9th Nagoya Meta-Philosophy Workshop
Date: 16:30 to 18:00pm, Dec 6, 2019
Venue: Liberal Arts and Sciences Main Building, Room C12
"Two-Dimensional Semantics and Cognitive Contents of Meaning"
SeongSoo Park (Sungkyunkwan University)
Abstract: Two-dimensional semantics (or 2D semantics for short) is an heir of Fregean Semantics. In addition to reference, this semantics adopts two additional types of semantic properties, namely, primary and secondary intensions to reflect cognitive aspects of meaning. Indeed, David Chalmers argues that primary intension in his version of 2D semantics can play much of the same role as Fregean sense does, based on his observation that it has much of the same features as Fregean sense has.
The purpose of this paper is to argue against the claim that primary intension can be a good alternative to Fregean sense. To achieve this, I will argue that primary intension cannot have the features that it is supposed to have by attempting to make it clear that primary intension cannot reflect cognitive aspects of meaning. More specifically, I will argue that 2D semantics has some difficulty in giving a satisfactory account of empty names. The way I see it, 2D semantics should give an account of why they are meaningful in a way that fits well with our commonsense. This is because the theory, unlike Millianism, associates cognitive contents of expression with its semantic contents.