TheorySummary

Why does a society develop the way it does?

I Introduction

II General theories of change

III Process of change

IV The Current Changing World

V Data

IV Bibliography

First Copyright November 2001.  May be used provided proper citation is given.  See note at bottom.

I. Introduction
This is a literature review of theory and research addressing social change: how and why social, economic and political systems change over time.  This review will cover general theories of change, one approach describing the process of change, and research and data about change in the current world.  This is a very long term project, and will be revised many more times.  Input is welcome!

A. Importance of studying change

Social change is important to study because a full understanding of many topics, such as the success or failure of different political systems, globalization, democratization, development and economic growth, are all rooted in this basic idea of social change.

For example, successful economic growth depends on a number of factors, such as technology and natural and social resources.  However, only some countries can take advantage of technology and their resources.  Thus, a more basic question is: why is it that only some countries are so well poised.  In general, successful utilization of resources depends on having a stable and fairly flexible economic and political system, and a social system compatible with growth, for example, having values and customs which are favorable toward capital development and accumulation.  Thus, at the next deeper level, the question is why have only some countries developed these kinds of political, economic and social conditions (e.g., stable and flexible systems, values favoring capitalism).  That is, the root question is how to explain the historical development of those societies.

Similarly, globalization and democratization eventually lead to the same questions.  For example, whether a country is able to participate in the globalization process depends on ...  Again, whether a country's political system was able to develop into a democracy depends on ... (this section in process)

B. What this review covers.

The root question is how and why social, economic and political systems developed and how they are now changing.  Overall, change is a highly complex process, involving many factors, such as demography, technology, availability of resources, politics, economics, and the interaction of these factors. We briefly review, in Section II, some of the major theories of change, what factors have been studied, and how these factors relate to change. Also, some aspects of change are seen as systematic and predictable, and others as random or coincidental. We review these two approaches to change. Section III describes one particular approach about the process of social change. Finally, there are a number of major areas of study of the current world situation:e.g., development, globalization, democratization, demographic changes, and the shift toward the knowledge based society. In Section IV, we give a brief overview of these topics, and then discuss data that can be used to study these topics.

C. Approach to change

The process of social, political and economic change is very complex. Change may involve many different factors, and multiple processes operating concurrently. First, many coincidental, unique or random factors influence the change process. For example, geography can have an impact on whether a civilization developes one great center versus many smaller independent centers. Similarly, the presence or absence of specific people may be one major determinant of the path a society takes. Consequently, the specific forms that a society takes, and the particular paths, for example of development, taken by different societies will not be the same among different societies. On the other hand, there are systematic or common processes which affect all societies. For example, successful development generally requires a basic degree of social mobilization, structural differentiation, development of free resources, specialization and diversity of social organization, and a stable and flexible governmental system. Social, political and economic change can best be understood by combining systematic with more unique, random or coincidental factors.
 

II General Theories of Change
This review is organized into two parts.  First, we discuss non systematic factors, such as geography, technology, human factors (e.g., human will) and how they interact.  Second, we describe some systems theories of change.

A. Non systematic Factors

Geography is often seen as a coincidental factor. For example, Hibbs and Olsson (2004) indicate that geography played a key role in earliest economic development (i.e. the transition from huter-gatherers to agriculture) because it provided the natural resources that made possible building institutions to support further development.

Later, the emergence of capitalism in the west was also described as depending on geography (Chirot and Merton, 1986; Weber, in Collins, 1986).  In North West Europe, geography led to the development of independent cities, the possibility of capital accumulation, and a semi-independent bourgeoisie (Chirot and Merton, 1986), which in turn resulted in more or less independent bureaucratic states based on universal citizenship, an egalitarian legal system, and a religion emphasizing the economic ethic (Weber, in Collins, 1986). All of these factors led to the development of systems of rights and responsibilities, legal regulations for fiscal and economic exchange, and standard rules for transactions (Chirot and Merton, 1986), which were positive preconditions for the development of capitalism (Weber, in Collins, 1986). In contrast, the geography of China led to dependence on large scale irrigation, which required strong centralized authority, and cities developed as dependents of monarchial authorities, rather then as more independent entities. Consequently, rule was by patrimony, rather than by a egalitarian legal system, and this kind of legal system was not suitable for entrepreneurial organization of capital (Weber, in Collins, 1986).

Another example is described in Nevins and Commager (1986).  In North America, since the Atlantic coast had many small bays and inlets, many small colonies could be established, rather than having one or a few large colonies.  Thus, independence led to a federation of colonies or states, rather than any other form of government.  Later, when the central plains were populated, the flatness and navigable rivers made communication and transportation comparatively easy.  Thus, this land was settled by people from all of the eastern seaboard, and all of Europe, interacting on equal terms, leading to a new democracy and a new American sentiment.

Chirot also indicates that environment can also be a cause of failure to change.  For example, the earliest civilizations developed in constricted river valleys.  These centers had high population densities and centralized authority.  The problem was that these centers of civilization were subject to great catastrophes.  There could be extreme droughts, or invasions by nomadic raiders who lived in surrounding dry regions.  When the droughts or invasions occurred, the civilizations fell, and it could take centuries to recover.  The necessary complex irrigation systems, the animal stock and the human population all took long times to recover from the great disasters.  Thus, because of constrictions places by geographic conditions, very long term continuous growth could not occur, since the civilizations had to spend centuries repeatedly recovering from recurring disasters.

In contrast, western Europe could continuously accumulate capital and raise productivity over a very long time period, because it did not have to deal with continuous disasters.  Western Europe had rainfall throughout the year, and thus rarely had periods of extreme drought or flooding, and did not need centralized authority required to maintain complex irrigation systems.  Western Europe also did not have adjacent dry zones with nomads, hence far fewer major invasions and disruptions than the earlier civilizations.  Western Europe, unlike earlier centers of civilizations, also was composed of many small river valleys, and thus difficult to unify, which meant more possibility of internal competition, and less bureaucratic roadblocks to innovation.
 

External events are another coincidental factor. The development of capitalism also depended on the discovery of the new world, which consequently allowed for an increase in overseas commerce, which in turn led to the growth of new manufacturing and industrial centers independently of the older forms of social organization, that is, of the feudal system (Marx, in Giddens, 1971).

