- Pay-what-you-want to support independent information: a field experiment on motivation (with Alessandra Casarico) [LINK]
- Water Tariffs and Consumers' Inaction (with Carmine Ornaghi) [LINK]
- The Effects Of The Universal Metering Programme On Water Consumption, Welfare And Equity (with Carmine Ornaghi) [LINK]
- Paying for what kind of performance? Performance pay and multitasking in mission-oriented jobs (with Daniel Jones and Michael Vlassopoulos) [LINK]
- When the market drives you crazy: Stock market returns and fatal car accidents (with Corrado Giulietti and Michael Vlassopoulos) [LINK]
Publications - Journal Articles
- Racial Discrimination in Local Public Services: A Field Experiment in the US, Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming.[PDF][LINK]
- “Now that you mention it”: A Survey Experiment on Information, Inattention and Online Privacy, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017, vol 140, pages 1-17. [DOI]
- Sharing One's Fortune? An Experimental Study on Earned Income and Giving, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2017, vol 66, pages 112-118 [DOI][PDF]
- Peer Pressure and Productivity: The Role of Observing and Being Observed, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015, vol. 117, pages 223-232 [DOI][PDF]
- Corporate Philanthropy and Productivity: Evidence from an Online Real Effort Experiment, Management Science, 2015, vol. 61(8), pages 1795-1811. [DOI][Online Appendix]
- Are Public Sector Workers Different? Cross-European Evidence from Elderly Workers and Retirees, IZA Journal of Labor Economics, 2015, vol. 4:11, pages 1-21.[Open Access]
- Benefits Conditional on Work and the Nordic Model, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 127 (July 2015), pages 115-126. [DOI]
- Are Workers Motivated by the Greater Good? Evidence from the Private and Public Sectors, IZA World of Labor, 2015: 138 [Open Access].
- The Sources of the Gender Gap in Economics Enrolment, CESifo Economic Studies, 2015, vol. 61(1), pages 72-94. [DOI]
- Reporting Import Tariffs (and Other Taxes), International Tax and Public Finance, vol. 21 (February 2014), pages 153-173. [DOI]
- An Experimental Investigation of Intrinsic Motivations for Giving, Theory & Decision, vol. 76 (January 2014), pages 47-67. [DOI]
- Experimental Evidence of Self-Image Concerns as Motivation for Giving, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 90 (June 2013), pages 19–27. [DOI]
- Underreporting of Earnings and the Minimum Wage Spike, IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, vol. 2 (2013), issue 2. [Open Access]
- Minimum Wage and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 95 (2011), issue 11-12, pages 1635-1651. [DOI]
- In-Work Benefits and Unemployment, International Tax and Public Finance, volume 18 (2011), issue 1, pages 74-92. [DOI]
- Disentangling the Sources of Pro-socially Motivated Effort: A Field Experiment, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 94 (2010), issue 11-12, pages 1086-1092. [DOI]
- Employment Protection Legislation and Job Stability: an European Cross-country Analysis, International Labour Review, volume 149 (2010), issue 3, pages 261-285. [DOI]
Publications - Peer Reviewed Conference Proceedings
- Exploring User Perceptions of Online Privacy Disclosures, Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on WWW/INTERNET (ICWI 2015). An extended version has been published as "Scared or Naive? An Exploratory Study on Users Perceptions of Online Privacy Disclosures", IADIS International Journal on WWW/Internet, vol. 13 (2015), issues 2, pages 1-16. [LINK][PDF]
- Referral Incentives, in: Crowdfunding, Proceedings of the Second AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing (HCOMP-2014), pages 171-183. [DOI] [PDF]
- The Economics of Philanthropy: Donations and Fundraising, edited by Kimberley Scharf and Mirco Tonin, MIT Press (ISBN: 9780262038447), 2018. [LINK]
Publications - Peer Reviewed Book Chapters
- Introduction, in: The Economics of Philanthropy: Donations and Fundraising, edited by Kimberley Scharf and Mirco Tonin, MIT Press (ISBN: 9780262038447), 2018. [LINK]
- Why Give Away your Wealth? An Analysis of the Billionaires' View, in: Social Economics, edited by J. Costa-Font and M. Macis, MIT press, 2017. [PDF]
- Too Low to Be True: the Use of Minimum Thresholds to Fight Tax Evasion, in: Critical Issues in Taxation and Development, edited by Clemens Fuest and George R. Zodrow, MIT press (ISBN: 978-0-262-01897-5), 2013. [LINK]
- Informality, in: Perspectives on Labour Economics for Development, edited by Sandrine Cazes and Sher Verick, ILO and Academic Foundation (ISBN: 978-92-2-126714-0), 2013. [LINK]
- Gender Differences in Earnings and Leadership: Recent Evidence on Causes and Consequences, ifo DICE Report 2 / 2017, vol 15, June 2017 [PDF]
- Minimum Wage or Minimum Tax? in: Fazekas K., Benczúr P., Telegdy Á. (eds.) "The Hungarian Labour Market Review and Analysis", Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences & National Employment Nonprofit Public Company Ltd., 2012.
