Analyzing the Commission on Appointments’ Role in Military Appointments:
Deliberations, Processes and Impacts (1987 to 2022)
Noel Yee Sinco
University of San Agustin
Embedded Files
ABSTRACT
The Commission on Appointments (CA) plays a crucial role in ensuring that military appointments in the Philippines are based on merit and fitness rather than political considerations. This study examines CA deliberations from 1987 to 2022, analyzing how the commission has influenced military promotions and appointments. Despite the president’s broad powers, the CA serves as a check on executive decisions, sometimes confirming, rejecting, or bypassing nominees. The research highlights recurring issues, including favoritism towards Philippine Military Academy graduates, regional disparities in appointments, and the increasing presence of former military officials in civilian government roles. It also explores how political dynamics, presidential preferences, and legislative oversight shape these appointments. By analyzing CA journals, this study sheds light on the evolving relationship between civilian authorities and the military, revealing the long-term implications of military influence in governance. The findings contribute to discussions on institutional accountability and civil-military relations in the Philippines.
keywords: military appointment, commission on appointments, commander-in-chief, civil-military relations, and journals
INTRODUCTION
Even with the overpowering appointment powers being given to the Philippine President, the framers of the 1987 Constitution authorizes the Commission on Appointments (CA) comprising the 12 Senators and 12 Lower House Members of Major Political Parties while chaired by the Senate President to adhere to the civil service standards of “Merits and Fitness” to screen the executive appointments.
Nothing is more interesting but to study this voluminous CA Journals from 1987 to 2022 and to analyze its challenges, processes and impacts to Military Appointments. Past President Rodrigo Duterte is very open and preferably appointing former military and police officials as cabinet officials because of their distinct military values and behavior that makes them very alluring in such executive appointments.
At the 2019 Araw ng Kagitingan Celebration, Duterte expressly explained his fondness for appointing former military men. Duterte stated that they were: “fundamentally honest and industrious." The President continued, "But ako I have a special fondness for the military for being fundamentally honest at industrious. Ano lang ako sa bureaucracy because I have met several failures pati hindi mo mautusan nang matino. Puro corruption. Kaya as you would see, ‘yung unang --- the next few officials coming in would be military guys." (Lopez, 2019)
Journals are the evident documents of institutional intent. It caters to the spirit of the Congressional action whether it is from the law-making functions from various legislative committees of both Houses (Houses of Representative and Senate) or the basis of its confirmation, rejection, or bypassed decisions of the executive appointees and promoted officials. That is why the author aimed to utilize these several journals to capture the legislative intent of the Commission on Appointments as an independent constitutional body separate from Congress itself but composed of members of Congress themselves, and in this instance, the researcher covers only military appointees.
As a frequent occurrence in the Executive Department for several presidents, this topic is a scarce research subject by itself. Being a rarely discussed research topic, military appointments in the Philippines need more of this kind of research to shed more light on these unique functions of the presidents and the confirmation power of the Commission on Appointments through its deliberative journals as evidence of its intentions, insights and possible patterns from the 8th Congress to the 18th Congress which this study is intended to analyze and share the body of knowledge taken from this study.
With this, this study aims to analyze the deliberations, processes and influence of military appointments through the journals of the Commission on Appointments (CA) from the 8th Congress to the 18th Congress. Specifically, it determines the following:
a) The challenges transpired out of the CA Journal Deliberations on Military Appointments; and
c) Influence of these Commission on Appointments (CA) deliberations on the Philippine civil-military relations.
This research covers only the past Philippine Presidents and excludes the current presidency as he is only on his 3rd and middle term which is being inchoate to analyze his military appointments in entirety.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Studies analyze the extent of the constitutionally allowed powers of the typical three branches of government: Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary Branches as emphasized in Figure 1.
Figure 1. The Conceptual Framework and their Interrelationships
In the Theory of Hyperpresidentialism, the executive branch becomes the most powerful among the branches of government. It demonstrates the presidents' overarching power, which has repeatedly undermined institutional efforts to limit their powers by finding legal loopholes or pushing the law's boundaries.
Relacion and Magalzo (2014) argue that the legislative and judiciary branches are reluctant to use their constitutional obligation to thoroughly check and balance each other. In other studies, they have found the perils of presidential redox. For several terms already, Congress has been party-dominated by the president. The Judiciary, in its nature, is a passive constitutional creature that can only operate if there is a petition on its Courts regarding any judicial controversies. However, such powers of the latter can produce judicial decrees on any grey areas or vacuum parts of the law through which the Judiciary can supply these missing or unclear parts using their powers to interpret the law.
This study uses this theory to explain the overlapping functions of the president and the creation of political appointments for civilian career and non-career positions that do not naturally need any former military men. These are the non-defense related cabinet positions in the Executive Branch and these career positions in the Foreign Service Corps. Regime militarization extends to the level of presidential appointments.
On presidential appointments, Lewis (2008) theorized and concluded in his study that the “politicization” of presidential appointments in American Bureaucracy is that it has revealed the trade-off that presidents make between control and competence in the bureaucracy and why presidents from different parties politicize differently. Presidents do not increase the number of appointees across the board, nor does partisanship differentiate them in their willingness to employ this tool. Presidents of different parties target different agencies for politicization since presidents naturally hold personal policy views.
Being the result of Hyperpresidentialism of military appointments, the institutional impacts of these unchecked presidential appointment powers even with the Commission on Appointments will weaken the civil-military relations doctrine of civilian supremacy over the military and the rise of meritocracy.
METHODOLOGY
This study utilizes a descriptive-narrative approach that involves the archival and documentary data analysis of publicly available and accessible materials online and through the grant of access of these concerned government agencies.
Aside from the C.A. Journals, the researcher used various Philippine Government and Non-Government Websites particularly the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Department of National Defense, Office of the President, Official Gazette, and other non-public media and information-related agencies.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The following Commission on Appointments Journal Deliberations duly allowed the researcher to access its contents from the 8th Congress up to the study’s limit of the 18th Congress (until 2022 only), depicting the power dynamics and the key themes that transpired between the president's hyper-presidential actions and the constitutional power of the Commission on Appointments to either confirm, deny or by-pass presidential appointments. The researcher emailed a cover letter to gain access to the Commission on Appointments Journals from 1987 to 2022. With the grant of such access, the researcher categorized and clustered the critical themes of every congress from the 8th Congress to the 18th Congress with the corresponding presidents. The researcher asked for access to the Commission on Appointments’ Journals from 1987 to 2021 last January 5, 2023.
