Golomb, J. (2006). Nietzsche’s Übermensch is not über Alles. PhaenEx, 1(1), 55–72. https://doi.org/10.22329/p.v1i1.45

Jacob Golomb compares and contrasts Nietzsche’s description of the “free spirit par excellence” a person whose personal identity is not influenced by their background or current environment, with the übermensch to emphasize the übermensch’s dependence on society. He argues that the übermensch needs the “association and collaboration of various creative powers” that society provides to be realized. This reasoning connects to my opinionated essay by affirming that the übermensch is not separate from mainstream society. It highlights the hypocrisy in Nietzsche’s implicit requirement that the übermensch separate themselves from society, for if they did so, the übermensch would not exist.

Graafland, J., & Wells, T. R. (2020). In Adam Smith’s Own Words: The Role of Virtues in the Relationship Between Free Market Economies and Societal Flourishing, A Semantic Network Data-Mining Approach. Journal of Business Ethics, 172(1), 31–42.

Johan Graafland and Thomas Wells’s empirical analysis of Adam Smith’s word choice in The Wealth of Nations indicates that Smith advocated for the development of personal virtues, contrary to many people's interpretation of his philosophy as purely self-interested. The quantitative analysis highlights the nuances of Smith’s worldview, including how many of the personal virtues that are necessary for societal flourishing are equally encouraged and discouraged by a capitalist economy. I use their analysis to support how personal virtues translate to prosperity in society, indicating that Nietzschean virtues have a place in Smith’s free-market system.

Kahambing, J. G. (2016). The abyss, or the insufficiency of ethical nihilism for Nietzsche’s Übermensch. Ethics & Bioethics, 10(3–4), 155–172. https://doi.org/10.2478/ebce-2020-0011

Jan Gresil Kahambing takes the position that Nietzsche’s übermensch cannot emerge from the nihilism of despair because it doesn’t prompt a strong enough will to power that can inspire an übermensch to desire suffering. Kahambing argues that the intellectual recognition of nihilism is not a strong enough force to create the übermensch, and one must experience it existentially to truly triumph over it. Kahambing’s arguments are applicable to my topic because they support my claim that the conditions of societal life are not conducive to the development of the übermensch. Human nature equips people with the tools to find meaning in a nihilistic world, demonstrating that one can create a fulfilling life without becoming an übermensch.

Magnus, B. (1983). Perfectibility and Attitude in Nietzsche’s “Übermensch.” The Review of Metaphysics, 36(3), 633–659. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20127877

Bernd Magus presents the idea that Nietzsche’s übermensch is not a rigid set of instructions, but rather an attitude towards life. Mangus argues that the übermensch mentality is life-affirming not because it possesses the abstract prerequisites of sublimating one’s drives or creating one’s character, but because it involves the enthusiastic acceptance of the eternal recurrence. His interpretation furthers my idea that one can live an affirming life without following Nietzsche’s words verbatim. If the übermensch is seen as an attitude and not a checklist, one can celebrate and revere their life while still living practically in society.