18 Janvier 2016 - Séminaire Externe - Marie Obidzinski

Date de publication : 23 janv. 2016 23:41:37

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze how political competition affects the design of public law enforcement policies. Assuming constant marginal cost of enforcement, and society's wealth large enough, the article arrives at two main conclusions: 1) electoral competition entails no loss of efficiency at equilibrium for both minor and major offenses (e.g. minor offenses are not enforced, while major ones are fully deterred); 2) intermediate offenses are enforced, but different distortions arises at a political equilibrium: a "weak enforcement" equilibrium emerges in the area of small offenses, and the issue of under-deterrence is exacerbated; for larger offenses, a "strong enforcement" equilibrium emerges, and there are more deterrence than what efficiency requires. When citizens' wealth is low enough, electoral competition aggravates the over-deterrence of large offenses, and yields incomplete deterrence of major ones.