Technology can be a coincidental factor or part of a systematic process.  For example, technological innovation, in the form of the invention of the heavy plow and improved harnessing of horses was one of the main factors which allowed northwestern Europe to develop between the ninth and thirteenth centuries (Chirot, 1994, 2000).  The plow and harness made it possible to efficiently turn the heavy soil of northwestern Europe, which allowed for a faster population growth. More recently, the railroad was an engine of change, as it lowered transportation costs, more effectively connected remote regions with more advanced areas, and “brought modernization everywhere it went” (Chirot, 2000, p. 84).  These innovations were not neccessarily inevitable, that is, not part of some logically flowing system dynamic of capitalist development.  Thus, some societies did develop innovations which allowed them to prosper and grow, while others did not develop innovations, and failed, and it is not always clear why some did and some did not.  More recently, many see technology or scientific innovations as a driving force of modern growth (e.g., Castells, 1996).  In this case, it seems likely that technological innovation is part of the systematic process of capitalism.

Human factors such as decision making are also important non systematic sources of change. Bendix (1984) mentions that it is "the clash of wills which is necessary for the emergence of the present" (p.55). This clash of wills is related to the political structures of states, and, recently, how they enter the modern industrial age. For example, Bendix (1964) indicates how important political management was in "reconciling tradition and modernity" (p. 209) in Japan's transition. Much of the source of Japanese development was from foreign technology and ideas, and these modern factors had to be managed to some degree, and integrated into the more traditional ways. Individual and collective decisions about political management thus had some influence in how successful Japan was in maintaining economic success, along with how well she integrated past and present culture. Similarly, the clash of wills relates to success in other states.  Nevins and Commager (1986) describe the American Revolution by saying that it was led by people who were well organized, while their opposition, the loyalists, were not, and it was the organization of the revolutionaries which helped them to succeed.  Again, during the revolutionary war, Nevins and Commager (1986) indicate that there were several occasions when the British army could have defeated the revolutionaries, but failed to do so because of decisions by their commanders.  In this clash of wills, the British failed, and delivered success to the emerging American state.

Historical situation and context are also critical factors. Change is not a single path or pattern, but depends on many factors, such as how a society is organized, it's relations with neighbors, or its previous level of development. For example, in discussing modernization, Eisenstadt (1973) makes reference to a set of variables which seem to, at least partly, explain the different forms modernization takes. First, the material and social position of a people at the initial stages of modernization is an important influence. People who are socially organized in tribal groups will modernize differently than people in caste systems. Likewise, the process will differ according to the level of economic development. More backwards economies may undergo more stress and discontinuity. Secondly, the temporal sequence of the process will lead to varying patterns of modernization. The western modernization was led by the economic and cultural spheres.  On the other hand, more recently, in Latin American, Asian and African countries, political modernization occurs first.  Finally, Eisenstadt (1973), like Bendix (1984) also refers to individual will, in this case, to the actions of the "modernizing elite" (1973, p. 33). That is, those who lead the modernization process will influence the form and content of the modernization process. Different elite groups may choose different policies of social or economic development. For example, Eisenstadt (1973) writes "the processes of modernization are ... borne or 'pushed' by the charismatic groups or personality" (p. 33). In some cases, an absence of an elite group may also delay or prevent the modernization process. These three factors, the previous level of a society's development, the temporal sequence, and the actions of the modernizing elite, combine in a variety of ways and produce a variety of forms and processes of modernization.

Conclusion:  The development path does not necessarily follow a single pattern. The specific forms of institutions which emerge, and the relations between sociodemographic characteristics and modernization, will not be the same for different societies. For example, in the western societies, as mentioned, modernization was accompanied by expansion of components of social mobilization (e.g., higher literacy, education, urbanization) and growth of specialized and separate spheres (political, economic, cultural). However, in the modernization process of more recent cases, including Latin American or Asian countries, beyond a certain point, there was a negative correlation between some sociodemographic factors (e.g., literacy and urbanization) and institutional capacity for sustained growth. Also, the kind of structural differentiation and separate and specialized development of institutionalized spheres which occurred in the west was not duplicated in other modernizing countries. For example, Russia developed a more centralized and merged system which included both the political and economic systems. Also, other differences may occur. For example, Japan incorporated much more of it's traditional sphere into it's modern framework than did western nations, and also developed orientations toward particularistic units (e.g., schools, companies), rather than an emphasis on universalistic and achievement criteria in all institutional spheres, as occurred in the west.
 

B. Systems explanations

There are a number of systematic explanations of change. In this section, we briefly review approaches by Marx (Giddens, 1971), Eisenstadt (1973), North (1996a, 1996b), ...

Marx described dynamics of the capitalist system. This system, according to Marx (Giddens, 1971) is based on the search for profit, through commodity production. Capitalist development, or growth, is achieved though expropriation of surplus value, or profit, by the capitalist, from the workers. The surplus value comes from the fact that the workers can produce more than the value that they need in order to maintain and reproduce themselves. In a market system, workers sell their labor in order to earn a living, and because the labor market is competitive, the capitalists can expropriate excess value from the workers. The surplus value taken from labor is the major source of profit.

The capitalist system, however, has a structural tendency which eventually leads to declining rates of profit (Giddens, 1971). In the search for profit, technological improvement and increasing mechanization are the major means used by each individual capitalist to compete with other capitalists. More mechanization and technology can help each entrepreneur to produce at cheaper rates and to increase his share of profits. However, each entrepreneur will similarly use more technology, so that all will eventually have higher ratios of capital expenditure on constant capital (e.g., technology, etc.), and less workers to expropriate surplus value from, so the average rates of profits for all will decline.

There are mitigating factors (Giddens, 1971). For example, spending more on constant capital may increase productivity of labor, so the proportion of ratio expended on constant capital can be steady or decline, and so profit can stay steady or increase. Countervailing forces also include the "intensified exploitation of labor" (Giddens, 1971; p. 53), which is expanding the work day or decreasing wages below their true value.

The capitalist system also experiences periodic "crises" of over production, which are manifestations of the structural contradictions of the system, and are also a regulating mechanism, which allow the system to work through the periodic fluctuations, restore an equilibrium and grow further.

