Letter to Arthur Schlesinger
I wrote the above in September 1991. A year later it occurred to me to ask Arthur Schlesinger, jr. what actually happened the night of April 16, 1961, at the presidential retreat at Glen Ora, since his account in A Thousand Days implies that he was there. I also took the opportunity to ask him about his reaction to Oliver Stone's JFK, which had come out in the meantime. Here is my letter and Schlesinger's reply, for what they are worth:
Sept. 22, 1992
Dear Professor Schlesinger,
I would be very grateful if you could answer a couple of questions for me concerning what you have written about the Bay of Pigs invasion and JFK's Vietnam withdrawal policy.
In A Thousand Days, you say that after a long telephone conversation with Rusk late Sunday afternoon (April 16, 1963), "the President directed that the strike [scheduled for dawn the next morning to accompany the invasion] be canceled" (p.273). One might construe from your narrative that you were in JFK's presence at this time--were you? If so, it would be interesting to know what else you overheard the president say. If not, how do you know that this is what he said?
You say that "Bundy promptly passed on the word" to Cabell. According to the Taylor report (Operation Zapata), Bundy called Cabell at about 9:30 p.m. From late afternoon to 9:30 in the evening doesn't seem very "prompt" to me, especially if this was merely a matter of passing on a direct presidential order to Cabell via Rusk and Bundy. Despite what your and other accounts assume, I am wondering if there ever was such an order.
In addition to the time discrepancy, according to the Taylor report, Bundy did not tell Cabell that the president had canceled the strike. He told him "that the dawn air strikes the following morning should not be launched until they could be conducted from a strip within the beachhead" (Memo. 1, para. 43). When Bundy was asked about this decision, instead of quoting Kennedy (or Rusk), alone would expect if he were merely relaying an order, Bundy responded in a letter, obviously choosing his words carefully:
This is a matter which arises from a conversation with the President and the Secretary of State, and I do not believe I am the right man to comment on it"(Operation Zapata, p. 179).
"A matter which arises..." does not sound like a presidential order. Furthermore, Bundy certainly is the right man to comment, since--as you make clear--it was Rusk who first decided to cancel the strike:
Rusk, after his talks with Stevenson, concluded that a second Nicaraguan strike would put the United States in an untenable position internationally and that no further strikes should be launched until the planes could fly (or appear to fly) from the beachhead. Bundy agreed, and they called the President at Glen Ora (p.273).
Since you say "they" called him, Bundy must have heard what JFK said, so there should have been no reason for him to hedge in response to the Taylor committee’s question.
It seems clear to me that the cancellation was Rusk's and Bundy's decision, and they talked JFK into agreeing, or perhaps into letting them handle it themselves (which would explain the 4-5 hours between talking with the president and informing Cabell).
I'd like to know what you think of this conclusion, and, if you disagree, what the direct evidence is that JFK explicitly canceled the strikes after approving them (along with the rest of the plan) at noon on Sunday.
If you're interested, my more general thesis is that the CIA purposely sabotaged the invasion. The basis for this is a close reading of Operation Zapata, which shows the following pattern:
1) The crucial D-Day dawn strikes were canceled, supposedly by the president, without the CIA attempting to consult the president directly.
2) The same strikes were made on D-Day evening, when it is too late, apparently without consulting the president.
3) The crucial D+2 ammunition resupply convoy is stopped, without consulting the president.
4) The resupply is attempted by air on D+2, when it is too late to be effective, this time consulting with the president.
I believe this shows a pattern of contradictory behavior on the part of the CIA leadership (Cabell and Bissell) that cannot be reasonably explained unless one assumes the CIA's real purpose was to force JFK into precisely the position that he found himself in--namely, of either fully committing US troops or facing disaster. As we know, he chose disaster. I see this as exactly parallel with the situation in November 1963. Withdrawal from Vietnam was considered a disastrous alternative by both the CIA and the military, but again JFK chose disaster, and paid for that decision with his life.
I have written a 20-page paper making this point in more detail which I would be glad to send you if you wish.
My second question concerns your Jan. 10, 1992 article in the Wall Street Journal. You say that Johnson's NSAM 273 called "for the maintenance of American military programs in Vietnam 'at levels as high' as before--reversing the Kennedy withdrawal policy." Can I assume you now agree, then, with Peter Scott that paragraph 2 of NSAM 273, pledging to maintain the withdrawal plan announced by JFK on Oct. 2, is a lie?
You do not mention in this article the recently revealed Bundy draft of NSAM 273. Some have suggested that since this draft was written on Nov. 21 it reflects the views of Kennedy. Since the draft and the final version signed by Johnson are virtually identical, if your reading of the document is correct, we must then assume that Kennedy reversed his own withdrawal policy in Bundy's Nov.21 draft. Do you think this is a fair assumption? Is there any other "evidence” that JFK changed his mind about withdrawal between Oct. 11 (NSAM 263) and Nov.22? There are conflicting reports of what happened at the conference in Honolulu on Nov. 20, but I know of no evidence that anything there, either, changed JFK's mind, or his policy.
Finally, I would like to know why you think the conspiracy theory in JFK is “reckless, paranoid, really despicable fantasy, reminiscent of the wilder accusations of Joe McCarthy."
"Reckless" because the truth is sought? "Paranoid" because it suggests that the government is our enemy? "Despicable" because the truth is despicable? "Fantasy “because Stone got his facts wrong--if so, which ones? (I'm sure you have seen the excellent and extraordinary documentation in JFK: The Book of the Film.) Why do you depict Stone as a fascist Commie-hunter like McCarthy, when he is suggesting just the opposite--that a fascist capitalist conspiracy to overthrow our government in 1963?
I did not intend this to be polemical, but you might as well know my opinion. If I were not open to changing it, I would not be writing to you. I would like very much to know your opinion on these matters, and will be grateful for a reply.
Sincerely,
Michael Morrissey