Results
On January 12, 2023, the Commission approved the grant of the 1987 to 2021 C.A. Journal’s access. Figure 1 shows the records from C.A. Journals from 1987 to 2021 which the C.A. has granted access to the researcher to whom he is grateful. The following C.A. Journals in the 11th Congress however are missing: Journals No. 1 to 4 of 1998, Journal Nos. 9 and 12 of 1998, and Journal No. 18 of 1999.
Figure 2. Records from C.A. Journals from 1987 to 2021
Discussion
This study discusses the occuring challenges from each of the administrations (1987 to 2022) about military appointments. Imbued by the provisions of the newly created 1987 Philippine Constitution, the Commission on Appointments (CA) caters only military appointments and promotions from the ranks of naval captain or army colonel to general ranks.
The following paragraphs are taken from the CA Journals from 1987 to 2022 concisely analysed and focused only on the civil-military relations:
1) Corazon Aquino Administration (1987 To 1992)
Fresh from EDSA I, the President just organized her government as she took over the administration of the deposed president. One of her first actions was the drafting and execution of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Soon after the end of canvassing, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 58, which announced the official canvassing of results and ratifying the draft constitution. The 1987 Constitution finally came into full force and effect on February 11, 1987, with the President, other civilian officials, and Armed Forces members swearing allegiance to the new charter, according to the Philippines’ Official Gazette Website (n.d.).
On August 27, 1987, the Commission on Appointments was organized after the 1987 Philippine Constitution was duly executed after its effectivity on February 11, 1987, under the 8th Congress, and the Commission’s members took oath in office (Section 18, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution). Upon the organization of the Commission on Appointments (CA), Congress now settled their members into different committees including that of the CA.
On its October 7, 1987 Session (Journal 6), the Committee on National Defense chaired by Senator Manintal Tamano, with no objections from the entire Commission on Appointments (C.A.), has approved that its name be changed to Committee on National Defense and Security as recommended by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (former Defense Secretary) also to include other offices like the National Intelligence and Coordinating Agency (N.I.C.A.). During this period, the appointments and promotions of General De Villa, Padilla, Tapia, and the rest of the 114 Armed Forces of the Philippines (A.F.P.) Uniformed Officers, from the naval captain or colonel up to full General or Admiral rank, are subject to the C.A.'s confirmation.
The most noticeable issue seen by the CA Members is the preference of the Philippine Constabulary led by Ramos and De Villa who are staunch supporters of President Corazon Aquino to be promoted to the upper echelons of military powers. Ramos became Defense Secretary and De Villa succeeded Ramos as AFP Chief of Staff but there was a problem with De Villa’s appointment and promotion as AFP Chief.
Other highly deliberated ones are the EDSA-I Loyalist Soldiers and preference to PMA Graduates.
Philippine Constabulary (P.C.) Preference
The Philippine Commission on Appointments (C.A.) scrutinized President Aquino's military appointments in 1987-1988, particularly the confirmation and promotion of Generals Ramos and De Villa, with Representative Verano-Yap noting the President's preferences. The C.A. initially questioned De Villa's simultaneous appointment as AFP Chief of Staff and full general but reached a compromise with the Executive branch to clarify his appointment letter. The C.A. likened this to confirming an ambassador's rank and mission simultaneously. President Aquino's two appointments for De Villa in early 1988, naming him a full general and implying the AFP Chief role, caused confusion. De Villa's term as Chief of Staff ended in April 1988 under pre-1987 rules, after which he became a civilian. The C.A. played a key role in ensuring clarity in these high-level military appointments.
General De Villa's A.F.P. Chief appointment after the 1986 EDSA Revolution was complex. Despite term limits, President Aquino retained him, leading Senator Maceda to call it "sui generis." Representative Verano-Yap used the C.A.'s veto to protect junior officers. De Villa's March 1988 confirmation made him the first chief to exceed the 1987 Constitution's three-year limit, due to his service spanning the transition period. Verano-Yap praised his prioritization of other military leaders. Senator Maceda clarifies that for record purposes, General De Villa’s promotion as Chief of Staff starts on January 23, 1988 (date of the appointment letter of President Aquino) and not on his confirmation date of March 16, 1988 Session.
As queried by Senator Pimentel, the other lieutenant colonels are bypassed by the promotion of Sales. Seconded by Senator Maceda, it is done because Sales is from the Philippine Constabulary (P.C.). Senator Pimentel is amazed by the preference given to the P.C. even though it is phased out (integrated into the Philippine National Police). Implying the Constabulary Preference, Senator Maceda claims that these military officers from the Philippine Army, Navy, and Air Force are dedicated and loyal officers of the Philippine Republic. Moreover, the gentleman from Ilocos says that on this Session, the Defense Committee Chair, Senator Tamano, claims to have a sore throat because all of the current confirmees exclude those from the Philippine Constabulary (Journal No. 4, September 20, 1989).
EDSA Comrades
In relation to the discussions stated above, these soldiers are loyal to the president as she grappled to power in EDSA I. These military personnel are given preference in their appointments as the CA Members deliberated as to the reason of their appointments excluding the presidential loyalty but such reasons should include merit and fitness. Notable personalities aside from Ramos and De Villa are Abadilla, Ermita, Biazon among others.
On EDSA's second anniversary, the C.A. confirmed EDSA figures. Senator Enrile supported Gen. Ermita's promotion based on merit, noting his term limit. Gen. Ramos became Defense Secretary after a policy clash; his sister, Senator Maceda, abstained due to civilian supremacy concerns, preferring a civilian. Retired Gen. Baccay was appointed Ambassador to Vietnam, raising questions about appointing ex-military there, dismissed as coincidence, as the future Foreign Service Act aimed for professionalism.
