Another central argument against the likelihood of war between the United States and China lies in the theory of nuclear deterrence, initially articulated by American political scientist and economist Thomas C. Schelling. In his seminal works The Strategy of Conflict (1960) and Arms and Influence (1966), Schelling explores how the threat of massive destruction can prevent armed conflict. This concept was first framed by American military strategist Bernard Brodie in his 1946 book, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order.
Moreover, German-American political scientist and diplomat Henry A. Kissinger discussed the implications of nuclear weapons on global order in his 1957 book “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy”, returning to the topic in his later work, “World Order”. In addition, Albert Wohlstetter examined this theme in his 1958 report, “The Delicate Balance of Terror”.
Brodie's renowned explanation of nuclear deterrence forms the cornerstone of modern thought. In "The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order," published a year after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States, the author asserts that while military forces were traditionally utilized to secure victory in wars, the emergence of nuclear weapons has transformed their role into one of prevention. This shift arises from the understanding that the consequences of nuclear conflict would be utterly catastrophic - "Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose." 1
In “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,” Henry Kissinger examines how nuclear weapons have reshaped the international system and global order. He starts with a metaphor from Greek mythology, in which the gods sometimes granted people's wishes so thoroughly that what was meant to be a blessing instead became a curse. In the nuclear age, he explains, humanity has obtained what it sought - greater power - but this power is too immense and perilous to wield effectively. 2
Kissinger argues that nuclear weapons have fundamentally changed the dynamics of global politics, rendering traditional wars between great powers unthinkable due to the shared risk of destruction. Consequently, he contends that diplomacy will emerge as the dominant approach for resolving conflicts. He believes this transformation will profoundly reshape the very foundations of the world order – “The power of the new weapons technology is said to have brought about a tacit nonaggression treaty: a recognition that war is no longer a conceivable instrument of policy and that for this reason, international disputes can be settled by means of diplomacy.” 3
In “World Order,” Kissinger contends that the international order during the Cold War was characterized by two key balances that were largely independent for the first time in history. The first is the nuclear balance between the USSR and the United States, while the second pertains to the internal balance within the Atlantic Alliance (NATO). He suggests that this nuclear balance has paradoxically shaped the international order – “The nuclear balance of power has produced a paradoxical impact on the international order. The historic balance of power had facilitated the Western domination of the then-colonial world; by contrast, the nuclear order – the West’s own creation – had the opposite effect.” 4
In "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Albert Wohlstetter advocates nuclear deterrence but critiquing its overly simplistic interpretation. He asserts that achieving a stable deterrent balance requires well-structured strategic forces, effective warning systems, and a robust command structure. Wohlstetter emphasizes that a naive understanding of deterrence or complacency in deterrence strategies could lead to serious miscalculations or prompt adversaries to exploit perceived weaknesses. He cautions that a misplaced sense of security can ultimately culminate in disaster - "Deterrence, however, is not automatic. While feasible, it will be much harder to achieve in the 1960s than is generally believed. One of the most disturbing features of current opinion is the underestimation of this difficulty. This is due partly to a misconstruction of the technological race as a problem in matching striking forces, partly to a wishful analysis of the Soviet ability to strike first." 5
In “The Strategy of Conflict”, Schelling argues that the threat of devastating destruction from nuclear weapons can help keep nations safe from war: “The precarious strategy of cold war and nuclear stalemate has often been expressed in game-type analogies: two enemies within reach of each other’s poison arrows on opposite sides of a canyon, the poison so slow that either could shoot the other before he died; a shepherd who has chased a wolf into a corner where it has no choice but to fight, the shepherd unwilling to turn his back on the beast; a pursuer armed only with a hand grenade who inadvertently gets too close to his victim and dares not use his weapon; two neighbors, each controlling dynamite in the other’s basement, trying to find mutual security through some arrangement of electric switches and detonators. If we can analyze the structures of these games and develop a working acquaintance with standard models, we may provide insight into real problems by the use of our theory.” 6
In "Arms and Influence," Schelling underscores the tremendous destructive potential of nuclear weapons, asserting that the threat of pain and suffering they can inflict is a key factor in deterrence among nations. Schelling provides the following definition of deterrence: "So nuclear weapons do make a difference, marking an epoch in warfare. The difference is not just in the amount of destruction that can be accomplished but in the role of destruction and in the decision process. Nuclear weapons can change the speed of events, the control of events, the sequence of events, the relation of victor to vanquished, and the relation of homeland to fighting front. Deterrence rests today on the threat of pain and extinction, not just on the threat of military defeat. We may argue about the wisdom of announcing 'unconditional surrender' as an aim in the last major war, but seem to expect 'unconditional destruction' as a matter of course in another one." 7
Schelling adds that nuclear deterrence does not always function as intended. For instance, North Korea was not deterred by U.S. nuclear weapons when it attacked South Korea, nor did China refrain from entering the conflict as U.S. troops approached its border. Additionally, the United States was not deterred by Chinese threats to become involved. In 1973, Egypt and Syria also did not feel deterred by Israeli nuclear weapons. However, Schelling notes that mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union was remarkably effective. 8
Additionally, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye emphasize that “The destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes any attack against a nuclear power dangerous. Nuclear weapons are mostly used as a deterrent.” 9
Both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, with the United States having them since 1945 and China since 1964.10 For 2025, the US has approximately 3,700 nuclear warheads; China has over 600.11 Potential escalations into atomic wars, which will be catastrophic for the whole world, can be one of the other factors that can deter direct military conflict between the US and China.
Even offensive realist John Mearsheimer acknowledges the restraining power of nuclear weapons, noting that "China, Russia, and the United States all have nuclear arsenals, which makes them less likely to initiate war with each other." 12
1. Bernard Brodie, ed., “Implications for Military Policy,” in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New Haven, CT: Yale Institute of International Studies, 1946), 71.
2. Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 3.
3. Ibid., 4.
4. Henry Kissinger, “Technology, Equilibrium, and Human Consciousness,” in World Order (London: Penguin Books, 2014), 249.
5. Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (January 1959): 212.
6. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 143.
7. Thomas C. Schelling, “The Diplomacy of Violence,” in Arms and Influence, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 23.
8. Thomas C. Schelling, “The Diplomacy of Violence,” in Arms and Influence, (Yale University Press: The United States, 2008), 9-10.
9. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye JR., Power and Interdependence, 4th ed. (Boston: Longman, 2011), 23-24.
10. Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Control,” accessed May 30, 2025.
11. Hans Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight-Boyle, and Kate Kohn, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, March 26, 2025. Accessed May 30, 2025.
12. John J. Mearsheimer, “Summary of European Wars by System Structure, 1792-1990,” in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Horton & 2001), 381.
