Skepticism about Good and Evil
According to Sextus Empiricus, a codifier of Greek skepticism, all judgments are equipollent—that is, all judgments are equally probable or improbable so that no one judgment can be given preference over any other, with respect to truth or falsity. It follows therefore that we should suspend judgment—that is, neither affirm nor deny anything—so as to experience an untroubled and tranquil state of quietude.
With respect to ethics in particular, Sextus Empiricus offers three major arguments in support of epistemological skepticism:
(1) “Good” and “Evil” are indefinable because we must already know what they mean before we are able to define them. Just as, in the definition of an ox as an animal capable of bellowing, “bellowing” is incomprehensible to a person who does not already know an ox, so also, in the definition of the good as the choiceworthy or the useful perhaps, “choiceworthy” and “useful” are incomprehensible to the person who does not already know what the good is. Hence any definitions of good and evil are incapable of informing us about anything.
(2) Good and Evil do not exist by nature because there is no common agreement as to what they are. Just as common agreement exists that fire by nature “warms” and snow by nature “chills,” there should be common agreement about Good and Evil. But such is not the case, as the numerous differences among both typical persons and philosophers show. Hence Good and Evil do not exist by nature.
(3) Even assuming that good and evil things exist, we cannot achieve happiness because their existence only produces distress and disquietude. If we are trying to acquire good things and avoid evil things, we encounter distress or discomfort in our quest; on the other hand, if we already possess good things, then we need to toil endlessly to keep what we have and are painfully anxious for fear of losing what we have. So happiness will be unattainable.
Intellectually then, we should suspend judgment about what the good life is and thereby achieve quietude. Practically, as a matter of convenience, we can choose to follow the customs of the country in which we live.
Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
(Note About Objections and Possible Replies: You should look upon the objections and possible replies as opportunities for further thought rather than as definitive statements. Holders of the original position are not likely to be overwhelmed by the objections; and critics of the original position are not likely to be convinced by the possible replies. These objections and possible replies accomplish a proper goal if they push you to think more deeply about an issue, leading you to seek more clarity and justification in drawing your own conclusions.)
(1) The Skeptics' Paradox
According to skeptics, “All judgments are equipollent.” If this is so however, the judgment, “All judgments are equipollent,” is equipollent as well. Therefore we cannot use this judgment as justification for suspending judgment. This objection is one version of what is usually called the skeptics' paradox.
A Possible Reply: Suppose we grant that the judgment, “All judgments are equipollent,” is itself equipollent. Such a result does not establish that other knowledge-claims or judgments are anything other than equipollent. So the objection accomplishes nothing.
(2) The Impracticality of Suspended Judgment
Even if epistemological skepticism were intellectually compelling in some abstract sense, it is irrelevant to ethics, which is concerned with the direction of practical activity. That is to say, it is impossible to suspend judgment in the practical activities of life. In practice, epistemological skeptics direct their lives according to techniques, tests, commitments, and experiential judgments similar to those used by those who claim to know something. For example, suppose that someone proposes to an epistemological skeptic that they steal a car. Although it may be comforting intellectually to suspend judgment, this suspension does not deal with the situation at hand. In practice, the epistemological skeptic must decide whether or not to steal the car and makes the decision according to analyses (or techniques, tests, commitments, and experiential judgments) similar to those used by non-skeptics.
A Possible Reply: Epistemological skepticism entails suspended judgment, not suspended action. In practice, we can do whatever is convenient; in doing so however, we do not claim to possess any knowledge.
(3) Definitions and Experience
The claim about the indefinability of good fails to take proper account of the relation between definitions and experience. We set up tentative definitions and then test them by experience to determine whether or not modifications are necessary. We cannot say, once and for all, that we know what something is before we define it. Consider the ox example after someone sees and hears an elephant. Would we say that an ox and elephant are identical because they are both bellowing animals or would we say that we never knew before what an ox was? Or would we say that the definition of an ox must be modified to accommodate new experience? The last alternative makes the most sense. Similarly we can define what the good is, tentatively, and then test the definition through experience, making modifications when appropriate.
A Possible Reply: How can we possibly set up even a tentative definition without knowing already in some way what will be included in this definition?
4.2 Evaluate the various objections to epistemological skepticism mentioned in the text. Be sure to consider the possible replies an epistemological skeptic may make. Which is the strongest objection? The weakest? Would you offer other objections besides those mentioned in the text? If so, what are they? What is your general evaluation of epistemological skepticism?
Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, tr. by R.G. Bury (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1990)
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