Part Five: Life in Zambia

Zambia: Life in an African Country

Author: Godfrey Mwakikagile

Paperback: 258 pages

Publisher: New Africa Press (27 April 2010)

ISBN-10: 9987160115

ISBN-13: 9789987160112

Part Five:

Life in Zambia

LIFE in Zambia is not very much different from life in other African countries in terms of development.

It's not a developed country. The vast majority of the people are very poor.

Also, the people who live in villages in the rural areas live the traditional way of life just like their counterparts in other African countries do. They're some of the most conservative people in Africa because of their strong belief in their customs and traditions which have been handed down through generations for centuries.

The major difference between Zambia and most of the countries on the continent is that about half of the country's population is urbanised. That's in sharp contrast with what goes on in most of the countries across Africa where the vast majority of the people live in the rural areas, except in South Africa, the most developed and most urbanised country on the continent.

But reverse migration is also taking place, a migratory trend fuelled by hardship – especially poverty and unemployment – in the towns and cities, forcing many people to return or move to the rural areas where they can support themselves by growing their own food and selling agricultural commodities.

Zambia also shares a number of characteristics with other countries on the African continent in terms of demographic composition. It's a heterogeneous society comprising many different tribes or ethnic groups just like other African countries do. Tribal identity is also strong just as in other countries across the continent.

Zambia has the largest number of ethnic groups or tribes among all the countries of southern Africa. And that includes South Africa, the most populous country in the region which has about 15 including racial minorities.

Zambia has 75 ethnic groups. Almost all of them are of Bantu stock.

The people speak related languages collectively known as Bantu languages which are a branch of the Niger-Congo family. But there is no Bantu race.

Some ethnic groups are small. Only two have enough people to constitute at least 10 per cent of the country's population.

Most Zambians are subsistence farmers owning small plots of land.

The predominant religion is a blend of traditional beliefs and Christianity.

The majority of the people are Christian, although many of them also practise traditional religious beliefs. The role of departed ancestors, now in another realm, is central to most of these religious beliefs.

Most of the people are black Africans. But there are large numbers of expatriates in the country. The majority are British and South African and live mainly in Lusaka, the nation's capital. Many others live on the Copperbelt in northern Zambia where they are employed in mines and related activities.

People of Asian descent constitute another significant part of Zambia's population. They're a small group but economically important. Most of them are of Indian origin, followed by Pakistanis, Sikhs and others.

Although they are of non-African origin like Zambians of European descent and others, they are an integral part of the nation which prides itself for its unity, diversity and harmony.

In fact, it's common for members of different tribes to tell jokes about each other. The jokes are not meant to be insults. Instead, they promote and strengthen inter-tribal harmony.

Even intermarriage between members of different tribes is fairly common, especially in towns and cities, creating integrated communities where tribal distinctions are blurred; although tribal identities and ethnic pride still remain strong even in urban areas.

But, in spite of the unity in diversity the country enjoys, there are ethnic groups that are dominant, although they don't dominate every part of the country. They are the Bemba, the main ethnic group in the north; the Lozi in the west; the Ngoni and the Chewa in the east; the Tonga and the Ila in the south; and the Tumbuka in the east and northeast.

Although they are regionally entrenched, they have a significant presence, and even influence, in other parts of the country in varying degrees; with the Bemba and the Lozi being the most dominant. In fact, the Bemba language is virtually Zambia's indigenous national language.

The other main tribes are the Chokwe who are also found in neighbouring Angola; the Lunda and the Luba also found in neighbouring Congo; and the Luvale in the northwest who are also some of the poorest people in the country in spite of the wealth in their midst; a point underscored by a report, “Luvales Still Poor Despite Having Mines,” in Lusaka Times:

“Poverty levels among the Luvale people in Northwestern Province are still on the increase despite the opening of the Kasanshi and Lumwana mines in Solwezi.

Chairperson of the Society for Poverty Reduction, John Lijimu, said majority of those employed in the mines were people from other provinces and not the Luvales.

He complained that people were still wallowing in abject poverty despite opening of the mines.

Mr Lijimu said in an interview in Kitwe today that government should devise a deliberate policy that would compel people from the area given the first priority of being employed when vacancies were able.

And Mr Lijimu has called on the government through the Road Development Agency to begin levying heavy trucks transporting copper and other minerals from Northwestern province.

He said the money to be raised from these trucks could be channeled towards the repair of the road.

Mr Lijimu said currently the state of the Chingola-Solwezi road has become an eyesore because it has been damaged by the heavy trucks.

The chairperson suggested that government should also allow investors to open up a railway line to Solwezi as this was the cheapest way of transporting goods other than by road.” – (“Luvales Still Poor Despite Having Mines,” in Lusaka Times, Lusaka, Zambia, 20 May 2009).

The Luvales have also served as a symbol of harmony and reconciliation with their neighbours in what is one of the best examples of harmonious relationships in the lives of many Zambians despite tensions and conflicts which have sometimes soured relations in the past. According to a report, “Likumbi Lya Mize Ceremony,” in the Times of Zambia:

“In his great hit Insaka, Zambian folk musician Pontiano Kaiche calls on all the Lundas and Luvales to unite as one family and put aside the earlier clashes between them.

Perhaps owing in part to that appeal, for the first time in many years, the levels of understanding between the Lunda people of Senior Chief Ishindi and the Luvales of Senior Chief Ndungu in the Zambezi town of North-Western Province are greatly improving.

This is a fair conclusion stemming from the way the two tribes’ annual cultural traditional ceremonies have gone on in this district this time around.

The two famous ceremonies - the Lunda-Lubanza of the Lunda people and the Likumbi Lya Mize of the Luvale people have in the past been the centre of controversy and tribal wars between the two tribes.

Whenever the Lundas held their ceremony, the Luvales would not be anywhere near the event, and like the Luvales when the Lundas were observing theirs; all this to avoid the risk of fighting.

Often, police from all the districts of North-Western Province have mobilised to keep a wary eye on the situation whenever either ceremony was being held.

Usually when the Likumbi Lya Mize was to take place, the Lundas would disrupt the ceremony by blocking the Luvales from starting the ceremony from their graveyard located on the Lunda side.

The two tribes have had a long standing vendetta against each other and to a large extent, it has all been about the question of which of the two was superior to the other. To a Luvale, speaking Lunda was provocative enough to lead to violence. It was the same the other way round.

But with the passing of time and the increasing number of inter-marriages between the two tribes belonging to the same province, the hatred for each other is dying away. In fact very soon, it could all be a thing of the past.

The just-ended Likumbi Lya Mize traditional ceremony in Zambezi was peaceful with both the Lundas and Luvales in attendance. They mingled joyfully.

“There was no peace during this event in the past,” said one Lunda, Artson Kakoma.

In those days, Kakoma recalled, the Lunda youths would, on the eve of the Likumbi Lya Mize, pelt the people watching the Kuvumbuka Cha Makishi Ku Mukanda (rising of the Makishi from the grave). Police were assigned to prevent fighting.

At last year’s Likumbi Lya Mize ceremony, the then Home Affairs Minister, the late Lackson Mapushi who represented President Levy Mwanawasa said his administration believed that culture was a powerful means of enhancing national unity and diversity.

'The fact that Zambia comprises a diversity of ethnic cultures living together and sharing common history is proof of the value of culture.

We also believe that culture forms a strong foundation for community and national development,' said Mr Mwanawasa in a speech read for him by Mr Mapushi.

The Likumbi Lya Mize cultural Association national chairman James Njolomba reiterated Mr Mwanawasa’s assession when he recently said people in the Likumbi Lya Mize also believed in peace.

A more precise reason why they worked hard to improve the ceremony and preserve and popularise their heritage.

He said the many tribes, languages and nationals present at the ceremony were all a perfect sign of their effort to make people appreciate culture.

'If people come together and appreciate culture, then we can go further and promote culture,' said Mr Njolomba.

And true to his words, a melodious Luvale song was recited at the ceremony: 'Enu vakwetu tuyeni ku mize mama, vashikilye va Luvale. Saluneho etu natuya nakuwahisa vyachisemwa (all the Luvale speaking people should go and promote their culture).'

The Likumbi Lya Mize is a ceremony at which the Luvale people celebrate the enthronement of their late senior chieftainess, Nyamulombwe who lived for 123 years and died in 1963. It is also an occasion dedicated to the remembrance of the origins of the Luvale tribe and the establishment of the Mize traditional capital.

The ceremony starts with the rising of the Makishi from the grave in Zambezi boma, the initial stage of the week-long ceremony.

Apart from the Makishi dancing, the ceremony is spiced by the Tundanjis (boy initiates), Nya Tundanjis (mothers of the initiates) and Nyamwalis (girl initiates).

