Schedule: Nov 113:30-13:40 Opening Remarks by Nagoya University13:40-14:35 Min Cheol Seo (Sungkyunkwan University)14:40-15:35 Donggeon Kim (Sungkyunkwan University)15:40-16:20 Tomoki Kodama (Nagoya University)16:20-17:00 Jihwan Park (Nagoya University)17:10-17:50 Jaehun Cho (Sungkyunkwan University)18:00-18:55 Naoya Iwata (Nagoya University) Schedule: Nov 213:00-13:55 Jian Xue (Nagoya University)14:00-14:55 Injin Woo (Sungkyunkwan University)15:00-15:40 Ryusuke Murata (Nagoya University)15:40-16:20 Gangwook Lyeo (Sungkyunkwan University)16:30-17:10 Yutaka Akiba (Nagoya University)17:20-18:15 Seong Soo Park (Sungkyunkwan University)18:15-18:25 Closing Remarks by Sungkyunkwan University Schedule: Nov 310:00-10:55 Masashi Kasaki (Nagoya University)
Titles & Abstracts: Nov 1Proof, Computer and Mathematical AgentMin Cheol Seo (Sungkyunkwan University)Abstract: Since Appel’s and Haken’s proof of the Four-Colour Theorem, machine-assisted proofs has become an integral practice in mathematics, to the point that computer has become an indispensable partner. Philosophers have approached this transformation of computer from a mere calculator to human-machine coalition in epistemic term—i.e., what warrants trust in machine output? do we have a genuine mathematical knowledge from machine-assissted proofs?—but only a hanful of philosophers engaged the fine-grained structure of mathematical practice itself. Hamami and Morris do so in drawing on Bratman’s theory of temporally extended planning, suggest that understanding proofs tantamount to recongnising and reconstructing underlying plan of mathematicians. Extending Hamami’s and Morris’ framework, I recast proof construction as a hierarchy of nested intentions in which computers occupy well-defined but partial roles. Transposing Bratman’s planning to mathematics, I shall give a hierarchical structure of intentions in mathematical proofs as: L0 Long-term intention: prove or refute a theorem T.L1 Strategic commitments: select overall method (induction, variational bound, etc.)L2 Tactical sub-intentions: state lemmas, fix parameterisations, choose normal forms.L3 Micro-steps: verify an inequality, explore a search tree, run a proof-assistant tactic. From this hierarchical structure, I map contemporary practice onto it yielding six recurring roles: (i) exhaustive enumeration–L3; (ii) rigorous numerics–L3; (iii) SAT/SMT certification–L3−L2; (iv) automated theorem proving–L2; (v) interactive proof assistance–L3; (vi) heuristic optimisation–L2. In this, each role associated with sub-intentions whose outputs are diffused upward level, which can be reflected through a series of case studies. Finally, I conclude with some remarks on a new approach to the conception of mathematical agents, through an agency-centered methodology for mathematical practice. What is Wrong with White Ignorance?: A Case against the ‘Environmental Model’ of Epistemic NormativityDonggeon Kim (Sungkyunkwan University)Abstract: In this presentation, I aim to argue against the radical “image-shift” in the epistemological domain proposed by Martin Miragoli (2025). Miragoli introduces the ‘environmental model’ (EM) of epistemic normativity as an alternative to two conventional agent-centered (or, “Cliffordian”) models: the psychological and the agential. He contends that these models fail in the case of sanctioned white ignorance, where factual evidence for racial equity is systematically hindered from coming into existence. Since no evidence is accessible to an agent, the agent-centered models cannot diagnose this ignorance as an epistemic failure. The agent appears, at least trivially, to be following epistemic ‘norms’. EM, in contrast, shifts the locus of epistemic normative judgements to the ground-level, that is, the epistemic environment sanctioning those harmful epistemic norms. For EM, this environmental injustice itself is the epistemic failure in question: more specifically, “should have known” is reinterpreted as “should have been accessible to the evidence”, and “epistemically wrong” as “the epistemic environment being unjust”. However, I contend that Miragoli’s argument faces some crucial issues. The core issue is that Miragoli presents EM as the only viable alternative, but fails to fairly consider other possibilities. To substantiate this point, I briefly consider two viable models of epistemic normativity: a modified version of the Cliffordian model, and a new model inspired by social virtue epistemology (Jarczewski&Riggs, 2025). I will show that both models are at least as explanatorily powerful as EM, in addressing the case of sanctioned white ignorance. Given these viable alternatives, the case of white ignorance alone is insufficient to warrant Miragoli’s radical proposal. While Miragoli appeals to the positive political implications of his model, I argue this appeal fails to justify EM over other possibilities. Once we clarify the ambiguity in his use of evaluative terms such as wrong by distinguishing between epistemic failures and political injustice, his political goals can be achieved without committing to EM. Therefore, I conclude that Miragoli fails to justify his model over others, leaving us no compelling reason to adopt it. Frege’s Logical System and Rules of InferenceTomoki Kodama (Nagoya University)Abstract: Gottlob Frege, a German philosopher and mathematician, is known for his logical system, Conceptual writing. Frege attempted to proof arithmetic truth solely on the laws of logic. Frege’s attempt is called Logicism. Frege believed that natural language causes errors in reasoning. The flaws in natural language hindered Logicism. Therefore, Frege considered the philosopher’s task to be “a struggle