25 Dec. 1992
Dear Noam,
This may seem a strange thing to be doing on Christmas day, but I sent the enclosed letter off to Z yesterday, and we are driving to Prague tomorrow for a few days' change of scenery, so I figured I might as well get this off today.
I don't think they'll print the letter since it's a bit late–I didn't get the copy of your article until a few days ago, sent by a former student who subscribes to Z–and probably too long. Of course I had the manuscript copy you sent me, but I didn't know where it would appear.
On re-reading I see that I've made at least one mistake. You do of course mention the PP account, but not the parts I quote, which I think are the point. Otherwise, as far as I can tell, it's a fair reading of what you say and of the points I made back in August. I realize that it's strong, but I feel strongly about the issue. In my last letter I said we'd have to agree to disagree, but I am finding that difficult. If it were anybody else but you–and I mean anybody–it wouldn't bother me so much. As it is, I can't help feeling that one of us is very wrong on a crucial issue, and that does stick in the gut.
Sincerely,
Michael
Chomsky responded (1/7/93) that my letter to Z made it "even clearer that we've left the bounds of rational discussion." That he was not pleased was clear. "I'll omit the sneering rhetoric," he said. This was presumably in reference to my article ("Chomsky on JFK and Vietnam"). "That's your problem," he added, "not mine."
My "effort to distinguish 'assumption of military success' from 'condition for withdrawal," he said, was "entirely without merit. If plans are made on the assumption of success, and the assumption proves wrong, it is logical to expect the plans to change. "The case that maybe they would have been carried out anyway, even with the explicit assumption on which they were based withdrawn, is too outlandish to merit consideration." I was "now really grasping at straws," which was not surprising, given the "overwhelming evidence" against my position. "NSAM 263, like the rest of the documentary record, is explicit about the condition of victory."
The "M-thesis" (mine)–that the withdrawal plan was based on the assumption of military success–is "uncontroversially true, and completely–totally–without interest." The "C-thesis"–that JFK planned to withdraw without victory–has been "refuted across the board and without exception." Kennedy was committed to "victory" in Vietnam, went along with the withdrawal plan only "reluctantly" and "on the explicit presumption of victory."
Chomsky should have called the "C-thesis" the "N-thesis," since he meant Newman's thesis, but the confusion is understandable considering that it is really Chomsky's thesis too in the sense that this is the one he is determined to refute.
"On this," Chomsky said, "we seem to agree, except that (for reasons that are unclear) you think the M-thesis is important. It is not." Everyone, including the hawks, was "looking forward to withdrawal by the end of '65 on the presumption of victory." JFK too. I had failed to make clear why these "uncontroversial matters" were of any interest at all.