Note well that the pleasure referred to under beneficence and self-improvement does not include bad pleasures that, according to Ross, arise from bad desires—namely, “(1) the desire to do what is wrong, (2) the desire to bring into being some particular evil, (3) the desire to inflict some pain on another.”3
How do we come to know that these prima facie duties are self-evidently true, when their truth is certainly not self-evident from infancy? According to Ross, through our experience we come to recognize the rightness of some particular act and then later generalize to recognize the rightness of some type of act. In The Right and The Good, he describes the process this way:
The general principles of duty are obviously not self-evident from the beginning of our lives. How do they come to be so? The answer is, that they come to be self-evident to us just as mathematical axioms do. We find by experience that this couple of matches and that couple make four matches, and this couple of balls on a wire and that couple make four balls: and by reflection on these and similar discoveries we come to see that it is of the nature of two and two to make four. In a precisely similar way, we see the prima facie rightness of an act which would be the fulfillment of a particular promise, and of another which would be the fulfillment of another promise, and when we have reached sufficient maturity to think in general terms, we apprehend prima facie rightness to belong to the nature of any fulfillment of promise. What comes first in time is the apprehension of the self-evident prima facie rightness of an individual act of a particular type. From this we come by reflection to apprehend the self-evident general principle of prima facie duty. . . .4
The process can be termed intuitive induction. For Ross, we cannot prove the truth of the prima facie duties; we can only intuit their truth through our experience.
While prima facie duties are self-evidently true, we can have only probable opinions about actual duties because we can never be absolutely certain that we are fully and properly considering conflicts among prima facie duties. Even if only one prima facie duty seems to apply to a situation, we can never be sure that others are not relevant in the long run. Ross says,
. . . we are more likely to do our duty if we reflect to the best of our ability on the prima facie rightness or wrongness of various possible acts in virtue of the characteristics we perceive them to have, than if we act without reflection. With this greater likelihood we must be content.5
In arriving at these probable opinions, Ross thinks that we must do our best and rely upon our experience; but he does not think that there are any clear standards by which to settle conflicts among prima facie duties. Nevertheless he does regard the duties of fidelity, reparation, and nonmaleficence to be stronger than the others because this is the common, considered judgment of thoughtful, well-educated people. He specifically denies that we can use good consequences as the standard for resolving conflicts. For example, he does not think you can break a promise to a person on the grounds that, by doing something else, you can produce a slightly greater amount of good for that person. (Ross grants though that the judgment of the right act may be different if you can produce a very much greater amount of good for the person by breaking the promise.)
Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
(Note About Objections and Possible Replies: You should look upon the objections and possible replies as opportunities for further thought rather than as definitive statements. Holders of the original position are not likely to be overwhelmed by the objections; and critics of the original position are not likely to be convinced by the possible replies. These objections and possible replies accomplish a proper goal if they push you to think more deeply about an issue, leading you to seek more clarity and justification in drawing your own conclusions.)
(1) Subjectivity and Intuition
Any claim to ethical knowledge through an intuition is only convincing to the person having the intuition and therefore provides no evidential support for anyone else. An intuition can produce an extremely strong sense of personal conviction; but it cannot produce an objective truth. That is why different persons claim intuitive knowledge and yet disagree. They possess strong personal conviction, but not objective truth.
A Possible Reply: By its nature, an intuition cannot establish evidence for anyone else. We must intuit for ourselves. While we may possess a number of extremely strong personal convictions, these are not what we mean by intuition, which is a special kind of insight.
Although we can understand G. E. Moore's contention that yellow is a simple, natural property to be perceived by the senses, a matter of common knowledge, we cannot grasp his further contention that good is a “non-natural property” to be "intuited." Both these latter terms are exceedingly vague. Most of us have no notion of what this intuited good is.