with speaking”. So how did Frege attempt to accomplish this “struggle with speaking”? In his attempt at Logicism, Frege criticized two intuitions: the first was geometric intuition, and the other was linguistic intuition. This presentation will examine Frege’s second intuition and explore how he confronted the flaws in natural language. Rethinking Communicative Action in Socially Engaged New Media Art: Revisiting Habermas’s TheoryJihwan Park (Nagoya University)Abstract: This presentation revisits Jürgen Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action (1981) to suggest an updated way to understand Socially Engaged Art (SEA) in the digital age. SEA usually aims for social change through mutual understanding and agreement among participants. However, in today’s practice, participation often happens through algorithmic, networked, or interface-based systems instead of direct human interaction. These conditions challenge Habermas’s language-centered model of communication. Pablo Helguera (2011) explains SEA’s social action by using Habermas’s idea of communicative action, seeing art as a social practice based on shared understanding. Grant Kester (2005) focuses more on the dialogical aspect, describing conversation as an ethical and aesthetic process. Both scholars use Habermas’s communicative approach, but they do not discuss much about the effects of technological mediation. Following Sjoukje van der Meulen (2017), who points out that new media art and SEA are closely related, this presentation argues that digital mediation itself can be seen as a new kind of social action. I propose an expanded model of communicative action that goes beyond linguistic communication and includes technological, networked, and algorithmic interactions, to explain how SEA can gain communicative meaning and social influence in the digital era. From a Calculative Space toward the Meaningful Place: A Phenomenological Deconstruction of the Sungkyunkwan University CampusJaehun Cho (Sungkyunkwan University)Abstract: This study investigates how a mode of dwelling can be transformed from a calculative space toward the meaningful place through a phenomenological analysis of the Sungkyunkwan University campus. Heidegger critiques calculative thinking—instrumental rationality aimed at efficiency—for dominating the everyday and making us forget authentic meaning, while proposing ways to recover authentic meaning beyond mere efficiency. Authentic meaning, for Heidegger, is realized by gathering the fourfold—the earth, the sky, the divinities, and the mortals through the thing. One way to gather the fourfold through the thing is through building. Among two forms of building, I focus on constructing, the human act of creation such as shipbuilding or temple-building. However, contemporary constructions such as high-rise buildings, residential houses, and even university campuses, tend to pursue efficiency but rarely reveal any kind of authentic meaning. Nevertheless, I argue that constructing can still realize authentic meaning as exemplified by the SKKU campus. First, I reveal the limitations of calculative space through ‘Geumjandi Square’, the central thing on campus by disclosing dwelling as a mode of being. Then, I discuss how the thing realizes authentic meaning as a step toward a meaningful place by criticizing the projectionist account of value and suggesting a Heideggerian account characterized by the fourfold and the thing. I clarify the Heideggerian account and combine it with an architectural phenomenology proposed by Christian Norberg-Schulz to systematically apply this theory to the case. Finally, based on the theory, I try to show how the thing can gather authentic meaning with the fourfold by contrasting ‘the 600th Anniversary Hall’ and ‘the Seokjojeon building of the confucian college’ on campus. AI-Assisted Philosophical Inquiry: Engaging with Classical Sources through ‘Humanitext’Naoya Iwata (Nagoya University)Abstract: “Human nature” and “natural right” (that is, what is right by nature) have been central themes of inquiry since the seventeenth century, commonly discussed under the heading of modern natural law theory. Although such theories have profoundly influenced moral philosophy, they primarily focus on the empirical or factual order of human life rather than on morality grounded in ideals or free choice. Following the decline of natural law theory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, discussions of human nature and natural rights were revived in several movements, including Rawls’s theory of justice, the Catholic “new natural law” school, and the American Straussian tradition of natural right. Yet none of these approaches, I argue, considers human nature and natural right in a genuinely realistic way.This study reexamines Leo Strauss’s interpretation of these notions and argues that, for Strauss, both human nature and natural right are to be understood as realities that can be actualized, rather than as moral ideals. More specifically, the “human nature” Strauss has in mind consists of the asocial and uncontrollable traits that become manifest in the philosophic and religious ways of life; and “natural right,” first and foremost, means living according to such a way of life. Drawing on a retrospective analysis of the intellectual history of natural law, this presentation first compares Strauss’s conception of human nature with those of his seventeenth and eighteenth-century predecessors. It then examines his intellectual development and, by revisiting his well-known reflection on the tension between Athens and Jerusalem, elucidates the distinctive approach by which Strauss investigates the meaning of human nature.
