When the euphoria after the Gulf War began to die down, Bush found himself confronted with the problem of explaining why, after supposedly winning the war against the Hitler of Baghdad, who had been itching to drop A-bombs on Tel Aviv, Saddam was still alive and still had his bombs.
Newsweek (NW) came to the rescue a year later (1/20/92). The problem had to be dealt with, since it "leaves a sour taste in the mouths of many American military people" (p. 12). The specific question was: Why were the allied forces stopped "just a few miles short of their final objective," thus allowing two divisions of the elite Iraqi Republican Guard to escape northward, taking their tanks and helicopters with them"?
Piling contradiction upon contradiction, after nine pages of discussion NW wonders "how much difference it all made" (p. 19). This is "the unanswered (and perhaps unanswerable) question," but lo and behold, NW does have an answer: "...it is unlikely that the capture of only two divisions at Basra would have spelled certain doom for Saddam Hussein." Why, then, do "many senior U.S. military officers and civilian officials believe that decision [the cease-fire on Feb. 28] was a mistake" (12)? Why does NW itself refer to the early end of the war as a "lost opportunity" (13)? And finally, why spend nine pages analyzing this "mistake," if it was of no consequence anyway?
It was of consequence, of course, particularly for the Kurds and Shiites that the CIA had encouraged to rebel and that Saddam then proceeded to murder with just those Republican Guard troops and helicopter gunships that the allies allowed to escape. Why did Bush CIA encourage these rebellions if he didn't mean to support them? Why did he allow Saddam, under the terms of the cease-fire, to fly his helicopters, although the rest of his air force was grounded? Were these also "mistakes"?
NW doesn't ask. Nor does NW ask why Bush reluctantly decided in April to change course again and send the troops back in to protect the Kurds from further decimation. NW has no curiosity about the fact that this decision came one day after the New York Times published Gary Sick's article reviving the October Surprise story, which hangs over Bush's head like a Damocles sword.
NW's task is clear. In the wake of such puzzling inconsistencies, the public must be made to understand how it is possible to win a war and lose it at the same time. King George mounted his white horse (several thousand miles behind the front lines) to slay the dragon, wins, declares victory for "the rule of law," victory over Saddam, victory in the Cold War, and victory over the Vietnam syndrome. A year later, the dragon is still spewing fire. The public is stupid, but not that stupid: Did we win or didn't we?
Of course we won. If Saddam is not out of our lives yet, it cannot be George Bush's fault. After all, this is an election year. A scapegoat is needed. Eeny, meeny, miney mo, catch Colin Powell by the toe.
Powell (understandably) refused to be interviewed by NW for this article, but NW reports that he told the president it would be "unchivalrous" to continue massacring the retreating Iraqis. Powell was "stirred by images from the 'Highway of Death'" (12). It does not occur to NW that Powell may have been thinking less about chivalry than about the Code of War and the Geneva Conventions.
In addition to chivalry, NW suggests three reasons why Powell called for the cease-fire and thus screwed everything up. First, incompetence. "Powell is widely criticized for misjudging the situation on the ground and failing to report it accurately to Bush" (13). We are not told what he is supposed to have misjudged. Schwarzkopf, "who by law reported directly to the president," also takes his knocks. He "had at least two opportunities to express his misgivings to Washington and failed to do so."
Neither of these accusations is credible. NW would have us believe the chairman of the Joint Chiefs failed to understand a patently obvious military situation, and that the commanding general of the operation, though presumably understanding the situation, failed or refused to report accurately to the commander-in-chief–and, presumably, to Powell, since otherwise Powell would have "understood" the situation.
The second reason NW offers is panic. This time it is not only Powell but also the White House "overreacting" to reports of the damage done to the retreating Iraqis (p. 17). The cause for this panic is not specified. What was there to panic about? All the allies had to do was stop the airstrikes and take the Iraqis prisoner.
Reason No. 3 is political expedience: "Panicked or not, the White House and Powell were increasingly concerned by the potential impact of the slaughter along Highway 6 on public opinion" (p. 18). Again it is Powell and the White House who are blamed, but Powell is taking the brunt of NW's assault. He was playing politics when he should have been winning a war. This is particularly absurd considering that the military censors had complete control of press coverage, so the public need not have seen much to form an opinion about. What was the "impact" of the bombing of Baghdad, which went on for over a month?
None of this is obvious on first reading, neither the contradictions nor the absurdity of blaming Powell and (to a much lesser extent) Schwarzkopf for the failures of George Bush. You have to read it at least twice–and what reader does that? This is how magazines like Time and Newsweek operate, like Madison Avenue propagandists. How would it look to say clearly that our top soldiers are incompetent, panicky and more concerned with politics than winning wars? No one would believe it, because it is obviously untrue. How would it look to say that even if it were true, their boss, the president, is the one who bears the responsibility for them?
And how would it look to say that Bush is incompetent, panicky and more concerned with politics than winning a war? A war he started, one should add, against the advice of top-level civilian and military experts (including Powell), against the will of almost half the Congress, against the will of more than half of the population, against the War Powers Act, against the Constitution, and against common sense?
The subtlety of such whitewashing should be appreciated. It goes far beyond partisanship. This is very sophisticated propaganda. If you only have to read once to get the message, twice to understand it, and three times to realize that it's a lie, you're dealing with experts.