It is therefore not surprising that a scholar such as Allamah Hilli (1250-1325 CE) wrote, “So, it is a price (for) the vulva and it is assigned to the woman in the contract.” (Hilli 1901:p. 140) What else could a sane man believe when in all the examples of marriage he saw around him people were still performing the roles ascribed to them by Roman law? Just as Christian writers had rationalised the conflict between the concept of universal justice and the actual condition of women, Islamic writers gave two natures to women. They were given a lower and more emotional nature than men that fitted them to their observed social role in tandem with a spiritual existence that would be rewarded as if they were men. A statement reported from Imām Mūsā ibn Ja’far in al-Kāfī is typical of those used to support this view, “Woman’s jihād is her nice behaviour towards her husband.” (quoted in Ṭabāṭabā’ī 1992;v8, p. 219)

Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s view that, “She (the wife) is duty bound to obey him in his presence and protect his interests in his absence, and any right of hers which stands in the way of his rights will cease to exist.” and the arguments that he supports it with could have as easily relied upon St Augustine, (354-430 CE):

The legal opinions of Matthew Hale, C.J., (1609-1676 CE) that held sway in English law for so long, display the remarkable similarity in the historical attitude to women of Christianity and Islam yet also expose a significant difference in the legal approach of Muslims and Christians:

From which it may be concluded that the wife is made subservient to her husband’s will, not by a payment but by her inability to withdraw from the marital agreement. In believing that women had no right to withdraw their consent Hale was merely expressing the orthodoxy of Christian opinion. This had been developed from scriptural sources by, among others, the former Roman magistrate Augustine of Hippo, “Thus between the conjugal pair, as long as they live, the nuptial bond has a permanent obligation, and can be cancelled neither by separation nor by union with another.” (Augustine, St )

The questions that should be considered are, do the parties to any form of marriage consent to the agreement freely and do they have the right of revocation if the contractual duties are abhorrent to them? It is a condition of nikāh that both parties enter the agreement freely and if married men and women have access to divorce then their fundamental freedoms and rights over their own bodies remain intact. The husband in an Islamic marriage has according to the shari’ah the unrestricted right to initiate divorce (ṭalāq) and a wife has access to divorce by request, purchase (khul’) from the husband or by seeking judicial intervention if a husband unreasonably refuses to agree to divorce. (Sistānī 1994) The ease with which either party may obtain a divorce is limited by local and regional customary practice and not by the shari’ah but neither party should be said to own the other, by a purchase analogous to that of a slave permanently and irrevocably.

Today we are able to return to the primary texts, the Qur’an and Hadith, and read them as they were intended, for all humanity. The starting point for the contemporary discussion of mahr must be that most people, whatever their culture or religion, desire to be married. From this position it would seem that our ethical and moral duty, as a society and as individuals who may be involved with the implementation of marital law or the blessing of intimate relationships, is to take all reasonable steps towards ensuring that the reasonable expectations or those reasonable expectations that are generally held by people contemplating or entering into any form of marriage are fulfilled. Consequently, we must exclude from our consideration ideas that claim all wives are slaves and that, “Freedom for women cannot be won without the abolition of marriage.” (Cronan 1970) In reality these are gender issues and have no more relevance to a nikāh with a bridal gift than to any other form of marriage or intimate relationship.

1 Defining the purpose of mahr

The right in Islam for a wife to receive mahr and to dispose of it as she pleases is a Qur’anic injunction:

In Islam many newly wed couples are comparative strangers to each other unlike the relationships established before marriage in the vast majority of marriages of Christians from Western or Roman churches. Therefore, the process of negotiating and giving a gift to the bride, and her remittal of part or the whole of the gift offered may be considered to be an act of reciprocal altruism or the first step in the process of developing their partnership from an assumed platonic social relationship into an intimate personal partnership. The mahr given by the groom to his bride during an Islamic wedding can be interpreted as the transfer of the ownership and title to a sum of money or property to publicly confirm his recognition of her new role in the family and society. This gift, viewed in this way, is in essence an act of empowerment and recognition of the woman’s increased social capacity that establishes her right to act more independently than an un-married woman. This recognition is not in principle affected by the value of the gift except that it can only be proven to be an actual recognition of rights when she has possession of the gift and by the degree of freedom of control she exercises over it.

