example, notions such as decades, fashions, generations, customs, the inventions of museums for tourism Like those developed around certain people in culture, I think of the Elvis Presley museum about which I had the opportunity to write about a project by Lihie Talmor and her daughter Ruti Talmor in the United States, their cars and their house. birth, or in that same vein, inventions resulting from collecting about decades, fashions or customs, for example, collecting forms of advertising from the sixties, or photographs of film actors of the period, even moving more towards collecting based on collection, the so-called antique shops where objects are collected sometimes barely according to customs in the home or in the body, collections of old records or of stamps and stamps, or of porcelain objects, or of coins, or antique watches, we thus extend from institutionalized museological and museographic concepts towards territories of an urban culture that collects itself and that nevertheless continue to be exposed to restorations, conservations and inventories that are part of our daily life and that allude to different temporalities which in turn respond to museological classifications, I am referring here to another territory of the visual culture artifact equally analyzable within the relativism of surrealism that we referred to before, but now from meanings such as that discussed by James Clifford.
What is in question here is nothing more than that to the same extent that the material culture we are dealing with forms part of our own cultural heritage and less of a culture that can be traced back to remote times or to ethnocentrically considered ethnicities, less contrasted and The parameters of objectivity are more interchangeable according to our parameters of subjectivity to consider a tangible material culture.
In this sense, not without first advancing a crucial distinction in cultural theory between the subjective understood versus the objective and the concept of subjectivity understood culturally, that is, when we analyze and put our forms of subjectivity as forms of culture in the focus of attention. .
In the analyzes in which I am focusing on the concept or notion of the subjective as opposed to its counterpart or opposite, the objective is not about, much as in another sense it has been opposed in certain history of philosophy to the idealism of materialism, but rather, our subjectivity and its forms become cultural formations that we must understand and study.
A clear example of the scope of the concept of subjectivity for cultural theory can be found in the consequences that derive from avoiding the criticism of commodity fetishism understood as a mere ideological criticism towards the analysis of how the concept of commodity fetishism I tried to place it broken down and objectified in terms of an analysis of the modes of cultural subjectivity and its logical and semiological figures that emerge when subjectivity has been imbued by the principles of merchandise and consumption from which, for example, notions such as reification derive. , kitch, palimpsest, imitation, pastiche, among others
In fact, I have written this essay largely based on a performative experience. On the one hand, I began to conceive my ideas for writing it during a stay that my life partner, Victoria Galarraga, and I had in La Mata, on the outskirts of from the city of Caracas beyond the hatillo.
When I saw myself there in front of nature in the home of two specialists in conservation and restoration, observing their collections and listening to Ingrid talk about the experience that makes her one of the most outstanding in conservation in Venezuela, I told Vicky my desire and intention to write it out.
The scene I am referring to was linked to an old motivation to extend my writings on Venezuelan art and culture towards the field of specialists who went beyond the artists who played a relevant place in the socioculturality of Venezuelan culture since the nineties. , Vicky and Ingrid, are two representative examples of this, one from their experiences of appraisals and certifications of works of art, practicing since the nineties a professional exercise in the axiology of art from a perspective that sees works museologically as expressions of heritage material culture. , that is, the works physically considered by the way in which their evaluative parameters oscillate between the authentic and the inauthentic, and these parameters can be relatively fixed on the museological scale, the same goes for Ingrid from the point of view of adequate conservation precautions. for works in museums and the methods of their physical conservation.
I am thinking of recent appraisals and certifications by Vicky and Jacquelin when they have had to move between very different territories of visual culture, from a realist work representing Simon Bolivar, to expressions of neo-expressionism by a visual artist like Alirio Rodriguez.
On the one hand, it is a series of everyday objects of the type I am referring to belonging to the collection of Ingrid and José Luis, from colonial antiques to works of modern art, and a visit to the launch of a book on culinary amazonica in a gastronomy institute where we taste indigenous foods from the Amazon treated in a commercial context.