The C.A. discussed appointments of EDSA Revolution figures. Senator Maceda questioned appointing ex-military as ambassadors, especially to the Middle East. General Baccay's ambassadorship to Vietnam was seen as a reward for his EDSA role, with Maceda even considering him for Defense Secretary. General Biazon, another EDSA figure, was promoted to AFP Chief, supported by Senator Tamano. However, General Abadia's promotion to AFP Chief bypassed a senior officer, raising seniority concerns. Maceda linked the Air Force's AVESCOM to Ninoy Aquino's assassination, highlighting the need for military professionalism enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Senator Enrile, through Senator Tamano, defended his past role and stressed that AFP Chief selection should prioritize national interest and military tradition over presidential preference and uphold the military's duty to protect the people, based on established criteria and seniority (Journal No. 13, June 5, 1991). Appointments to Chiefs of Staff should be unquestioned “because of the solid qualifications and achievements of the appointee which placed him above his fellow officers likewise considered for the position of Chief of Staff,” according to Enrile (Journal No. 13, June 5, 1991).
The C.A. debated General Abadia's AFP Chief appointment, focusing on presidential prerogative vs. military seniority. Senator Osmeña questioned Abadia's rapid rise, suggesting political influence, while Senator Enrile cited presidential prerogative but warned against bypassing senior officers and potential political machinations. Senator Maceda supported Abadia, prioritizing merit over seniority, which he linked to corruption. He also discussed branch preferences, noting the Army's dominance and the exclusion of former PC officers, with only Marines and Navy officers as potential alternatives to Abadia.
General Loven Abadia's promotion was confirmed despite his Marcos ties, supported by his friend Rep. Verano-Yap. General De Villa's Defense Secretary confirmation was delayed due to missing documents, sparking debate on the C.A.'s 30-day rule versus executive relations. Ultimately confirmed, Rep. Romero stressed civilian supremacy, citing US precedent. Sen. Ziga highlighted De Villa's martial law roles, while Sen. Shahani denied political motivations. Sen. Alvarez praised De Villa's administrative skills.
PMA Graduates Only
CA Members are also worrying that the decision of the AFP and that of the president are always appointing and promoting PMA Graduates into higher positions neglecting other qualified non-PMA Graduates from naval, air force and military training schools who are also competent to such promotions. The best case in point is that of Colonel Mateo’s promotion as Brigadier General.
Senator Tamano, the Defense Committee Chair, states that Colonel Mateo's promotion is not included in the regular list of military promotions as he moves for the suspension of the rules, which the Commission approves. As Senator John Osmeña expresses his objection to the promotion of Colonel Lorenzo Mateo as Brigadier General, Senator Maceda is amazed by the credentials of Colonel Mateo, who did not graduate from the Philippine Military Academy (P.M.A.). Senator Maceda further notes that Colonel Mateo holds a regional command, whereas the others are from technical services. Senator Pimentel emphasizes the fact that Colonel Mateo rose from the rank of corporal to a star rank.
Representative Verano-Yap reports that her constituencies are from the Air Force Flying School and are vying for promotion. She thanked the administration for recognizing the men and women from the lowest ranks to star ranks (C.A. Journal No. 21, March 21, 1988). On its December 7, 1989, Session, Senator Angara pointed out that there should be a healthy balance among the military appointees from all corners of the Armed Forces: the Air Force Flying School, “integrees,” and the Graduates from the PMA. Senator Tamano replied that several lineal seniority rosters in all areas of the Armed Forces also include the integrees and graduates from the Reserved Officers' Training Corps (R.O.T.C.) that strike a good balance from a healthier “civilian-military” area. (Journal No. 7)
2) Fidel V. Ramos Administration (1992-1998)
Being a former Armed Forces Chief of Staff and a Defense Secretary, President Ramos knows firsthand all about militarization and its pros and cons in the Philippine Society. He defended President Aquino during the EDSA Revolution and the December 1989 coup d’état attempts against her government. Now, it is his time to appoint his cabinet members to help him govern the entire Philippines. Using his background in the military and experience in running the Defense Department, he still embodies the style of his former boss in letting his boys “return to the barracks” and trusts the civilian process of democratic government. With this, following themes include the Journals of the Commission on Appointments during the 9th Congress during the Ramos Administration about politicizing the military in the cabinet.
The first issue during the Ramos Administration is the appointment of his junior in the PMA and fellow PC Chief for the position of Defense Secretary. CA Members during this time doubted his ability to run the Defense Department but similar to Ramos, it shed light to this déjà vu. Aside from the military appointments to the civilian agencies, the CA tackled several issues such as the personal preferences of the CA Members, regional representations of the military generals, the returning PMA vs non-PMA graduates and problems about institutional stability.
A Military Man Can Run a Civilian Department
Congressman Cuenco, now as the Defense Committee Chair of the Commission on Appoints during the 9th Congress, motions the floor for the confirmation of General Renato De Villa for his ad interim appointment as the Defense Secretary (Journal No. 7, December 9, 1992).
Representative Cuenco expresses that:
"We, in the Committee on National Defense, recommend his confirmation, not as a reward for his record but on our behalf that he will ably successfully meet the challenges of the future. It would have been complicated, if not preposterous, for anyone to object to him when it is clear that there is no basis for any objection. He was once a military man. But this point has been settled since former General Fidel V. Ramos was confirmed as Secretary of National Defense. In a real sense, his military background should not impede his confirmation. This issue was already settled after his assumption as Defense Secretary. While we do not wish that appointments of military generals will become a tradition, the case of Defense Secretary Ramos, and that of the appointee under consideration, came under peculiar circumstances."
Personal Reasons
Appointments are not only due to the president. It is also connected to the CA Memberships. The preferences of these CA Members are also connected to their residence to whom the other CA Members coming from other provinces argued for biases in such confirmations.
During the March 31, 1993 Session, the Commission on Appointments deliberated the confirmation of Ambassador Isabel Wilson's ad interim appointment to Spain. Senator Maceda expresses his abstention to the appointee because he had a bad experience when Wilson, alongside her friends, lectured him during a meeting at the United Coconut Planters' Bank Board Meeting not to speak badly against the armed forces and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police that time. He understands he is a traditional politician with an agenda, but he abstained his vote against Wilson because she lacks “the best exponents of grace and diplomacy and tact…” as a diplomat (Journal No. 16, March 31, 1993).