Finally, Marx indicates that "capitalism is an inherently unstable system, built upon antagonisms that can only be resolved through changes which eventually undermine it" (Giddens, 1971; p.59).

Eisenstadt also provides a systematic explanation for part of change. He uses a comparative approach in attempting to lay out conditions of social growth and development, for example, for laying out laws or patterns of development of political systems of empires (1993), in specifying those conditions under which successful modernization occurs (1983), when revolution and revolutionary transformation occurs (1978), or under what circumstances axial age civilizations arose (1986). He is interested in specifying dynamics of social growth, or explaining why something occurred where and when it did.

In Tradition, Change and Modernity (1983) Eisenstadt describes the dynamics of modernization. He first points out that modernization requires the development of a base level of certain factors, including social mobilization, structural differentiation, the development of free resources, specialization and diversity of social organization, and the development of regulative and allocative mechanisms in the economic, political and other institutional spheres. Examples of these regulative and allocative mechanisms include the market system and political parties, in the economic and political spheres, respectively. Eisenstadt (1983) goes on to indicate that achieving a certain level on these factors is necessary for the development of modernity, but is not sufficient alone to guarantee continuation of modernization. In order for a society to continue to modernize, it needs to develop an institutional framework capable of continuous absorption of change. That is, as the society modernizes, new demands arise, new constituencies come to power, and the political, economic, social, and other spheres need to adapt to these changes, and also need to maintain some kind of continuity. So for example, the political system must be able to deal with suffrage or national independence movements and still be able to maintain continuity. Thus, beyond a certain minimal level of social mobilization and structural differentiation required for modernization, in addition there is a need for an institutional framework that can successfully cope with the changes and problems associated with modernization, and that can also maintain a continuous existence for itself.

Eisenstadt (1983) sees modernization as partially systematic, and, as mentioned above, partially indeterminate. Thus, while there are certain factors required for modernization, there is also a great variety in the specific forms society may take and how the modernization process occurs, and the differences in the modernization process may be partially explained by the previous level of a society's development, the temporal sequence, and the actions of the modernizing elite.

North, and Institutions
North (1996b) is concerned with the dynamics of political, social, and economic change.  In particular, he writes about institutions as the carrier of the process of economic change (North, 1996b).

Institutions are a society's "formal rules (constitutions, statute and common law, regulations, etc.), informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions, and internally imposed codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of each" (North, 1996b, Section I).  Institutions are created to reduce uncertainty in pursuit of goals in economic, political and social exchanges. (North, 1996b, Section I) and to provide the underlying structure to exchange and human organization. (North, 1996b, Section III)

The broad process of economic change is that organizations - economic, political and social - are the actors, and will "introduce new institutions or technology when they perceive that they can improve their competitive position by such innovation." (North, 1996b, Section I).  For example, when there are secure monopolies, there is little incentive to innovate.  On the other hand, when there are competitive markets, there are more incentives to innovate.  (North, 1996b, Section I).

However, organizations are a product of their society's institutions.  The form, structure and even competitive behavior of organizations depends on the institutions of society.  Thus, competition is the immediate determinant whether organizations innovate, but the institutions determine how and what kinds of innovations occur (North, 1996b, Section I).  For example, under certain conditions, it may happen that innovation involves improving productivity, but innovation can also involve creating monopolies or blocking further competition.  The form that innovation takes, as mentioned, depends on the existing institutions. (North, 1996b, Section I)

Further, only some kinds of institutions support sustained economic growth, basically those institutions which reduce costs of transactions. (North, 1996a. Section IV) "Sometimes they (institutions) are created to facilitate exchange, encourage technological change, and induce human capital formation and in consequence reduce transaction and/or transformation costs; at other times they are created to support monopoly, prevent technological change, thwart human capital development, and generally raise the costs of transacting and/or transformation" (North, 1996a, Section IV).  Thus, for example, institutions may lead to social investment in education, dissemination of knowledge and encouraging applied and pure research, or on the other hand may lead to ‘investment’ in support skills for more redistributive activities, such as piracy (North, 1996a, section IV).

North gives some examples (North, 1996a, Section VII).  Some belief systems in Africa and somewhat in Latin America, following their historical economic experience, did not lead to the creation of political and economic institutions which permitted impersonal exchange.  As these economies became exposed to the larger world economy, rather, they developed organizations which favored redistributive activities.  That is, the state basically became a theft machine.

On the other hand, some economies, for example England and the Netherlands, developed economic organizations which favored productive activities.  This modern economic growth of Europe “had as its source the growth in the stock of knowledge that is associated with the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.” (North, 1996b, Section III)  In turn, the institutional developments of the scientific revolution -- political, economic, and social – were the result of the development of a belief system “that had its origins in the way religious beliefs (and reaction to those beliefs) evolved in medieval-early modern Europe and the way those beliefs in turn were heavily influenced by the unique experiences that characterized that part of the world.” (North, 1996b, Section III).  North also indicates that the key to the success of England and the Netherlands was “the dynamic consequences of the competition among fragmented political bodies that resulted in an especially creative environment. Europe was politically fragmented; but it was integrated in having both an overall belief structure, derived from Christendom, and information and transportation connections that resulted in scientific, technological, and artistic developments in one part spreading rapidly throughout the others.” (North, 1996a, section V).

III Process of change

Murdock (1961) does not present a theory of change, but rather describes the process of cultural change.  According to Murdock, culture is a system of collective habits.  The collective habits may be habits of actions, ie, customs, or habits of thoughts, ie, collective ideas.  These habits are learned, collectively.  Some of the habits, for example language, may be shared throughout the society, while others may be limited to certain classes or groups.  Habits are shared because some people are in similar situations, so would learn similar habits.  More importantly, each generation is socialized to adopt the habits that previous generations found to be adaptive and satisfying.  Further, social pressure is exerted in order to ensure that people conform to the habits which the social group consider to be right and appropriate.  Adoption of the appropriate habits equips the individuals to deal with the various social situations, and to develop reliable expectations of how others may respond.

Since each society develops under different geographic and social conditions, the collective habits of each society differs for each society.  Consequently, changes in social behavior, or culture, generally has its origin in “some significant alteration in the life condition of a society” (p. 249).  If the situation of the society changes, old behavior patterns may be discouraged and new patterns are encouraged.  Typical events that result in change may include changes in the population, in the geographical environment, movement to a different environment, contact with people of different culture, natural or social disasters, wars, discoveries, even particular leaders.