A Possible Reply: Good can never be identified with any natural property—for example, pleasure or health or wealth—as shown by a simple test. If we identify good with some natural property, such as pleasure, we can still sensibly ask, “But is pleasure good?” This question however should not make sense once the identification has been made—because it amounts to asking, “Is good good?” (Identification of good with some natural property commits what Moore terms the naturalistic fallacy.) Since, then, we definitely have a notion of what good is, we must conclude that it is a non-natural property directly intuited.
Serious doubts arise about the completeness of Ross' list of prima facie duties and about the specific duties included. For example, why should we not add to the list the duty to trust other persons or the duty to take personal responsibility for our actions? Do we have a duty to improve our own condition or simply one to achieve self-realization through our own free choices and efforts? When we receive gifts or benefits from others, are we really obligated to make some return, as the duty of gratitude requires, when we made no prior agreement to make such a return? While the duty of non-maleficence makes sense, are we really obligated to improve the conditions of others as beneficence requires?
Also, the absence of any clear standards to settle conflicts among prima facie duties is unsatisfactory. Without clear standards, any objectivity gained by the self-evident truth of the prima facie duties themselves will be lost when individuals—with their assorted interpretations—decide upon their actual duties. For example, beneficence will be weighed in all sorts of ways by different persons.
A Possible Reply: The list of prima facie duties can be looked upon as an irreducible minimum rather than as a final, complete list. Whether any additions should be made depends upon whether or not they can be accommodated by the original list. The objection mentioned trust and personal responsibility as possible additions. But perhaps trust can be subsumed under beneficence, and personal responsibility under justice. Regarding the challenge to the inclusion of gratitude, while it may be true that receipt of some gifts entails no obligation to make some return, it is also true that we cannot go on indefinitely receiving non-trivial gifts or benefits without taking on an obligation to reciprocate.
In the final analysis though, we need to recognize that we cannot prove conclusively what should be included in the list of prima facie duties or how conflicts among the duties should be resolved. We need to rely upon experience and to reflect as best we can; but we still must intuit the self-evident truth of the prima facie duties and settle for probable opinions about our actual duties. Still, on the basis of experience, we need not be excessively discouraged about the possibilities for acting rightly.
4.70 How would you explain G. E. Moore's intuitionist position in your own words? Would you yourself claim to have an intuition of what is good? If not, do you think that the absence of such an intuition is sufficient in itself to refute Moore's position? Or do you need to know more about his position?
4.71 Explain in your own words why Ross' theory of prima facie duties can be termed an intuitionist position. Explain how he distinguishes prima facie duties from actual ones and why prima facie duties are true with certainty whereas our judgments of actual duties are probable opinions. What do you think about his seven prima facie duties? Would you drop any of them from the list? Would you add any?
4.711 A marriage vow constitutes a promise. Given Ross' theory of prima facie duties, discuss under what conditions, if any, a dissolution of a marriage vow through divorce would be a right act. Some fairly common grounds for divorce in the United States are cruelty, desertion, non-support, alcoholism, felony conviction, sexual impotence, pregnancy at marriage (by someone other than the groom, without his knowledge), drug addiction, fraudulent contract, course of conduct detrimental to the marriage relationship, and incompatibility without regard to fault.
4.712 Can you think of any situation(s) where Ross' theory leads to the judgment that lying is a right act? If so, give justification.
4.713 How do you think that Ross would stand on the issue of deontological vs. teleological ethics?
4.714 Reread Hume's position on moral sentiments earlier. To what extent are there agreements and differences between moral sentiments and prima facie duties? Can they have the same kind of origin?
4.715 Would Ross' theory of prima facie duties be likely to lead to a favorable judgment of the lifestyle of a wealthy “playboy” (perhaps someone like the character “Arthur” during the early part of the 1981 movie of the same name)? Why not? Would you agree with Ross? Explain your answer.
4.72 Evaluate intuition as a method of knowing the good life, giving justification. In evaluating, be sure to read over the objections and possible replies.
1. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 7.
2. For Ross' account, see W. D. Ross, The Right and The Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 20-22,
3. Ibid., p. 163.
4. <Ibid., pp. 32-33.
5. lbid, pp. 31-32.
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