According to R. M. Hare, we are free to prescribe, or commend, any actions we choose. For example, we are free to prescribe that we ought to exterminate Jews as easily as that we ought to be kind to our neighbors. In this sense, moral judgments arise from subjective commitments.
Hare argues however that an analysis of the way we use moral language shows that moral judgments (including these subjective prescriptions) have rational implications and hence are not simply unanalyzable. Given a prescribed action, it makes sense to ask why it is a good action. It makes sense because, logically, moral judgments possess the characteristic of universalizability. (Hare terms his position, “universal prescriptivism.”) That is to say, moral judgments, logically, must hold universally. For example if a person offers the prescription that we ought to exterminate Jews, then this means that all of us with the opportunity ought to do it and that it ought to happen to every single person who is a Jew. The task of moral reasoning then becomes one of testing the characteristic of universalizability to find out if the person will continue to accept the prescription. In Freedom and Reason, Hare says,
. . . When we are trying, in a concrete case, to decide what we ought to do, what we are looking for (as I have already said) is an action to which we can commit ourselves (prescriptivity) but which we are at the same time prepared to accept as exemplifying a principle of action to be prescribed for others in like circumstances (universalizability). If, when we consider some proposed action, we find that, when universalized, it yields prescriptions which we cannot accept, we reject this action as a solution to our moral problem—if we cannot universalize the prescription, it cannot become an "ought."4
Establishing truth or falsity of prescriptions is not the task of moral reasoning. Rather, moral reasoning tests the universalizability of the prescription to aid a person in deciding whether to continue to accept it. Presumably, sufficiently fanatical persons will accept a prescription regardless what moral reasoning shows; however most people, according to Hare, will not.
Why does a moral judgment contain the characteristic of universalizability? Hare maintains that, in addition to being a prescription, a moral judgment entails a descriptive standard. You make the following commendation, “John Doe is a good person.” When I ask “Why,” you reply, “Because he is a person of strong character, wisdom, sensitivity, and good will.” In other words, you offer a descriptive standard of what you take a good person to be. Or I say, “You ought to be kind to your neighbor.” When you ask “Why,” I reply, “Because it enhances one's hopes for social cooperation.” I offer a descriptive standard for at least one good action. Hare goes on to argue that any such descriptive standard possesses the characteristic of universalizability. Thus, for the examples, anyone (not just Doe) who possesses strong character, wisdom, sensitivity, and good will is a good person; and any action that enhances hope for social cooperation is good. (In passing, we may note that the exact phrasing of a moral judgment so that its universalizability is clearly and properly evident may be more complex than these examples indicate.) Given this logical attachment of universalizability to moral judgments, we can proceed to tests based upon (1) facts, (2) inclinations, and (3) imagination. (1) We can examine relevant facts to make sure no false claims occur; (2) We can check to determine whether the universalized moral judgment comes into conflict with a person's inclinations; and (3) We can make use of imagination to determine a person's willingness to be included under the universalized moral judgment.
Suppose we return to the case of persons offering the prescription that we ought to exterminate Jews. We ask “Why,” and get the reply, “Because Jews are persons of inferior intelligence.” How can we use moral reasoning to get these persons to give up the accepted moral judgment? We can proceed by showing that the claim about inferior intelligence is factually false. Or we can turn to universalizability and ask whether they really want to recommend that everyone of inferior intelligence in the world be exterminated. Or, presuming that these persons have a personal inclination against being exterminated, we may establish that they possess no superior intelligence over Jews and hence are also candidates for extermination—thereby creating a conflict between the inclination and the rational consequence of the moral judgment. Or better yet, if we can establish that these persons have Jewish ancestors and are thus candidates for extermination, we can draw out very sharply the conflict between inclination and rational consequence. Or, barring this, we may turn to imagination and ask whether these persons would still prescribe extermination if they were themselves Jews. Or, barring this, we may ask whether the extermination prescription for those of inferior intelligence would still be accepted if they or some close loved ones had an accident in which mental functions were somewhat impaired. Actual situations are usually more complicated than this example; but Hare's method of analysis should be fairly clear.
Thus, for Hare, although moral judgments arise through free, subjective commitments, we can still use moral reasoning to force reconsideration of the acceptability of those commitments.
Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
(Note About Objections and Possible Replies: You should look upon the objections and possible replies as opportunities for further thought rather than as definitive statements. Holders of the original position are not likely to be overwhelmed by the objections; and critics of the original position are not likely to be convinced by the possible replies. These objections and possible replies accomplish a proper goal if they push you to think more deeply about an issue, leading you to seek more clarity and justification in drawing your own conclusions.)
