Unit History II

On 31 July 1966 the 36th Transportation Battalion arrived at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. The 36th, 39th and 57th Truck Battalions, all of which arrived in 1966, fell under the command of the 500th Transportation Group (Motor Transport), which also arrived in October 1966. All logistics units fell under the control of the Cam Ranh Bay Support Command.

During the time the Battalion assumed command of the 442nd Medium Truck, which had arrived in 1966, the 566th Light Truck, which had arrived in 1965. The 529th Light Truck and 670th Medium Truck arrived in 1967. All the medium companies operated the M52 series tractors and a platoon of the 670th Company had refrigerator trucks. The 36th Battalion’s main responsibility was to conduct direct haul to the base camps in the First Field Force in the II Corps Tactical Zone. The other truck battalion, the 24th, only conducted port clearance to the nearby supply depot. Its trucks ran day and night while the 36th Battalion trucks only drove during the day.

Short haul routes were one-day round trips from Cam Ranh Bay to locations along Highway 1 such as north to Nha Trang and Ninh Hoa and south to Phan Rang. Long hauls went north and turned west on Highway 21 to Ban Me Thout, or straight west from Cam Ranh Bay along Highway 11 to Da Lat and Bao Loc. On a long haul, the convoy would drive up one day and return the next. The battalion route later included a long haul south along the coastal highway to Phan Thiet. As many as 90 to 180 vehicles of all types – cargo, tanker, and reefers – lined up for a convoy each morning in serials of 25 to 40 vehicles. The drivers put in long days. The trucks began lining up for convoys at about three o’clock every morning and would go through inspection before they left the gate. Depending on where the convoy was going, the truck driver’s day would not end till well into the night. Running on an average of four hours sleep a night caused a few drivers to fall asleep and drive off the side of the road. Accidents were relatively low compared to the number of miles being driven, but with the large number of trucks on the road at any day, the number of accidents seemed high.

Just as the men, the trucks also had very little rest. Convoys ran daily so the only time the trucks could be worked on was at night. The M52s were driven well past their life expectancy.

On 2 September 1967, a company of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) launched an ambush in the Qui Nhon area that destroyed 27 trucks and killed or wounded most of the drivers. Up until that time, enemy ambushes had only fired on single trucks in a convoy. 8th Group in Qui Nhon began to convert 5-ton trucks into gun platforms with armor plating to escort the convoys. As the company sized ambushes spread into the Cam Ranh Bay area, trucks of the 500th Group likewise built guntrucks. The hardened convoy and helicopters flying support increased the cost to the enemy thereby reducing the frequency of ambushes.

In response to the Tet Offensive, which began on 31 January 1968, the US Army began to send more units to Vietnam. The 172nd Medium Truck Company was a Reserve unit activated from Omaha, Nebraska, activated for service in Vietnam. It arrived 11 October 1968. Because the men had worked together for years, the company had high morale and the best maintenance shop in the battalion. After the previous company commander rotated back to the United States, First Lieutenant Thomas Bruner, assumed command. He went on to make brigadier general in the US Army Reserves.

In late April 1969, a convoy from the 36th Battalion was bound for the 2/1 Cavalry base camp at Phan Rang south along the coastal highway (QL1). This was a short run that only took half a day to reach the destination and then return by the end of the day. The convoys ran with 70 to 80 trucks with three to five gun trucks. They usually had an MP gun jeep or V-100 armored car in the lead and gun trucks spaced evenly throughout the convoy with one in the trail party. The line up consisted of the MP gun jeep, the convoy commander’s gun jeep, Rick “Snuffy” Smith’s gun jeep, then the cargo trucks.

Route 1 or QL 1 ran north and south along the flat coastal plane. The “Coconut Grove,” was about halfway between Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang to the south. The “Coconut Grove” was a rubber plantation on the west side of the road and open field on the east with elephant grass. Smith claimed that a million monkeys must have lived in the grove and swarmed the trucks whenever they passed. That is why they called it the “Coconut Grove.” The coastal highway was a heavily trafficked highway by both military and civilian traffic. For this reason, no one ever expected to get hit along this route. The drivers did not even wear their flak vests.