President Mwanawasa who was invited to attend the ceremony but could not it because he had just arrived from Tanzania to attended a SADC meeting, said in a speech read for him by Energy minister Abel Chambeshi, that the Likumbi Lya Mize was an occasion at which the Luvale people reviewed, expressed and displayed their livelihood and cultural heritage in general.

He urged people to use events like the Likumbi Lya Mize for reflecting on various issues of concern such as education, agriculture, health, governance, peace and security. They should not only be used to celebrate and feast over achievements.

He said there was need to encourage orientation of the youths to cultural practices that enable them to grow up into useful members of the community.

“The time-honoured rituals that are practised by our people such as initiation ceremonies, should not be used to encourage children and youths to engage in early marriages and other social vices,” he said.

'Instead, children must be taught to respect their elders in line with our cultural values. Children and the youths should be encouraged to go to school to learn basic education and life skills to empower them to look after themselves and their families in adulthood.'

A London-based tourist Michael Fitzgerald said ceremonies like Likumbi Lya Mize were not only important to tourists but also to locals as they helped them consolidate friendship.

Alex Mwila Mpundu and Thomas Mukoka who travelled to Zambezi from Kitwe for the occasion, said it was important for the Likumbi Lya Mize to act as a unifying factor to the general population of Zambia and urged other tribes to emulate it.

Indeed, ceremonies like the Likumbi lya mize and Lunda-Lubanza should be unifying events and not divisive ceremonies.” – (Potipher Tembo, “Likumbi Lya Mize Ceremony,” in the Times of Zambia, Ndola, Zambia; cited in this book on 20 January 2010).

Another factor which has contributed to peace and stability in the lives of millions of Zambians is the size of the country.

It's a large country with a relatively small population, hence sparsely populated. This has provided ample room for members of different tribes to have their own areas without coming into conflict with their neighbours fighting over land and other resources.

There is also strong British influence in the country since it was once ruled by Britain. This has led to propagation of Western values, especially in the towns and cities as well as in schools which are patterned after British schools. Even the judicial system is modelled on the British system.

Life in Zambia is very African but also very British in some ways especially among the elite who not only ape the consumption proclivities of the West but also cherish Western values.

Still, it's the vast majority of the people who are very traditional in their way of life who have shaped the identity of Zambia as a nation and as a country. And this inexorably leads to the important role ethnic groups play in national life in terms of moulding the character of their people from childhood to adulthood. This includes what kind of traditional beliefs they have; what kind of customs they observe; and in some cases, even what kinds of foods they prefer to eat and for what reasons.

For example, among the Bemba, a bride is not allowed to eat eggs. It's believed that if she eats eggs, her fertility will be affected in some kind of way, making it impossible for her to bear children or will give birth to children with some kind of defects. Not every bride pays attention to this taboo but it's part of the Bemba culture.

People in the rural areas, especially, are more likely to observe this taboo than their counterparts in the urban areas.

But even with the influence of modernisation since the coming of missionaries and the advent of colonial rule, traditions died hard. And it's not uncommon to find many urbanised Zambians still adhering to their customs and traditions because they are an integral part of their identity and essence.

It's also partly a reaction and a response to the cultural arrogance of Europeans who conquered Africa and dismissed African cultures – customs and traditions – as primitive.

Cultural imperialism may have destroyed some traditional ways among some Africans, but it also galvanised a sgnificant number of others into action to defend their traditional life styles and cultures.

Colonial rule also led to the establishment of heterogeneous communities as never before, especially in towns.

But the creation of these communities also led to the establishment of ethnic enclaves and organisations which served as sanctuaries for the urban dwellers who no longer had direct ties to the places where they came from in the rural areas. They had been cut off from their roots in the villages in the rural areas, in most cases hundreds of miles away, and needed solace in their solitude. The Copperbelt provides the best example.

More than any other part of Zambia, the Copperbelt has served as the nation's centre of cultural and ethnic diversity – and “amalgamation” – because of the large number of people from different tribes or ethnic groups who have settled there.

And tribal or ethnic solidarity has endured and persisted through the decades in spite of the perceived image of the Copperbelt as the nation's melting pot; if it ever indeed was one or has even ever claimed that distinction at all.

Different parts of the Copperbelt have been known to be dominated by some groups even if not necessarily to the total exclusion of others.

But there have been dominant groups, in terms of numerical preponderance and not necessarily in terms of power, in different towns and cities on the Copperbelt through the decades; while at the same time, this part of Zambia – and before then of colonial Northern Rhodesia – has continued to be the most ethnically representative part of the country.

All the tribes of Zambia are represented on the Copperbelt. In fact, the Copperbelt has more tribes or ethnic groups – in terms of representation – than the whole country does. Zambia has 75 tribes; the Copperbelt more than 100. And as Peter Claus Wolfgang Gutkind states in his book The Passing of Tribal Man in Africa:

“On the Copperbelt..., the ethnic diversity is patent. Over one hundred different 'tribes' were recorded in a social survey of the towns of Zambia in the 1950's. The majority were represented by only very small numbers.

On the average 44.8 percent of the 'tribes' separately enumerated in the survey in the towns of Ndola, Luanshya, Kitwe, Mufulira and Chingola each contained less than 0.5 percent of the total adult males.

An additional 13.7 percent each contained 0.5 to 0.9 percent of the males, and 7.8 percent by 1.0 to 1.4 percent of the males. In fact only 7.4 percent of the tribes each contained more than 5 percent of the adult males.

Different tribes preponderated in different towns. In all towns the Bemba represented the largest proportion of males in the population. In Ndola the Lala, Lamba, Swaka and Nsenga also each had more than 5 percent, in Luanshya the Bisa, Lala and Nyakyusa; in Kitwe the Nyakyusa, Bisa and Kaonde; in Mufulira the Aushi, Kaonde, Bisa, Ng'umbo and Chishinga and in Chingola the Kaonde, Nyakyusa, Chishinga, Lungu and Lamba.

Where there are a large number of persons from a single tribal area in a town, cliques based on common local area of origin from within the tribal area are able to develop. But where there are a few persons from a tribal area they may perforce have to associate together if they wish to select their friends from co-ethnics. But the relationship is not simple.

The enumeration of separate 'tribes' on the Copperbelt may be deceptive because many of the 'tribes' share a large number of cultural characteristics.

The Bemba, Bisa, Kawendi, and Mukulu, for example, speak similar languages and have similar customs but count themselves as separate tribes.

The Lamba, Lala, Lima and Swaka speak a language which resembles Bemba and practice many customs similar to those of the Bemba-speaking peoples but also count themselves as distinct peoples.

The Lovale, Luchaze and Lwena peoples on the other hand while sharing sharing language and other cultural characteristics are distinctive ethnically from the Bemba peoples.

A person in these circumstances may associate with others first because he knew them before he came to town or because he is connected to them through common links to other parties either in the rural areas or in town.

Cliques of people who associate on the grounds of common origin and who come from tribally complex areas are likely to include members of several different tribes.

Secondly, a person may associate with others because he has some common ground in language and custom with them as compared with those whose language and customs are markedly different. Thus Lumba and Swaka people may be in one clique and Luvale and Lwena in another.

Thirdly, a person may be in a clique made up of people because they are excluded from association by the majority.

The point is illustrated by the Nyakyusa people on the Copperbelt in the 1950's.

At the time of the social survey they were relatively numerous in Luanshya, constituting 5.1 percent of the male adults; in Kitwe, 10.8 percent of the male adults; and in Chingola, 6.1 percent of the male adults.

They were concentrated heavily in mining and since they seldom brought their wives with them usually lived in messing-groups in single quarters.

In many ways they resembled the incapsulated Xhosa groups described by Mayer.

I have not yet analysed the data on the composition of and the basis of association of men in single quarters and we do not have the information to say whether the Nyakyusa messing-groups were 'homeboy' cliques based on pre-existing links, or 'homeboy' groups which had come into existence as a consequence of their preferring to live with other Nyakyusa, whether or not they had known them previously, rather than with men from other tribes whose language and customs were so different.

The language and cultural characteristics of the Nyakyusa were so different from the Bemba and the people similar in culture to the Bemba who constitute such a large proportion of the Copperbelt population, that they were possibly thrown on their own resources simply by exclusion by others.

Preliminary impressions suggest that the group were categorical 'homeboys,' that is they did not know each other before coming together in single-quarters. For example, there were very few Safwa men on the Copperbelt; where they were found they were usually messing with Nyakyusa whose language and cultural characteristics were most familiar to them. Since they came from areas quite far away from those the Nyakyusa came from the implication is that they were thrown together by categorical exclusion rather than on the basis of pre-exsting links.” – (Peter Claus Wolfgang Gutkind, The Passing of Tribal Man in Africa, International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, V. 10, Brill, 1970, pp. 95 – 96. See also Godfrey Mwakikagile, Life in Tanganyika in The Fifties, Second Edition, Pretoria, South Africa: New Africa Press, 2009, pp. 117 – 118).

