#1
Jury Trial
7th Amendment
7th Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in federal court for suits at common law.
Where damages are claimed a jury can't be denied on the damages issue. Where suit involves issues of both law and equity in federal court the legal issues go to the jury first, and then the equity claim goes to the judge. In a California court, the judge hears the equity issues first, and the the jury decides the legal issues.
Since Paul is seeking damages for injury to his land because of Danco's negligent use of explosives, this is a common law action. Paul is entitled to a jury trial for the issue of damages, which is a legal issue.
Paul is requesting $100,000 in damages and injunctive relief to prohibit future blasting, so there are issues of both law and equity. The damages issue is legal and should go to the jury first, and then the court should decide the issue of injunctive relief.
Court erred in denying jury trial on damages.
2. Danco MSJ- Owen
MSJ
No genuine issue of material fact & entitled to judgment as matter of law.
Prior case must be analyzed to make a determination.
Res judicator (claim preclusion)
Valid & final judgment on the merits
Actually litigated
Same parties
Same claim
Majority rule Fed: same T or O
Cal: primary rights theory
Judgment for Danco on prior case was entered after "extensive evidence" of property ownership and concluded no damages were found.
Owen was no a party to the prior suit, was not notified, was not in privity, and his interest was not represented in the prior suit, so res judicator cannot be used.
Here, the same COA and conduct (negligent blasting) and the same piece of land are all involved so it is the same claim.
Court correct in denying MSJ.
Collateral estoppel (CE) (issue preclusion)
Final judgment on merits
actually litigated
issue essential to judgement
Mutuality: party or privy only
modern Cal. rule: party CE used against must be party or privy in prior suit
The trier of fact heard "extensive evidence" and concluded both that Paul had no property interest in Blackacre and that no damage had been sustained.
However, Paul had no property interest in Blackacre, so the damages issue was not essential to the judgment since the judge did not need to make a finding on damages to resolve the case.
Further, Owen was no a party to the prior suit, was not notified and was not in privity, thus his interests were no represented in the prior suit. Since Owen was not a party in the prior case and had no opportunity to be heard, Danco will not be permitted to use the judgment against him using either the traditional or California rule.
Court correct in denying MSJ.
3. Danco MSJ-Paul
MSJ
No genuine issue of material fact and entitled to judgment as matter of law.
Prior case must be analyzed to make determination.
Res judicator (claim preclusion)
valid & final judgment on the merits
Actually litigated
Same parties
Same claim
Majority rule Fed.: same T or O
Cal: primary rights theory
Judgement for Danco on prior case was final and entered after "extensive evidence" of property ownership and concluded no damages were found.
Earlier suit was Paul v. Danco, and so is the current suit.
If a new transaction or occurrence of blasting, court was correct in denying motion.
Here, the case hinges on whether the COA in the prior suit is the same as in the subsequent suit. The COA is for the same conduct (negligent blasting), but to a different piece of property (Whiteacre).
The fact are unclear: If this suit is the result of the same transaction or occurrence of blasting activity as Paul's earlier suit, res judicator would bar the subsequent suit. However, if this suit is the result of different blasting activity), but to a different piece of property (Whiteacre).
The facts are unclear: If this suit is the result of the same transaction or occurrence of blasting activity as Paul's earlier suit, res judicator would bar this subsequent suit. However, if this suit is the result of different blasting activity, the suit would not be barred. It is similarly unclear if the blasting activity invades a single primary right. The nature of the blasting activity will control the outcome.
If a new transaction or occurrence of blasting, court was correct in denying motion.
July 1994 Question 3 [Criminal Law] [Criminal Procedure]
Prosecution v. Doug
1A. Defenses to the Murder Charge
Defense of Others?
One may use force in defense of any other person if she reasonably believed the person assisted had the legal right to use force in his own defense; however, minority view holds no defense if the person protected had no legal right to use force in self-defense.
Self-Defense?
A person may use deadly force in self-defense if she is without fault, is confronted with unlawful force, and is threatened with imminent death or great bodily harm.
Crime Prevention?
Deadly force may be used to prevent dangerous felony involving risk to human life.
Privilege of Arrest by Private Person?
Private person may use deadly force only if the person harmed was actually guilty of the offense for which the arrest was made.
Mistake of Fact?
Because Jane's status as a police officer is an element of the charged offense, Doug would argue his reasonable mistake as to her identity is a defense.
1B. Doug's Criminal Liability
Homicide
Common Law Murder
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, which is evidenced by: intent to kill, intent to inflict great bodily injury, reckless indifference to an unjustifiably high risk to human life, and intent to commit a felony.
Deadly Weapon Rule
Intentional use of a deadly weapon permits inference of intent to kill.
Frist Degree Murder?
Deliberate and premeditated killing
Second Degree Murder?
Residual category for unjustified killings not of the first degree.
Voluntary Manslaughter?
Intentional killing with adequate provocation or imperfect self-defense.
Involuntary Manslaughter?
Unintentional killing.
2. Prosecutor's Use of Peremptory Challenges During Jury Selection
Exclusion of Potential Jurors based on Race?
Exclusion of Potential Jurors based on jurors opposition to the death penalty?
3. Doug's Rights under Eighth Amendment
Cruel and Unusual Punishment?