When the convoy reached the “Coconut Grove,” the enemy initiated the ambush with small arms fire on the lead and middle vehicles creating two kill zones. The APC gun truck, “USA,” and one gun jeep were caught off guard. There was one gun truck and one gun jeep for every 30 vehicles. The vehicles were typically bunched up with no more than 20 feet between vehicles. The lead kill zone caught 16-20 vehicles. Gun trucks did their normal routine. Rick Smith fired his M79 grenade launcher from the hip as fast as could. The enemy fired a few mortars but missed. They overshot. The fire fight lasted about 15 minutes.

No one in the convoy was killed or wounded but a number of vehicles were shot up. Most of them had flat tires. All were able to drive to their destination. The thing that Rick Smith learned was to never take his eyes off Coconut Grove again.

In July 1969, LTC Edward Honor assumed command of the 36th Battalion from LTC Paul Reese. LTC Reese told LTC Honor that “Whatever you do, don’t run our convoys out there without air support.” If a convoy was ambushed, the gun trucks would provide enough fire support until the reaction force showed up to drive back the attacking force. The only convoy ambushed left without air support on a return trip since air cover prevented helicopters from flying. One driver was killed when his fuel truck was hit by a rocket.

In October of 1969, the 500th Transportation Group, commanded by Colonel Gus Wolman, was inactivated and the 36th Transportation Battalion fell under the 124th Transportation Command, commanded by Colonel Henry Del Mar. Since Colonel Del Mar and Lieutenant Colonel Honor had worked together before, Honor had the confidence to ask his commander for permission to let trucks shut down every third day for maintenance. There was always more cargo needed to be delivered than trucks to haul it. This was a risky venture, but as it turned out, the maintenance improved and Honor was able to put more trucks on the road. Similarly, the extra rest reduced the number of accidents.

In spite of the losses incurred in the Central Highlands by 8th Group convoys, the 500th Group had not lost anyone to an ambush until late 1969, almost two years after the ambushes began along Route 19. The threat level was not nearly as dangerous as it was on Route 19 though enemy attacks on convoys in the southern II Corps Zone began to increase in the summer and fall of 1969. In response, the 36th Battalion began constructing gun trucks. At first they built double wall gun boxes out of lumber with the air gap filled with sandbags. These turned out to be too heavy resulting in poor handling, excessive wear on the tires and continuous brake failures and resulted in the death of one driver. These were replaced with 5/8-inch steel walls.

Ban Me Thout was a routine destination for the 36th Battalion. The terrain between Nha Trang and Ban Me Thout was mountainous jungle with some open areas where the jungle had been cleared or defoliated. The road was so narrow that trucks could not pass. The run to Ban Me Thout took most of the day so the convoys had to RON at the camp and return the next day. The convoys ran with anywhere from 80 to 150 vehicles divided into serials of 20 30 vehicles with a 5 to 10 minute gap between them. An MP with a V-100 armored car usually led each serial followed by a lieutenant or NCO in a gun jeep with radio communications and an M-60 mounted on a pedestal. Each serial had a Gun Truck with an NCO, radio and one 50 Caliber machine gun and two M-60. The Trail Party made up the last serial and included a gun jeep, wrecker, Medic Ambulance, tire truck, 10 to 20 bob tails and gun truck. The number of extra bob tails depended on the size of the convoy. Because of the rapid promotion from second lieutenant to captain in two years, LTC Edward Honor, the 36th Battalion Commander, had a policy that captains had to be the convoy commanders.

Around October or November 1969, CPT Wayne Patrick, Commander of the 442nd Medium Truck Company, was the convoy commander. On a return trip from Ban Me Thout, the convoy was delayed on account of the poor weather conditions and low clouds prevented helicopters from flying. Normally the convoys departed between 0700 to 0800 hours depending on mechanical problems. After line-up for the return trip they waited around an hour or more for the weather to improve. LTC Honor also had a policy that no convoy would run without air cover. It would have been normal procedure to radio Battalion headquarters and inform them of the situation and get approval. Air cover would normally have joined them before they had gone far outside Ban Me Thout. CPT Patrick made the decision to depart without air cover since road security in the mountain pass was considered adequate.