Murdock also indicates that any event which produces change is historical.  It occurs at a certain time and place, and the consequent changes will depend on the context.  However, it is possible that similar events could have similar effects on other cultures.

Murdock outlines a general process of cultural change.  First, there may be an innovation, which is “the formation of a new habit by a single individual which is subsequently accepted or learned by other members of the society” (p. 250).  Innovations may be variations, that is slight changes of already existing habits.  Variations may be small at any given time, but the accumulation over time may be very large.  Innovations may also be inventions, which is transferring behaviors from one context to another, or is combining old behaviors in new ways.  Murdock indicates that most of the technological innovations have been inventions.  In addition, inventions can occur simultaneously within the same or similar cultures.  A third type of innovation happens when, basically, entirely new habits are developed.  These happen through trial and error, and may occur because old habits prove ineffective and people in the situations are strongly motivated to find new solutions.  Crises, for example, economic crises, famines or epidemics are particularly conducive to this third type of innovation.  The final type of innovation is cultural borrowing, or diffusion.  This type is the most common and important.  Murdock writes that almost every culture owes at least 90 percent of it’s culture to borrowing.  He gives as an example, the U.S. culture, with it’s language borrowed from England, it’s alphabet from the Phoenicians, paper and printing from China, family and property system from medieval Europe, banking and finance system from Babylonia along with modern elaborations from Italy and England, and so on.  Most often, societies borrow mostly from immediate neighbors, and trade, missionary activities,  political conquest and inter-marriage are the usual means of enabling borrowing.  Borrowing only occurs when there is need, when a society does not already have a trait or habit that fills its need.  Borrowing is not necessarily exact, but commonly includes modification, for example, to fit the current cultural situation and needs.

The second process in change is social acceptance. That is, in order for an innovation to become part of the culture, it has to be accepted by more than the innovator.  Thus, the innovation has to be socially shared.  Whether the innovation is adopted by others largely depends on the prestige of the innovator and of the initial adopting group.

The third process is selective elimination.  Those innovations which are more rewarding than their alternatives are more likely to be picked up, while, consequently, those which are less adaptive are likely to be dropped, and disappear.  Murdock mentions through that many innovations, even when they become less effective or adaptive, are retained, but with a change in function.  For example candles were replaced by electric lights, but were retained for ceremonial or other purposes.

The final process of change is integration.  The shared habits that are accepted become adapted with other shared habits, such that they all form, more or less, an integrated whole.  The adopted habit both is modified as it is adapted, and modifies the social situation, or culture, to which it is adapting.

Murdock concludes “The net effect of the various processes of cultural change is to adapt the collective habits of human societies progressively over time to the changing conditions of existence” (p. 260).

Benedict (1961) in the same book, reminds us that the change process is complex, and cannot be reconstructed logically and by deduction.  The habits of any particular culture are deeply ingrained and are not always easily changed.  There may be times when some simple and obvious thing or idea may not be invented or adopted, even when there is a great need for it, and very complex things or ideas may be developed in simple societies.  She gives the example of the metric system, something very useful and logical, which was none the less not adopted in the United States.

Thus, Murdock gives an overview of what the change process may look like, while Benedict reminds us how complex and illogical the process may be.
 

IV Current World Change (last updated in 2001)

Many organizations list a variety of issues that are important in todays world.  For example, the United Nations University (UNU, 2000) lists human development, security, governance and environment.  The United Nations Association in Canada (Spencer, 2001) lists conflict, crime, development, disarmament, economic issues, environment, extra state actors, globalization, health, human rights, knowledge revolution, population trends, including movements and other issues, and scientific development.  Similarly, the Canadian International Development Agency (2003) lists basic education, capacity development, desertification, child protection, gender equality, health and nutrition, HIV/AIDS, humanitarian crises, information and communication technologies, human rights, democratization and good governance, peacebuilding, poverty reduction, and private sector development. The Global Education program sponsored by the Australian Agency for International Development (2006) lists a variety of topics, lists a wide variety of issues, such as children's rights, desertification, food security, infrastructure, rice, urbanization, water and others.

We review main points for a number of these topics, focusing on social, economic and political issues, such as globalization, democratization, economic and demographic changes, technology, health and human development, human rights, social change, environment, and the interaction among these above areas.  The last section will describe data that can be used to study these changes.

Globalization

Guillén (2001) provides an excellent overview of current research on globalization.  Globalization, or “the rapid increase in cross-border economic, social, technological and cultural exchange” (p.2.) is becoming increasingly discussed in social science literature.  In his review, Guillén starts by indicating that globalization is “far from a uniform, irreversible, and inexorable trend. Rather, globalization is a fragmented, incomplete, discontinuous, contingent, and in many ways contradictory and puzzling process” (p.6.)  Some indicators seem to be clear evidence of globalization.  For example, “Foreign direct (excluding portfolio) investment as a percentage of GDP is 2.5 times greater today than twenty years ago” (p.6).  Similarly, international tourism has more than doubled and international calling has nearly doubled.  On the other hand, stock of international migrants has been nearly stable.  There has also been an increase in the number of independent nation states and there are currently many ethnic groups who are aiming toward national independence.  That is, national individualization is still a strong process.  In addition, foreign investment and trade are concentrated in Western Europe, North America and Japan.  Further, while inward direct foreign investment has increased, it is still only 14% of total world GDP.  Finally, regarding whether there is convergence among states and organizations, Guillén writes “globalization does not seem to compel governments, firms, and individuals to converge in their patterns of behavior” (p. 15).  For example, “firms pursue different modes of economic action and adopt different organizational forms depending on the institutional and social structures of their home countries even as globalization increases” (p. 13).   Similarly, government policy making and interactions with other economies remains diversified among states, rather than becoming more convergent.  Guillén writes that research, overall, seems to argue that globalization is occurring, and he refers to social and political writers who present pursuasive cases, although he doesn't describe the cases and the references seem to describe mainly internet and phone use. Guillén also points out several issues such as the world AIDS epidemic and global warming, that show how important it is, at least in some areas, to use global perspectives in addressing problems.