Such exclusion is an enduring phenomenon even today on the Copperbelt. And it has played a major role in strengthening and solidifying ethnic enclaves and communities among the members of the tribes who live in this industrial heartland of Zambia. And as Tanzanian writer Godfrey Mwakikagile who is a Nyakyusa states in his book Life in Tanganyika in The Fifties:

“Some of the Ngoni also went to work in the mines in South Africa – where they originally came from – but not in significant numbers as the Nyakyusa and other people from the Southern Highlands did, especially from Rungwe and Mbeya Districts in a region bordering what was then Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia.

Northern Rhodesia itself attracted many mine workers from my region and many of them settled in that country. Even today, you will find many Nyakyusas who settled in Kitwe and other parts of the Copperbelt many years ago after they went to work there in the mines. For example, in 1954 the Nyakyusa in Kitwe formed an organisation to preserve, protect and promote their interests as a collective entity.

The Lozi, members of another ethnic group from Baraotseland or Barotse Province and one of the largest in Zambia, also formed their own organisation around the same time, as did others and some even before then including the Ngoni. And they were all cited as examples of ethnic solidarity among the mine workers in Kitwe and other parts of the Copperbelt in Northern Rhodesia. The Nyakyusa presence in what is now Zambia is still strong even today.

In fact, one of my mother's first cousins who was older than my mother emigrated from Tanganyika to Northern Rhodesia as a young man in the early 1940s.” – (Godfrey Mwakikagile, Life in Tanganyika in The Fifties, ibid.).

His father's elder brother, William Mwakikagile, also immigrated to Northern Rhodesia in the 1940s and was one of the Nyakyusas who settled there permanently.

Godfrey Mwakikagile is one of the Tanganyikans, and one of the Nyakyusas, who had some relatives in Northern Rhodesia. They settled there permanently. Many of them found jobs in the mines and in other areas. In his case, he had at least two relatives who left Tanganyika and went to live in Northern Rhodesia in the 1940s. And his case is just one example.

He just happens to be writer who has written about that and whose writings have documented and demonstrated this phenomenon and pattern of immigration, especially of Tanganyikans including the Nyakyusa who went to Northern Rhodesia in the 1940s and 1950s and some even before then in the 1930s.

The Nyakyusa constituted the largest group of immigrants from what was then Tanganyika who settled in Northern Rhodesia, mostly on the Copperbelt. They were only surpassed by immigrants from Nyasaland. A very large number of them never returned to their home countries and eventually became citizens of independent Zambia.

Even some of the ones who went back to their home countries – Tanganyika (renamed Tanzania) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) – returned to Northern Rhodesia. Many of them went back to their home countries just to visit or for other reasons including marrying people usually from their home areas or tribes.

They're now a permanent feature of the Zambian demographic landscape, with some of them becoming prominent ethnic groups – in terms of numbers – in the towns and cities where they live.

As immigrants, they're concentrated in the towns and cities of the Copperbelt because that's where they went to seek employment in the mines. They were also highly valued by their employers as hard workers who had a well-established programme to recruit them. As Arnold Leonard Epstein states in his book Politics in an Urban African Community:

“By the time that the mines were opened up on the Copperbelt, many Nyasalanders were experienced underground workers, accustomed to give a high standard of efficiency (after working in the mines in Southern Rhodesia). By contrast local labour, when it could be persuaded to accept underground work, was very inefficient.

At the Roan Antelope (mine compound), the system was adopted of having a Labour Recruiting Agency in Southern re-directing Nyasalanders working there to the Copperbelt. According to the Compound Manager at Roan, Mr. Spearpoint, a noticeable change took place from the time of their arrival.

Later, the company found it expedient to develop this group as a corps of instructors of the other labourers.

In the main, Nyasalanders have managed to retain the dominant position they achieved in the early days, though for some years past it has been increasingly challenged by Bemba and others.

A second 'alien' group (after Nyasalanders) is the Nyakyusa of Tanganyika.

These are a patrilineal, cattle-keeping people who come from a fertile land in the Rift Valley at the head of Lake Nyasa.

Originally they were few at Roan, but since 1947 their numbers have risen with such remarkable rapidity that they are now, after the Bemba and the Bisa, the largest single tribal group represented on the mine.

Nyakyusa men have fine physique, and enjoy a reputation amongst European compound officials for hard work, particularly underground. But because f their different habits..., they have been generally despised by their fellow-workers of the local tribes, and in the past clashes between Nyakyusa and others were said to be common.

Possibly because of this hostility, possibly because of linguistic differences, the Nyakyusa appear to live a life apart from the rest of the community.

This impression of separateness is further emphasized in the fact that most Nyakyusa are not accompanied by their wives, and thus tend to live contiguously in the men's single quarters.” – (Arnold Leonard Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community, Manchester, England, UK: Manchester University Press, 1958, pp. 6, 8 – 9).

The fact that the Nyakyusa were the largest single tribal group represented on the Roan mine reflected the general increase in the number of black Tanganyikans who sought employment on the Copperbelt.

It was not peculiar to Roan, although the largest concentrations of the Nyakyusa during that period in the late forties and early fifties – and probably thereafter – were to be found at Nkana and Luanshya.

Dr. J. C. Mitchell also did a study of this and published his findings in an article, “The Distribution of African Labour by Area of Origin on the Copper Mines of Northern Rhodesia,” published in the Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, xiv, 1954, (pp. 30 – 36).

Also, Dr. Mitchell noted in 1955 that because of the competition the Nyakyusa faced from the mine workers from Nyasaland, the Nyakyusa at Nkana sought to form their own trade union to protect and promote their interests.

Such competition played a role in fuelling hostilities between different ethnic groups on the mines, especially between migrant workers from Tanganyika as well as Nyasaland and the indigenous Northern Rhodesians such as the Bemba.

There were also cleavages between some of the foreign workers themselves, for example, between Tanganyikans and Nyasalanders as demonstrated by attempts by the Nyakyusa to form their own trade union which would make them more competitive against mine workers from Nyasaland; and also protect them against other mine workers native to Northern Rhodesia.

Still, such separation and exclusion did not fully define the nature of relations between these workers; nor did it demonstrate the existence of clearly defined boundaries or demarcation lines separating members of different ethnic groups from one another on the mine compounds or elsewhere.

Yet, there is no question that ethnic solidarity was a fact of life as much as it is today:

“But the ties which link Africans in the towns together as members of of a tribe, and thus divide them from other tribes, operate only in certain situations....Fundamental to the urban situation is the fact that Africans of many tribes now participate in the common wage economy of the towns. They are linked and divided within new sets of relations which involve them as wage-earners and urban dwellers rather than as tribesmen....

So far as I am aware, no attempt has ever been made on the mines to fit members of a given tribe to particular kinds of work. The gang, which forms the unit of labour on the mines, is usually made up of members of many tribes.

There are cases where certain tribes do predominate in particular kinds of work. For example, the work of night-soil removal is usually undertaken by members of the Luvale-speaking group of peoples from the far west of the Territory. But this reflects the unwillingness of other tribes to be employed in this kind of work, rather than any deliberate act of Management policy.

A similar position also exists outside the work situation. For whole a man may choose friends, he cannot always choose his neighbours. There are no tribal sections either in the mine compound or in the Government location.

Everywhere people of many tribes are intermingled, and new bonds of co-operation based on propinquity and neighbourliness are constantly being formed....

It is in the leisure-time activities of the people that one gains perhaps the clearest impression of the emerging urban communities of the Copperbelt, based on these new sets of relations, and coming to possess their own distinctive culture.

The Beer Halls, of which there is one in each section of the town, form an important focus of African community life.

One's first impressions of a visit to the Beer Hall are apt to be confused amid the constant clamour and jostling going on all around. But, with repeated visits, a pattern begins to emerge.

Young men, dressed in gaily-coloured open-necked shirts, and wearing cowboy hats, squat on the ground or move around strumming a guitar and singing the latest Copperbelt 'hit-numbers' or otherwise seek to gain the attention of the bakapenta, the 'young ladies of the town.'

Elsewhere a group of Tribal Elders are sitting together, and complain of a member of their tribe who has just bought a present of beer for an Urban Court Member of another tribe.

In another group, some of the town's leading personalities, all smartly dressed in lounge suits, are engaged in quiet conversation in English with a well-known African visitor from Kitwe or Lusaka. They gossip about personalities and discuss the political news from other towns, and they make arrangements for later meetings in their private homes.” – (Arnold Leonard Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community, op.cit., pp. 9 – 10).

