8th Nagoya Meta-Philosophy Workshop
Date: 14:00 to 17:30pm, Sep 10, 2019
Venue: Liberal Arts and Sciences Main Building, Room S16, 1st Floor
"Methodological Reflection on the Frankfurt-style Cases"
Koji Ota (Niigata University): 14:00-14:40pm
Abstract: The Frankfurt-Style Cases (FSCs) have been eminent for eliciting intuitive judgments that an agent is morally responsible despite being unable to act otherwise, which is supposed to falsify the Principle of Alternative Possibility (PAP): one can be morally responsible for an action only if one can act otherwise. Recent studies in experimental philosophy suggest that many people share the inclination toward intuitive judgments against PAP. This suggestion, if it is correct, seems to strengthen the argument against PAP. However, some philosophers argue against the philosophical significance of these empirical studies and instead advocate Descriptive Anti-Intuitionism (DAI): intuitive judgments have never played the evidential role in philosophy; thus, the experimental studies are of no philosophical significance. First, I point out that DAI, if taken literally, is false in the debate about the FSCs, and yet an insight associated with it is still valid to the extent that the intuitive judgments are so fragile that they are easily defeated by counter-arguments. Nevertheless, second, I argue that the experimental studies are significant because what is deemed important in the debate about the FSCs is the general principles to which we are committing in our practice concerning moral responsibility. Uncovering the commitment to the general principles is accomplished by empirically investigating the psychological mechanisms underlying our ascription of moral responsibility. Such empirical investigations offer robust evidence pertaining to the philosophical debate over moral responsibility.
"The Epistemological Challenges of the Evolutionary Debunking Arguments"
Masashi Kasaki (Nagoya University): 14:50-15:50pm
Abstract: The evolutionary debunking arguments for moral skepticism typically consist of an evolutionary and an epistemological premise leading to a skeptical conclusion. The evolutionary premise says that the origin of our moral beliefs is evolutionary explained, and the epistemological premise says that if the evolutionary premise is correct, then our moral beliefs fail to meet a necessary condition for knowledge or justification. The arguments then go to conclude that moral skepticism is correct. Many philosophers propose or interpret evolutionary debunking arguments in different ways. In this paper, I focus on what epistemic principles are appealed to in giving substance to the epistemological premise. I describe and compare different epistemic principles behind the epistemological premise and argue that they raise different epistemological challenges to the possibility of moral knowledge. The upshot is that since the evolutionary debunking arguments contain multiple challenges, a single solution cannot handle them all at once.
"What are Basic Needs? An Empirical Investigation of Folk Intuitions"
Thomas Pölzler (University of Graz): 16:00-17:30pm
Abstract: Some normative theorists appeal to the notion of basic needs. They argue that when it comes to issues such as international development, justice to future generations, basic rights or limits of development our first priority should be that everybody is able to meet these needs. But what are basic needs? I attempt to inform discussions about this question by gathering quantitative evidence about ordinary speakers’ intuitions about the concept of basic needs. First, I briefly explain, motivate and qualify my empirical approach to conceptual analysis. Second, by analyzing the available (non-science-based) literature I identify potential constituents of the concept of basic needs. Third, I discuss the potential participants and methods of a quantitative study on folk intuitions about basic needs that is supposed to test these constituents. I hope to run this study and come up with first results within the next months.