Giddens (1999) also discusses globalization.  He believes that the world is really undergoing great changes, related to globalization, and outlines a few of the fundamental changes in the global economy.  For example, Held et al (1999) point out that the level of world trade in commodities is much higher than it ever has been.  In addition, Giddens argues, trade in services is more intense, and financial and currency trade is the most intense.  The economy has especially become more global in the trade in information, about commodities and finance, for example.  Further, globalization is not just an economic phenomena, but also a social, political and cultural phenomena.  Globalization has effects on local culture, and influences our identities and relationship with other people.  The result of globalization is that tradition and customs have less of an impact on us, that we  have to live a more reflexive life toward an open future.  We have more options in creating our identity, rather than accepting what is given in our traditional culture.  Politically, the nation state is still a vital power in the globalized world and in some respects more important.  The nation state is the near universal form of governance in the current world.  Further, nation states, or at least the larger ones, are still more powerful than corporations.  Nation states are territories, have control over military power, and nations are responsible for establishing rules of law in which corporations operate.  Giddens argues that the development of electronic world communication systems (e.g., the satellite) was a main feature of globalization, through the ability of instant electronic communication among all parts of the world.  The new form of communication called for new forms of political and social systems.

Held et al (1999) also summarize globalization.  In terms of defense and military power, the current world has a greater degree than ever before of diplomatic links, "multilateral arrangements or multilateral fora for military or security matters" (section 6), and "organization of defence production in the direction of more extensive and intensive transnationalization through licensing, co-production agreements, joint ventures, corporate alliances, sub-contracting, etc" (section 6).  In terms of economics, international trade is greater than ever before, leading to greater interrelationships among economies, and "Social protection and the welfare state play an important role in ameliorating the impact of structural change arising from trade" (section 7).  As does Guillén, Held et al also point out the importance of environmental issues. "the pollution and degradation of the global commons (such as the oceans and the atmosphere); the overspill of the effects of environmental degradation from one state to another (environmental refugees); transboundary pollution and risks (nuclear power, acid rain); the transportation and diffusion of wastes and polluting products across the globe (toxic waste trade, global relocation of dirty industries); and, finally, the formation of global institutions, regimes, networks and treaties that seek to regulate all these forms of environmental degradation" (section 8).  Held et al also describe the political implications of globalization.  Because of the many interconnections, in military, environment and economy, there is a political shift from government to multilevel governance, e.g., "coordination and collaboration across shifting transnational and international networks" (conclusions).  Held et al conclude that "Far from globalization leading to 'the end of the state', it is stimulating a range of government and governance strategies and, in some fundamental respects, a more activist state" (conclusions).

Democratization and political change

Giddens (2000) defines democracy as "a system involving effective competition between political parties for positions of power.  In a democracy, there are regular and fair elections, in which all members of the population may take part. These rights of democratic participation go along with civil liberties - freedom of expression and discussion, together with the freedom to form and join political groups or associations."  Giddens (2000) goes on to write that the past few decades has seen a good deal of growth of democracy.

Other democratization researchers include Gurr, Jaggers and Moore (1990), Jaggers and Gurr (1995), Freedom House (2000), and O'Loughlin, Ward, Lofdohl, Cohen, Brown, Reilly, Gleditsch and Shin (1997).  For example, Jaggers and Gurr (1995) describe global and regional trends in democracy and show that states in the Middle East and Africa are much behind states in other regions in the transition to democracy, and that, as autocratic elites attempt to resist pressures to liberalize, the results are unconsolidated, or 'incoherent', polities.  O'Loughlin et al (1997) use Polity data to describe temporal and spatial aspects of diffusion of  democracy.  They point out that there are geographic and temporal clustering of autocracy and democracy and that democratization is subject to reversal.  They also indicate that there is not necessarily a single form of diffusion of democracy, and that external conditions are important.  For example, some situations such as economic crises may affect a group of related countries all at the same time.

Gurr, Marshall and Khosla (2000) describe trends in armed conflicts, self determination movements and democracy.  They report three main findings (all in the report highlights).  First, there has been a large increase in societal wars (e.g., internal wars) from the 1950's to the early 1990's, but "The number and magnitude of armed conflicts within and among states have lessened since the early 1990s by nearly half."  Second, "Conflicts over self-determination are being settled with ever greater frequency, usually when ethnic groups gain greater autonomy and power-sharing within existing states."  Finally, "Democratic governments now outnumber autocratic governments two to one and continue to be more successful than autocracies in resolving violent societal conflicts."  However, the high proportion of democratic states to autocratic states is a very recent phenomena.  Gurr et al show trends in the numbers of democratic, autocratic and transitional regimes from 1946-1999.  The number of democratic regimes had increased slowly but steadily up to almost 1990.  During this time period, the number of autocratic states grew faster and outnumbered democratic states.  With the collapse of western communism in 1989, the number of democratic states increased rapidly.  However, Gurr, Marshall and Kholsa (2000) go on to warn that these three positive trends are limited and can potentially be reversed by three problems (in highlights).  First, "Virulent armed conflicts persist in parts of Eurasia and Africa and have the potential for metathesis into neighboring states."  Second, "New and transitional democracies everywhere are at risk for reverting to autocracy."  Finally, "Lack of economic development undermines democratic institutions and breeds violent conflict."

In research related to democratization, The Freedom House (2000) described changes in political freedom over time, based on political rights and civil liberties.  Many countries in their data show fair stability over time.  A few, such as Bolivia, Romania and Uruguay show large improvements.  On the other hand, some, such as Bhutan, Antigua & Barbuda, and The Gambia show changes toward less freedom.
 

Demographic changes

A main feature of society is it's demographic make up, including, for example, population size, age and race/ethnic breakdown, and urbanization.  We review here some of the major trends in these characteristics.

One of the major features of the 20th century has been a population growth larger than at any other time in history (Gelbard, Haub and Kent, 1999).  Although the population growth is expected to continue into the next several decades (Gelbard, Haub and Kent, 1999), the pace of growth has decelerated since 1970 (Shackman, Wang and Liu, 2002).  The majority of the high growth has been occuring in developing countries (Soubbotina and Sheram, 2000).  A consequence of the higher growth rate among less developed countries is that population in the less developed countries is becoming an increasingly large proportion of world total population, growing from 70% in 1960 to 81% in 2001 (Shackman, Wang and Liu, 2002).  In addition, there have also been increases in life expectancy, declines in childbirth, and shifts in population distributions (Gelbard et al, 1999).  The causes of population increase are highly complex, and involve many different biological, cultural, economic, geographic, political, and social factors, such as cultural traditions that encourage girls to marry at a young age (Gelbard et al, 1999).  Decreases in fertility, on the other hand, is associated with, for example, increasing age of marriage and higher education (Gelbard et al, 1999).