The Copperbelt continues to be a laboratory for the continuing experiment in cultural and ethnic integration in the quest for a truly “One Zambia, One Nation.”

Also, the urban centres on the Copperbelt and elsewhere in Zambia are the exception rather than the rule in terms of life and modernisation across the country. The majority of Zambians don't live what can be described as a truly modern life, especially in the Western sense. But a large number of people in towns and cities do.

The Copperbelt is the most urbanised region in the country. And it has the largest number of people who live an urban life known for its modern ways. They also earn a living by working in the mines and in various industries or in the subterranean economy involving provision of services and trade in various commodities.

That's in remarkable contrast with other parts of Zambia. In most parts of the country, life is inextricably linked with agriculture. About an entire half of the Zambian population is in the rural areas.

But even urban residents depend on the rural areas for survival in terms of food supply. Most of the food comes from the people who grow food crops and sell agricultural products to those who live in towns and cities.

It's hard to generalise but there are some things which are common throughout or in most parts of the country even when it comes to the kind of food the people eat.

The main food item in Zambia comes from maize. It's called nshima, a kind of porridge, stiff porridge, that's common in neighbouring countries as well.

In Tanzania, it's called ugali in Kiswahili or Swahili. In my tribal language, Nyakyusa or Kinyakyusa, it's called kyindi, or ikyindi, depending on the context in which the term is used.

It's also called “mealie meal” in Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe.

Many people associate it with poverty. People who eat nshima are considered to be poor. But even those with good income also eat it because it's a traditional dish. They also eat it because they like it.

If you are invited to eat nshima or any other kind of food but you refuse to do so, you will be considered to be arrogant. It's very rude and highly offensive behaviour in African culture.

In Malawi, nshima is called nsima. Although it's traditional food, there are even some black Africans who think it's beneath them to eat this food. Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the president of Malawi, is probably the most prominent person who refused to eat nsima, further giving “credibility” to the claim that he was not a Malawian but a black American impostor.

There were those who already suspected he was not of Malawian origin. And when he returned to what was then Nyasaland – before the country was renamed Malawi – to lead the struggle for independence, he refused to eat local foods including nsima.

He did not even speak any of the local languages. It was said that he forgot his tribal language, Chewa. He reportedly left Nyasaland when he was only a young teenager, perhaps 16 years old or younger, and did not return to his home country until after 40 years which he spent in the United States and in the United Kingdom but mostly in the UK.

And he was not the only African who looked down upon his fellow Africans. Many educated Africans feel the same way.

They're ashamed of their cultures. They don't want to eat traditional foods. They don't want to follow the customs and traditions of the tribes to which they belong. They're more European than the Europeans themselves.

The refusal by Dr. Banda to eat nsima is probably the most glaring example because he led the struggle for independence and became the first president of Nyasaland which was renamed Malawi.

But although nshima is the most well-known food in Zambia, there are plenty of other kinds of food available. They include cassava, sweet potatoes, vegetables, groundnuts, bananas, mangoes, pineapples, paw paw and other kinds of fruits.

All these are available in almost all parts of the country. But commercial crops are different. For example, the northern part of Zambia is known for growing coffee; and the eastern part is suitable for cotton.

Many Zambians also earn a living from catching and selling fish. The country has many rivers and a number of large lakes where the people catch fish for local consumption and for the market. But they usually don't depend on fishing alone. They're also farmers.

Livestock is another important sector of the economy. Many Zambians own cattle. Some also own sheep and goats.

As a developing country, Zambia still does not have a well-developed industrial sector. There are a number of items which are made in Zambia but manufacturing is limited.

Still, the industrial sector has played a major role in the urbanisation of Zambia. Many people have moved to the towns and cities through the decades to look for jobs even when jobs don't exist. The attraction of urban life has always been very strong, and irresistible, to many people in spite of the hardship many of them face when they get there.

One of the biggest problems they face is shortage of housing. This has led to the growth of shanty towns many of which don't have clean water, sewage systems, or electricity. Crime is also high in these areas.

The harsh realities of life in urban areas, as well as in the rural areas, have also forced even children to fend for themselves; a problem compounded by the AIDS epidemic which has claimed the lives of many people, including parents who have left children behind to fend for themselves, with hardly any orphanages to care for them. Many of these children don't have relatives who can or who are willing to take them in.

Hundreds of thousands of children are involved in child labour in Zambia, forced by economic hardship to start working when they're three, four or five years old. They're just babies, forced by gruelling poverty to become adults overnight.

They're on their own, as demonstrated by the following news report from Lusaka, Zambia, appropriately entitled, “Crushing Stones Is Not Child's Play”:

“LUSAKA, 6 September 2006 (IRIN) - Maria Banda, just five years old, and her grandmother, Aineli, spend every day breaking stones into gravel in quarries a few kilometres from the heart of Zambia's capital, Lusaka. Hundreds of others are doing the same.

Maria produces two to three tins each day, her grandmother as many as nine, which they sell for US$0.50 a tin. Roadside stalls sell the chipped stones to construction companies, but the demand is oversupplied. This backbreaking work pays for their US$15 monthly rent; the rest provides a meagre living.

'We eat nshima [maize meal] once, before going to bed, because I don't have enough money to buy food to eat twice. If something remains after we have eaten, then Maria has to finish it in the morning before we go for work, otherwise I will have to buy her some fritters around 12:00 [noon] if she didn't eat anything in the morning,' Aineli, aged about 70, told IRIN.

Small but agile, Maria's left hand sweeps away the gravel from the stone she has just crushed and swiftly puts another one against a larger pebble. Her right hand brings down a big hammer to pound it. 'I was hurting myself when I started doing this work but now I know how to avoid the hammer,' she says.

Maria has been living with her grandmother since her parents died from a suspected AIDS-related illness a year ago. Barefoot and dusty, her struggle to survive is a snapshot of the growing number of children drawn into the labour market here.

More than 600,000 children in Zambia are believed to be working on farms, in construction and other business sectors, and in the sex industry.

Anne Kamwendo, project officer for the protection of children at the United Nations International Children's Fund (Unicef), said children were forced to work to supplement low household incomes.

'Poverty and HIV/AIDS are the major causes of child labour, after creating an army of orphans and vulnerable children who are now being left in the care of aged grandparents or extended family members. When times are hard, these guardians tell the children to begin contributing to their own welfare by doing some form of work for money.'

Although Zambia is signatory to the conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and although its laws do not allow children below the age of 15 to work for a living, for many of the country's million or more HIV/AIDS orphans and vulnerable children, there is little alternative.

Grade six pupil Mervis Mulenga, 11, is one of nine children. She works in the stone quarry because her mother told her they needed to pay for schooling and clothing.

'I am forcing myself to crush at least five tins in one day because I really want to become a nurse when I finish school. I start crushing my stones around seven [in the morning] after cleaning the house, and I go to school at eleven,' she said. When school finishes, she either goes back to the quarries or helps her mother at home.

By early evening, with only candles for light, sleep takes often precedence over homework

A hacking cough is often the telltale sign of a child working long days in the dust-laden air of the quarry said Godfridah Sumaili, president of the Jesus Cares Ministry. 'When they first come to our centres, most of the children from stone crushing have physical symptoms of their neglect, such as stunted growth and bodily injuries. They look harassed, afflicted, hopeless and lifeless,' said Sumaili.

'They appear withdrawn and reserved. They have not known to look at themselves as children, but as adults, and some of them actually head families. Therefore, parents and guardians also refuse to let go of such children, who are perceived as economic pillars.'

With assistance from the ILO and Unicef, the ministry has managed to withdraw 5,000 children from various types of labour, including 3,000 previously involved in stone crushing. Some have been reintegrated into the formal primary school system, while others are attending the organisation's community schools throughout the country.” – (“Crushing Stones Is Not Child's Play,” IRIN, Lusaka, Zambia, 6 September 2006).

Bad economic conditions have often caused civil unrest, chaos, and even civil wars in many countries including some in Africa. But even with such hardship, Zambia has remained peaceful; which is another unique aspect of life in this poor yet potentially rich country.

This is also reflected in inter-ethnic relations which in many other countries on the continent have been a source of conflict and even bloodshed.

Although Zambia has one of the largest numbers of tribal or ethnic groups in Africa, it has enjoyed peace and stability since independence unlike many other countries which have been torn by conflicts fought along ethnic and regional lines. In fact, it has been one of the most peaceful countries on the continent during the post-colonial era which has witnessed some of the deadliest conflicts in the world since the end of World War II.

In spite of the ethnic differences, the people of Zambia have formed one nation, united and peaceful, under the banner: “One Zambia, One Nation.”