Titles & Abstracts: Nov 2Leo Strauss’s Rediscovery of Human Nature and Natural RightJian Xue (Nagoya University)Abstract: “Human nature” and “natural right” (that is, what is right by nature) have been central themes of inquiry since the seventeenth century, commonly discussed under the heading of modern natural law theory. Although such theories have profoundly influenced moral philosophy, they primarily focus on the empirical or factual order of human life rather than on morality grounded in ideals or free choice. Following the decline of natural law theory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, discussions of human nature and natural rights were revived in several movements, including Rawls’s theory of justice, the Catholic “new natural law” school, and the American Straussian tradition of natural right. Yet none of these approaches, I argue, considers human nature and natural right in a genuinely realistic way.This study reexamines Leo Strauss’s interpretation of these notions and argues that, for Strauss, both human nature and natural right are to be understood as realities that can be actualized, rather than as moral ideals. More specifically, the “human nature” Strauss has in mind consists of the asocial and uncontrollable traits that become manifest in the philosophic and religious ways of life; and “natural right,” first and foremost, means living according to such a way of life. Drawing on a retrospective analysis of the intellectual history of natural law, this presentation first compares Strauss’s conception of human nature with those of his seventeenth and eighteenth-century predecessors. It then examines his intellectual development and, by revisiting his well-known reflection on the tension between Athens and Jerusalem, elucidates the distinctive approach by which Strauss investigates the meaning of human nature. On the Reference of Social Groups under Reductive MaterialismInjin Woo (Sungkyunkwan University)Abstract: The ontology of social groups has recently become an active topic of discussion in philosophy. In the context of social ontology, reductive materialism holds that social groups are concrete material particulars and that no additional abstract entities are required to explain them. These theories can be divided into fusionism, which identifies social groups with the fusion of individuals, and pluralism, which takes groups to be the plurality of individuals. While ontological debates have progressed, the question of how to explain the reference of social groups has remained a peripheral issue within ontology. Fusionists naturally assume that social groups are referred to singularly, whereas pluralists assume that they are referred to plurally. However, when these views are combined with reductive materialism about social groups, they face the coincidence problem.In this presentation, I argue that existing accounts of the reference of social groups are inadequate. Proponents of these views often maintain that the names of social groups refer to certain roles, yet they fail to provide a satisfactory explanation of what such roles are. Moreover, unlike role accounts concerning ordinary objects or individuals, the role account of social groups encounters an additional difficulty with respect to their persistence conditions. Religious Belief and Epistemic NormRyusuke Murata (Nagoya University)Abstract: My central question is "Why are religious beliefs permissible?" Since there seems to be no epistemic reason or evidence supporting religious beliefs (e.g. the belief that God exists), it is questionable whether any religious belief can be permissible. This doubt comes from an idea: the evidential norm of belief. One way to save religious beliefs is to find some plausible evidence for them and another is to reject the very idea of epistemic norm. In this presentation, I will consider the latter possibility. First, if some religious beliefs are permissible, evidence may not be the norm of belief. Or perhaps, there is no legitimate epistemic norm in general. In that case, the previous doubt will be removed straightforwardly. Second, even if some legitimate norms of belief exist, they may not be a distinctive kind of norm. In this case, the permissibility of religious belief would depend on non-epistemic norms. Evidence is unlikely to feature in those norms. The doubt would be mitigated. Indeed, there is a bunch of literature indicating these possibilities. I will present this literature and illustrate some ways to save religious beliefs. From Text to Existence: The Circular Structure of UnderstandingGangwook Lyeo (Sungkyunkwan University)Abstract: In this presentation, I will clarify that the hermeneutic circle grounded in temporality constitutes the ontological structure of Dasein, and furthermore, that the circular process of such interpretation is a fundamental condition not only for understanding texts, but also for perceiving objects, understanding events and actions, and achieving self-understanding.According to Heidegger, the being of Dasein is care (Sorge), which consists of three structural moments: existentiality, facticity, and fallenness. These three moments form a unity as a whole. However, what makes possible the totality of this articulated structure of care is temporality, which consists of the ecstases of the future, the past, and the present. I understand