Questioning the constitutional mandate of proportional recruitment of the Armed Forces (Article XVI, Section 5, Par. 6), Representative Enrile inquires about this constitutional mandate. Congressman Cuenco gives this latest list of the proportions of the newly appointed 80 colonels throughout the country, namely the following:
8.75% National Capital Region (NCR);
22.50% Region I;
6.25% Region II;
15% Region III;
16.25% Region IV;
3.75% Region V;
10% Region VI;
7.50% Region VII;
1.25% Region VIII;
3.75% Region IX;
2.50% Region X;
2.50% Region XI;
0% Region XII.
Congressman Cuenco recalls the reply of AFP Chief Abadia about the latter's inability to control the promotion of the officers for specific regions: “Because there are also few men from that place who joined the armed forces.”
The C.A. discussed AFP promotions' regional imbalance, with Senator Rasul lamenting the lack of promotions for Region XII and ARMM, citing a lack of trust in Muslim officers and advocating for equitable distribution. Congressman Cuenco, referencing General Abadia, explained that promotion numbers reflect applicant distribution, noting low NCR representation and high Region I representation. The lack of Generals from Sulu was also highlighted. Separately, the C.A. considered Rafael Alunan III's appointment as DILG Secretary, with a senator noting his preparedness for the role.
Senator Ople expresses his budgetary support for creating the PNP's internal affairs division and the AFP's office of ethical conduct under the Vice Chief of Staff's Office.
Downsizing the Military
Another main issue arising during the Ramos Adminstration is the attrition limit of the military. The plan to decrease the military strength of the AFP implies the decrease of these military generals which caused tensions. Now stemming from the downsizing of the military inquired during the previous Commission deliberations, Senator Maceda inquires about the statutory limits of military generals as required under Commonwealth Act No. 1. Maceda outscores the difference between the quota of a particular department and that of the entire AFP. In fact, during the Sub-committee on Finance Hearing, Secretary De Villa stated that the quota of a star rank has already been exceeded by 4. However, Maceda recalls that the Defense Secretary corrected his figures, saying they exceeded it only by one. (Journal No. 4, December 15, 1993)
Congressman Cuenco enlightens the Body by giving the actual figures based on Senator Enrile on the J-1 Department of the AFP, stating the following numbers: 70- one-star generals, 5- two-star generals, 6-three-star generals, and 1-four star generals. Senator Maceda amplifies this practice of appointing excess generals because it violates the law. Furthermore, he asks if it is legal for the President to promote more generals beyond the quota (89 total) because some generals would be retiring that year.
According to Senator Maceda, Admiral Madamba testified in the committee that military strength be downsized within five years, hopefully by 30 to 35 percent or one-third of the total size. About 30,000 to 50,000 people are in the AFP, decreasing the number of generals. Hence, the AFP promoted more generals to be still able to keep the pace of such downsizing starting in 1994. Further, the former general uttered that the natural attrition rate of the military would take care of the downsizing concerns.
For the third time, the issue of the excessive promotion of generals is a topic of deliberation. According to its Defense Chairperson (Cuenco), there were no excess promotions of generals because, by June 30 of this year (1994), several generals were retiring. The Commission has recommended the ad-interim appointments of 9 officers. The quota of 89-star ranked personnel is maintained.
On June 1, 1994, Session (Journal No. 12), the Commission maintained its stand to protect the statutory quota of the star rank promotions. It confirmed the existing military promotions of the star ranks until some generals retired by June 30, 1994. Senator Maceda inquires if Abelardo De Dios, a Brigadier General, retired on June 20, 1994, violating the ban imposed by former President Corazon Aquino of promoting officers retiring less than 1 year. Congressman Cuenco replies that such a ban is now relaxed as per agreement with both the Executive Department and the Commission.
GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement
Another important military event in Ramos Presidency is the peace agreement between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Some CA Members questioned the promotion of these military personnel who allegedly badly remarked the advocates of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). Other female CA Members claimed being insulted by an allegedly sexist remark by MNLF Chair Nur Misuari.
On August 21, 1996 C.A. session, Rep. Lobregat used Section 20 to protest military appointees' negative comments on the SPCPD/Davao Consensus. Sen. Roco, supporting 31 AFP promotions, stressed constitutional loyalty regarding the SPCPD. Sen. Maceda condemned Nur Misuari's alleged sexist insults against Rep. Lobregat for being unmarried, viewing it as disrespectful to her and former President Aquino. On the other hand, Senator Roco expressed his concern and called Nur Misuari's attention to this misbehavior. Misuari is Mindanao's symbol, champion, and gladiator of peace and promise cautioned Congress that:
"If we allow statements denigrating women to pass unnoticed, it may be taken as a signal, Mr. Chairman, that the SPCPD and the gains of peace and unity of Mindanao are now signals for losses against the women in the Philippines."
Congressman Romero supports Senator Roco's remarks protecting Nur Misuari's statements against Congressman Lobregat but against the SPCPD because General Santos City and other Christian towns are unrepresented in forming the SPCPD. (Journal No. 11, September 11, 1996)
PMA and Non-PMA Graduate Proportional Representation
Just like in the Aquino Presidency, this issue emerged once more. On its June 4, 1997, Session (Journal No. 10), the Commission, through its Defense Committee Chairperson, recommends the confirmation of 15 AFP Officers. Senator Osmena III is elated to report that out of 15 members of the AFP, only 25% are from the PMA, and the rest, 75%, are non-PMAyers. The undue preference is highly noted since then.
3) Joseph Ejercito Estrada Administration (1998-2001)
Being the shortest administration of the Post-EDSA I Period, the Estrada Administration had some of the most intelligent people hired to be cabinet members, but in the end, most of them withdrew support from their Chief Executive.
As the leading proponent of the non-concurrence of the US-RP Military Bases Agreement during his time in the Senate and a famous movie star and mayor, President Estrada became one of the most popular presidents, garnering almost 40 percent of the total votes. (Brittanica Online Dictionary, n.d.) President Estrada experienced another version of the original EDSA I, wherein the people toppled another president. Sadly, the incumbent president resigned, as enunciated by the Supreme Court. Through the landmark case of Estrada vs. Desierto (G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001), the Supreme Court both distinguished EDSA I and EDSA II.