- Employment Protection Legislation in Central and East European Countries, South East Europe Review, issue 4, 2009.
- The Wage Dimension of Flexibility and Security in Selected Central and Eastern European Countries in: Cazes, S., Nesporova, A. (eds.) “Flexicurity: a relevant approach for Eastern Europe?“, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2007.
Pay-what-you-want to support independent information: a field experiment on motivation (with Alessandra Casarico)
Pay-what-you-want schemes can be a useful tool to finance high quality and independent news media without restricting readership, therefore guaranteeing maximum diffusion. We conduct a field experiment with the Italian information site lavoce.info to explore how to structure a campaign in a way that maximises readers' willingness to contribute. We compare messages stressing two possible motivations to contribute, namely the public good component of the news or the importance of the individual contributions. We also test the effect of including information about the tax allowance associated with donations. While the particular motivation stressed does not have a significant impact, information about tax allowances surprisingly reduces overall donations, due to a reduction in the number of (small) donors. Stable unsubscriptions from the newsletter suggest that the campaign does not have an adverse effect on readers.
Water Tariffs and Consumers' Inaction (with Carmine Ornaghi)
We study adoption by more than 150,000 households of an optional transitional water tariff implemented in the South-East of England in conjunction with an universal metering programme. We document how inertia leads customers to relinquish substantial financial gains, with less than a third of customers who would benefit from adopting the transitional tariff actually doing so. We also show how households responds not only to overall gains, but also to more short-term gains from adopting the tariff. Households in high income/high education neighbourhoods display a higher responsiveness to potential savings, as do households where the contract holder is of prime age instead of being more senior or junior. Finally, the probability of adoption is positively impacted by adoption by neighbours, thus suggesting the presence of peer effects. We also look at the timing of the call, showing how most customers choose to call early on, when less information is available, but the issue is more prominent. The choice of when to call is consistent with customers taking into account the option value of waiting, as well as future consumption patterns.
The Effects Of The Universal Metering Programme On Water Consumption, Welfare And Equity (with Carmine Ornaghi)
There is general consensus that water meters are necessary for promoting an efficient use of water through some form of pricing mechanism based on effective consumption. However, available evidence on benefits and costs of metering is scant and often based on a small sample of households. This paper uses data of the first large-scale universal metering programme in England to produce a comprehensive analysis of the impact of metering on consumption, social efficiency and distributional outcomes. We find that, on average, due to metering households decrease consumption between 18% and 22%, a higher value than assumed as a policy target. The percentage reduction in water consumption is very similar across different income groups but, whereas high-income households gain financially upon switching to metering, less affluent households are, on average, around £10 worse-off. Finally, our analysis shows that there is a large proportion of households for which the social cost of metering outweighs the benefits, thus calling into question whether universal metering should be extended to other areas of the country in its current format, as opposed to a selective metering programme where only “large” households receive a meter, which would be more efficient from the society’s point of view.
How does pay-for-performance (P4P) impact productivity, multitasking, and the composition of workers in mission-oriented jobs? These are central issues in sectors like education or healthcare. We conduct a laboratory experiment, manipulating compensation and mission, to answer these questions. We find that P4P has positive effects on productivity on the incentivized dimension of effort and negative effects on the non-incentivized dimension for workers in non-mission-oriented treatments. In mission-oriented treatments, P4P generates minimal change on either dimension. Participants in the non-mission sector – but not in the mission-oriented treatments – sort on ability, with lower ability workers opting out of the P4P scheme.
The stock market influences some of the most fundamental economic decisions of investors, such as consumption, saving, and labor supply, through the financial wealth channel. This paper provides evidence that daily fluctuations in the stock market have important--and hitherto neglected--spillover effects in another, unrelated domain, namely driving. Using the universe of fatal road car accidents in the United States from 1990 to 2015, we find that a one standard deviation reduction in daily stock market returns is associated with a 0.5% increase in the number of fatal accidents. A battery of falsification tests support a causal interpretation of this finding. Our results are consistent with immediate emotions stirred by a negative stock market performance influencing the number of fatal accidents, in particular among inexperienced investors, thus highlighting the broader economic and social consequences of stock market fluctuations.