Upon the death of a wife her mahr, whether it has been paid to her or not, becomes the property of her heirs and they may claim its payment from her husband. If the husband dies before her she may claim it from his estate before it is divided amongst the inheritors or claim it from his heirs if it has been mixed with the deceased’s estate for any reason. As-Ṣadūq (d. 991 CE) writes, “…Whatever is promised to the woman as ṣadāq is a loan (by the wife) to the man, thus it is obligatory for the man to pay it to her during his life or after his death or after her death.” (al-Sadūq 1996:288)

2 The shari’ah guidance upon the value of mahr

Although the mahr is an obligatory and essential element of the ‘aqd al-Nikāh the shari’ah does not set a maximum value upon the gift but its minimum value is specified as teaching the bride the verses of the Qur’an known to the groom. This value is derived from the hadith that describe a woman asking the Prophet (saw) if she could be married. The Prophet asked the men sitting with him if any of them wished to marry the woman and one man said that he would but when the Prophet asked if he had anything to give to the woman he explained that neither he nor his family had anything that they could give to her as a bridal gift. The Prophet asked what he knew of the Qur’an and to him to teach that to the woman as her gift. (Bukhari 1985:7.62.24) Versions of this hadith also appear in Muslim, al-Muwatta’, with different isnāds in Taḍīb al-Aḥkām, (Ṭūsī 1981) Man Lā Yaḥḍar al-Faqīh, (Sadūq 1996) al-Kāfī (Kulaynī 1996) and with a further isnād in Jami’ah al-Saḥih. Some schools of Islamic law do recommend minimum cash values below which the mahr is considered as “disliked” but these are on the whole very low sums although it may be of interest to consider on what basis one of these values was calculated. “I do not think that women should be married for less than a quarter of a dinar. That is the lowest amount for which cutting off the hand is obliged.” (Mālik 1980:3.11) This analogous use of amputation, adopted with differing resultant sums by Mālik and Abū Hanīfa, was criticised by Ibn Rushd (d. 1198 CE) for its weakness and its use in opposition to sound hadith. (Ibn Rushd 1996).

The strength of the hadith specifying that there is no minimum value for mahr has not prevented an acceptable sum being established from the usual practice of the Prophet. Mahr al-sunnah as it is termed, is a recommended value set at not more than 500 dirhams. This sum of money is recommended because it is explicitly mentioned in several similar hadith that have been transmitted from different primary narrators and verified by scholars of both the Sunni and Shi’a schools. The following hadith is one of the versions found in Saḥih al-Muslim:

Spectorsky draws attention to hadith which indicate values of 480 and 400 dirhams for mahr al-sunnah:

She does not give any consideration to the changing value of the dirham during the period of the reporting and collecting of hadith. Certainly the number of dirhams per ūqīyah would have been lower in the time of the Prophet when the heavier Sassanian coinage was in general use than the number of coins for the given weight at the end of the first century AH. (Miles 1991) Certainly, the generally accepted figure of 500 dirhams is confirmed by the modality of Shi’ite narrations similar to this statement reported from Imām al-Ṣādiq, “the sunnah of those who follow Muhammad (saw) is five hundred dirhams and those who give more are acting against the sunnah.”(‘Ameli 1990) Abwāb al-Mahr, Hadīth 14) One conclusion from this and the foregoing hadith is that mahr naturally divides into two overall categories. A gift that is within a value range up to 500 dirhams can be said to be sunnah compliant while gifts that exceed that range may be said to be non-compliant and, perhaps, increasingly so as the value of the gift increases. However, large gifts cannot be considered to be impermissible as presented in the argument of al-Shahīd al-Thānī in Sharḥ al-Lum’ah al-Dimishq that if Allāh forbids men to take back a large sum of money from a divorced wife then the original gift was permissible, “In the words of the Omnipresent, ‘and you have given them a qintar (a talent of precious metal, usually gold)’, (Qur’an 4: 20) and it is a very large sum of money.” (Amīni and Āyātī 1998)