Political Appointments of the Military and Police
In his presidency, Estrada appointed more retired military and police personnel to key civilian positions. Although not emphasized in previous administration, the CA Memberships during this time reiterated the civilian supremacy over the military that they required all military appointees to make an oath of allegiance to the Republic.
On his appointment as the next Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Secretary, Gregorio Vigilar (US Military Academy Graduate, 1953) confirmed his ad-interim appointment as the DPWH Secretary. He is a trained military engineer in the US West Point. (Journal No. 20, April 28, 1999). In its October 6, 1999 Session (Journal No. 4), the Commission deliberated Secretary Angelo Reyes's ad-interim appointment as Defense Secretary. Being a senator and a member of the Commission on Appointments, Senator Honasan has defended the confirmation of Reyes together with the rest of the 11 military appointees. According to Senator Honasan, he has known all the 11 military appointees and fought alongside him. He approves their appointments.
Congressman Diaz asks them if they adhere to the constitutional supremacy of the civilian over the military. Diaz emphasizes the experiences of the Filipino People against the Marcos Dictatorship of using the military as his primary governance tool. The acting Defense Chair during this Session (Congressman Dy) supports the appointments as in the initial military interviews with the appointees led by Secretary Reyes. The latter affirms his subservience to civilian supremacy over the military in the Philippines.
On the March 8, 2000 Session (Journal No. 9), Secretary Alfredo Lim was confirmed as DILG Secretary for his experience as a former police colonel and NBI Director. Also, on this Session, the ad-interim appointment of Colonel Daniel Calixto was deferred and stopped because of his non-submission of the documentary requirements as prescribed by the Commission for two years and no disciplinary actions from the Board of Generals.
Institutions of Stability
Moments during EDSA II, Senator Biazon remarks before the Chairman of the Commission that during these trying times:
"We need institutions to rely upon to provide stability in our society. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, Mr. Chairman, continue to manifest steadfastness in carrying out and discharging their institutional functions to provide justice [The AFP] They continue to keep the soldiers insulated from whatever attempts by any sector to drag the soldiers into this political instability or political controversy."
The CA Memberships stated the political neutrality of the AFP and PNP and to serve only the government and not to the personalities involved in that government.
3) Gloria Macapagal Arroyo Administration (2001-2004; 2004-2010)
As another version of EDSA came on January 17-20, 2001, President Estrada was ousted from office, and Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took her oath as the next president of the Philippine Republic. Despite all the controversies during her term of office, she served as president for 9 years (2nd most extended of all time). Being the second longest serving president after Marcos Senior, she faced the intense problems about political appointments of former military personnel, EDSA II loyalist soldiers and other institutional stability problems of the AFP.
Institutional Stability of AFP
Post-EDSA II, the C.A. reviewed 33 AFP appointments, emphasizing civilian control and debating a "padrino system" via Section 20 invocation. Regional imbalance in 70 appointees was flagged, heavily favoring Luzon over Mindanao. Senator Madrigal's Section 20 suspension of 25 appointments sparked debate on its proper use. Colonel Anquilo's appointment faced rejection due to past misconduct and a dishonorable dismissal recommendation. Colonel Abadilla, previously bypassed, was not reappointed due to insufficient Commission support.
EDSA II Comrades
Another déjà vu event occurred once more, the EDSA II loyal soldiers were promoted during the Arroyo Presidency. CA Members questioned more than just being loyal to the president the qualifications of the Arroyo Appointees. The best deliberation about being meritorious as a soldier and at the same time a staunch supporter of the president is that of the appointment of General Angelo Reyes as the Defense Chief.
Like her previous presidents from the original EDSA Revolution, President Arroyo appointed the AFP Chief of Staff of the ousted Commander in Chief Estrada as her Defense Secretary. General Angelo Reyes emphasized in a Washington Post Interview in 2001 that “If they did not side with the opposition, the military would fracture, and they could have a very violent situation on their hands” (Rajiv and Rasekaran, 2001). The new Defense Committee Chairperson, Jurdin Jesus Romualdo, states that Reyes is a good decision-maker and not only a good soldier. (Journal No. 9, December 20, 2001).
According to Chairperson Romualdo's implication, Reyes’ abilities are in the hands of individuals with capabilities and less than excellent professional records. The former emphasizes that the Defense Secretary Post cannot be trusted “to individuals who do not possess the character appropriate to the demands and pressures of the job. Romualdo further describes General Angelo Reyes' principles as “... No man is better than his principles…” Reyes possesses the “Operations-other-than-war” skills- more academic training than field operations.
MILF Destroyers
Loyalty to the President does not suffice. It should include the merit and fitness qualifications to the civilian office and successful military operations just like the MILF military operations in Mindanao.
On March 13, 2002 (Journal No. 15), the Commission confirmed the 20 ad-interim military appointees, who are the commanders of the 4th ID officers who cleared the Narciso Ramos Highway against the MILF in those times in Northern Mindanao, namely General Berroya and Colonel Prejido. Next, the Commission also recommends the confirmation of the ad-interim appointments of 20 AFP Officers during the “OPLAN ARIES” in 1997, namely: Major General Sigaya in Camp Abu Bakar; B/General Cabuay in the intelligence operations; B/General Lumang in his outstanding performance as the Brigade Commander of the 403rd Infantry Division in Malaybalay City; B/General Faustino, a member of the Blue Diamonds of the Philippine Air Force; Colonel Tigno being a gamma knife radiosurgery trained pediatric neurosurgeon and craniofacial specialist (Journal No. 16, May 8, 2002).
Another chief military strategist of the Estrada Administration’s War against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), General Roy Cimatu, is confirmed as the next AFP Chief of Staff. On August 21, 2002 (Journal No. 1), the Commission on Appointments deliberated the ad-interim appointment of General Roy Cimatu. The excellent general was instrumental in the AFP Campaign Lambat Bitag against the communist rebels during the 90s. Before that, he was the infantry commander of the 47th Infantry Battalion in Aklan. General Cimatu is also the Deputy Chief of Staff or the Comptroller of the AFP and a critical operational strategist during the Estrada Administration’s Campaign against the MILF in the 90s. As a former Southern Command Leader, Cimatu is equipped with the knowledge and skills of Mindanao and is a leading figure on all of the Mindanao Campaigns of the AFP, wherein 40 percent of the total strength of the AFP is focused.