A lot of credit for this goes to the founding father of the nation, Kenneth Kaunda, a former school teacher like his close friend Julius Nyerere in neighbouring Tanzania who also was able to unite about 130 different tribes into a cohesive entity, also one of the most peaceful countries in Africa since the end of colonial rule.

Kaunda was a leader who transcended ethnicity. But he also faced some problems arising from tribalism and ethno-regional loyalties during the first years of independence:

“Zambia passed through a year (1968) of internal political strife which, in a brief spasm during February, resulted in President Kaunda's resignation because he had been 'upset by what was a terrible provincial and tribal approach to our national problems.'

Speaking to the ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), on 10 March, Dr. Kaunda attacked tribal divisions within the party. Earlier, the President had forbidden junior ministers and members of Parliament to leave Lusaka for the provinces without his written permission for fear that they would stir up tribal feelings.

Tribal and regional rivalries centre mainly on two groups – the Lozis of Barotseland and the Bemba of the North; but these rivalries have recently widened into 'alliances of regions': thus some Lozi leaders have made common cause with elements of the Angoni in the East, and the Tonga and Ilas in the South; while the Bemba leaders have succeeded in maintaining a national alliance across the country, but at least, temporarily, weakest among the Lozis and the Tonga-Ilas as was shown in the general election held in December.

Contrary to what is popularly supposed, there is no traditional rivalry or enmity between the Lozis and the Bemba; but although both tribes have a history of vigorous migration – which has helped to spread their influence – both have retained strong ethnocentric tendencies.

Rivalry between the two groups is of comparatively recent origin – due, partly, to their resistance to the Central African Federation when the Lozis, unlike the Bemba, developed separatist tendencies: Lozi separatism was sharpened by the traditionalists who, supporting their Litunga (King), came into opposition against their own modernising elite – led by the Wina brothers, Mr. Munu Sipalo and Mr. Maluniko Mundia – who were early supporters of the nationalist movement in the politics of the towns, despite the counter-pressures in Barotseland.” – (Colin Legum and John Drysdale, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1968 – 1969, London: Africa Research, Ltd., 1969, pp. 245 – 246).

Modernising influences including urbanisation were one of the most important factors which helped break down tribal barriers, reduce mistrust, and bring the members of different tribes together especially in the towns, although rivalries remained.

That was especially the case during the early years of independence when many members of different ethnic groups had not transcended ethno-regional loyalties for the sake of national unity:

“During the formative period of the nationalist movement, the Lozis (from Western Zambia) – who had come to the capital before the Bemba – were strongly defensive in their reactions to the more numerous, but often less sophisticated, Northerners in Lusaka whom they suspected of wishing to dominate UNIP.

The Bemba tended to migrate to the Copperbelt where they were in a majority – but, they were not, at first, prominent among the modern elite. Thus the modern nationalist movement was virtually born with an inner tension; this surfaced angrily when, in 1967, Bemba leaders successfully challenged the non-Bemba holders of some of UNIP's top posts, the Vice President – Mr. Reuben Kamanga, an Angoni – and the National Treasurer and Minister of Finance, Mr. Arthur Wina, a Lozi.

This bitterly-fought struggle seriously damaged the fabric of UNIP's unity.

Despite the patient efforts of Dr. Kaunda, all he could do was to prevent the party splitting apart altogether. But a group of young Lozi nationalists – headed by a former UNIP Minister, dismissed earlier for irregularities, Mr. Mundia – broke away to form a new party of their own, the United Party.

Its strength lay mainly in Barotseland and on the Copperbelt, where miners' grievances against the government always provide an easy opportunity for Opposition activities.

In August (1968) the UP was banned and its leaders restricted, following violent disturbances on the Copperbelt in which five people, including two UNIP officials, were killed.

The third major group involved in the ethnic struggle are the Tonga and the Ilas; their favourite son is Mr. Harry Nkumbula – the first nationalist leader to whose party, the African National Congress, they have remained staunch.” – (Africa Contemporary Record, ibid., p. 246).

But in spite of this rough start during the first years of independence, the country weathered the storm and has remained united through the decades; although regional loyalties remain and tribal affiliations continue to a be a way of life for many Zambians even if they have not seriously threatened national unity.

That is one of the most enduring characteristics of Zambian national life.

Zambia has also experienced economic changes which have profoundly affected the lives of many Zambians through the years.

The sixties were years of prosperity for Zambia. The price of copper, the country's leading export, was high, and many Zambians enjoyed a high standard of living. There were plenty of jobs in the mines and the Copperbelt became a powerful magnet, attracting people from all parts of the country, and even from neighbouring countries such as Tanzania and Malawi, to work in the mines.

They had been going there even before, for years, since the copper mines were opened in the late 1920s and early 1930s. For example, the relative of many Nyakyusas – relatives they never even met – migrated from Tanganyika to Northern Rhodesia to work in the mines on the Copperbelt at a time when there were plenty of jobs in the mines. And many other people continued to do so even in the sixties.

But things changed in the seventies. The price of copper on the world market dropped precipitously and copper was no longer what it once was as Zambia's source of economic salvation.

It continued to be the country's biggest foreign exchange earner. But the copper mines no longer provided the kind of employment they did before.

Many people lost their jobs, and with the loss of jobs came a drop in the standard of living, compounded by rising crime and increasing poverty in the towns and cities on the Copperbelt. Also, many people started moving to the rural areas, where they once lived, or sought employment elsewhere.

The situation got worse by the 1980s when the price of copper hit rock bottom. It was lowest during that decade, and Zambia never fully recovered from that economic nightmare.

This was compounded by the socialist policies pursued by the government – good intentions notwithstanding, aimed at sharing the nation's wealth and resources and achieving social equality – which discouraged foreign investment in the mines and other sectors of the economy. And Zambia has not been the same since.

The biggest change in terms of economic fortunes has taken place in the towns and cities because of declining employment opportunities. The Copperbelt has been the hardest hit. Low copper prices, compounded by market instability, have led to loss of jobs through the years.

The people in the rural areas have continued to live basically the same way they have since they fend for themselves by working on the farms where they grow crops for subsistence and for the market. Some of them have been affected because they no longer can get the kind of financial help they used to get now and then from relatives and friends who had jobs in the mines. But, in general or at least for the majority, the standard of living has remained the same.

Over-dependence on a single export commodity, copper, has been one of Zambia's biggest challenges and disadvantages in terms of economic development where diversification is critical to economic survival and prosperity. Unfortunately, Zambia, like most African countries, has not been able to diversify its economy to the extent it should or could have in order to sustain economic growth and achieve progress.

Even as recently as 2008, the price of copper continued to drop, while Zambia continued to be overly dependent on this export commodity as the biggest foreign exchange earner. According to a report, “Zambia Copper Prices Drop by Nearly 60 Percent,” in The Zambian Chronicle:

APA (African Press Agency) -Abuja, Nigeria - The global financial crisis has affected Zambian economy to the extent that the price of copper has come down to $3,300 from $8,000 per tonne, Zambian President Rupiah Bwezani Banda told journalists in Abuja on Thursday (27 November 2008).

Speaking at a joint press conference with President Yar’Adua, Banda said his government intends to 'widen the base of other industries and commodities.'

Banda, who was on his first trip outside Zambia since he was elected in October, called for the strengthening of developmental ties between his country and Nigeria to cushion the effect of the global financial crisis.

'We believe Nigeria is in the position to assist us. You have got the educated manpower, experience over the years for some of the crops we want to introduce in our country as staple foods,' he said.

He said his country was proud that Nigerians have invested in Zambia.

'We have for the first time truly an African bank from Nigeria – Access Bank – and two more banks will be coming to our country from Nigeria,' he said.

He called on Nigeria\’s business to come to Zambia to take advantage of the facilities and opportunities that exist in the industrial, manufacturing and financial sector of his country and to help in producing such crops as cassava, cocoa and palm oil for which Nigeria is 'well known as specialist in that field.'

President Yar’Adua said he had discussed with the Zambian leader issues of a bilateral nature, African issues, situation in Zimbabwe and need for Nigeria and Zambia to convene a bilateral commission and to sign the various agreements that will enhance their bilateral relations.” – (“Zambia Copper Prices Drop by Nearly 60 Percent,” in The Zambian Chronicle, Lusaka, Zambia, 28 November 2008).

A drastic drop in the price of copper is bad enough, making life even harder for the mine workers and their families. But even before then, working in the mines and life in the towns and cities on the Copperbelt was not easy for the workers.

Poor working conditions, low wages in some cases, and pollution, have had a profound impact on the lives of the mine workers and their families in spite of the financial benefits which are relatively higher compared with what many other Zambians get from their jobs in other sectors of the economy including agriculture in the rural areas.

Even for skilled workers in the mines, working conditions including salaries are not as attractive as they should be. And the country as a whole is suffering. Living standards and important sectors such as health have been seriously affected through the years.