this temporal structure as fundamentally indicating the temporal structure of understanding itself: that is, based on linguistic conventions to which we already belong (past), we anticipate or project a certain sketch in a specific direction (future), and we interpret the given object or event within a coherent narrative context (present). Thus, every interpretation of Dasein begins from a pre-understanding historically transmitted through language, and understanding of phenomena occurs only through the anticipatory projection.However, the overall sketch anticipated from parts is subsequently tested and sometimes challenged by the parts that follow. When new parts fail to coincide with the previously assumed whole, the whole is revised by the parts, and the parts that once belonged to the previous narrative context are reinterpreted in new ways. Whereas Schleiermacher and Dilthey limited the hermeneutic circle to the methodological level of interpreting texts or history, Heidegger expanded the circularity of interpretation to the ontological structure of human existence (Dasein). The temporal structure of interpretation and the hermeneutic circle thus acquire universality as conditions for all understanding and interpretation — not only of texts, but also of perception, events, and self-understanding.Accordingly, in this paper I will first explain the circular structure of understanding based on Dasein’s temporality through the texts of Heidegger and Gadamer (Chapter 1). Then, I will apply this circular structure of interpretation to a close reading of Frederick Brown’s short text, examining how the reader’s overall projection is frustrated by the resistance of the text, and how the text compels the reader to reconstruct context and partial meanings (Chapter 2). Furthermore, I will show that such a structure of interpretation occurs not only in reading texts but also in everyday perception of objects, in understanding events, and in our engagement with works of art (Chapter 3). Finally, I will argue that since actions and personal identity can also be understood through narratives, the reconstruction of narrative through hermeneutic circularity in new experiences also takes place at the level of personal identity (Chapter 4). Does a Forward-Looking Responsibility Gap Exist in the Context of Autonomous AI Systems?Yutaka Akiba (Nagoya University)Abstract: Autonomous AI systems, such as autonomous vehicles and lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), raise the well-known problem of a "responsibility gap”, where no agent appears properly responsible for behavior and outcomes of such systems, due to their technological traits, organizational structures, and so on. Most existing work addresses backward-looking responsibility―blame and accountability after harm―but has comparatively neglected forward-looking responsibility for what is expected to happen. So, this talk asks whether a forward-looking responsibility gap exists. Drawing mainly on Joel Feinberg and Robert Goodin, I define a forward-looking responsibility in the context of AI systems as a commitment to see to it that some accidents or harm caused by AI systems are avoided and well-being of stakeholders is improved. Then, I identify three sources of difficulty in exercising such responsibility: (1) autonomy and self-learning capacity of AI systems, (2) organizational modularity in the development/use of AI systems, and (3) temporal distances between development and use of AI systems. Finally, adopting a constructivist perspective associated with Science and Technology Studies, I argue that any forward-looking responsibility gap is not metaphysically inevitable. Rather, it can be mitigated by redefining the relevant “X” (the outcomes to be ensured) and reconfiguring socio-technical arrangements. Gaslighting and BullshitSeong Soo Park (Sungkyunkwan University)Abstract: In this paper, I clarify the relation between gaslighting and bullshit. To this end, I first present paradigmatic cases of gaslighting grounded in the key features identified in the literature. Using those cases, I then argue that gaslighting is a perlocutionary act that requires a specific psychological effect on the hearer. After that, I argue that the effect necessary for gaslighting is typically achieved through a special kind of bullshit, which I call persuasive bullshit. To support this, I elaborate on the notion of persuasive bullshit and the need for it by extending the existing account of bullshit. Finally, drawing on the relation between gaslighting and bullshit, I briefly diagnose why victims of gaslighting are numerous and argue that ongoing efforts to dismantle unjust epistemic hierarchies are essential to prevent gaslighting.
Titles & Abstracts: Nov 3What is Epistemic Justification?Masashi Kasaki (Nagoya University)Abstract: Recently, many express a doubt about the notion of epistemic justification. Some argue that the notion is inherently ambiguous, and some argue that there is no theory-neutral way to understand it. I agree with those critics of the notion of epistemic justification. I also offer more reasons to doubt the notion: (i) it is not clear at all what epistemically deontic status it refers to, and (ii) knowledge might not be normative in any deep sense. If I'm right, epistemology would be beter off without the notion of epistemic justification.