The 101st Airborne Division and ROK Army provided security in the area. The Koreans had a base at the top of the Pass and the ARVN had a training base at the bottom. CPT Patrick had radio contact with security operations when entering there area of operation and there had been no reports of any significant enemy activity. It was not unusual to receive sporadic small arms fire from time to time but no convoy had been ambushed on this route before. Another factor in making the decision to depart was to return to Cam Ranh Bay before dark. It was not unusual to delay departure for various reasons but it was unusual to cancel a return trip.

An MP V-100 armored car and a gun jeep lead the convoy. The convoy had between 80 and 100 vehicles divided into serials. CPT Patrick kept a gun truck at the rear of the first serial another in the trail party and the others space evenly though the middle of the convoy. He often rode either in the rear of the first serial or the middle of the convoy. This day he rode in the middle. This allowed him to drive up and down the convoy to respond better to problems. It also kept him in radio range with the lead and rear of his convoy. As the convoy commander, CPT Patrick’s jeep had three radios to coordinate with air, ground and artillery support.

About two hours after departure, the convoy was halfway down the mountain pass in the area secured by the 101st Airborne Division The mountain rose above them on the north side of the road, to their left, and leveled out into a flat cleared zone to the south (their right) with a tree line around 100 yards away. That section of paved road had multiple curves that caused the trucks to slow down. CPT Patrick heard a boom up ahead followed by the report of contact on the radio.

The enemy in the wood line fired three to five B40 rockets (RPGs) at one of the gun trucks in the middle of the convoy and hit the top corner of the passenger side of gun box. The blast wounded three crew members and cut Don Matthews in half. The lead part of the convoy continued on while the trucks behind stopped. Another gun truck pulled security on the disabled gun truck. The fight lasted five minutes.

CPT Patrick was a quarter to a half a mile behind it and raced up to the rear of the disabled gun truck. He reached the scene a few minutes later. He was on the radio with the 101st. A couple of 101st troops were nearby and were firing on the tree line for another 15 to 20 minutes. In just a few minutes there was a call on his radio from a Cobra Gun Ship, with the call sign “Undertaker.” He reported his position and three Cobras came in and worked the area over for about ten minutes. During that time, a Huey from the101st Airborne Division came in and extracted the wounded. The rest of the convoy continued on. The trail party recovered the disabled gun truck.

The rest of the convoy moved up while the area was secure and the trail party secured the disabled gun truck. The rear half of the convoy regrouped with the lead half at the normal rest stop in a safe area. The convoy returned to Cam Ranh Bay without further incident. This was the only driver of the 36th Battalion killed in action during LTC Honor’s command.

Due to the race riots at Cam Ranh Bay, the commander of Cam Ranh Bay Support Command was relieved in October 1969 and Hank Del Mar took his place. Del Mar was the kind of commander who would turn an organization upside down to improve it. Del Mar wanted to convert the personnel billets of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 36th Transportation Battalion to create a property disposal unit. In December 1969, he offered Honor command of the 24th Truck Battalion and gave all the trucks of the 36th to the 24th Battalion. Honor assumed command of a terminal battalion headquarters to manage nine truck companies. Honor went on to become the first black Transportation Corps general officer retiring as a lieutenant general. The 36th Transportation Battalion remained on paper until its inactivation on 13 August 1970.

The 36th Transportation Battalion had earned two Meritorious Unit Commendations for 1 August 1966 to 31 March 1967 and 1 April 1969 to 30 September 1969, two Vietnamese Crosses of Gallantry Phase II for 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967 and Phase III for 1 June 1967 to 29 January 1968, and the TCC for 30 January 1968 to 1 April 1969.