EDSA III Comrades
EDSA III attempted to oust President Arroyo but failed. So, the CA deliberated on the soldiers being appointed into higher command.
On September 4, 2002 (Journal No. 2), the Arroyo Administration appointed Secretary Mendoza as the Transportation and Communications Secretary in other non-military and police-related fields. Alongside Secretary Mendoza and Roy Cimatu as AFP Chief of Staff, several AFP officers are promoted and confirmed in their ad-interim appointments, including the promotion of Major General Alberto Fernando Braganza, who is President Arroyo Senior aide de camp during the May 1, 2001 coup d’état attempt in Malacanang.
Another EDSA III figure, this time supporting Arroyo, General Narciso Abaya, alongside 58 other AFP Officers, is being confirmed by the Commission (Journal No. 1, September 3, 2003). Representative Del Mar, Chair of the Defense Committee who also hails from Cebu, expresses his support for confirming the ad-interim appointment of the excellent general as full general and at the same time as the AFP Chief of Staff. According to the Cebu Solon, peace talks are essential to the Mindanao Island. Representative Del Mar of Cebu stated that: “The most notable for the period in the conduct of AFP operations which, in no small measure, forced the MILF to agree to the resumption of peace talks.”
On January 28, 2004 (Journal No. 2), the Commission deliberated the ad-interim appointments of 40 officers who, according to Congressman Del Mar, participated one way or another in crushing the Oakwood Mutiny last July 27, 2003.
Modernizing the Military
On December 18, 2002 (Journal No. 7), the Commission on Appointments deliberated the excellent general's appointment. General Dionisio Santiago is confirmed as the next AFP Chief of Staff within five months before he retires. However, Senator Angara expresses concerns that Santiago cannot serve the entire Armed Forces better if he is only given five months to do that. He proposes a law to standardize such tenure to be at least two years for better and stable performance from the Chief of Staff. Senator Angara uttered the importance of the AFP’s professionalization specifically: “On the issue of the professionalization of the military, Senator Angara urges the military to be loyal to the government and not to the opposition. “
On the September 20, 2006 Session (Journal No. 3), Senator Richard Gordon inquired on whether it has now become a tradition for every Congressman to express his heartfelt endorsement or to be the compadre of a particular appointee, thus manifesting as well he may be allowed to state his expression of endorsement of General Ralph Villanueva’s ad interim appointment, who hails from Zambales and a member of the Free Masons. Senator Villar replies that everyone can endorse any appointee as well.
Also to protect the total separation of the military against partisan politics, the confirmation of the ad-interim appointment of General Nestor Sadiarin is deferred. During the recent election, General Sadiarin conducted a political survey about Senator Trillanes, through which Trillanes won as a senator. On February 13, 2008 Session (Journal No. 6), the appointment of another military man to a civilian post and the ad-interim appointment of former General Ebdane, Jr. as the DPWH Secretary was deliberated before the Commission on Appointments.
5) Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III Administration (2010-2016)
Being the second presidential child (after Arroyo) winning the presidency after the EDSA I Icon (Corazon Aquino), President Benigno Simeon Cojuangco “PNOY” Aquino, III becomes the next president with a vow of changing the alleged mistakes of the past administration under the Liberal Party.
Old Issues on Proportional Representation
In its October 13, 2010 Session (Journal No. 3), the Commission deliberates the ad interim appointments of 97 AFP Officers. Congressman Del Rosario informs the Commission that 67 officers are PMA graduates while 30 are not.
Senator Angara queries about the different representations of the AFP branches. He mentions only five Colonels from the Philippine Air Force, 16 Captains from the Philippine Navy, and the rest from the Philippine Army. The Quezon Solon inquired to the Commission Secretariat about the predominance of the Army over the rest. The Commission Secretary replies that the list of officers is based on the sequence of the officers submitting their documentary requirements. The Defense Committee Chair states that in the system of promotion in the AFP, the respective Promotion Boards of the significant service base their allocation of promotions on the estimated number of vacancies for different ranks. The Commission also inquires more about the J1 Team of the AFP.
Corruption in The Military
Senator Drilon expressed his concerns before the Commission about the alleged military corruption and the screening system's failure on these senior military officers.
Senator Drilon uttered:
"Mr. Chairman, the entire citizenry witnessed the public hearings that both Houses of Congress conducted. While these practices, Mr. Chairman, were exposed in the context of the disregard and violation of an anti-graft law and the failure of the auditing process, an important aspect of this sad episode in our lives was the failure of the system of screening out the undesirable in our system of promotions in the bureaucracy, both in the civilian and the Armed Forces. I must emphasize that his failure is in the Armed Forces and the civilian sector. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Mr. Chairman, we have the Board of Generals. In the civilian bureaucracy, we have a promotions board to screen promotions. In the legislature, it has its own system. As part of the checks and balances in our government system, there is a Commission on Appointments."
4) Rodrigo R. Duterte Administration
Having admitted that he intended to militarize the government, President Duterte revolutionized the government by appointing more military and police officers to the cabinet. He trusted them for being obedient as officers without complaints against their superiors.
Balwarte-Mindanao Connection
As the most recently elected president, President Duterte appointed General Ricardo Visaya as the next AFP Chief of Staff. The Commission deliberates his appointment and promotion as general, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the other 24 AFP Officers. Representative Roy Loyola, Chair of the Defense Committee, recommends their ad-interim appointments.
General Visaya is from Ilocos Norte and served in various capacities throughout the Philippines, namely as Brigade Commander in the 104th Brigade assigned in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao Provinces and Basilan and the 901st Brigade in Bicol Region, then designated as the Assistant Division Commander of Aswang, Maguindanao and the Commander of the 5th Infantry Division in Cagayan De Oro City (Journal No. 3, September 21, 2016). On October 19, 2016, Session (Journal No. 7), the Commission deliberated the ad interim appointment of Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana. Congressman Roy Loyola, the Defense Committee Chairperson, recommends the said appointment.