Although the contract of marriage is valid without the payment of the mahr the bride is not obliged to consent to the consummation of the marriage until it is paid. (Sistānī 1994:p 447) Its payment is a religious obligation upon the man, and the importance of honouring such obligations for Muslims is an article of faith, for according to the Qur’an one of the attributes described for a believer is, “Those who faithfully observe their trusts and their covenants.” (Qur’an: 23:8)

If there is a divorce following a nikāh contracted without a mahr or with one that was poorly defined or was of an impermissible type, a qaḍī (judge) will impose an obligation for the man to pay mahr al-mithl a sum calculated from but not exceeding the mahr al-sunnah in the opinion of Shi’a jurists. Other Islamic schools may award a sum calculated using other criteria such as that adopted by the Shafi’i scholar Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri (d.1368) and the comment of ‘Umar Barakat (d.1890):

By custom the actual payment of the gift, or part of it, may be deferred, although there were, “objections raised against this practice by several contemporary jurists, including Mālik b Anas.” (Rapoport 2000) In practice it has been found at divorce that if the whole mahr has been paid close to the time of the nikāh most men will relinquish all claim for repayment of it whatever the cause of the marital failure. The opposite is true when the mahr is still an outstanding debt.

3 Arriving at a Sum to be Offered to the Bride

Having briefly established the purpose and religious importance of mahr some consideration may be given to the factors that influence the value of the gift offered. In assessing a customarily acceptable value for the mahr the following criteria should be addressed:

1. The status of the bride and her female relatives-this will include considerations such as the bride’s virginity, her family’s wealth and the mahrs received by her close female relatives.
2. That the parties to the agreement are cognisant of its terms and enter into it freely.
3. That all parties find the agreed sum satisfactory.

A mahr that is of a customarily acceptable value may not be desirable or reasonable and further to the points above the social and legal consequences of the agreed gift that might be considered are:

1. The effect of the amount given on other marriage agreements, which become apparent when large payments act as a source of pressure for other brides not to settle for less or to demand more. An example of this is the case of an English Muslim, Mr Y when he offered his bride a mahr including the house he owned and his total income for the first year of marriage. This was in cash value a sum that then exceeded £200,000.00 and at the property values of 2005 a figure of over £400,000.00 is not improbable. Despite the prolonged opposition to the sum offered by the Islamic scholars present Mr Y insisted upon paying the sum offered encouraged by his future mother in-law saying, “She would get this at home.” A middle-eastern country where the payment would be deferred.

2. Avoiding the sums involved becoming an impediment to the marriage or other marriages-the customary amounts paid have caused major changes in marital practices for some societies. A different approach was taken by the Egyptian government, in the new personal status law of January 2000 that recognised a cheaper marriage alternative,

Finally the law recognises ‛urfi marriages. ‛Urf is actually a category of law derived from customary practice and tribal law which has, in certain cases been employed as an acceptable source of shari‛ah. However such marriages were not previously considered to be as legitimate as were registered nikah (the "normal" category of the marriage contract) marriages. ‛Urfi marriage is to date, an Egyptian phenomenon. Many young Egyptians, reportedly often including university students, resort to 'urfi marriages because "regular" marriage is beyond their financial means, costing more than six years' wages for many young Egyptian men. The funds include payment of the dowry gifts, formal engagement and wedding parties, purchase of an apartment and major appliances and furniture. If not for this alternative, young people would have to postpone marriage for many years and in the meantime are not, according to local custom and Islamic law, supposed to have sexual relations. Although many have engaged in ‛urfi marriages, the courts had previously refused to consider the legal issues such couples might encounter if they seek to divorce or have children. (Zuhur, S. )

In the Emirates governments have tried various strategies to stop their men going abroad to find wives in societies where mahrs have, to date, been lower. An effect of this that was of more concern to the authorities in the Emirates was the large number of their female population who remained unmarried.

