HostageCrisis

This book I used for a presentation on the Iranian hostage crisis / Iran Contra affair:

After giving the following presentation to the Theories of International Relations class at FIU north campus in the summer of 1998, I was taken aside by the Lt. Col. professor and told "you should be careful about talking about these things here". Was it the exiled anticommunists, the US supported drug cartels, or the Israeli lobby, or all three that might take it as an offense? I didn't ask, I didn't care, and I still don't.

While the case presents to Alex S. testimony from people who experienced the case first hand, most of the testimony is focused on the individuals involved. From the secretary of State, to the Secretary of Defense, most accounts of the crisis are focused best using the lens of the pluralist. However as Mr. S. was charged with shedding light on the crisis to further our understanding of events like these if they are to occur again, it seems only logical that I attempt to view the crisis in the realist perspective. As stated in the case, ‘growing instability in the world makes the possibility of a situation along the lines of the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis more likely than ever. While my associates undoubtedly have much insight into elements described directly within the case study, it will be my duty to explain the case using peripheral elements.

Obviously the first thing to mention here is that the period in which this crisis took place was during the cold war. The USSR and the US while having better relations than they had in the past, were still engaged in a struggle for the third world. The US had had a devastating experience in Vietnam, and the like for the Soviet Union was about to occur. But first we need to go back in history a bit to understand the Iran that caused us so many problems.

Twenty years after the Soviet revolution, the fear of communism was rampant in the west and as a result US policy planners saw the need to protect the southern periphery from soviet expansion. The 1937 Sa’Dabad treaty was created to bring about a northern tier of states that would jointly counter the communist threat. It included Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. At the onset of the second world war, the prior British and French involvement in south west asia was further diminishing. The time when the French and British had ultimate authority in the region was gone. In 1941, both the British and Soviets cooperated to eliminate the threat from Hitler’s Germany. The two jointly occupied Iran. A year later they had agred to allow for Iranian independence upon termination of the war. However by 1946 the Soviets had retained their troops there, until enough protest came from the US and other western powers. This was the first instance where the two superpowers had come into conflict over Iran. In seven years it was to become clearer how important Iran was for both the US and USSR. 1953 saw the first deposition of a Shah, nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil company, and subsequent reinstatement of the Shah with help of the CIA. It has been stated that during this time offers were made of hundred dollar bills to anyone who chanted, ‘long live the Shah’. Then as the Shah’s position had been cemented, in 1955, the mother of all containment policies was enacted, the Bagdad Pact. Like the previous Sa’Dabad Treaty, this Pact included Iraq, Turkey, Great Britain, Iran, and Pakistan. This union was intended to be a permanent political, military, and economic alliance. The US joined the Pact a year later, but only with regards to the economic sphere. Again the aim was to create a northern tier boundary between the USSR and the Persian gulf. In 1957 Eisenhower made public the need for American action in the Middle East to counter communist expansion. Unfortunately two years later was the first widely known division between Iran and Iraq. The Baathists, of which the modern Saddam Hussein is a member decided to withdraw from the Bagdad Pact, and subsequently the Pact was renamed CENTO (the central treaty organization). At this time the principle of twin pillars came into being. The crucial focus for the US in the middle east became Saudi Arabia and Iran. The moderate Arabic monarchy, and the secular pro-western Iran.

By 1978 about one year prior to the hostage crisis, there was no question that the current Shah, as the continuing legacy of the Pahlavi dynasty, was little less than a ruthless dictator. On September 8, thousands of demonstrators were killed in Tehran, the modern capital. Then on November 6 martial law was imposed as a response to striking oil workers. Without the oil what good was Iran economically. Then by the beginning of the year 1979 is when the events become rapid fire, so I’ll turn to the overhead.

So now that the context of the hostage crisis is put into perspective, let me analyze the case.

First and fore most is the balance of power system between the US and the USSR. As the revolution in Iran led to the hostage crisis, this symbolized the loss of one of the crucial pillars in the region. As the first interviewee Tom ‘OBrien states ‘It was part of the national strategy. Iran and Saudi Arabia were seen as the two essential allies in the region, although the relationship with the Saudis was a discrete one. There was nothing discrete about the Iranian relationship. The Shah poured out money, and we poured in military aid, building projects, and more salesmen and consultants than you could count.’ The loss of Iran was perceived as a gain for the Soviets. Strategically this was a failure because if the revolution meant that the USSR now had control over Iran, then they had access to the Persian Gulf, which meant they had a place to station forces in the area, an area that was crucial. The spread of communism was enough to get the attention of policy people, but couple that with the huge oil reserves in the region, and there was clearly a two-fold foreign policy disaster looming.

Since the inception of the Anglo-Iranian Oil company in the beginning of this century, Oil for the west has been the key factor in staying involved in Iran. The Shah was the peacock throne who facilitated the extraction and continuation of foreign investment in the oil and gas sectors. During the early seventies, Iran due to the Arab oil embargo on the west, became ever more important as a source for the industries of the west. Roughly 10% of the US oil supplies came from Iran around the time of the revolution. Likewise from 1973 to 1978, Iran bought 19 billion worth of US military equipment. As the public sentiment became distrustful of the Shah and his secular policies, the US, Britain, etc., was to loose favor with one of their larger raw materials suppliers. When the riots broke out in 1978, newspapers in Iran, still loyal to the Shah were accusing the Ayatolla of conspiring with the Communists against the Shah. As the national Security Adviser at the time of the hostage crisis Zbigniew Bzezinski argued that while he supported democratization, it was not to be at the risk of loosing oil supplies and undermining strategically important partners. This was his view that there had to be on the part of the Shah a heavy hand in keeping domestic order. Not to get into the individuals and their contribution to the crisis, but that Brzezinski saw that there was a dire need to keep Iran in the western camp at all costs.