Conservation and restoration workshop by Ingrid Lucenas and Jose Luis, La Mata, photography Abdel Hernandez San Juan, 2024
The writing scene, Object in the collection of Ingrid Lucenas and Jose Luis, la mata, el hatillo, Caracas, photography Abdel Hernandez San Juan, 2024
The Writing Scene, Object in the collection of Ingrid Lucenas and Jose Luis, La Mata, El Hatillo, Caracas
The writing scene, Object in the collection of Ingrid Lucenas and Jose Luis, La Mata, El Hatillo, Caracas, Photography Victoria Galarraga
Object in the collection of Ingrid Lucenas and Jose Luis, La Mata, El Hatillo, Caracas, photography Abdel Hernandez San Juan, 2024
Object in the collection of Ingrid Lucenas and Jose Luis, La Mata, El Hatillo, Caracas, Photography Abdel Hernandez San Juan, 2024
In the background Victoria galarraga, Venezuelan museologist and researcher, photograph Abdel Hernandez San Juan, 2024
In front, Objects in the collection of Ingrid Lucenas and Jose Luis, La Mata, El Hatillo, Caracas
Object in the collection of Ingrid Lucenas and Jose Luis, La Mata, El Hatillo, Caracas, photography Abdel Hernnadez San Juan, 2024
Victoria galarraga, Venezuelan museologist and researcher, la Mata, photograph, abdel Hernandez san juan, 2024
Victoria Galarraga, Venezuelan museologist and researcher, La mata, photo by Abdel Hernandez San Juan, 2024
Victoria Galarraga, Venezuelan museologist and researcher, La mata, photo by Abdel Hernandez San Juan, 2024
Victoria Galarraga, Venezuelan museologist and researcher, La mata, photo by Abdel Hernandez San Juan, 2024
Victoria Galarraga, Venezuelan museologist and researcher, La mata, photo by Abdel Hernandez San Juan, 2024
House and conservation and restoration workshop of Ingrid Lucenas and Jose Luis, La Mata, photography Abdel Hernandez San Juan, 2024
Victoria Galarraga, Venezuelan museologist and researcher, la mata, photo Victoria galarraga, 2024
The writing scene, Abdel Hernnadez San Juan and Victoria Galarraga, la mata, 2004
Jose Luis, Venezuelan museology, curator and museographer, la mata, 2024
Ingrid Lucenas, Venezuelan museologist, conservator and restorer, photography Abdel Hernandez San Juan
s
According to James Clifford and we will assume in this part of our analysis his table, what he calls the system of art and culture can be understood as a machinery for the production of authenticity.
Between the authentic and the inauthentic located at both ends above/below of the table James Clifford places the authentic and the inauthentic, at the left and right ends of his table he places the notions of masterpiece, on one side, and artifact on the other, Within the box, the notions of art/original/singular appear on the left, on the right the notion of culture/traditional/collective, further down within the box again on the left under art the notions of non-culture/incommon. and on the right not art/reproduction/commerce, again leaving the box in its external tangents, Clifford places on the left above, the notions of the art museum/the art market, on the right, history/folklore, the ethnographic museum , material culture/craft, in the same way symmetrically at the bottom left inventions/museum of technologies, ready mades and anti-art, on the right, tourist art/commodities/collections of curiosities and utilities.
I consider this painting by James Clifford about the system of art and culture crucial and highly relevant to what I am discussing. (James Clifford Pp224/225, the predicament of culture, Harvard university press).
Grades
This essay, chapter of a book in preparation, was conceived, composed and written between La Mata and Caracas with the collaboration of the Venezuelan museologist and researcher Victoria Galarraga in the coordination of the experience that led to it, as well as in the photography and the scene. of writing and exchanges, visual support material and photographs, as well as with the collaboration of museologists, conservators and restorers Ingrid Lucenas and Jose Luis in the stay space, as well as with photographs and visual support material. Finally with the collaboration of my colleague, the analytical philosopher Alberto Mendez Suarez, with supporting visual material.
Bibliography
Bourdieu Pierre, The distinction
Clifford James, Art and Culture Collecting, Dilemmas of Culture, Gedisa
Clifford James, The Colecting of Art and Culture, The Predicament of Culture, Harvard university press
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The World Correlate, Gyan Books, india, new delhi
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Thinking Science, Gyan Books, india, new delhi
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Performativity in research, Rethinking intertextuality: research method in sociology of culture
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Semiotics of art, semiotics of culture and postmodern anthropology: an interdisciplinary perspective, six-month seminar given at the Petare Popular Art Museum
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Art of Intermediaries, three-month seminar given at the Mario Abreu Museum of Contemporary Art
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Material and immaterial Culture, Semantic Elucidation: Semiotic, sociolinguistic and semantic theory of culture
Maury Abraham Marquez, Traditional Venezuelan Ceramics, Polar Foundation and Foundation of Ethnomusicology and Folklore
Rubin William, Primitivism in XX century Art. Affinities of the tribal and the modern, volumen, the museum of modern art of new York