Relatedly, the aging of the population is another major trend (Kinsella and Velkoff, 2001).  The population age 65 and older is increasing at an unprecedented rate, both in developed and developing countries, and expected to continue to increase well into the 21st century.  The increase is occurring more in developing countries, though.  Related trends are that public pension take a large part of GDPs, that disability rates are more likely to be a problem in developing states than in developed states, and that in most countries, there are more elderly women than elderly men.

Another major change taking place, specifically in the developing countries, involves increasing urbanization (Shackman, Liu and Wang, 2002), especially in concentrations of populations in the largest cities (Brockerhoff, 2000).  While some cities may manage the growth process well, some of the concerns are about the threat of increasing morbidity and mortality, depletion of nonrenewable natural resources, and increasing urban poverty and inequality, with "consequent weakening of the state, civil unrest, urban-based revolutions, and radical religious fundamentalism" (Brockerhoff, 2000).

Economic changes

Growth trends are described by various writers.  For example, Maddison (2001) shows long term economic growth, including growth over the past century. Total output showed a many fold increase in the 1900's for the world and most regions, with most of the growth concentrated in the 1950-1973 period, except Asia (excluding Japan) experiencing its main growth in the more recent decades. In another exception, the former Soviet Union had a decline in output in the most recent two decades. World and regional output per capita followed similar patterns, except of course for the former Soviet Union, which again experienced a large decline in output per capita in the most recent decades.

In many theories of growth, economists such as Abramovitz (1989, 1990), Kendrick (1989), Kuznets (1989), Maddison (1989), Romer (1990) and Robelo (1991) emphasize technology or growth in knowledge as sources of growth, along with social and institutional conditions that allow knowledge to be applied. For example, Kuznets (1989) writes that a source of growth is "a high rate of accumulation of useful knowledge and of technological innovations derived from it" (p. 8).  This knowledge and technology, though, can only be used along with the appropriate conditions, such as financial and legal systems which allow mobilization of savings and investment, and with a stable government, which can deal with social or economic disruptions which may occur during periods of change (Kuznets, 1989; p. 8+).  Thus, the rapid growth of Europe and Japan in the 1950's was due to the relative peace and stability following WW II, which allowed those countries to restructure their organizational systems, so to take advantage of newer technology, to rebuild, and so forth, in other words, to achieve high growth rates.  Once they "caught up", or organized around the newest technology, their rates of growth would naturally slow down.  The recent slowdown in Europe and Japan is simply the result of those countries catching up to their technological potential (Abramovitz, 1990), rather than to problems in policy, technology and so on.

Boettke (undated) points out that culture is one of the important social conditions allowing for growth. For example, protection of private property rights, freedom of contract, and rule of law are all important in fostering growth, but it is not just a simple matter of introducing these constructs into a society, because the society has to have the cultural values and history which allow these factors to fit in and be accepted.

There has also been considerable research about growth and development. One set of papers (CAER II) examines how different variables affect economic growth.  Koropecky (no date given) presents an overview of these papers.  Some of the main points are that, for example, "moderate income inequality sustains economic growth while immoderate income inequality chokes it off", and that "developing countries that have achieved the most rapid gains in income per capita are also those that have recorded the fastest growth in manufactured exports... all of the successful developing-country exporters of manufactures established an export platform ... which, esentially, is an enclave that is at least partially free of the conditions that hold back the rest of the economy (poor trade policies, weak infrastructure, inconsistent rule of law), so that firms there can become more competitive and more fully integrated into the global economy."  This set of papers also examines how growth affects various variables, including climate and population.

Research in development also points to the importance of investment in infrastructure, physical capital and education, including investment in information technology (Pohjola, no date given).  Infrastructure may include the number of telephones, the number of telephone main lines, kilo-watts of electricity-generating capacity, kilometers of total roads, kilometers of paved roads, and kilometers of railway lines (Canning, 1998), of which there may be an optimal mix (Canning and Bennathanm 2000).

Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers (1993) write that a country's growth rate varies quite a lot over time while other country characteristics such as educational level or political stability, tend to remain stable.  They concluded that either shocks or worldwide technological change are important in determining long run growth, and that country characteristics may determine relative income levels.  They also showed that, for a set of 28 countries, over the very long term, country rank order of GDP per capita stays the same.  That is, countries with relatively lower GDP per capita tended to remain at the lower levels, comparatively, of GDP per capita.

Gwartney and Lawson (2000) show how country's levels of economic freedom have changed over time.  Many countries do increase their freedom, but some also decline. Gwartney and Lawson (2000) also show that economic freedom is related to factors such as per capita income and life expectancy.

Poverty and inequality

I'm going to update this.There is considerable debate around global trends in poverty and inequality (Ravallion, 2003). For example, there is disagreement about the amount of decline, and a few argue that poverty has increased (IFG, undated) or that the data are insufficient to determine whether poverty levels have changed (Reddy and Pogge, 2003). One UN report shows that, for developing countries as a whole, there has been a large decline in poverty rates  (percent below $1 a day per capita) between 1990 and 2005 (UN, 2010). Not all regions improved though. There was an increase in poverty rates in Europe and Central Asia (the transition economies) and a slight increase in Sub Saharan Africa and in the Middle East and North Africa. The remainder of the regions experienced a decline in poverty rates. In addition, for developing countries as a whole, there was a slight decrease in the number of people in poverty. Most of this decline was in China. Excluding China showed an increase in the number of people in extreme poverty. The increases were especially marked in Europe and Central Asia and in Sub Saharan Africa.

On the other hand, Bhalla (2002) argues that there were large declines in poverty rates, from 37% in 1985 to 13% in 2000. Bhalla's estimate of poverty in 2000 is much lower than the World Bank estimate, of 23% in 1999. One report from the International Forum on Globalization (IFG, undated) argues the opposite though, that a consequence of globalization has been increased poverty.  A summary of their book is described on the IFG web site. The book, unfortunately, is not freely available, so that details of their methods and results are not available on the web.