As it became clear that the Shah wasn’t ever to return, and Khomeini solidified his position as supreme sovereign, the US had to quickly reverse the policy of arms support, and the military parts pipeline was closed.

‘In addition publication of documents captured by the students who took over the embassy revealed US intelligence activities in Iran and confirmed the suspicions of many Iranians that the United States was interfering in their internal affairs. In this atmosphere, Iranian moderates who had had contacts with US officials became suspect, while extremists in Tehran gained credibility.’

By the end of 1980, despite greater relations among the two super-powers, the USSR began its Vietnam equivalent into Afghanistan. The gradual détente and warming relations was shattered as the USSR began it Afghani campaign on December 27. Suddenly the questions about Iran became intimately linked with what was occurring in nearby Afghanistan. Predictably the Soviet representative to the UN security council vetoed the proposal for international sanctions against Iran. This then compelled the US to act alone with regards to the hostage crisis. Then within the defense administration, several ideas were floating around about military options available. One proposal was to mine the waters around the Shat-Al-Arab, the Iranian port on the Persian gulf. Now however, Iraq was seen as needing to be courted, and thus this plan was scrapped. Then proposals came together with almost unanimity calling for the rescue attempt. But there was concern. ‘Even a successful rescue attempt could spark a major anti-US reaction in the Islamic world, and Iran could simply round up new hostages from the thousands of Americans still living in the country. The President replied that his biggest concern was potential Soviet involvement – a small rescue mission would be least likely to provoke the Russians.’ So what began as a student revolt, which is ostensibly an intra-state phenomenon, quickly became a statist phenomenon, which brought in the greatest of foes, the USSR. Then to complicate matters more both Iran and Iraq became involved in state to state conflict. This however gave the Iranian an immediate need for their siezed and frozen assets. The US it turns out was fortunate that Iraq had taken military action against the Islamic republic. This forced them to the table. But the fact that the Soviets were pushing south through Afghanistan didn’t make things any easier. There was a fear that when the mission was underway out of Turkey, the Soviets may advise the Iranians that they were coming into their territory. Possibly the USSR wanted Iran for themselves.

Additionally it should be mentioned that Israel was intimately involved in the discussions about Iran. To quote a former Mossad agent Ari Ben-Menashe, ‘We were trying to tell the US representatives that there would be a change in the status quo in the Middle East and Israel could not depend on Iran for any military backup against the Arabs. It had always been accepted that if ever Israel was stormed by the Arabs, the Americans would come to the rescue, using Iran as the staging ground. Now the Shah was going to go, and Israel’s security would be weakened. It was as simple as that.’ Further on in his book the author says with regards to the Iran-Iraq dispute, ‘Despite the strong defensive position taken by the Iranians, the Israeli government and intelligence community were extremely worried about Iraq’s incursion. It would be in Isreal’s interest to flood Iran with military equipment, but we had to be cautious. Much of the material we had was American, and if that went to Tehran without the release of the hostages and Carter’s ok, there could be serious repercussions in the US Congress with its Democratic majority.’ Then he states, ‘It was exactly as had been arranged in Amsterdam in September by the Israelis. The hostages would be released in exchange for $52 million, guarantees of arms sales for Iran, and unfreezing of Iranian monies in US banks. The only difference was the timing of the hostages release. Instead of immediately, the Republicans insisted that it take place on January 20, 1981, upon Ronald Reagan’s inauguration.” Finally he says of Khomeini, ‘The rational for helping the Khomeini government was straightfoward. If the Iranians fought the Iraqis, their soldiers would be killed instead of ours. Moreover the war not only diverted attention away from Israel, but also drained the Arab countries of money. From Likud’s point of view, since Camp David, Israel had lost its edge as a strategic asset to the US in the Middle East. The moderate Arab countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jaordan—were still Anti-Israel, but they were accepted by the United States. Israel was becoming increasingly isolated. So as we now saw it, the rise of Khomeini was one of the best things that had happened to us in years. He was radical, anti-American, and anti-Arab. He was doing our job, and we believed that it was in our national security interest to support him.’

Then regarding the 52 million to be given to the Iranians, he recalls a conversation with his chief, ‘The Americans cannot arrange the money from the US budget because the Americans were dealing with are not in the government-yet. So they have asked their Saudi friends to help them.

‘Is this Saudi money’

‘No, its CIA connected, but the Saudis helped arrange for the banking of it’

He then goes back to the narrative, ‘Pieces of the jigsaw began to fall into place. I like many others was aware of a band of former Israeli intelligence officers who were running a drug and arms smuggling operation in Central America, backed by the CIA.

‘Is this drug profit money from central america?’

‘Don’t ask too many questions my friend.’

So to end my presentation I have to conclude that

1 the states involved were for the most part engaged in rational behavior

2 the concerns were of importance to several states involved

and 3 power, which is money and weapons, was the basis of the dillemma

thankyou,

Now I turn to the next presenter