People might think, hey why are they spending so much on these people?" says Marriage Fund President Jamal al-Bah. "But it does make sense: our Emirati men end up marrying foreigners because it's cheaper and Emirati women who are not allowed to marry out of their religion and culture are forced to become spinsters because there are no men left to marry them. (Beatie, M. 1999)

1. The gift may not be socially or legally acceptable and as such it may be found that payment cannot be enforced. Establishing a definition of what is or is not an acceptable mahr and what methods of control and enforcement may be applied are issues for legislators and governments in Islamic and non-Islamic states. Arriving at such a definition will allow the possibility of the payment of mahr acquiring a genuine legal status in non-Islamic countries to become a reality and indicate a reasonable value for payments.
2. The ability of the groom to pay the agreed amount- In some countries there are legal provisions that consider this after a divorce has occurred but the Qur’an uses the phrase bi amwālikum which can be translated to mean what wealth the groom has at the time of the reading of the marriage contract or might reasonably expect to have shortly thereafter. (Q )
3. Is there is a real intention to transfer the actual sum agreed? This is not necessarily related to the size of the marital gift or to the groom’s ability to pay as will be described in the case studies. The deliberate non-payment of the mahr is considered to be a very serious act of criminality according to the statement of Imām Abū ‘Abdillah. “Thieves are of three types, those who withhold zakāt, obstruct the payment of mahr and similarly those who take a loan with the intention of never repaying it.”(Majlisi, B. :96;12)

4 Categorising mahr by size and consequences

The categorisation of mahr is a necessary and convenient step to take before considering if there is a need for measures of control rather than assuming that market forces will regulate its value. (Botticini and Siow 2002) Also the need for legislation, and the existence of the problems, must be established as real in terms of ethics, law and social consequences. Amongst the questions that should be asked when considering categorising mahr are:

a) What is its desired or actual effect on society with regard to marriage and social cohesion?

b) What is its effect upon the individual with regard to affordability and satisfaction?

c) Will the effects be, on balance, in conformity with the general concepts of Islamic social ethics and personal behaviour?

d) Who are the people that derive satisfaction, benefit or harm from the agreed sum?

4,1 The Socially Aggressive Mahr.

The mahr can be used for socio-political motives as seen in the account of the wedding of the Caliph al-Ma’mūn (786-833 CE) to Būrān bint al-Hasan ibn Sahl. (al-Tabari 1987:XXXII) In such situations it is used as a means to display the power and wealth that a person, family or group has in order to establish social divisions by intimidation. In the case of al-Ma‛mūn his display of wealth, that included scattering 1000 matched pearls over his bride to be, left no doubt as to who was the ruler and who were the ruled. Al-Ma’mūn on the eve of the wedding also compelled his father in law to drink wine as a further display of his Caliphal power.

Where mahrs are agreed for the purpose of extravagance or as a way of creating or maintaining class divisions they need to be excluded from the calculation of the typical mahr in a given society. They are distortions of an Islamic practice and are in principle contrary to Islamic ethics.