Shutz Alfred, the formulation of our problem: the methodological concepts of Max Weber, PP, 33-74, the meaningful construction of the social world, introduction to comprehensive sociology, prologue by Joan Carles Melish, ilse shutz, Paidós, basic, 1993
Shutz Alfred, the formulation of our problem: the methodological concepts of Max Weber, PP, 33-74,
Shutz Alfred, Phenomenology of the social world: introduction to comprehensive sociology, introduction George Walsh, paidos publishing house, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Shutz Alfred, the meaningful construction of the social world, introduction to comprehensive sociology, prologue by Joan Carles Melish, ilse shutz, Paidós, basic, 1993
Shutz Alfred, Phenomenology of the social world: introduction to comprehensive sociology, introduction George Walsh, paidos publishing house, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Shutz, common sense and the scientific interpretation of human action, the problem of social reality
Talamonti Alessandro, Written on Stone, the history of mindkind, editorial sanyomit, C.A
Wagner Erica, Lourdes Blanco, Miguel Arroyo, The Pre-Hispanic Art of Venezuela, National Art Gallery,
Epilogue
I conceived this book, composed it and wrote it between Havana and Caracas, the first two chapters were written in Havana, and the rest in Caracas, it covers an important transition or change in my life that highlights from July 2023 the beginning I have written about my partner in life with Victoria Galarraga, (Vicky) at her side, writing in our home in Caracas, in Los Caobos with a beautiful view of Mount Avila, it also covers an unforgettable stay that we both did at Ingrid Lucenas' house and José Luis in La Mata, a couple from the same professional area as Vicky (Venezuelan museologist and researcher), a house in nature in a rural environment where we relaxed and I had the opportunity to meet and listen to the experience of these valuable museologists, conservators and restorers who also make editions and curators. From La mata I conceived the last part of the book. I want to especially thank several people who have been crucial to my writing process, first to Vicky, my partner and life partner, to whom I dedicate it, but also to my sister Nahila Hernandez San Juan for her support in my writing. change of life, for the same reasons to Morela Galarraga, Vicky's sister, to Ingrid and Jose Luis in La Mata, to my friend and colleague the analytical philosopher Alberto Mendez Suarez in Florida, and to my friend and colleague in visual artist, professor and reflexologist Ernesto León, without the support of these people this work would not have been able to reach its writing or its final form.
General bibliography
Berger Peter L. and Thomas Luckman, The foundations of knowledge in everyday life, pp, 34-63, The social construction of reality, amorrortu editors
Bourdieu Pierre, things said, gedisa
Bourdieu Pierre, Distinction, criteria and social bases of taste, taurus
Clifford James, Art and Culture Collecting, Dilemmas of Culture, Gedisa
Clifford James, The Colecting of Art and Culture, The Predicament of Culture, Harvard university press
Deleuze, Gilles, The Fold, Leibniz and the Barroque, the university of Minnesota press
Deleuze, Gilles, The fold, Leibniz and the baroque, Paidós studio
Deleuze Gillez, Empiricism and subjectivity, an essay un hume theory of human nature, Columbia university press
Derrida Jacques, Form and Wishes to Said, Note on the phenomenology of language, margins of philosophy, the university of Chicago press
Derrida, Jacques, Form and Meaning, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language, Margins of Philosophy, Cathedra, 1989 Derrida Jacques, Genesis and Structure: Of Phenomenology, Anthropos
Derrida Jacques, The Geneva Linguistic Circle, 175-192, margins of philosophy, chair
Derrida Jacques, Notes on the Phenomenology of Language, Pp, 195-212, margins of philosophy, chair
Eugenio Quetzil, letter to Abdel Hernandez San Juan (sended to transart foundation as artistic director), Lake Forest College, Faculty of Sociology and anthropology, Lake Forest College, Illinois, USA, 1999
Eugenio, Quetzil The Invisible theater of Ethnography: Performative Principles of Fieldwork, The Open School of Anthropology and Ethnography, Anthropological Quarterly 79 (I)75-104, USA, also distributed at los mil y un textos, editado por Desiderio Navarro, criterios
Eugenio Quetzil, The Neoliberal imperative of tourism, vol 34, no 3, pp 47-51, summer 2012
Eugenio Quetzil, Art Writing in the modern Maya art world of chichen itza, Transcultural ethnography and experimental fieldwork, American Ethnologist, Open School of Ethnography and Anthropology, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 21–42, Universidad autonoma de Yucatan, 2004
Eugenio Quetzil, Between Pure and Applied Research: Experimental Ethnography in a Transcultural tourist Art World, Napa Bulletin, 23: 87-118
Eco umberto, the ground, The universe of meaning, Pp, 62-136, the absent structure, lumen
Eco umberto, the semiotization of the referent, 77-81, The universe of meaning, Pp, 62-136, the absent structure, lumen
Eco umberto, the mistake of the referent, 66-70,
Eco umberto, interpretant, ground, meaning, object, Lector in Fabula, the semiotic foundations of textual cooperation,
Eco umberto, El ground, 44-46, Pierce, the semiotic foundations of textual cooperation, Lector in Fabula, 40-72
Eco umberto, Denotation in a semiotic perspective, 94-101, The universe of meaning, the absent structure, lumen
Eco Umberto, Connotation in a semiotic perspective, 101-106, The universe of meaning, Pp, 62-136, the absent structure, lumen