Ismael “Mike” Sueno has been appointed Department of Interior and Local Government Secretary under Duterte. Senator Angara, the Chair of the Interior and Local Government, Regional Consultative Commission, and Regional Autonomous Government of the Commission, supports confirming the former's ad interim appointment. Former President Ramos appointed Sueno as a member of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development or SPCPD, and he also founded the South Cotabato Foundation Incorporated and the Tinguha Foundation, which helped all people, including micro-entrepreneurs, farmers, fisherfolks, women, youth and other marginalized groups.
Militarization of the Government
In 2019-2020, the C.A. confirmed Eduardo Año (DILG) and Gregorio Honasan II (DICT). They also approved promotions for 113 AFP officers, with Senator Marcos noting their Ilocano origin. General Santos was confirmed as AFP Chief, and Luzviminda Camacho became the first female Commodore in the Philippine Navy, celebrated by Senators Hontiveros, Poe, and Marcos, who also highlighted Camacho's Ilocano heritage. In its March 11, 2020 Session (Journal No. 12), the Commission deliberates the promotion of Colonel Sara Duterte in the reserve corps of the AFP. All members of the Commission support the confirmation of Duterte.
On its August 24, 2020, Session (Journal No. 1), the Commission deliberated the ad interim appointment of Major General Antonio Parlade Jr. as Lieutenant General of the AFP and Major General Edgardo De Leon. Senator Zubiri expresses his joy as Bukidnon is blessed to have the excellent general to work (Infantry Commander in Malaybalay, Bukidnon) in the area before he became Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.
On November 19, 2020, Session (Journal No. 9), the Commission deliberated the interim appointment of Secretary Eduardo del Rosario as the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development (DHSUD). Senator Go states the former's credentials, including his stint in the AFP as the General Officer-in-Charge of the Southern Luzon Command, Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, and the Commander of Task Force Davao, which is the Anti and Counterterrorism Unit in Davao City.
On the other hand, Senator Zubiri commends the promotions of Major General Arevalo, Colonels Barandon, Delos Santos, Liboon, and Navarro. They all served in the Province of Bukidnon in various capacities in the AFP. On the September 15, 2021 Session (Journal No. 4), the Commission deliberated the ad interim appointments and nominations of 41 AFP Senior Officers, General Jose C. Faustino, Jr., as a full general and the Chief of Staff.
The Chair of the Defense Committee Representative, Luis “Jon-Jon” Ferrer, IV, recommends confirming their appointments and nominations. Congressman Ferrer IV states that General Faustino Jr. is a native of Itogon, Benguet, and has served various capacities in the AFP, specifically as the first-ever commander of the Joint Task Force Mindanao and spearheaded the development of the Mindanao Security and Stability Plan to harmonize peace in both Eastern and West Mindanao Regions.
IMPACT ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
The 1987 Philippine Constitution is very clear on the “civilian supremacy over the military”. But clearly, this study found out through the strict scrutiny of the CA Journals which emphasizes these institutional problems shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Impact of Hyperpresidential Appointments
Several practices even practiced up to today resulted in the gradual decay of the institutional checks and balances by the Hyperpresidential powers of the president and the CA confirmatory powers. In Figure 3, the CA Journal Deliberations show the evident problems of Hyperpresidentialism as the presidents in their time appointed their loyalist soldiers (EDSA I, EDSA II, and EDSA III).
Generals Ramos, De Villa, Biazon and Abadilla are die-hard soldiers vital to take over power from Marcos in EDSA I. Generals Ermita, Reyes, Ebdane, Cimatu and others are those who stood firm withdrawing their support to President Estrada and those soldiers staying with Arroyo in EDSA III are rewarded by appointments and promotions. Although most of them are qualified because of their meritorious experiences and credentials, the CA Memberships have deliberated and emphasized to adhere not to loyalty to the appointing authority but to that of the government. But for several times seen in the CA Journals, these appointment practices weakens the CA's checks and balances of presidential appointments as the presidents could still reappoint the appointees even if bypassed by the CA.
Similarly with Indonesia when Suharto took over power. Callahan (1999) describes that in 1966, Suharto quickly consolidated his own central power by filling key appointments throughout the national and provincial bureaucracies with his followers from the army. Military exigencies urge Suharto to fill his quarters with loyal soldiers following his declaration of Martial Law in 1957. In 1973, fully one-third of cabinet ministers, two thirds of provincial governors and half of ambassadors were active-duty or retired ABRI (Indonesian armed forces Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) officers. By 1995, these percentages declined to 24 percent, 40 percent and 17 percent, respectively (Lowry 1996, 188 as cited by Callahan, 1999). With Suharto's personalized appointment style, he made sure that appointees should always side with him. But as the military soldiers loyal to him grew older, Suharto went more to his family as he appointed them. So even in Indonesia, although during Suharto's Rule, there is also a problem of the merit and fitness of appointments.
As the 1987 Constitutional Framers invested in the concept of the Commission on Appointments (CA), the perennial problem of appointments is a problem even with this famous implied veto of the CA. Even with the invocation of Section 20 of the CA Rules, the merit and fitness rule of the Constitution is still compromised as a possible reappointment will still be possible by the president. Although Section 20 of the CA Rules is a powerful Congressional tool emphasizing the CA and the president to correct their wrong practices otherwise, the invoker of the Section 20 of the CA Rules will not change his stand and will not withdraw the implied veto towards the appointee. Senator Madrigal invoked it to stop the alleged practice of “padrino system” towards several military appointees.
Hypresidentialism is so vast that the appointment practice adheres to the “Revolving Door Policy” or the appointments of every top soldier to the highest military post (AFP Chief of Staff) but in a short period of time (usually in months).