4,2 The Socially Strategic Mahr

In an attempt to be associated with those who are endowed with the means to deploy socially aggressive mahrs individuals and families will emulate the excessive mahrs of the “elite”. That is an attempt to defend the self-perception of their status and leads them to demand that un-reasonable sums be agreed for mahr. The details of the agreed sums may be flaunted publicly contrary to the behaviour expected of Muslims, “And swell not thy cheek (for pride) at men, nor walk in insolence through the earth; for Allah loveth not any arrogant boaster.” (Qur’an 31:18)

The Caliph, ‘Uthmān ibn Affan (c. 574-656) spent between 30,000 and 100,000 dirhams on each of his free-woman brides in order to advance his position in society and as Madelung observed: “The pattern of marriages of ‛Uthmān and of his daughters clearly reflect his desire, especially when he was older, to strengthen his ties with the old-established Meccan aristocracy.” (Madelung, W. 2000:Ex 3;369)

The people who employ this strategy or its like may not be seen to be separate from the majority of the population and so their mahrs have a strong an effect on what is perceived as the normal amount to be agreed upon as mahr. This effect is inflationary and socially divisive to a much greater extent than the aggressive mahr and this is true whether it is intended for the sum declared to be paid or not. The inflationary consequences of high bridal gifts in a wealthy country such as the UK causes similar changes to the sums given in the countries of origin

4,3 The Socially Acceptable Mahr

Where a mahr does not cause derision, envy or encourage excessive sums it can be said to be socially acceptable. This is with the assumption that all agreed mahrs are by definition acceptable to the parties to the agreement. These mahrs will have values within the normally accepted range within a community but will not necessarily take into consideration the real wealth of the groom. It is possible, if not probable, that the majority of mahrs that conform to social norms have the potential to cause great hardship.

A case that illustrates this type of mahr is that of Mr and Mrs I who had married by nikāh for a deferred mahr of 50,000,000 Rials and 14 gold coins, a sum that is not untypical in their country of origin. Having mutually agreed to divorce Mrs I released her husband from the obligation of paying the deferred mahr. When asked why he had promised such an enormous sum, that a man with his income had little hope of ever possessing he replied, “We all promise things when we want to get married.”

4,4 The Socially Constructive Mahr

Where the parties to a marriage might settle for a mahr of high value but decide for reasons of mutual or public interest to proceed upon an amount that is within the range of commonly accepted mahrs they can be said to be socially constructive. They set an example of mutual consideration for all to see. In cases where couples of average status settle for less than the norm their decision may have a great impact towards reducing the expectations of others and can cause a reduction in the sum that might be expected by brides and their families.

The payment of mahr has been considered, by some scholars, to be an act of worship akin to prayer and as such there is an obligation that it should be adequately performed but devoid of show or any competitive purpose. In addition to the theological arguments the hadith quoted earlier, “Thieves are of three types, those who withhold zakāt, obstruct the payment of mahr and similarly taking a loan with the intention of never repaying it.” is an example of the religious value of repaying debts and that the payment of mahr and zakāt (social fund) are to some extent considered to be similar obligations. However, the first three categories exhibit characteristics more akin to business transactions than to acts of faith and it may be said that they are ‘sunnah non-compliant’ according to the definition given earlier. The fourth category, the ‘Socially Constructive’ is in intent and execution a ‘sunnah compliant’ act within the framework of a transaction. This to some extent resolves the ancient question of whether mahr is an act of worship or an element in a transaction by proposing it is dealt with as either an act of worship moderated by contractual obligations or as part of a transaction moderated by faith.

7 Regulation of mahr by government

Having presented evidence that there are social, legal and economic problems associated with the values agreed for mahral gifts that fall into the three categories of ‘sunnah non-compliance’ an ethical question should be addressed, particularly by Muslims. By what right do we initiate further legislation and change to what may be seen as a private transaction? If it is accepted that marriage is intended for the good of the individual and society then anything that acts against marriage acts against society and society has grounds upon which to act. An Islamic justification for the permissibility of regulation can also be made on the grounds of public interest and this can be specifically supported in regard to mahr with the phrase “huwa mā tarāḍa alayh an-nās” or what satisfies the people, (Ṭūsī 1981) that is commonly used by Kulayni and Ṭūsi in the narrations they report defining mahr or al-ṣadāq as an alternative to the mahr al-sunnah. Al-nās is not given any restriction and so it may apply to the bride and groom, near relatives or be extended to anyone who is affected by the sum agreed. Thus regulation would seem to be justified when the primary purpose for regulating the size of mahral payments is to maximise their positive social effects and avoid them becoming an obstacle to marriage.

