Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy

brought to you by Ron Yezzi

Emeritus Professor of Philosophy

Minnesota State University, Mankato

(Author's Note: The account below, with slight modifications, is taken from Ron Yezzi, Philosophical Problems: The Good Life (Mankato: G. Bruno & Co., 1994), pp. 132-135.)

Topics

David Hume

The Limits of Reason

Moral Sentiments

Benevolence

Hume and Logical Positivism

Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies

Creative Excursions

Sources

Positive Answer:

Moral Sentiments

David Hume

One way of establishing that we can know what the good life is rests upon the position that we have an inherent moral sense, or basic moral sentiments, by which we distinguish right from wrong. Here we explore this view through the thought of David Hume.

Biographical Sketch

David Hume (1711 -1776 C.E.), a Scottish philosopher, was an excellent student who never completed his studies at Edinburgh University, leaving at the ripe age of 15 to direct his own intensive studies. He held posts as a private secretary, a diplomat, a librarian, and undersecretary of state in Scotland.

According to Hume, "love of literary fame" was the ruling passion of his life―a passion not always satisfied. (In a brief autobiographical sketch, he recites his trials as an author.) By 1739, he had worked out and published his basic philosophical position in A Treatise of Human Nature. As Hume put it, "It fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots." Much of his later philosophical work consisted of shorter, better written versions of what was covered in the Treatise. Turning from philosophy to history, he wrote a History of England and achieved the literary fame he sought.

Apparently, Hume was a sociable person known for his great humor and good will. His close friend, the economist-moralist Adam Smith, wrote: "Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit."

Hume's philosophical positions―especially with respect to the nature of substances, the self, causation, the relation between facts and values, liberty and necessity, the failure of theology based upon the natural world, and inductive arguments―have been centers of attention and controversy for two centuries. (Hume would have been quite pleased at all this.) In addition to the Treatise already mentioned, his major philosophical works include An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

The Limits of Reason

According to David Hume, reason is useful with respect to moral judgments to the extent that it makes clear the consequences of actions for ourselves and others; but reason cannot establish that an action is good, that is, worthy of approbation, or bad, that is, worthy of blame. For example, reason tells me that refusal to report income on my tax return deprives the government of revenue and subjects me to criminal liability, whereas willingness to report income fully does not; but reason cannot tell me which alternative is good, and which is bad. Although reason can aid in the establishment of facts and can demonstrate rational relationships, it cannot certify judgments of value.

Moral Sentiments

The certification of value judgments rests rather on moral sentiments, that is, immediate feelings of human beings about values. Moreover, Hume asserts that there are moral sentiments common to all human beings; so he is not a moral relativist. He says,

The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it. It also implies some sentiment so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and conduct, even of the persons the most remote, an object of applause or censure, according as they agree or disagree with that rule of right which is established.¹

These common moral sentiments lead us to approve qualities of the following sort: honesty, fidelity, truth, benevolence, wit, ingenuity, cheerfulness, decency, and courage. We can label Hume's position a moral sense theory about the origin of values, because it attributes to all human beings an inherent moral sense consisting of common moral sentiments.

Benevolence

Foremost among the qualities approved of by our common moral sentiments, for Hume, is benevolence—a very general term that encompasses any of the following qualities: sociability, good-naturedness, humanity, mercy, gratefulness, friendliness, generosity, beneficence, natural affection, and public spirit. He says,

. . . no qualities are more entitled to the general good will and approbation of mankind than beneficence and humanity, friendship and gratitude, natural affection, and public spirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender sympathy with others and a generous concern for our kind and species. These, wherever they appear, seem to transfuse themselves, in a manner, into each beholder, and to call forth, in their own behalf, the same favorable and affectionate sentiments which they exert on all around.²

Hume also attributes part of our approval of benevolence to its utility in promoting the happiness of society. He concludes,

Upon the whole, then, it seems undeniable that nothing can bestow more merit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence in an eminent degree, and that a part, at least of its merit arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness on human society.³

Hume and Logical Positivism

Hume's position bears some resemblance to Logical Positivism in that values are ultimately traceable to feelings; but it differs from positivism in two fundamental ways:

(1) Ethical statements are not meaningless; and

(2) The existence of common moral sentiments establishes an objective morality for all human beings.

Positivists may well insist however that the absence of any sort of justification for the moral sentiments establishes Hume's position as an emotive theory of ethics.

Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies

(Note About Objections and Possible Replies: You should look upon the objections and possible replies as opportunities for further thought rather than as definitive statements. Holders of the original position are not likely to be overwhelmed by the objections; and critics of the original position are not likely to be convinced by the possible replies. These objections and possible replies accomplish a proper goal if they push you to think more deeply about an issue, leading you to seek more clarity and justification in drawing your own conclusions.)

(1) The Error in Strictly Limiting the Role of Reason

Hume's contention that reason cannot certify judgments of value leads to difficulties as soon as some disagreement arises about what are the common moral sentiments of human beings. Without the assistance of reason, these disagreements will be unresolvable. By not placing strict limits on the role of reason, we at least have hope that we can overcome disagreements through some rational method.

A Possible Reply: Any disagreements about what the common moral sentiments are must be resolved by observing human beings, because there is no rational way of justifying these immediate feelings. We can observe human beings to discover their moral sentiments; but we cannot analyze further because they are the ultimate foundation for values.

(2) A Denial of Common Moral Sentiments

Hume's claim that there are common moral sentiments shared by all human beings is false—as shown, for example, by the study of especially aggressive cultures where benevolence is hardly the foremost quality approved by the moral sentiments within those cultures.

A Possible Reply: Individual persons and even particular cultures can misapprehend the common moral sentiments because of factors such as mental distress, bitterness, or miserable conditions of life. What is important however is what most persons and most cultures apprehend as the common moral sentiments. Here we are able to arrive at agreement about sentiments such as the worth of benevolence.

Thought Excursions

4.4 What is a moral sentiment? Do you agree with Hume that we have common moral sentiments among human beings leading us to approve qualities such as honesty, fidelity, truth, benevolence, wit, ingenuity, cheerfulness, decency, and courage? You may want to begin by considering whether or not you would challenge any of the qualities listed. Suppose that someone challenges Hume in the following way: Not everyone approves of truth since there are some people who value lying and tell lies quite frequently; hence there is no common moral sentiment among all human beings that approves of truth. How may Hume reply? Or would he just admit his error?

4.41 Some people believe that their conscience tells them what is right or wrong. To what extent is this belief similar to Hume's position on moral sentiments? Would Hume regard conscience to be as effective a guide to moral actions as moral sentiments would be?

4.42 Do you agree with Hume that “nothing can bestow more merit on any human creature than the sentiment of benevolence”? Would you suggest any alternative?

4.43 Evaluate the two objections to the method of moral sentiments. Be sure to consider the possible replies. Which is the stronger objection? Would you offer other objections besides those mentioned in the text? If so, what are they? What is your general evaluation of reliance upon moral sentiments to know what the good life is?

Sources

Footnotes

1. David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1902). p. 272.

2. Ibid., p. 178.

3. Ibid, p. 181.

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