Summer School and Workshop in Experimetrics & Behavioral Economics
Soleto, July 17-23 2023
Scientific and Social Program (July 17-23, 2023)
Summer School: Topics and Timetable of the Parallel Lectures (July 17-21, 2023)
Organization
The summer school has been thought as a week spent in an unconvential university, with classrooms spread throughout an old town in Southern Italy, and different levels of parallel lectures, targeted for Master, PhD or Post-doctoral students.
Courses will be held at 08:45-10:45 and 11:15-13:15 (morning lectures) and at 14:15-16:15 (afternoon lectures).
Keynote lectures will be held each night during the social dinner, from 21:00 to 23:00.
The time slot from 16:30 pm to 21:00 will be dedicated to social activities, letting students interact with the keynote and other speakers (individual and group sports, music concerts, guided visits of artistic and archeogical sites, bus excursions to agriturisms and to the sea).
Before the beginning of the summer school, each attendant will be asked to indicate his/her preferred courses (from one to three) for each day of the summer school (partial attendance, e.g., at least 2 days, will be allowed). For Master students: a 2-day full summer school attendance will allow 1 ECTS, 4-day full summer school attendance will allow 2 ECTS, full summer school + worskhop attendance will allow 3 ECTS.
Throughout the 4 days of the summer school, each student can move from one parallel session to the other, building his/her own study plan and preferred interdisciplinary path. Mentoring sessions, where students can present individually to the keynote or other speakers their own research are also available options during the morning and afternoon lectures' slots.
Keynote Lectures/Speeches:
1. July 17, 21:00-22:00: Aurora Garcìa Gallego -- Experiments on Impunity, Embezzlement and Competition: Gender matters
Abstract: The talk merges three exploratory experiments that check for the role of gender. First, an experiment is designed aiming at analysing both players’ behaviour in the impunity game when subjects are aware of the gender of their partner. In this context, the effect of different stake sizes is examined. The main findings are that proposers give to responders an important (around 35%) share on average, and that both the stake size and gender identification affect their decisions. Second, antisocial behaviour is analysed in the context of the embezzlement game, checking for the importance of watching eyes in reducing this type of antisocial behaviour. The variable sex is also considered, analysing the sex of the subject and the interaction between the sex of the decision maker and the sex of the eyes. Gender differences on embezzlement decisions are significant, with significant differences found regarding the realism of the tool of watching eyes and the sex of it. Third, a lab experiment helps us to investigate individuals’ reaction after a defeat. In this design, subjects complete a math task and decide on their payment scheme (piece-rate vs. tournament) while having information about the gender of their opponent. In the second stage, subjects observe the result of the competition and decide whether they want to compete again. The strategy method is used and men’s as well as women’s behavior is elicited in a repeated competition context. Data shows that competitive men and women behave similarly, that is, they all are more willing to compete after defeating a female opponent, and it is more likely that they accept to re-compete against men after a victory.
2. July 18, 20:00-21:00: Massimo Egidi -- TBC
3. July 19, 21:00-22:00: Peter Moffatt -- Modelling subject heterogeneity in experimental data
4. July 20, 20:00-21:00: Nicolas Jacquemet -- Pro-social behavior under oath: Empirical evidence and some applications
Abstract: A large amount of literature in social psychology documents drastic changes in behavior due to contextual elements that are very difficult to rationalize with the usual economics toolbox — preferences, beliefs and incentives. The theory of commitment in social psychology, in particular, studies the conditions under which past actions lead to significant shift in behavior in otherwise identical situations. This can be leveraged as a powerful tool to achieve more efficient outcomes when incentives fail. This talk will review a series of (recent or ongoing) works focusing on the change in pro-social behavior obtained thanks to a particular commitment device: a truth-telling oath.
5. July 20, 21:30-22:30: Giorgio Coricelli -- Strategizing and attention in games
6. July 21, 18:00-19:00: David Cooper -- What can we learn from what they say
Abstract: This talk surveys David Cooper’s work with various co-authors on decision making and game play by teams. While most experiments focus on play by individuals, there are great benefits to using teams as the decision making unit. First, many real world environments involve decision making by groups rather than individuals. As familiar examples, how many papers are written by co-authors and how many decisions within universities are made by committees? If decision making by teams fundamentally differs from decision making by individuals, conclusions based on experiments using individuals as the decision making agent may be false. Second, economists have become increasingly interested in using process data (e.g. response times, eye tracking, and fMRI) to understand decision making. The dialogues between teammates are a valuable source of process data. Analyzing the content of team dialogues provides direct insights into the thought processes underlying agents’ choices that cannot be easily obtained using other methods. This makes it possible to directly observe how and why decisions came about.
7. July 22, 08:45-09:45: Guillaume Hollard -- Better belief model in normal form games
8. July 22, 16:45-17:45: Daniela Puzzello -- Is money essential? An experimental approach
Abstract: Monetary exchange is called essential when better outcomes are incentive feasible with money than without it. We study essentiality theoretically, and experimentally, using finite-horizon monetary models that are naturally suited to the lab. Following mechanism design, we also study the effects of strategy recommendations, both when they are incentive compatible and when they are not. Results show output and welfare are significantly enhanced by fiat currency when monetary equilibrium exists. Also, recommendations help if incentive compatible, but not much otherwise. Sometimes money gets used when it should not, and we investigate why, using surveys and measures of social preferences.
9. July 23, 08:45-09:45: Volodymyr Lugovskyy -- Trading institutions in experimental asset markets: Theory and evidence
Abstract: We report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of trading institutions in the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets. We employ three trading institutions: Call Market, Double Auction, and Tatonnement. The results show that bubbles are significantly smaller in uniform-price institutions than in Double Auction. We reproduce this and other critical patterns of the data by calibrating a heterogeneous agent model with fundamental and myopic-noise traders. The model produces larger bubbles under Double Auction because multiple trades occur within a period, amplifying the impact of myopic traders with positive bias on transaction prices.
Workshop: Topics and Timetable of the Parallel Sessions (July 22-23, 2023)