In Sinco (2024), the author found out that 39 AFP Chiefs of Staff (1987 to 2021) serve the government for an average of 356.4 days. The tenure of the Chief of Staff means that overall is below one year. It confirms the revolving door policy but the new law (Republic Act No. 11709) eliminates this politicized tool, although no longer part of this study. Moreover, the retired soldiers turned civilian appointees flocked to the departmental level as more of them are appointed into office. Several retired military personnel are appointed during the Arroyo Administration namely Ermita, Cimatu, Reyes, Ebdane who were appointed and reappointed four times respectively (with other departments). Returning into loyalty to the appointing authorities, similar appointments like these ones erode institutional integrity and democratic norms.
Arugay (2021) argues that militarization dilutes civic space. Clearly, regime militarization is present by the frequent appointments of retired soldiers and the practice of the “Revolving Door Policy”. In his paper, “The Generals’ Gambit: The Military and Democratic Erosion in Duterte’s Philippines”, Arugay (2021) states that the frequent appointments of these former military personnel also called “civilianization” is only good on paper, as these retired generals are equipped with military knowledge, skills and networks to resolve civilian problems. This logic holds true when these retired soldiers are assigned to non-military departments namely those stated in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Retired Soldiers appointed to Non-Military And Law-Enforcement Departments
These retired soliders turned cabinet secretaries have served to civilian agencies at most two times mostly with Public Works, Environment, Energy, Executive Secretary, Transportation and Presidential Management Staff. Although it is within the discretion of the President to whom to appoint, but when it comes to vital decisions to resolve some civilian problems, these former soldiers have no choice but to resort to their long military experience and strategies which in return might indeed worsen than resolve it in the easiest way possible.
Furthermore, Arugay (2021) holds true that military appointments to civilian departments become problematic when civilian leaders like to invite and encourage the military's direct involvement in the formulation and implementation of security policies. Sources from inside the Duterte administration have observed that there is a lack of diverse perspectives in peace and security policy circles and a complete absence of contentious debate (which is critical to arriving at a satisfactory policy outcome) because military officers are trained to focus on immediate responses to perceived crises and are not used to prolonged deliberation. In a very complicated policy area such as peace and security, a government whose most dominant voice comes from the military might settle for quick fixes and lack a holistic appreciation of complex issues.
This is seen in the country’s pandemic response so far. The militarized nature of the policies imposed by Duterte’s government has failed to appreciate the critical public health and human security dimensions of the pandemic. Its heavy-handed and punitive approach is often not grounded on complex science and empirical evidence that should guide public policy.
Militarization of governance is present in the Philippine System. Civilian offices are oftentimes surrounded by former military personnel. Even though they are legally-speaking civilians because they are retired, Sinco (2024) described these retired soldiers as military still because of their military mind. The Military Mind Theory is defined as connecting the former military men who are still psychologically and skills-wise wired as military personnel. It shapes by the state's specific political-historical experiences where the military personnel have intervened in domestic politics and decided the legitimacy of civilian governments—years of socialization and practices created a mental map with a different perspective on political affairs–far less straightforward, limited, and categorical.
This Military Mind Theory keeps generals and other military/police officers in their military/police mentality. Generals do not lose their networks and connections within the military, even if they leave the military/police departments. As Arugay (2021) observed, they brought other military personnel (often fellow retirees who were their subordinates) into every government institution they led. This multiplier effect leads to groupthink in decision-making and exacts a toll on the progress of the civilian expertise in the government’s already weakened bureaucracy.
To keep it simple, civilian problems are resolved by using military strategies as commanded by a retired soldier. The democratic norms of civilian appointments because of Hyperpresidentialism are circumvented by tapping political appointees and mostly non-qualified personnel by virtue of their military experience and assignment to non-military related departments. In Figure 5, Sinco (2024) found out that military appointees are accorded several appointments to other offices- some of them not military related ones (i.e. Reyes, as Energy Secretary; Cimatu, as Environment Secretary; and Ebdane as DPWH Secretary).
Figure 5. Military/Police Cabinet Appointees
In Figure 5, only President Benigno Simeon Aquino III has not changed his Defense Secretary with Delfin Gazmin unlike other presidents who have appointed other people to the top defense spot.
Also, the CA Journal Deliberations emphasize the recurring matters of disproportional military appointments across the different regions and the preference of PMA graduates compared to non-PMAers. Based on the deliberations, those residents from the Ilocos Regions, Central and West Visayas and Calabarzons are the frequently promoted soldiers to the top military positions making other regions lack of colonels and generals.
The study found out that Hyperpresidentialism is a threat to our democratic principles as presidents use political lobbying to their allies in the CA to vote in favour of their appointees even at the expense of the CA. The civilian oversight through the CA is oftentimes circumvented by allowing the president to reappoint a by-passed appointee. It has been shown in the CA Journals that loyal soldiers are at the forefront of being promoted first (EDSA 1, 2, and 3, and those who followed their military operations against the MILF). Some of them are also promoted ahead of others if they are from the same province as that of the president and his cabinet members compared to those who have no “backers” from their own towns (lack of generals in the ARMM and others).
CONCLUSION
This study has concluded that civilian supremacy over the military doctrine has been part of this confirmation requirement of these military appointees and promotions. It has been an inherent requirement for any appointees to top military posts. The repeated issues of regional misrepresentation, pro-PMA Graduates over non-PMAers, and predominant Philippine Army Appointees to top military posts need to be resolved on the end of the Executive Department and the AFP itself as it can cause some schisms among the military ranks. It is a good development that the current President Marcos Jr. has signed the new law (Republic Act No. 11709) to lessen the Presidential abuse of the Revolving Door Policy to gain influence and blind loyalty from the military.
In fairness, the AFP has made several initiatives to promote other non-PMAers to top military posts even to lateral entrants coming from other branches of government or even from the private sector going to the military ranks. The researcher also found out that the classical view of soldiers fighting several battles gained not only medals but respect among their peers and the top administrators for a possible promotion to higher posts. That is why the most fought military branch- the Philippine Army is the predominant military branch for the AFP Chiefs.
Overall, by studying the annals of these Commission on Appointments (CA) Journals, the researcher discerned the spirits and intents of these military appointments and promotions including the invocation of Section 20 of the CA Rules. But such a topic is rarely discussed. Therefore, the researcher recommends more studies on this topic as more possible topics could be discussed like civil-military relations from various perspectives (gender, militarization, and others), alleged nepotism on these appointments, and even cross-country studies between and among countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
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