The country's economic growth has also suffered despite predictions to the contrary in this era of globalisation. According to a report, “Mined Out in Zambia,” in the English edition of a leading French newspaper, Le Monde Diplomatique:

“Peter and Irene, both 30, are engineering graduates of Lusaka university and have been working since 2006 in Chingola, a small Copperbelt town in Zambia in southern Africa.

The couple are employed by Konkola Copper Mines (KCM), the biggest mining company in a country which earns more than half its gross domestic product from mineral extraction.

KCM produces 70% of the country’s copper and provides its employees, the children of neoliberalism, with a decent lifestyle: a net salary of 5m kwachas ($876) a month, plus shares they can cash in in 2010. They also enjoy professional status in a sector whose 400,000 employees earn an average monthly income of 2m kwachas ($350), while 68% of the population of 11 million live on less than two dollars a day.

Of course Peter and Irene have had to make sacrifices. Irene’s job is to look after the chemicals used to treat the copper ore, and in 2007 she had to leave her husband and young child to go on a training course in India. The Indian multinational Vedanta has been the majority shareholder in KCM since 2004. The sale was the latest in a series of privatisations that began in the late 1990s, and in which 257 of Zambia’s 280 businesses left the public sector.

Nearly 100,000 people lost their jobs over this period, 40,000 of them from the country’s flagship company, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), which was carved up into as many pieces as there were buyers. Vedanta got its hands on the biggest slice when it bought up the Chingola mine.

Irene has nothing but happy memories of her time in India. But when she returned to KCM she found some of her Zambian colleagues had been dismissed and replaced with young expatriate Indians 'who are no more qualified, but better paid, housed in custom-built accommodation and given a company car.' While she was away, Peter had to deal with the sudden rise in price of essential goods, petrol and rent: their three-room flat and kitchen, infested with cockroaches and subject to regular power cuts, now cost them 2m kwachas ($350).

Then, on Christmas Eve last year, the rent fell to 1.7m kwachas ($298) – in tandem with a record fall in the price of copper, which dropped to $2,817 a tonne from more than $8,675 in July. The spectre of mine closures re-emerged. It was a glum Christmas for the 20,000 or so permanent employees of the mining sector – three times fewer than the state sector had employed at the end of the 1970s. Employers and employees both had to economise to ride out the approaching financial storm: for workers, so they could afford the new school fees at the start of term on 12 January, and for employers, so they could maintain their comfortable profit margins.

A river of acid

Vedanta’s Zambian subsidiary declared a turnover of nearly $122m in the final trimester of 2008 – almost half what they earned in the previous one.

First they reduced their contracts with the mainly South African temping agencies, which had flourished after privatisation. Thousands of underpaid and non-unionised workers, who had done the riskiest jobs, were laid off.

Vedanta then resorted to other 'sacrifices,' in order to maintain maximum input (its goal, written in large letters above the entrance to its Zambian complex). Suppliers had to wait a little longer to be paid – some went out of business. Working hours became longer: 'four 12-hour days followed by two days off,' according to a local member of the largest union in the sector, the Miners Union of Zambia (MUZ).

Even Peter, a model employee, says they are being pushed to the limit: 'We have to be on call 24 hours a day. If this carries on, there will be more accidents.'

'Who benefited when the price of raw materials went up?' asks the economist James Lungu who teaches at Copperbelt University in Kitwe. 'Mining companies and their shareholders. And who is suffering now the price is falling? Miners, their families, and the environment. We are on the verge of a social catastrophe.'

It takes 100 tonnes of ore to produce one tonne of copper. On 6 November 2006 the people living on the banks of the Kafue – which flows down towards Lusaka before joining the Zambezi further south – were confronted with a strange sight: the river had turned turquoise. Vedanta had accidentally discharged its toxic waste into it.

Two million inhabitants of Chingola district – 100,000 of whom draw water directly from the river – were deprived of drinking water for at least two days. Thousands went for hospital check-ups after eating fish from the river. Analyses of the Kafue’s water showed it contained 38.5mg manganese, 10mg copper and 1mg cobalt per litre: concentrations 1.7 times, 10 times and 10.7 times higher respectively than the limits set by the World Health Organisation. With a pH of 1.5, the Kafue had become a river of acid.

The Vedanta employee who admitted the company’s responsibility was sacked on the spot. The multinational threatened to withdraw advertising from the state-owned daily Times of Zambia if the incident was reported. But the editors stood firm, and the scandal erupted.

On the orders of the Environmental Council of Zambia, a public body charged with maintaining standards, Vedanta called a brief halt to its mining activities at Chingola. The company was indignant at losing $2.5m. Then business started up again. The price of copper continued to rise, and with it, the pollution.

An unauthorised visit to the massive Vedanta site during the rainy season revealed a vision from Dante’s Inferno: 3km from the mines, the pollution control dam was overflowing, spewing copper-coloured water, reeking of acid, into a tributary of the Kafue. 'Of course we pollute,' said an employee, 'but all the mines do.' 'It was worse in ZCCM’s days,' retorted Sampa Chita, director of KCM’s social responsibility programme. 'We are fed up being blamed. You cannot run a mine without causing pollution.'

Vedanta is the only mineral extraction company in Zambia to have a department devoted to 'the community.'

In her empty office, devoid even of a computer, Chita estimated her budget, with some hesitation, at around '$12 or $13m.'

The money is used to fight malaria and HIV/Aids, fund orphanages, pay university fees, dig wells and support the local cricket team – but not the football team. Chita refused to say if this is because Indians prefer cricket to football. But now, for the first time in its 60-year history, the Chingola copper mines’ football team, Nchanga Rangers, has been relegated to the second division.

Chita claimed not to know what her company’s profits are. When pressed, she admitted only that her department’s budget is tiny given the scale of the problems. 'ZCCM had a social outlook – perhaps too social,' she added. 'We are more focused on results. But is it wrong to want to make money? Mines need a lot of investment, and investors want to make a profit. You have to be realistic.' Three months after taking over 51% of KCM’s shares in 2004, Vedanta had already made a profit of $25m.

A lack of transparency

Lungu is co-author of an astounding report on the privatisation of the copper mines. The sale was orchestrated by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) – including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – under the government of President Frederick Chiluba.

'ZCCM’s privatisation was carried out with a complete lack of transparency, no debate in parliament, and with one-sided contracts which few of us have ever seen,' explained Lungu. 'It has never profited the inhabitants of the Copperbelt. Nor its environment.'

His view is shared up by Edith Nawakwi, Zambia’s former finance minister, who oversaw the privatisations. Her testimony says a lot about the behaviour of the IFIs: 'We were told by advisers, who included the IMF and the World Bank, that not in my lifetime would the price of copper change. All the production models that could be employed were showing that, for the next 20 years, Zambian copper would not make a profit. Conversely, if we privatised, we would be able to access debt relief, and this was a huge carrot in front of us – like waving medicine in front of a dying woman. We had no option but to go ahead.'

In recent years international media attention has focused on the social responsibility of Chinese companies in the Copperbelt. More than 40 years after building the Tanzam railway, linking Zambia to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam, China has made a comeback. The nationalist third worldist ideology of the past has given way to a more pragmatic approach. Beijing is now the third biggest investor in sub-Saharan Africa.

But the initial good feelings engendered by China’s 'win-win' discourse faded in April 2005, when the Chinese dynamite factory (BGRIMM) near Chambishi exploded, killing 52 people. The factory had been contracted out by Non-Ferrous Company-Africa (NFCA), itself a subsidiary of the China Non-Ferrous Metal Industry’s Foreign Engineering and Construction Company. Anti-Chinese sentiment hit the roof. The Chinese president Hu Jintao, on an official visit in February 2007, even had to cancel a tour of the mining belt.

Employees of the Chinese mining companies are denied union rights and their conditions are probably worse than for those working for Canadian, Swiss or South African multinationals.

But for all that, Sam Mulafulafu, head of the Catholic charity Caritas in Zambia, says: 'It is important to remember it wasn’t the Chinese companies who privatised copper.'

The new globalised Zambia is pursued by companies from every corner of the globe, but the Bench Marks Foundation, based in South Africa, notes that many of these multinationals apply much lower standards in terms of health, security and respect for the environment in Zambia than they do in the developed countries where they are based.

In January 2008 acid waste from Chingola’s mines reached the ground water at Mufulira, around 40km away. More than 800 people in the township adjoining the Mopani Copper Mines (MCM) complained of diarrhoea, abdominal pain and vomiting. The mine is co-owned by the Swiss group Glencore and the Canadian company First Quantum, and the joint venture was set up with the help of the European Investment Bank.