The history of attempts to regulate mahral payments begin it is said when the Caliph ‛Umar (c. 581-644) tried to fix a maximum amount to stop the large sums being given as mahr preventing poorer Arab men from marrying during his rule. He was forced to abandon the attempt when a woman objected with the words, “You shall not deprive us of what God gave us.” Although the accuracy and authenticity of this report are questionable there is, by its frequent use in discussions upon the issue of mahral values, a strong indication of an early and lasting concern about them and their affect in limiting the number of available marriage partners. This concern can also be inferred to have existed in the first century AH by the number of hadith that refer to 500 dirhams and in the second and third centuries AH by the frequency with which the Shi’ite Imams and early Sunni scholars responded to the question of what should be given with the answer “mahr al-sunnah”.

In the twentieth century attempts to limit the size of mahral payments by legislation met with as little success. In Afghanistan in 1924 and 1978 limits were imposed but failed to gain popular support because women felt they were being devalued, and Turkey with the adoption of Swiss Family Law tried to outlaw mahr altogether but the practice still continues. (see, Stirling 1965) The issue in Turkey was the secularisation of the state while in Afghanistan bridal gifts were seen as an impediment to national and educational development because the high mahrs forced men to work from 5 to 10 years in order to obtain a bride. (Afghanistan Country Study, Illinois Institute of Technology, Paul V. Galvin Library.)

Countries with large religious minorities, such as Malaysia and India, have made provision for variations in family law for different faiths. India has the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 3), among other provisions to include shari’ah laws within the secular law of the nation. This act recognises mahr and allows a magistrate to order its payment, “or, as the case may be, for the payment of such mahr or dower or the delivery of such properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) to the divorced woman:” An Indian magistrate may also reduce the sum offered or order its payment by instalments after assessing the man’s wealth and income.

Subsidies, offered by some governments to assist bridegrooms, have undoubtedly assisted some men and women to marry and it is a practice that has many Islamic precedents. Among the examples of this is the story told by Imām Ja‛far al-Sādiq of a man coming to his father, Imām al-Bāqir, who asked the man if he had a wife. The man said, “No.” His father then said he would not like to own the world and all it holds if he had to sleep one night without a wife. He then told the man that two rakāt (units) of prayer by a married man had more merit than if a bachelor prayed all night and fasted all day. He (as) then gave the man seven dinars and told him to marry with it. (Majlisi, B. :103;217)

However, subsidy may be limited in its effect upon society because it has little or no direct effect on the overall size of the obligatory gifts or to the financial consequences for men who do not qualify to receive any assistance. The subsidies offered in the Emirates present an opportunity for them to be studied after there has been sufficient time for the long-term effects to be observable and it would seem prudent that the results of such studies have been digested before any judgement is passed upon them.

8 The current status of mahr in law (England and Wales)

As stated in the opening paragraph the parties to a nikāh can derive some recognition at law by being considered to have formed common law marriage but in England and Wales:

Thus, the often referred to case of Shanaz v Rizwan was dealt with as a marriage contracted according to “foreign law” and the mahr was awarded to the wife under the provisions of Indian Law. (QBD 1965:390) Mahr has never been accepted in English courts of law as a “notorious fact”. Justice Winn in his summation of Shanaz v Rizwan at appeal wrote,