Discrimination in access to public services can act as a major obstacle towards addressing racial inequality. We examine whether racial discrimination exists in access to a wide spectrum of public services in the US. We carry out an email correspondence study in which we pose simple queries to more than 19,000 local public service providers. We find that emails are less likely to receive a response if signed by a black-sounding name compared to a white-sounding name. Given a response rate of 72% for white senders, emails from putatively black senders are almost 4 percentage points less likely to receive an answer. We also find that responses to queries coming from black names are less likely to have a cordial tone. Further tests demonstrate that the differential in the likelihood of answering is due to animus towards blacks rather than inferring socioeconomic status from race.
“Now that you mention it”: A Survey Experiment on Information, Inattention and Online Privacy (with Helia Marreiros, Michael Vlassopoulos, and m.c. schraefel), Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2017, vol 140, pages 1-17.
Personal data lie at the forefront of different business models and constitute the main source of revenue of several online companies. In many cases, consumers may have incomplete information or may be inattentive about the digital transactions of their data. This paper investigates whether highlighting positive or negative aspects of online privacy policies, thereby mitigating the informational problem, can affect consumers’ privacy actions and attitudes. Results of an online survey experiment indicate that participants adopt a more conservative stance on disclosing sensitive and identifiable information, even when positive attitudes of companies towards their privacy are made salient, compared to when privacy is not mentioned. On the other hand, they do not change their attitudes and social actions towards privacy. These findings suggest that privacy behavior is not necessarily sensitive to exposure to objective threats or benefits of disclosing personal information. Rather, people are inattentive and their dormant privacy concerns may manifest only when consumers are asked to think about privacy.
Sharing One's Fortune? An Experimental Study on Earned Income and Giving (with Michael Vlassopoulos), Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2017, vol 66, pages 112-118
In this paper we investigate the relationship between charitable giving and earnings, focusing on whether earning more due to good luck influences the decision of whether and how much to give. To do this we set up a real effort experiment, in which subjects enter data in four one-hour occasions and are paid a piece rate. From the second occasion onwards, half of the subjects are randomly assigned to a treatment with higher piece rates. At the end we ask subjects whether they want to donate a share of their earnings to a charity of their choice. We find that, despite large differences in earnings due to different piece rates, givers in the two groups give the same share of their total earnings, and that subjects receiving the higher piece rate are actually less likely to give. On average charities receive the same amount from the two groups.
Peer effects arise in situations where workers observe each others' work activity. In this paper we disentangle the effect of observing a peer from that of being observed by a peer, by setting up a real effort experiment in which we manipulate the observability of performance. In particular, we randomize subjects into three groups: in the first one subjects are observed by another subject, but do not observe anybody; in the second one subjects observe somebody else's performance, but are not observed by anybody; in the last group subjects work in isolation, neither observing, nor being observed. We consider both a piece rate compensation scheme, where pay depends solely on own performance, and a team compensation scheme, where pay also depends on the performance of other team members. Overall, we find some evidence that subjects who are observed increase productivity at least initially when compensation is team based, while we find that subjects observing react to what they see in a non-linear but monotonic way when compensation is based only on own performance.
Contributing to a social cause can be an important driver for workers in the public and non- profit sector as well as in firms that engage in Corporate Philanthropy or other Corporate Social Responsibility policies. This paper compares the effectiveness of social incentives - that take the form of a donation received by a charity of the subject's choice - to financial incentives. We find that social incentives lead to a 13% rise in productivity, regardless of their form (lump sum or related to performance) or strength. The response is strong for subjects with low initial productivity (30%), while high-productivity subjects do not respond. When subjects can choose the mix of incentives half sacrifice some of their private compensation to increase social compensation, with women more likely than men. Furthermore, offering subjects some discretion in choosing their own payment scheme leads to a substantial improvement in performance. Comparing social incentives to an equally costly increase in private compensation for low productivity subjects reveals that the former are less effective in increasing productivity, but the difference is small and not statistically significant.
This paper previously circulate under the title "Social Incentives Matter: Evidence from an Online Real Effort Experiment". A non-technical summary appeared on Vox and on the Review of Environment, Energy and Economics - Re3 with the title "Do social incentives matter? Evidence from an online real effort experiment" and on The Conversation with the title "Note to Bosses: Workers Perform Better if you Give to Charity " This paper has been discussed in the “Behavioural Bulletin Issue 2” by the Behavioural Insights Team, Cabinet Office [LINK].