Several researchers discuss the apparent contradictions in counting world poverty and inequality numbers, rates and trends. For example, Ravallion (2003) argues that the differences are due to measurement issues, e.g., how poverty is defined, use of absolute versus relative poverty, what levels are used to define poverty, and so forth.  According to Ravallion (2003), defining poverty in absolute terms (e.g., the same purchasing power in all countries), results in finding larger declines in world poverty. Similalrly, defining inequality in absolute terms (absolute differences in levels of living, compared to relative differences) results in finding larger increases in inequality. Ravallion (2003) also points out that poverty and inequality data are generally questionnaire based, and there are a number of problems in using surveys. For example, questionnaires from different countries may use different definitions (e.g., using income versus consumption to measure well-being) or may ask about different time periods (e.g., last year, last month, etc). All of these variations may result in finding different levels of poverty.

Reddy and Pogge (2003) also criticize the World Bank estimates, and argue for a better measure. According to Reddy and Pogge (2003), the main problems with the World Bank estimates are, "The Bank uses an arbitrary international poverty line unrelated to any clear conception of poverty. It employs a misleading and inaccurate measure of purchasing power "equivalence" that creates serious and irreparable difficulties for international and inter-temporal comparisons of income poverty. It extrapolates incorrectly from limited data and thereby creates an appearance of precision that masks the high probable error of its estimates. The systematic distortion introduced by these three flaws may have led to an understatement of the extent of global income poverty and to an incorrect inference that it has declined"  (Reddy and Pogge, 2003, abstract).

In sum, a decline in poverty would be consistent with other changes among less developed countries, such as improved literacy rates, declines in infant mortality rates, increased political freedom, increased newspapers, televisions and radios per capita, and increase in per capita GDP (Shackman, Liu and Wang, 2003). However, there are still a number of problems with data and methods, and conclusions are therefore our 'best guess', though reasonable.
 

Health and Human development

The 2002 UN Human Development Report (UNDP, 2003) indicates that life expectancy is a good indicator of a country's health, and that in the last several decades, life expectancy has increased in most regions of the world, except Sub-Saharan Africa (due to AIDS and conflicts), Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (former Russian Federation states). Also, though, life expectancy in high income OECD countries were still higher than life expectancy in other countries.

Similarly, there has dramatic decreases in infant mortality rates throughout the world (Shackman, Wang and Liu, 2002).  For the world, and for both less developed countries and more developed countries, Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) declined significantly between 1960 and 2001.  For example, IMR among less developed countries declined from 141 infant deaths per 1000 births in 1960 to 63 in 2001.  However, infant mortality rate was and still is very high for some countries.  In 2001 , the IMR among less developed countries, on average, was about 10 times as large as it was among more developed countries, and infant mortality rate for several west and north Africa countries was still above 150 (Shackman, Wang and Liu, 2002).

   
Social changes

There appears to be little multinational research about changes in society that is available over the web.  One study, described below, examines change in social values over a short time interval (Ehrlich, Franzese and Inglehart, 1999).  One other study (Smith and Jarkko, 1998) examines national pride among 23 countries, and part of the study examined change in national pride over time.  They found that "National pride is greatest in stable, established, developed democracies.  Pride is lowest in ex-Socialist states, countries riven by ethnic conflict, and nations with war guilt." (summary section).  In addition, rankings of national pride are very stable over time.

Interrelationships among social, economic and political areas

A number of studies discuss the integration of social, political and economic change, or some aspects of these interrelationships.  Ehrlich et al and Welzel et al use World Value Survey data to look at the interrelationship among changes in political, economic and social systems.  Tilly examines the relationship between the state and the economy.  Farr, Lord and Wolfenbarger look at how political freedom, economic freedom and economic growth are related.

Ehrlich, Franzese and Inglehart (1999) researched specifically the relationships among social values, economic growth and level of democracy.  They examined how values, democracy and growth at one time period were related to values, democracy and growth at periods about 6-9 years later.  Social values was an indicator of where a society was located on a survival-self expression continuum, varying from mainly focusing on survival issues to having their survival secure enough that they could focus on self expression.  The values data were from three waves of the World Values Survey (2000)

They found that all three variables had a significant positive impact on each other.  For example, “Higher levels of democracy in the past tend to produce more democracy, higher GNP, and more self expressive values in the present” (p. 9).  The results are similar relating past GNP and self expressive values to present GNP, self expressive values and democracy, although the relationship of past self expressive values to present democracy is indirect.

They conclude that “Economic development and movements toward democracy and self expressive citizen-values tend to reinforce the others, supporting a theory that posits these three processes as the main elements of a larger syndrome, namely the modernization process” (p.11).  They also note that, for policy makers, the implication is that progress make on any one of these three dimensions will have positive results on the other two dimensions.

Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2000) also discuss the relationships among expressive value change, economic modernization, and democratization.  They note first that, while there is a great deal of research about the relationship between any two of these concepts, there is very little on the relationship among all three.  Without an underlying theory of the interrelationships, it is very difficult to understand causal relationships between modernization, value changes and democratization.

Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann argue that  growth of human choice in society, or Human Development (HD) is the underlying concept that unifies these three major trends.  Human Development “can be understood as the development of human beings’ capabilities and opportunities to base their lives on free choice” (p. 7). Thus, “modernization, or economic HD, reduces constraints on the level of objective means by enlarging peoples’ physical and cognitive resources. Value change, or ethical HD, reduces constraints on the level of subjective aspirations by intensifying human strive for self-expression.  And democratization, or institutional HD, reduces constraints on the level of formal rules by granting citizens with 'negative' and 'positive' freedom rights” (p. 8, 9).  In sum, “economic resources, expressive values and freedom rights improve the societal opportunity structure in favor of human choice” (p9.)