As McLean says, “English courts take judicial notice of the law of England and of notorious facts, but not of foreign law.” (McClean 1994:36) It would, however, require further adaptations of current Muslim marriage formalities to increase the possibility that brides and ex-wives might enforce their right to receive any deferred payments in the future. These adaptations would include arriving at a specified value range for marital gifts that would be regarded by courts as being acceptable for legal action to be pursued and specifying that the mahr is a gift within the marriage so that claims for its payment might proceed under the provisions of the Married Women’s Property Act of 1882, section 17, in the United Kingdom. (Black, J., J. Bridge and T. Bond 1998:508) This need to establish the time and date of the marital gift is less critical if a Civil Marriage ceremony has been solemnized before the reading of the ‘aqd al-Nikāḥ. Where the civil ceremony precedes the aqd the gift of the mahr is de facto within the legally recognised marriage but to date this has not been tested at trial.

There are also lessons to be learned from experiences in U.S. courts where in some cases the payment of mahr has been enforced but has often been confused with the Jewish get or simply been misunderstood:

“In the Islamic empire, the humanitarian tendency of the Qur'an and the early caliphs was to some extent counteracted by other influences. Notable among these was the practice of the various conquered peoples and countries which the Muslims encountered after their expansion, especially in provinces previously under Roman law. This law, even in its Christianized form, was still very harsh in its treatment of slaves.” (Lewis 1994)

“Nor can it be doubted, that it is more consonant with the order of nature that men should bear rule over women, than women over men. It is with this principle in view that the apostle says, "The head of the woman is the man;" and, "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands." So also the Apostle Peter writes: "Even as Sara obeyed Abraham, calling him lord."” (Augustine, St )

“The husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract, the wife hath given herself in kind unto the husband, which she cannot retract.” (Hale, M. 1736)

“And give unto the women (whom ye marry) free gift of their marriage portions; but if they of their own accord remit unto you a part thereof, then ye are welcome to absorb it (in your wealth).” (Qur’an 4;4)

Abū Salama b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān reported: I asked Ā’isha, the wife of Allah’s Messenger (saw): How much was the ṣadāq (mahr) of Allah’s Messenger? She said: It was twelve ūqiyya (ounces) and one nash. She said: Do you know what a nash is? I said: No. She said: It is half of an ūqiyya, so that is five hundred dirhams, and that was the ṣadāq that Allah’s Messenger married with. (Muslim 1990: opposite p. 357)

Ibn S’ad has a chapter on the dowers of the Prophets’s wives, which contains eight traditions. Half report 500 dirhams as the amount that both the Prophet’s wives and his daughters received; the other half report 480 dirhams.” (Spectorsky, S. 1993:18)

The bride possesses the marriage payment when it has been expressly stipulated (in the marriage agreement, whether validly stipulated or invalidly. If valid, she owns the amount stipulated, while if invalid, she owns the amount typically received as marriage payment by similar brides.) (al-Misri 1991, p.532)

Jamīl ibn Darāja said, ‘I asked Abū Abdullāh, peace upon him, about the ṣadāq. To which he replied; It is what the people (al-Nās) agree to or twelve ūqīyah and a nash or five hundred dirhams. He then said; An ūqīyah is forty dirhams and a nash is twenty dirhams.’ (Ṭūsī 1981:7;354)

“Compared to traditional Bangladesh, the only major difference in this scenario is that the bargaining is over pounds or dollars now, rather than takas, and that there is a significant inflationary effect in Bangladesh itself, since the many Bangladeshi overseas migrants have driven upwards all rates of everything to do with marriage.” (Menski, W. F. 2002)

All marriages which take place in the United Kingdom must, in order to be recognised as valid, be monogamous and must be carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Marriage Act 1949, as amended by the Marriage Acts of 1970, 1983 and 1994, the Marriage Regulations of 1986 and other related Acts (eg; the Children Act 1989). (Immigration Directorates Instructions 2003).

the right to dower, once it has accrued as payable, is a right in action, enforceable by a civil action without taking specifically matrimonial proceedings, regarded by Mohammedan law as a proprietary right assignable under section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, of the Indian Code, (Winn 1964)