This paper has won the Best Paper Award at the 9th Young Economists' Workshop on Social Economy, Italy.
We investigate whether public and private sector employees differ in terms of public service motivation using a representative sample of elderly workers from 12 European countries. We find that public sector workers, both those currently employed and those already retired, are significantly more prosocial; however, the difference in prosociality is explained by differences in the composition of the workforce across the two sectors, in terms of (former) workers' education and occupation. Subsample analysis reveals that public sector former workers in education are more prosocial even after controlling for a rich set of characteristics.
Welfare benefits in the Nordic countries are often tied to employment. We argue that this is one of the factors behind the success of the Nordic model, where a comprehensive welfare state is associated with high employment. In a general equilibrium setting, the underlining mechanism works through wage moderation and job creation. The benefits make it more important to hold a job, thus lower wages will be accepted, and more jobs created. Moreover, we show that the incentive to acquire higher education improves, further boosting employment in the long run. These positive effects help counteracting the negative impact of taxation.
Through numerical simulations, we show how this mechanism can contribute to explain the better labor market performance and more equitable income distribution of Nordic countries compared to Continental European ones.
Are Workers Motivated by the Greater Good? Evidence from the Private and Public Sectors, IZA World of Labor, 2015: 138.
The empirical evidence, based on experimental studies and surveys, shows that an organization promoting a social cause has an advantage in promoting effort and commitment among its employees and in being more attractive for jobseekers. The public sector is generally not very successful in attracting a particularly motivated workforce. Randomized controlled trials show that extrinsic incentives (higher pay, career prospects) result in the recruitment of more productive people into the public sector, without negatively affecting intrinsic motivation.
The Sources of the Gender Gap in Economics Enrolment, (with Jackie Wahba), CESifo Economic Studies, vol. 61(1), pages 72-94.
In many countries there is a considerable gender gap in enrolment for a bachelor's degree in Economics, arguably an important stepping stone towards positions of influence in policy making and occupations paying relatively high wages. We investigate the sources of this gap by looking in detail at the university admission process in the UK. We use a 50 percent random sample of administrative data covering all university applications in 2008 and find no evidence of universities discriminating against female applicants. What we find is that girls are less likely to apply for a bachelor's degree in Economics to start with, even if once they apply their likelihood of enroling is the same as for boys. Girls are less likely to study Maths in high school and this may deter them from applying to study Economics at the university level. However, even among those who have studied Maths, females are less likely to apply than males, suggesting that differences in the choice of A level subjects cannot explain the whole gap.
Reporting Import Tariffs (and Other Taxes), International Tax and Public Finance, vol. 21 (February 2014), pages 153-173.
This paper derives the implications for compliance and fiscal revenues of a tax base that is the product of several factors. For instance, in the case of import tariffs, the tax base is the product of quantity and unit value, both reported to, and during an audit assessed by, the custom authority. Import tariff are particularly interesting as custom receipts represent an important share of government revenues in many developing countries and there has recently been a surge in empirical studies showing how evasion in this field is a pervasive phenomenon. I show that, with a multiplicative tax base, when the fiscal authority has an imperfect detection technology a greater declaration in one dimension actually increases the fine when evasion in the other dimension is detected. Therefore, there is an additional incentive for the taxpayer to underdeclare and a multiplicative tax base is subject to more evasion, compared to a tax base that can be assessed directly. As a result, fiscal revenues decrease with the dimensionality of the tax base. Also, voluntary compliance and fiscal revenues may be higher when the importer is required to declare only the total value of imports instead of quantity and unit value separately.
This paper provides an argument in favour of uniform or specific tariffs and a reason for why a flat tax may improve compliance.
This paper presents results from a modified dictator experiment aimed at distinguishing and quantifying intrinsic motivations for giving. We employ an experimental design with three treatments that vary the recipient (experimenter, charity) and amount passed (fixed, varying). We find giving to the experimenter not to be significantly different from giving to a charity when the amount the subject donates crowds out the amount donated by the experimenter such that the charity always receives a fixed amount. This result suggests that the latter treatment, first used by Crumpler and Grossman (2008), does not provide a clean test of warm glow motivation. We then propose a new method of detecting warm glow motivation based on the idea that in a random-lottery incentive (RLI) scheme, such as the one we employ, warm glow accumulates and this may lead to satiation, whereas purely altruistic motivation does not. We also provide bounds on the magnitudes of warm glow and pure altruism as motives that drive giving in our experiment.