Accidents like these increase what two young Zambian researchers call the 'ecological debt.' Economist Nachilala Nkombo and legal expert Brenda Mofya say the environment has been sacrificed on the altar of privatisation: 'Unlike the financial debt, the creditors this time are the Zambian people. Though linked to Zambia’s financial debt, the ecological debt is far larger than Zambia’s $7bn financial debt was at its peak'

The mining townships of Mufulira are stark reminders of this ecological debt. One of the worst is Kankoyo, home to 30,000 people, and a canker on an otherwise fertile and verdant landscape. Only two things grow here: avocado trees and cactus.

Open sewers, dilapidated shacks with tin roofs corroded by acid rain, abandoned pharmacies, grocers shops with broken windows – the local population maintain these vestiges of the ZCCM’s social programme as best they can.

'They don't listen to us'

Kankoyo also lies downwind of the smoke spewing out of MCM’s blast furnace: on some days the township is smothered in a choking fog. Every year nearly 700,000 tonnes of sulphur dioxide is released into the air. Cholera is common. And unrest grows as unemployment rises. MCM’s armed guards sit on plastic chairs on top of the slag heaps, watching out for illegal miners searching for minerals among the waste.

A heavy contaminated air envelops the former hospital where Percy Chanda, MP for Mufulira district and member of the main opposition party, the Patriotic Front, has his office.

'I am not against foreign companies – we need them,' he said. 'But the way they have behaved in the Copperbelt is very regrettable. They don’t listen to us. Imagine you came to my house, and I made you a meal. You would probably offer to help with the dishes. But here they just sit still at the table, without lifting a finger, waiting for the next course.'

A former miner, Chanda remembers 'the good old days' of the ZCCM: a state within a state that looked after every aspect of workers’ lives from birth to death. Everything from housing, education and health care, to evening classes and sports clubs was run by the ZCCM – they would even change your light bulbs, people used to joke.

Chanda was still a miner when Zambia – caught between ZCCM’s losses of $713,000 a day and the offer of debt relief – accepted the advice of the IFIs. At that time copper was worth about $2,500 a tonne. A militant member of the mining union during the post-privatisation cutbacks, Chanda finally hung up his miner’s hat in 2006 when he became an MP: 'I have never been able to find out anything about the agreement that was reached on privatisation. Nor about what profits have been made since. I feel I am banging my head against a brick wall.'

When copper prices began to rise, Chanda tried to negotiate a pay rise for miners. 'They told us we couldn’t benefit from the price rise, because they had sold their copper in advance at the previous year’s prices. Now they tell us they have to lay us off because of the price drop. But they are still selling at September’s prices when they were at their peak! But you know it’s not safe being in hostile territory, surrounded by your enemies. One of these days they’ll regret what they did to us.'

Everything is for sale

The financial storm has hit the Luanshya Copper Mines (LCM), an Israeli-Swiss joint venture registered in the Netherlands, which has just sacked its 1,300 permanent staff. LCM’s director, Derek Webbstock, says business will resume when the price of copper goes back up.

The atmosphere is gloomy in the mining town. Around 60 policemen have been sent to guard the entrance to the complex, but LCM has already sent its mining equipment – sawhorses and piping cut up into pieces – to South Africa by lorry. Nothing is wasted – it can all be reused, and sold.

It is rumoured the Chinese may take over the mine. At the mini-market, customers count their pennies, and worry about Christmas. The local union representative, Boniface Kabwe, has four children. The abruptness of the closure knocked him sideways. 'In October some miners tried to borrow money from the local bank, but they were told they didn’t have enough security. The bank seemed to know the mine would close before the government did! In fact, [the government] was the last to know.'

Up to now relations between LCM and the local population have been reasonable. Unlike other mining companies, LCM had kept the road to Luanshya in good repair. In fact the town was voted the cleanest in the Copperbelt last year, in a competition dating back to ZCCM days.

Two-thirds of the local council’s revenue – more than 1.2bn kwachas ($210,000) in the last six months of last year – came from local taxes paid by LCM. 'They told us recently that they had enough funds to stay open despite the financial crisis,' says Mutakela Kayonde, a Luanshya town planning official. 'It’s not just the miners who are affected by the closure. With eight people to a household, it’s the whole community.'

Like an increasing number of people in the Copperbelt, including local correspondents from the national press, Kayonde is beginning to wonder what’s going on. Has the collapse in the price of copper given businesses another opportunity to blackmail Zambia’s government?

Last spring the Zambian government finally decided to review its mining contracts. It raised corporate tax from 25% to 30%, and tax on profits went up from a miserable 0.6% to 3%. The World Bank – forced to recognise how modest the Zambian treasury’s share had been up to then – supported the measure.

Zambia was getting nothing out of the exploitation of its copper reserves, while the multinationals were making a handsome profit. The mining companies had even set up sophisticated systems to avoid paying taxes by channelling their profits through offshore companies in islands like Mauritius. In 2006 Zambia earned $133m from copper exports estimated to be worth $3bn.

Mining companies made $3bn from copper extraction last year. But of the $421m that should have made its way into Zambia’s state coffers, only $200m was actually collected. Even though Zambia has some of the lowest taxes in southern Africa, the multinationals contested them, threatening to take their disagreement to a commercial court – in their home countries. That was before the risk of redundancies, on the back of falling prices, offered them a new way to put pressure on the Zambian government.

It seems they have achieved their objective. After winning a narrow victory at the end of October 2008, following the death of his predecessor Levy Mwanawasa, President Rupiah Banda announced that his government was having discussions with the mining companies – on cutting taxes: 'We must ensure that we do not kill the goose that lays the golden egg. There is little point in taking in a few million dollars in tax if thousands of jobs are lost as a result.'

Fred M’Membe runs the main Zambian opposition daily The Post, which started up in Chiluba’s day. Sporting a South African communist party cap, and going around in a Hummer 4X4, he is now one of the wealthiest and most powerful men in the country, both from his editorials and his stake in the new Zambian economy.

'Our government opened the doors wide to foreign businesses, but didn’t leave itself the possibility of closing them again. The economic policy of a country cannot be dictated by agreements made with private businesses,' said the business magnate. 'It’s true privatisation did create a certain amount of hope. But now the Hollywood movie is over and reality has hit with the global financial crisis. The only solution is for the state to move back into the mining sector. Cooperatives or nationalisation, it doesn’t matter. The people should be the first to profit from the mines.'

Kabwe’s zinc and lead deposits used to be the richest in Africa. After almost a century of exploitation by the South African giant Anglo American they were finally abandoned, almost exhausted, in the mid-1990s. Now, despite a campaign to clean up the site funded by the World Bank, this town of 300,000 inhabitants is one of the ten most polluted industrial towns on the planet, according to the Blacksmith Institute. The average level of lead in the blood of children is reported to be between five and 10 times higher than the limit set by the US Environmental Protection Agency.

Their only means of survival

Illegal miners from the nearby townships dig around in the rubbish tips for bits of manganese, copper or cobalt ore which they can sell on in 100kg bags to middle-men. Their fathers worked for the mines. It’s a risky job – three young men were killed in 2007 when a tip caved in – but it’s their only means of survival.

High levels of lead dust in the soil and heavy metals in the water within a 20km radius of the town are having a harmful effect on agriculture. On the road up to Lusaka, fields of maize and stalls selling mushrooms the size of umbrellas are reminders, however, that Zambia is as rich in arable land as it is in minerals. Many former miners, casualties of privatisation, have returned to work their family’s land.

In its obsession with mineral resources, though, Zambia has neglected its agriculture: 80% of the rural population lives below the poverty line. Peter Kapumba – a former ZCCM employee, built like a boxer, his eyes drained of colour by all the mining chemicals – lives with three generations of his family on an old colonial farm. 'Life is hard,' he said. 'But it’s better here than in town. I think farming is the future for this country. As long as the government makes up its mind to diversify the economy. It’s about time too. One day there will be no more copper. The only thing left will be the pollution.'

Since this winter (2009) another 8,000 Zambian miners have been laid off.” – (Jean-Christophe Servant, “Mined Out in Zambia,” in Le Monde Diplomatique, 9 May 2009).

The decline of the copper industry has affected the whole country.

But that's only one aspect of the problem. Harsh economic realities have many people questioning the new economic policies which have been introduced in this era of globalisation.

They realise that the majority of the people have not benefited from the free market policies which international financial institutions including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said would improve the economy and living conditions for everybody. They have also realised that the biggest beneficiaries of these new economic policies are not Zambians – except the privileged few – but foreign investors.

And in a fundamental way, what has happened to the copper industry is very much a reflection of what has happened to the country as a whole. When people talk about the economy of Zambia, they think about copper. Copper is synonymous with Zambia.

