Research

Publications

1. Optimal Delegation via a Strategic Intermediary

2013, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 82, 15-30.

I study the optimal design of delegation rule when a principal has to delegate to an informed agent via a strategic intermediary. I show that when the subordinates have opposing biases, the optimal delegation set will involve a "hole": some modest options are precluded. This may shed some new lights on policy threshold effects: small changes in the underlying state cause large policy responses.

2.
Exit and Voice: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Customer Complaint Management

2013, Pacific Economic Review, Vol. 18, 177-207.

This work uses mechanism design theory to investigate business management problem. Motivated by the evidences from marketing research, using a multiagent-principal communication game model with voluntary participation constraint, I analyze how to design a mechanism that elicits and aggregates information from informed, strategic consumers, and retains customer base. The model predicts low complaint/dissatisfaction ratio, costly complaint, weak relationship between complaints and objective failure, and a variety of complaint management strategies, which are largely in line with the empirical findings.

3. A Game of Thrones: Power Structure and the Stability of Regimes (with Ruixue Jia), 2014, in Karl Warneryd (Eds) The Economics of Conflict: Theory and Empirical Evidence:: Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 79-103.

4. Decentrlization and Military Coups (with Ruixue Jia), 2012, in Chen Bo, Manas Chatterji, Hou Na (Eds.) Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development: Cooperation for a Peaceful and Sustainable World, Part 1:: Vol. 20:: London: Emerald Publisher, pp 149-170.

Working Papers

Favor Transmission under Social Image Concerns: An Experimental Study  (joint with Juanjuan Meng)

Social Interactions, Internet Access, and Stock Market Participation: An Empirical Study in China (joint with Shiqi Guo)
, Revised & Resubmit in Journal of Comparative Economics.

Work in Progress

Optimal Hierarchical Delegation with the Possibility of Skip-level Intervention. 

Persistent Mistrust towards Intellectuals among the Old-Three-Generations: A Legacy of the Cultural Revolution (joint with Jiajia LI)

Fresh Cadres, Fresh Air? Personnel Control, Legal Environment, and China's Water Pollution (joint with Nan GAO)

Does Imprisonment Affect Social Preferences? A Field Experiment among Chinese Inmates (joint with Fangfang Tan and Erte Xiao)


中文发表

“人事变更、法制环境和地方环境污染”(与高楠),《管理世界》已接受。

晋升激励、市场化与中国政治预算周期”(与高楠),世界经济文汇》已接受。

青春无悔?:知青经历对社会信任的长期影响”(与李佳珈),《世界经济文汇》第2期,2014年,90——109页。

“经济学研究的‘重要性’与‘有趣性’”,《经济学家茶座》第63辑,山东人民出版社,2014年。

人际关系、间接互惠与信任:一个实验研究”(与孟涓涓),《世界经济》第12期,2013年,90——110页。

知青更不信任社会吗?”(与李佳珈),《经济资料译丛》,第4期,2013年。

制度与国运?——西班牙历史的沉思”,《经济学家茶座》第60辑,山东人民出版社,2013年。

文艺创作与经济学建模”,《经济学家茶座》第59辑,山东人民出版社,2013年。

多层科层中的最优序贯授权与‘一刀切’政策”,《经济学(季刊)》,第12卷,第1期,2012年,29——46页

中国经济学教育的一块‘飞地’”,《经济学家茶座》第57辑,山东人民出版社,2012年。