The death penalty is not inherently cruel and unusual punishment, but the Eighth Amendment requires that it be imposed only under a statutory scheme that gives the jury reasonable discretion, full information concerning the defendant, and guidance in making the decision; statute that makes the death penalty mandatory upon conviction of first degree murder of a police officer is unconstitutional.
I. Doug's defenses to homicide
A. Self-defense
Self-defense is the use of reasonable force to protect oneself at a reasonable time. Deadly force may only be used to protect against the use of deadly force. Doug will argue that he was engaged in self-defense when he shot Jane. However, Jane was no longer a threat when Doug disarmed her so he is not entitled to self-defense.
B. Defense of others
A defendant may have a valid defense if he acts with reasonable force, with a reasonable belief that such force is necessary for self-defense or the defense of another. Here, Dough disarmed Jane and she was no longer a threat to Al but Doug nonetheless shot and killed Jane with deadly force.
C. Doug's criminal liability
1. First degree murder of a peace officer in the performance of her duties
Here, Jane was wearing civilian clothes and never indicated that she was a peace officer. Since she was killed in a poorly lit alley and Doug acting spontaneously in reaction to what he mistakenly thought as an armed robbery by Al, he did not premeditate before killing Jane.
2. Homicide liability: common law murder and manslaughter
He's probably be charged with manslaughter or common law murder.
II. The prosecution's conduct during jury selection
A. 14th Amendment
The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment guarantees the right to be tried by a jury pool that is not tainted by racial discrimination. Doug will win right to a new trial if the prosecution cannot present a race-neutral explanation of these peremptory challenges. Over Doug's repeated objections during jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to remove all African-Americans and death penalty opponent from the jury.
1) Exclude death penalty opponents
The prosecutor may use peremptory challenges to exclude death penalty opponents from the jury. His right to a fair and impartial jury is not compromised by the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges.
2) Mandatory death penalty statutes violate the 8th Amendment
Doug has been convicted of the murder of Jane under a statute which mandates imposition of the death penalty for first degree murder of a peace officer who is in the performance of her duties.
A. The 8th Amendment
The 8th Amendment protects those convicted of crimes from cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court has found it cruel and unusual to mandate death sentences without allowing the sentencing authority to consider the aggravating and mitigating factors in each case. Even though Doug's defense of others and self-defense efforts at justifying his killing of Jane are likely to fail, they could be considered mitigating factors that would justify sparing his life.
This case involves the sale of goods, which is which the purview of the UCC. Questions regarding the impact of incorporation would be governed by the state statute for the state in question concerning incorporations.
Finance Co. (F) v. Al
(A). Under state incorporation law, filing of Articles of Incorporation setting forth the statutorily required data including names of incorporators and capital shares
Al liable as promoter on pre-incorporation contract
When Al entered into the contract with Retailer, he was acting as a promoter on behalf of Paintco, a corporation which had no yet been formed. A promoter remains liable on pre- incorporation contracts, even if the corporation is formed and later adopts the contract, as Paintco did here. A promoter is relieved of liability on the pre-incorporation contract only if the contract expressly provides this (which the facts do not indicate it did) or if there is a novation, i.e., a new contract between Paintco and Retailer and Al which expressly relieves Al of liability under the new contract.
AL’s liability for cost of paint
Prior to incorporation, when a promoter incurs debts in the name of a corporation to be formed, these debts may be collected against the promoter individually. This remains true even after the corporation by resolution of its board of directors formally adopts the debt as its own, following organization and completion of the requisite filing. Here, Al signed the contract in question as President of a corporation to be formed. This put Retailer (R) on notice that Paintco (P) the putative contracting party was not yet in existence and that Al, with whom R had a preexisting relationship, would be liable. Later when P adopted the contract, it agreed to become liable for the debt created by the contract. This act obligates P, but does not absolve A from his personal liability on the contract. This is due to the fact that at the time the contract was entered into, P had not been formally established, R knew of it and so there could have been no reliance upon credit worthiness of P by R. Instead, on these facts it is certain that R relied upon A individually for the contract payment. This avoids any argument by A that R was really relying upon P for payment. Such arguments, not applicable here on these facts, are known as incorporation by estoppel.
Accordingly, Al will be liable to the extent that the contract entered into was valid and required his payment to be made as a result of performance by R. These issues, and the validity of an attempted modification and assignment are discussed below, under the liability of Paintco, but each such issue and analysis is applicable to Al as well, such that Al will have liability to F to the extent that P has liability to F, all as discussed below.
P’s Liability to F
As noted, P's board of directors adopted the contract, and accordingly P will have liability for the contract duties. Valid Contract. To be valid a contract requires mutual assent and consideration. Mutual consent consists of an offer (promise communicated to identified offeree which is definite and certain) and an acceptance (unequivocal statement by the identified offeree
Validity of Tess' 2010 Will
Formal Will?
The California Probate Code requires that a formal will must be in writing, signed by the testator (or by someone at the testator's direction), and signed by two persons as witnesses. The will must be signed by at least two persons each of whom are present at the same time. Both witnesses must also witness the signing of the will and understand that the instrument they signed is the testator's will.
Joint Presence of Witness?
under California law, the signing by the testator must occur in the joint presence of the witness. The 2010 will is thus invalid, as it was signed in the presence of only one of the two witnesses and Ness did not understand that the document was a will.