We conduct an experiment in which subjects make a series of decisions of allocating an endowment of £10 between themselves and a passive recipient that is either a charity or the experimenter. When making these decisions subjects are informed that one of them will be chosen randomly at the end to determine payoffs. After all decisions have been made and it has been revealed which decision will determine payoffs we offer subjects an opportunity to opt out from their initial decision and receive £10 instead. We find that around one third of subjects choose to opt out. The fact that a subject decides to revise a decision to give and chooses instead to exit and keep the whole amount - an option that was available when she made the first decision and was not exercised - indicates that giving in the first instance was not motivated solely by altruism toward the recipient. We argue that opting out indicates that giving is also motivated by self-image concerns.
[PDF] [DOI] [Appendix]
Underreporting of Earnings and the Minimum Wage Spike, IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, vol. 2 (2013), issue 2.
This paper documents a positive correlation within European labour markets between the proportion of full-time employees with earnings on the minimum wage and the extent of underreporting of earnings in the economy. Using a simple model of a competitive labour market, I show how this correlation can emerge as a result of the common dependence of both quantities on the strength of enforcement of fiscal regulation. This suggests that a high spike in the wage distribution at the minimum wage level is, in some contexts, an issue of fiscal enforcement, more than a labour market issue.
[PDF] - Open Access
Minimum Wage and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence, Journal of Public Economics, volume 95 (2011), issue 11-12, pages 1635–1651
This paper examines the interaction between minimum wage legislation and tax evasion by employed labor. I develop a model in which fi rms and workers may agree to report less than the true amount of earnings to the fiscal authorities. I show that introducing a minimum wage creates a spike in the distribution of earnings and induces higher compliance by some agents, thus reducing their disposable income. The comparison of food consumption before and after the massive minimum wage hike that took place in Hungary in 2001 reveals that households affected by it experienced a drop compared to similar but unaffected household, thus supporting the prediction of the theory.
This paper is discussed in OECD, 2008, Employment Outlook.
This paper presents evidence from a field experiment, which aims to identify the two sources of workers' pro-social motivation that have been considered in the literature: warm glow altruism and pure altruism. We employ an experimental design that first measures the level of effort exerted by student workers on a data entry task in an environment that elicits purely selfish behavior and we compare it to effort exerted in an environment that also induces warm glow altruism. We then compare the latter to effort exerted in an environment where both types of altruistic preferences are elicited. We find evidence that women increase effort due to warm glow altruism while we do not find any additional impact due to pure altruism. On the other hand, men in our sample are not responsive to any of the treatments.
A non-technical summary appeared on Vox with the title "Are workers motivated by the greater good? Evidence from a field experiment"
Press Coverage: Independent on Sunday and Daily Telegraph
Cited in a report presented to the US Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Ways and Means.
In-work bene fits are becoming an increasingly relevant labour market policy, gradually expanding in scope and geographical coverage. This paper investigates the equilibrium impact of in-work benefi ts and contrasts it with the traditional partial equilibrium analysis. We find under which conditions accounting for equilibrium wage adjustments ampli fies the impact of in-work bene fits on search intensity, participation, employment, and unemployment, compared to a framework in which wages are fixed. We also account for the fi nancing of these bene fits and determine the level of benefi ts necessary to achieve efficiency in a labour market characterized by search externalities.
This paper is discussed in Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2010), Swedish Fiscal Policy - Report of the Fiscal Policy Council 2010.
Based on Eurostat data on wage employment for the period 1999–2006, this article investigates the dynamics of job tenure across the European Union. The authors’ analysis shows no generalized decline in job tenure, but a trend towards shorter tenure among young workers (aged 15–24 years) in many European countries. Their regression results indicate that this trend is associated with the weakening of employment protection provided by law and by trade unions. Given young workers’ weak individual bargaining power, the trend towards individualization of the employment relationship may thus affect them disproportionately.
Refereed Conference Proceedings:
Exploring User Perceptions of Online Privacy Disclosures (with Helia Marreiros, Richard Gomer, Michael Vlassopoulos, m.c. schraefel), Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on WWW/INTERNET (ICWI 2015)
Referral Incentives in Crowdfunding (with Victor Naroditskiy, Sebastian Stein, Long Tran-Thanh, Michael Vlassopoulos, Nicholas R Jennings), Proceedings of the Second AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing (HCOMP-2014), pages 171-183.
