The Uprising

3. The uprising

One clear aspect of the plan was that once the invasion force landed, there would be a spontaneous uprising on the part of the Cuban people, presumably anxious to be liberated from Castro. Dulles also tries to weasel out of this (p.111-112):

Dulles: We didn't count on this so much in the Zapata Plan; whereas the Trinidad Plan [an earlier plan to land at another beach] was more of a shock treatment which might have brought the Cuban people around to our side. The later plan was not tailored to this, and it was far quieter. Perhaps Castro might have played down the landing instead of blowing it up. As a matter of fact, he only blew it up when it was rather evident that he had licked the invading force.

This stream of words is meant to disguise the lie in the first sentence--but Robert Kennedy pursues him:

Kennedy: Then what was the objective of the operation?

Dulles: Get a beachhead, hold it, and then build it up.

Kennedy: How could you possibly do that--take a thousand or 1,400 men in there and hold the beachhead against these thousands of militia?

Dulles has no answer to this. If he wasn't counting on an uprising, everyone else was, including the Secretaries of Defense and State:

McNamara: It was understood that there was a substantial possibility of uprisings... (p. 202)

Rusk: There was a very considerable likelihood of popular uprisings.

Question: How essential was such an uprising regarded for the success of the operation?

Rusk: It was believed that the uprising was utterly essential to success in terms of ousting Castro (p. 220).

Gen. Shoup, the Marine Commandant, had also been convinced by the CIA that there would be an uprising:

Shoup: ...The intelligence indicated that there were quite a number of people that were ready to join in the fight against Castro (p. 243)...My understanding was that the possibilities of uprisings were increasing, that people were just waiting for these arms and equipment, and as soon as they heard where the invasion was that they would be coming after them (p. 245).

Question: The success of this operation was wholly dependent upon popular support?

Shoup: Absolutely. Ultimate success (p. 253).

Question: You'd say then that they would still be on the beach if the plan had been carried out as conceived and depended upon popular uprisings throughout the island of Cuba? Otherwise they would have been wiped out?

Shoup: Absolutely. I don't think there is any doubt at all. Eventually 1,500people cannot hold out against many, many thousands.

Question: Would you send 1,200 Marines in there to do that?

Shoup: No, I wouldn't, unless 1,200 Marines are going to be assisted by 30,000Cubans.

Question: Did somebody tell you there'd be 30,000 Cubans?

Gen. Shoup: No, they didn't, but we were getting materials ready for them (p.253).

The intelligence Shoup refers to came from the CIA:

Question: Who gave you this information on the uprisings?

Shoup: I don't know. I suppose it was CIA. Well, it's obvious we wouldn't be taking 30,000 additional rifles if we didn't think there was going to be somebody to use them. I don't think any military man would ever think that this force could overthrow Castro without support. They could never expect anything but annihilation (p. 253). 

Lemnitzer also makes it clear that the CIA was the source of information on the uprisings:

Question: What impression did the JCS have of the likelihood of an uprising?

Lemnitzer: We had no information. We went on CIA's analysis and it was reported that there was a good prospect. I remember Dick Bissell, evaluating this for the President, indicated there was sabotage, bombings and there were also various groups that were asking or begging for arms and so forth (p. 334).

Obviously, despite Dulles's denial, the CIA had convinced Rusk, McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs that the uprisings were both likely and essential to the success of the mission.

What basis did the CIA have for this "information"? The Zapata Peninsula, where the Bay of Pigs is located, was swampy, isolated, and uninhabited, so there could have been no possibility of a spontaneous uprising, because no indigenous Cubans would have seen the landing. Therefore, pre-invasion propaganda would have been essential to prepare the Cuban people for what was coming. This was the mission of 12 CIA-controlled radio stations in the region, including one on Swan Island that had been set up in March 1960 by the infamous Gen. Edward Lansdale. There were also supposed to be "extensive leaflet drops" on the day of the invasion (Taylor's Memorandum 1, para. 38). According to Cuban sources, however, writes Luis Aguilar in the introduction to Operation Zapata, "With the pretext of secrecy, no clear explanation of the expedition's objectives was given to the Cuban people, and no appeal was made to their anti-Communist feelings" (xii). Indeed, it would have been quite a feat to let the Cuban people know about the impending invasion without letting Castro know too, and as it turned out, Castro was one of the first Cubans to hear about it. He had thousands of potential opponents arrested on April 13, days before they even heard about the coming invasion, thus quelling the "uprising" before it had a chance to get started. The leaflets were not dropped either, because "the military situation did not permit the diversion of effort" (Memo. 1, para. 38), although as it turned out the planes that could have dropped them never took off from Nicaragua.