Almost the life of every Zambian is inextricably linked with the rise and fall of copper prices and with the successes and failures of the copper industry. That is because whatever money the government gets from copper, it becomes a major part of the national budget. It is from those funds that money is obtained to finance development projects in all parts of the country including the rural areas.

Therefore when the production of copper falls, and prices fall, almost every Zambian is affected.

And there is no other African country which depends so much on copper as Zambia does. Its fortunes have been determined by copper for decades. So have its misfortunes even in recent years long after the country abandoned its socialist policies pursued almost since independence under the leadership of President Kenneth Kaunda.

As the first decade of the 21st century came to an end, the people were still suffering from the decline of the copper industry. Capitalism had not protected them from the devastating impact of this phenomenon. According to a report from Lusaka, Zambia, 10 November 2008, by the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) which is a part of the UN Office for the Coordination of humanitarian Affairs, entitled “Lower Copper Prices Will Hurt the Poor”:

“The fall in international copper prices is causing unease in Zambia, one of the world's largest producers, whose impressive economic growth in recent years has been based on copper exports.

Frederick Bantubonse, general manager of the Zambia Chamber of Mines, told IRIN: 'It's causing a lot of concern; we are selling, well and good, but the pricing is not as profitable as we would like it to be. This is not good for the Zambian economy.'

Since the beginning of the credit crunch in the US, copper prices have tumbled from the record highs of nearly US$9,000 per metric tonne between 2005 and 2007, to around $5,000 per tonne, amid concerns that the global economic slowdown will puncture demand. Copper is a key metal in the electronics and building industries.

'We are foreseeing a situation where our mining companies may begin to cut down on further investment programmes because of [making] less money and, ultimately, this may not just affect their profits but even their employment base,' Bob Sichinga, an economist and former MP who served on Zambia's parliamentary mining committee, told IRIN.

'We now have some mining companies advocating for the cancellation of the new tax regime [introduced by the government this year] because they feel the market is no longer favourable for such taxation, which is very unfortunate for the country.'

Copper accounts for 80 percent of Zambia's foreign earnings, and has helped drive healthy economic growth of five percent over the last six years. The government had projected additional revenue of $415 million in 2009 after raising the mineral royalty tax from 0.6 percent to the global norm of 3 percent, and the introduction of a windfall tax on mining companies as a result of record copper prices.

Social services

Oliver Saasa, a consultant economics professor at the University of Zambia, said falling copper prices would affect the delivery of social services. 'It's putting a lot of pressure on the new government. As it is now, there is a reduction in government revenue, and also no windfall profit because of the low prices; the windfall tax is only applicable where prices are high,' he commented.

Newly elected President Rupiah Banda is keen to make a positive impression after narrowly winning the 30 October presidential election, in which urban voters in the capital, Lusaka, and the central Copperbelt region, Zambia's economic heartland, voted overwhelmingly for opposition leader Michael Sata. In his inaugural speech Banda pledged to fight poverty and improve social spending.

'Because of the reduced resource base, government will face problems in social investments for such critical sectors as education and health,' Saasa said. 'Already, even before the fall in copper prices became an issue, we had overshot our national budget because of the [October 30] elections.'

The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) October survey projected that growth in sub-Saharan Africa was likely to slow to 6 percent in 2008 and 2009, down from 6.5 percent in 2007, but the deceleration in oil imports could be sharper, dropping to 5 percent.

Food and fuel prices are likely to remain substantially above their 2007 levels, the IMF said. This means deeper poverty for households in sub-Saharan Africa, which typically spend about half their income on food. The World Bank has estimated that 44 million people worldwide will fall into poverty in 2008 as a result of price increases.

The prices of key commodities have rocketed over the last three years in Zambia: a 25kg bag of maize-meal now sells for $18.00, up from $11.00 in 2006; a litre of petrol (gasoline) has risen US 75 cents over the same period.

But all is not gloom, according to Mathias Mpande, head of the mining engineering department at the University of Zambia. 'The price of around $5,000 per tonne is not very low - it is still four times higher than the all-time average of copper, which is about $1,200 per tonne. In any case, the former prices were very high, and unsustainable because copper is traditionally a cheap product.'

The three-year record copper prices were triggered by strong demand from the fast-industrialising Asian countries, especially China and India, the biggest foreign investors in Zambia's Copperbelt mining region.

'What we should realise is that this credit crunch has mostly affected the US and the European Union; China and India have not been that much affected. The demand for copper in China and India will not drop and, therefore, prices are slowly going to stabilise, which is why we should not tamper with the new tax regime,' Mpande said.

Kalombo Mwansa, Zambia's mines minister, said the government was working on policy measures in the event of a long-term price slump. 'Our hope is that this fall in copper prices won't last long, because the whole world is very much united to find a lasting solution to the credit crunch,' he told IRIN.

'But even if it lasts longer than anticipated, government is currently working on measures to ensure there is a steady flow of investment ... and that the situation does not ground our economy.'

At its peak in the 1980s, Zambia produced about 750,000 tonnes of finished copper annually, before output dropped to 200,000 tonnes in the 1990s. Current production is around 600,000 tonnes per year, but the government had projected this to rise to one million tonnes by 2010.” – (“Lower Copper Prices Will Hurt the Poor,” IRIN, Lusaka, Zambia, 10 November 2008).

Since independence, Zambia has had a lot of successes and failures; perhaps more failures than successes in the economic arena. But it has survived as a nation. And it still has a long, long way to go in terms of development as all African countries do with the possible exception of South Africa, the continent's economic giant and industrial hub.

Zambia's road towards development is also sharply contrasted with what has taken place in neighbouring Botswana through the decades since independence; a phenomenon observed by many people including Africans such as Godfrey Mwakikagile in his book Botswana Since Independence in which he explains why Botswana has prospered while most of the other countries on the continent have not. As he states in his book:

“Botswana stands out among all the countries on the entire continent as the most successful one in terms of economic prosperity.

In fact, it has been one of the most successful in the entire world. It has also enjoyed political stability and democracy since independence unlike most countries on the African continent; an achievement derived from and sustained by the country's traditional democratic institutions.

But why has Botswana been so successful while others have failed?

There are several reasons why Botswana has been so successful, featured prominently through the decades as an example others should follow in their quest for economic development....

Botswana has not done anything other countries can not do in order to prosper. It has done the same thing the Asian tigers have done. Southeast Asian countries were once poor just like African countries were.

In fact, soon after independence in the sixties, some African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia had a higher per capita income than South Korea. Yet within a few years, South Korea outstripped them all and is now a relatively developed country. Other Asian tigers such as Malaysia and Singapore have been equally successful.

Botswana was in even worse shape at independence and a few years after that. It was one of the poorest countries in Africa.

There's no question that the discovery of diamonds and other minerals provided a big boost to the economy. But it's what Botswana did with the mineral wealth, how, and under what conditions, which determined success for this once impoverished country.

The government invested heavily in infrastructural development. It also invested heavily in health and in education in order to have a healthy and skilled work force.

But none of that would have helped Botswana to prosper if the government did not provide a climate conducive to investment.

The government of Botswana made a concerted effort to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). It also encouraged and promoted local capital investment.

Botswana has also enjoyed political stability and the rule of law since independence – without which development is impossible.

It has also enjoyed transparency which has equally encouraged investors to invest in the economy.

Lack of transparency discourages investors from investing in any country. Botswana's success in this area is demonstrated by the fact that the country has one of the highest ratings in the world – it has been consistently rated as the least corrupt country in Africa by Transparency International.

And its legal system has a track record maintaining a system of checks and balances separate from its legislative and executive branches.

The country's tradition of democracy has also helped to foster a climate of political stability and encourage investment, although the countries of Southeast Asia have prospered under authoritarian regimes without democracy. But they are inherently unstable because they are not democratic and they could explode anytime, as has been demonstrated by the political instability in Burma because of repression.

Investment in Botswana, especially in the mining sector, in construction and in the service sector has through the years helped create jobs and raise the standard of living for many people, with urban residents being the biggest beneficiaries.

But development has also spread to the rural areas because of investment in the infrastructure in different parts of the country.

Before 1966, that was unheard of. And on the basis of all available evidence during that period, prospects were bleak for Botswana....” – (Godfrey Mwakikagile, Botswana Since Independence, Pretoria, South Africa: New Africa Press, 2009, pp. 155 – 157).

Many observers also have provided different perspectives on Zambia since independence in terms of her successes and failures.

One of these observers, if he can be called an observer at all in addition to being what he was, is Kenneth Kaunda, the founding father of the nation.

He had a lot to say after he stepped out of office. He led Zambia for 27 years since independence.

What he did and did not do in those 27 years from 1964 to 1991, coincidentally during the same period Nelson Mandela was in prison and for just as many years, is a textbook on the challenges of leadership in post-colonial Africa. We learn from Dr. Kaunda himself next.