Word-of-mouth, referral, or viral marketing is a highly sought-after way of advertising. We undertake a field experiment that compares incentive mechanisms for encouraging social media shares to support a given cause.Our experiment takes place on a website set up to promote a fundraising drive by a large cancer research charity. Site visitors who choose to sign up to support the cause are then asked to spread the word about the cause on Facebook, Twitter or other channels. Visitors are randomly assigned to one of four treatments that differ in the way social sharing activities are incentivised. Under the control treatment, no extra incentive is provided. Under two of the other mechanisms, the sharers are offered a fixed number of points that help take the campaign further. We compare low and high levels of such incentives for direct referrals. In the final treatment, we adopt a multi-level incentive mechanism that rewards direct as well as indirect referrals (where referred contacts refer others). We find that providing high level of incentives results in a statistically significant increase in sharing behaviour and resulting signups. Our data does not indicate a statistically significant increase for the low and recursive incentive mechanisms.
Refereed Book Chapters:
Why Give Away your Wealth? An Analysis of the Billionaires' View (with Jana Sadeh and Michael Vlassopoulos), 2017, in: Social Economics, edited by J. Costa-Font and M. Macis, MIT press.
We explore what motivates the philanthropic activity of the extremely wealthy individuals and families. We focus on a recent large-scale philanthropic initiative by billionaires, the Giving Pledge, a commitment to donating half or more of one's wealth. We perform two pieces of analysis: first, we investigate what personal characteristics of billionaires are associated with becoming a pledger. Second, we undertake a textual analysis of the pledgers' letters describing their philanthropic outlook and classify their motivation into ten categories. We then correlate these motivational categories with various personal characteristics of the pledgers. The main insights obtained from our analysis is that pledgers are more likely to be self-made billionaires, and that their philanthropy is impact-driven.
Too Low to Be True: the Use of Minimum Thresholds to Fight Tax Evasion in: Critical Issues in Taxation and Development, edited by Clemens Fuest and George R. Zodrow, MIT press (ISBN: 978-0-262-01897-5), 2013.
The enforcement of compliance with tax regulation is a complex task. This is particularly the case when the administrative capacity of the tax authority is low, as is often the case in developing and transition countries. In this paper, I first formally model the impact of minimum thresholds by explicitly taking into account the low administrative capacity. The model shows that the introduction of a threshold creates a spike and a "missing middle" in the distribution of declared incomes and highlights under which conditions introducing a threshold is likely to increase net revenues for the tax authority.Then, I draw on some international experiences in fighting tax evasion to identify tools that can be used to reduce underreporting by employed labor, small and medium enterprises, self-employed, and professionals. In particular, I analyze the Italian "Business Sector Analysis" and the Bulgarian "Minimum Social Insurance Thresholds".
Informality in: Perspectives on Labour Economics for Development, edited by Sandrine Cazes and Sher Verick, ILO and Academic Foundation (ISBN: 978-92-2-126714-0), 2013.
A striking feature of labour markets in developing economies is informality: informal employment is not only widespread, often involving the vast majority of workers, but it does not seem to be receding. This chapter looks more in depth into this issue. After defining and quantifying the informal sector, the chapter discusses the reasons behind its existence, emphasizing how people may work informally by choice or due to exclusion from the formal sector. This chapter then describes the most important characteristics of informality in the main developing regions of the world and, finally, considers possible policy responses.
Minimum Wage or Minimum Tax?
in: Fazekas K., Benczúr P., Telegdy Á. (eds.) "The Hungarian Labour Market Review and Analysis", Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences & National Employment Nonprofit Public Company Ltd., 2012.
Employment Protection Legislation in Central and East European Countries, South East Europe Review, issue 4, 2009.
This article presents updated indicators of employment protection legislation for several central and eastern European countries according to OECD methodology. Common patterns and outliers are identified and additional information is provided to interpret correctly the strictness of the regulatory environment. The aim is to provide some hard evidence for the debate regarding the interface between employment protection legislation and labour markets and welfare, based on the legislations applying in central and east European countries at the end of 2003. The article focuses on the 22 aspects of employment regulation encompassed within the OECD model, examining how each relates to the employment protection legislation in force in each country, and scores each one based on the relative restrictiveness of the regulation. The article concludes that the occurrence of informal arrangements complicates the picture but that this does not invalidate the usefulness of examining formal rules in detail.
The Wage Dimension of Flexibility and Security in Selected Central and Eastern European Countries
in: Cazes, S., Nesporova, A. (eds.) “Flexicurity: a relevant approach for Eastern Europe?“, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2007.