Eco umberto, Dynamic object and immediate object, 46-48, Pierce, the semiotic foundations of textual cooperation, Lector in Fabula, 40-72
Eco umberto, The Absent structure, lumen
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The World Correlate, Gyan books, india, new delhi
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Thinking Science, Gyan books, india, new delhi
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Overordination in the worlds of life, The Intramundane Horizon
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Between the Acervo and the backgrounds, Self and Acervo
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Dialectique of evocation, pp, Thinking Science: new Phenomenological avenues between philosophy and sociology, Gyan Books
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Performativity in research, Rethinking intertextuality: research method in sociology of culture
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Semiotics of art, semiotics of culture and postmodern anthropology: an interdisciplinary perspective, six-month seminar given at the Petare Popular Art Museum
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Art of Intermediaries, three-month seminar given at the Mario Abreu Museum of Contemporary Art
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Material and immaterial Culture, Semantic Elucidation: Semiotic, sociolinguistic and semantic theory of culture
Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Textual inference: The object language/Semiotics, sociology and semantics of culture, Semantic Elucidation: Semiotic, sociolinguistic and semantic theory of culture
Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Science of Logic London: Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929
Hegel, Science of Logic, Logic of Being, Logic of Essence, Logic of the Concept, Axete
Hegel, reality, science of logic, axe
Hegel, the foundation, science of logic, hatchet
Hegel, the living individual, science of logic, axe
Hegel, life, science of logic, axe
Logan Joy, transculturation and affect in the l2 classroom: Teaching English and ethnography in the Yucatan, University of Hawaii at manoa, usa, published at www.osea-cite.org, For OSEA matters please use quetzil@osea-cite.org
Muguenza Javier, Contemporary sociological theory, techno
Mendez Suarez Alberto and Abdel Hernandez San Juan, Counterpoints: Philosophical Dialogues, book in preparation 2022/2023
Mendez Suarez Alberto and Abdel Hernandez San Juan, Rumbos: Explorations in cultural anthropology, book in preparation, 2023/2024
Mendez Suarez Alberto, Wittgentein: from the philosophy of language to the interpretation of culture, Pp 15-37. Culture and Value, Ludwig Wittgenstein, posthumous notes, Exodus
Mendez Suarez Alberto, Overcoming detours of Mind-Body dilemma through Quine-Duhem holism revisited, university international of florida
Natanson Maurice, introduction, Pp 1-33, the problem of social reality. By Alfred shutz, compiler Maurice natanson, amorrortu editors, buenos aires
Nubiola Jaime, interview with W.V Quine, University of Navarre
Sanders Peirce Charles, Division of signs, pp 21-43, The science of semiotics, collection of semiology and epistemology, Nueva Vision editions, Buenos Aires
Sanders Peirce Charles, Icon, index, symbol, pp, 45-62, The science of semiotics, collection of semiology and epistemology, Nueva Vision editions, Buenos Aires
Sanders pierce charles, The science of semiotics, collection of semiology and epistemology, new vision editions, Buenos Aires
Shutz Alfred, the formulation of our problem: the methodological concepts of Max Weber, PP, 33-74, introduction to comprehensive sociology, introduction George Walsh, editorial paidos, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Shutz Alfred, Phenomenology of the social world: introduction to comprehensive sociology, introduction George Walsh, paidos publishing house, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Shutz Alfred, the meaningful construction of the social world, introduction to comprehensive sociology, prologue by Joan Carles Melish, ilse shutz, Paidós, basic, 1993
Shutz Alfred, Phenomenology of the social world: introduction to comprehensive sociology, introduction George Walsh, paidos publishing house, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Shutz Alfred, common sense and the scientific interpretation of human action, the problem of social reality, the problem of social reality. By Alfred shutz, compiler Maurice natanson, amorrortu editors, buenos aires
Sini Carlo, Pierce, 13-81, semiotics and philosophy, axe
Tyler A Stephen, Then other voices without mirrors, paidemu
Tyler A Stephen, Posmodern Ethnography, from document of the occult to an occult document, The unspeakable, discourse, rhetoric and dialogue in the postmodern world. Wisconsin university press
Tyler A Stephen, Posmodern Ethnography, from document of the occult to an occult document, Writing Culture, experiments in contemporary anthropology, edited by James Clifford and George Marcus, The University of California Press
Tyler A Stephen, Evocation, The unwriteable, a response to Abdel Hernandez San Juan, September 9, rice university, Houston, texas, usa, 1997
Tyler A Stephen, The Said and the unsaid, mind, meaning and culture, Academic press
Vinao Verónica, Quine, an interpretationist and pragmatic turn in the analytical philosophy of logical positivism, Universidad Nacional del Comahue, Argentina
William Rubin, Primitivism in XX century Art. Affinities of the tribal and the modern, volumen, the museum of modern art of new York