Reread the Objections and Possible Replies following the exposition of Existentialism as a view of the good life.
(1) The Absence of Objectivity
Since the method of existential commitment makes no claim to objectivity with respect to values, it is not really a positive answer to the question, How can the good life be known? A personal commitment is still personal opinion, not knowledge; hence we have no method allowing us to know what the good life is.
A Possible Reply: What is significant about the method of existential commitment is the way it makes values the central focus of persons' lives. Value judgments may not be objectively true or false; but they clearly also are not a waste of time. Existential commitment therefore differs from negative answers such as cultural relativism, epistemological skepticism, and emotivism (logical positivism) where concern with value judgments may be looked upon as a waste of time.
(2) Hare's Mistaken Notion of Universalizability
Hare maintains that a moral judgment always involves a descriptive standard that entails universalizability. Yet neither the descriptive standard nor the universalizability need be granted. Suppose, for the moment, that we presume the descriptive standard and examine the thesis of universalizability. When someone says that Jane Doe is a good person because she exhibits strong character, wisdom, sensitivity, cooperativeness, and good will, why must this entail the principle that anyone with the same properties also is a good person? Why do we have to bring universalizability up at all? Why is it incorrect to say, “These are the properties I use to say that Jane Doe is a good person, but I am not saying anything about what makes other persons good? Besides, there are other persons I regard to be good who exhibit different properties. For example, I consider Alice Roe to be a good person simply because she is the most loving person I ever met”? It should be clear that a descriptive standard does not entail universalizability. Going a step further back, we need not even grant the presence of a descriptive standard. Someone can commend some entity or action as being good without admitting to any descriptive properties being present as a standard. For example, “I say that acts of kindness are good simply because I choose to regard them as good.” Hence we can conclude that Hare's attempt to bring moral reasoning to bear upon moral judgments fails.
A Possible Reply: The moral judgment that acts of kindness are good cannot be attributed to simple, unanalyzable choice because, as a matter of fact, persons always have reasons underlying their choices. We would find it exceedingly strange for someone to say, “I chose but there is not one relevant reason underlying the choice.” Accordingly, moral judgments always involve some descriptive standard. Furthermore, this standard entails universalizability. If someone says that Jane Doe is a good person by reason of possessing the five properties already mentioned, then logical consistency requires that anyone else possessing the same five properties is also a good person. On what logical grounds, can anyone deny this? As for the Alice Roe example, it only shows that arriving at a descriptive standard of a good person is more complicated than was first thought. It does not establish the non-existence of a descriptive standard or the absence of universalizability.
4.90 Should persons really think (worry?) seriously about authenticity as the existentialists do?
4.901 Read over Nietzsche's four questions of conscience. How would you answer them? How much value do you attach to answering these particular questions? (Can you think of any friends, acquaintances, or well known persons who might benefit from answering these questions of conscience? Explain.)
4.91 Consider in some detail Hare's universal prescriptivism. Be sure to think about how it involves both commitment and moral reasoning. Then read over the objection and possible reply dealing with his position. To what extent do you agree with Hare?
4.911 If you accepted Hare's universal prescriptivism, how do you deal with the following:
(a) Elaine: “Rapists ought to be castrated.”
Jean: “Why?”
Elaine: “Because it will teach them a lesson they're never going to
forget.”
(b) Vince: “Homosexuals ought to get the hell beat out of them.”
Mary: “Why?”
Vince: “To show them they can't get away with unnatural acts.”
(c) Vicky: “We ought to end all wars.”
Bruce: “Why?”
Vicky: “Because they cause so much death and destruction.”
4.912 The examples in the preceding excursion are purposely oversimplified to make the application of Hare's position easier. But now you should try a tougher problem. Choose some issue where persons take a moral stand for multiple reasons—for example, abortion, capital punishment, prayer in schools. (You may want to consider the previous exercise again, offering more reasons or perhaps constructing different moral judgments on the issues of rape, homosexuality, or war.) Then try to determine whether or not Hare's universal prescriptivism helps in making progress on the issue.
1. See Soren Kierkegaard, Either/0r, in Robert Bretall, ed., A Kierkegaard Anthology (New York: Modern Library, 1946), p. 105.
2. Ibid., p. 103.
3. See Ibid.
4. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of The Idols, in Geoffrey Clive, ed., The Philosophy of Nietzsche (New York: The New American Library, 1965), p. 639.
5. F. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 89-90.
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