At the level of the individual person, these three concepts are tied together though aspiration adjustment.  That is, people adjust their aspirations to their objective means.  That is, “Human motivation is led in general by the strive for self-expression or growing choice. ... people with higher education and higher incomes (i.e., greater physical and cognitive resources) put stronger emphasis on self-expression. These people have greater means to unfold their potential which makes it perfectly rational that they put stronger emphasis on self-expression. This is the micrological origin of the relation between resource mobilization and expressive values. In addition, there is a micrological origin of the relation between expressive values and democratic institutions. When people gain an increasingly self-expressive orientation it becomes perfectly rational that they support democracy, since democracy is the regime that enlarges their formal opportunities for self-expression. Exactly for this reason we will see that people tend to be the more supportive of democracy the stronger they emphasize expressive values” (p.10).

Tilly (1997) describes the relationship between the state and economies in several different ways.  First, the state influences the economy through political activities (i.e., war), creating administrative structures, infrastructural investment, and regulating, to varying degrees, exchanges, commitments and other relations among economic actors.  Most historians have claimed that the relationship between the state and the economy is that autocratic empires typically coincide with landlord- dominated but peasant-based agrarian economies, and urbanized trading economies typically support thinner oligarchic states.  Tilly examines Europe over the last 1000 years, using a comparison of organized capital versus organized coercion.  In this comparison, states range from “regions of sparse capital and abundant coercive means” at one end, to “regions featuring extensive concentrations of capital along with great fragmentation of coercive means” at the other end.  States in different parts of the range practiced policies that had much different effects on their economies.  Thus, coercion-intensive states, such as landlord dominated Russia, taxed those who were politically vulnerable rather than those who had wealth or income, and used its army to seize conspicuous unprotected wealth.  On the other hand, capital-intensive states, such as merchant- dominated Venice, obtained money from excise taxes and customs, and purchased its armed forces national or international markets, activities which led to further commercialization of their economies.  England and France, Tilly indicates, were in the middle of this range throughout most of this time period.

Tilly also describes the relationship between the state and the economy in a second way.  The state, aside from it’s other functions, serves as an instrument of exploitation, that is, as a support of owners of production, so that they can extract more from workers than the value workers put into the product.  The state supports exploitation through regulations of the production of goods in ways that favor the owners of the means of production.  Democratic governments mitigate exploitation by producing public goods and by increasing within its state of the numbers of beneficiaries of its system of exploitation.

However, there is as yet no general agreement on the relationship among democracy, capitalism, and economic growth.  For example, some view democracy as an outgrowth of capitalism, while others describe countries experiencing rapid economic growth without moving toward capitalism.  Since there are different views of the past and current relationships, there are consequently different expectations of the future.  Thus, there are different views on how well development of currently mature capitalist economies represent probable paths for newly emerging economies, , how much pre-existing social and cultural organization constrains developing economies, and how much specific historical circumstances constrain development.  As Tilly writes, “The debate continues.”

A good deal of research also looks at the relationship among political and economic freedom, and economic growth.  Farr, Lord and Wolfenbarger (1998), for example, looked at the time series relationship among economic and political freedom, and economic well being (real per capita GDP).  They showed that "past economic freedom is significantly related to the current level of real per capita GDP" (Empirical  results section).  Also, past economic well being predicts current economic freedom.  Thus, they argue, economic well being and economic freedom are bilateral, each contributing to the other.  Their results also showed that past economic well being causes current political freedom.  However, past political freedom did not predict current level of either economic well-being or economic freedom.  Farr et all mention that "results in this paper provide no support for previous studies that suggest that political freedom significantly affects the level of economic well-being" (conclusion section).  But they also mention that perhaps political freedom takes a longer time to have an effect on economic well being than was covered in their data set.

V Data

Just as there is research on a wide range of social, political and economic change areas, there is a great deal of data.  All of the following is available for free over the web.

Population data is often quite varied in timeliness, and data from different sources may have different time frames available.  For example, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific has recent data on some variables.  For example, their sources for data on percent urban are from 1990's data sources, and the  appear to be estimating percent urban for recent years.

Human development data has been released every year since 1990, by the UN has released Human Development Program (UNDP, no date).  In particular, they publish the Human Development Indicator (HDI), a composite measure using life expectancy, adult literacy and schooling, and purchasing power.

Economic data includes GDP, Purchasing Power, and a variety of other measures.  Gwartney and Lawson (2000) describe ratings of countries in terms of economic freedom.  Several data sets describe GDP.  "The Penn World Table displays a set of national accounts economic time series covering many countries. Its expenditure entries are denominated in a common set of prices in a common currency so that real quantity comparisons can be made, both between countries and over time."  (Penn World Tables, date).  GPD data is also available from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC, date).  One of their data sets contains real gross domestic product in constant US dollars, and population, for 65 countries. Maddison's (1989, 1991) economic data covers OECD states, including annual data on GDP, the consumer price index and exports; periodic data for employment patterns, productivity and investment; and some similar data for a number of Asian and Latin American countries.  Maddison's (1991) data, for the western states, often begins at 1870.

Political and economic freedom data There are a number of measures of political and economic freedom.  For example, the Freedom House (2000) publishes ratings of political freedom over time, based on political rights and civil liberties.  An index of economic freedom is published by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal (O’Driscoll, Holmes and  O'Grady, 2002).

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Spencer, Christopher (2001) Global Issues of the Twenty-First Century, United Nations Challenges, AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY.  Section: GLOBAL ISSUES WITH DIRECT RELEVANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS.  United Nations Association in Canada, The National Capital Region Branch.  Retrieved February 12 2002 from http://www.global-challenges.org/002global-issues.html

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I can't find it on the web but a related paper is available here
The theory of human development: A cross-cultural analysis, Welzel, Inglehard and Klingemann,
European Journal of Political Research, Volume 42 Issue 3 Page 341 - May 2003   http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6765.00086/abstract 

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Bibliography last verified  10/4/13
Bibliography last modified 10/4/13

First copywrite November 2001 by Gene Shackman.  Copywrite renewed 2002, by Gene Shackman.  This review may freely be cited and quoted, as long as proper citation is used.  Please do not repost this review anywhere, as we are constantly revising.  Please post a link to this site instead.  If you do post a link, we would appreciate knowing.  Send a note to my email, listed on our about page
Cite as
Why does a society develop the way it does? 2002. Gene Shackman, Ya-Lin Liu and George (Xun) Wang.  Available at https://sites.google.com/site/gsocialchange/socialchangereports/theorysummary

last modified November 2004