1. Optimal Delegation via a Strategic Intermediary

2013, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 82, 15-30.

I study the optimal design of delegation rule when a principal has to delegate to an informed agent via a strategic intermediary. I show that when the subordinates have opposing biases, the optimal delegation set will involve a "hole": some modest options are precluded. This may shed some new lights on policy threshold effects: small changes in the underlying state cause large policy responses.

Exit and Voice: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Customer Complaint Management

2013, Pacific Economic Review, Vol. 18, 177-207.

This work uses mechanism design theory to investigate business management problem. Motivated by the evidences from marketing research, using a multiagent-principal communication game model with voluntary participation constraint, I analyze how to design a mechanism that elicits and aggregates information from informed, strategic consumers, and retains customer base. The model predicts low complaint/dissatisfaction ratio, costly complaint, weak relationship between complaints and objective failure, and a variety of complaint management strategies, which are largely in line with the empirical findings.

3. A Game of Thrones: Power Structure and the Stability of Regimes (with Ruixue Jia), 2014, in Karl Warneryd (Eds) The Economics of Conflict: Theory and Empirical Evidence:: Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 79-103.

4. Decentrlization and Military Coups (with Ruixue Jia), 2012, in Chen Bo, Manas Chatterji, Hou Na (Eds.) Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development: Cooperation for a Peaceful and Sustainable World, Part 1:: Vol. 20:: London: Emerald Publisher, pp 149-170.

Working Papers

Favor Transmission under Social Image Concerns: An Experimental Study  (joint with Juanjuan Meng)

Social Interactions, Internet Access, and Stock Market Participation: An Empirical Study in China (joint with Shiqi Guo)
, Revised & Resubmit in Journal of Comparative Economics.

Work in Progress

Optimal Hierarchical Delegation with the Possibility of Skip-level Intervention. 

Persistent Mistrust towards Intellectuals among the Old-Three-Generations: A Legacy of the Cultural Revolution (joint with Jiajia LI)

Fresh Cadres, Fresh Air? Personnel Control, Legal Environment, and China's Water Pollution (joint with Nan GAO)

Does Imprisonment Affect Social Preferences? A Field Experiment among Chinese Inmates (joint with Fangfang Tan and Erte Xiao)