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Context
Context
El Salvador’s President Bukele is facing growing criticism around the world for what many describe as human rights abuses and an authoritarian turn in his War on Crime. This contrasts sharply with his high approval rating at home and the praise he receives from international leaders. Why the drastic difference?
At least part of the answer lies in carefully crafted regime narratives and tactics that go far beyond reducing crime through mass incarceration alone. This raises a central question: Is Bukele a strong and effective leader, or is he edging toward becoming a dictator who has used crime as the pathway to secure power?
The Rise of Bukele
The Rise of Bukele
Nayib Armando Bukele Ortez was born on July 24, 1981, in San Salvador. His father, Armando Bukele, was a prominent businessman and religious leader of Palestinian descent, which helped shape the family’s public presence and influence. Before entering politics, Bukele worked in advertising and business, fields that later proved useful in his approach to politics, crafting his image and communication style.
Bukele’s political career began in 2012, when he became mayor of Nuevo Cuscatlán. He gained national attention for his branding-heavy approach to governance, which he carried into his next role as mayor of San Salvador in 2015. By 2019, he leveraged his public appeal and marketing skills to win the presidency of El Salvador. Notably, he founded the political party Nuevas Ideas, which now controls most of the legislature.
This background is important to understanding the “Myth of Bukele” because his rise was rooted not only in political strategy but also in his expertise in image and narrative-making and public persuasion.
In the Beginning...
In the Beginning...
When Bukele became El Salvador's President in 2019:
El Salvador was one of the most violent countries in the world, with high homicide rates, widespread extortion, and territorial control by MS-13 and Barrio 18.
But, homicide rates had been in steady decline since 2015.
Bukele opted to negotiate with the gangs.
In exchange for things like perks for incarcerated gang members and softer policing, the country's two most dominant gangs agreed to keep homicidal violence (murders) down.
Bukele's nonaggression pact helped to halve the homicidal rate during the first two years of his presidency.
The Self-Coup of 2021
The Self-Coup of 2021
In 2021, Bukele used his party’s supermajority in the Legislative Assembly to remove the attorney general and all five magistrates of the Constitutional Chamber. He replaced them with loyalists who no longer acted as a check on presidential power. This move is widely described as a "self-coup" because it allowed Bukele to consolidate control over all branches of government.
Change: March 25, 2022
Change: March 25, 2022
MS-13 went on a killing spree on March 25, 2022 that changed everything. Linked to a gradual breakdown of the gang's negotiations with the government, a wave of attacks by the gang caused at least 86 deaths in a period of 72 hours. March 26, 2022 marked one of El Salvador's deadliest days on record.
On March 26, 2022, Bukele and his allies began to implement what would become known as the "Bukele Model" in the face of a grave, urgent, and unexpected security crisis.
The Bukele Model
The Bukele Model
The Formal Suspension of Constitutional Rights
The Formal Suspension of Constitutional Rights
On March 27, 2022, Bukele's supermajority in the Legislative Assembly quickly approved a "state of emergency." This immediately:
Suspended several individual rights and due-process guarantees.
Notably, this included the right to a defense attorney and allowed authorities to withhold basic information from detainees, their attorneys (if they had one), and their families.
Allowed state security forces to conduct arrests, intercept private communications, and restrict movement.
Valid for only thirty days, the state of emergency has been renewed every month since March 2022.
In other words, it has been renewed 44 times.
Mass Arrests
Mass Arrests
Bukele sought to punish and dismantle gangs by getting rid of them from Salvadoran society: imprisoning their members, collaborators, and sometimes even their families and acquaintances.
In the 3 years since the start of the Model, more than 88,000 arrests have occured. To put this statistic in context:
El Salvador currently has arround 111,000 people in prison. More than 79% of those in prison were arrested under Bukele's watch.
El Salvador holds the title for having the highest incarceration rate in the world.
In January 2023, the government opened a new maximum-security megaprison popularly known as CECOT, short for "Terrorism Confinement Center" in Spanish.
Recent news coverage indicates that, under a new arrangement between the United States and El Salvador, at least some individuals deported from the United States — including non-Salvadorans — are now being held at CECOT.
Punitive Legal Reforms
Punitive Legal Reforms
Bukele and his allies in the Legislative Assembly have removed, rewritten, and passed numerous laws that strengthen executive power and expand the tools available to carry out the War on Crime. These reforms include:
Hardening sentencing guidelines
Harsher penalties for a wide range of crimes, especially those labeled as gang-related.
Lowering the age of criminal responsibility to 12
Children can now be prosecuted under gang-related statutes, significantly expanding who can be detained.
Authorizing mass trials
Thousands of detainees can be prosecuted at once, reducing individual due process guarantees.
Targeting political opposition
Legal reforms and selective prosecutions have been used to intimidate critics and opponents.
Restricting Freedom of the Press and Human Rights Organizations
Ambiguous and far-reaching changes to the Media Law and Foreign Agents Law have created legal grounds to investigate or punish journalists, community organizations, and media outlets that report critically on the government.
Interpreting Success
Interpreting Success
The "Good"
The "Good"
President Bukele has secured changes in El Salvador that once seemed unimaginable, even as recently as 2022. These include:
A near-elimination of visible gang activity and violence
A sharp drop in extortion, one of the crimes that most affected everyday life
Historic reductions in homicide, bringing the country to one of the lowest homicide rates in the world
A widespread public sense of safety that many Salvadorans say they had never experienced before
And A Lot Of Bad...
And A Lot Of Bad...
Although we should acknowledge the benefits seemingly brought on by the Bukele Model, we should also acknowledge that they come with significant costs and raise major concerns in El Salvador and around the world. These include:
Mass Arrests
Mass Arrests
As seen above, mass arrests are central to the Bukele Model. But beyond the huge scale, what is more concerning is that many were detained without warrants or clear evidence, often based on appearance, location, or anonymous accusations. Families report that innocent people, including children and workers with no criminal record, have been taken from their homes or communities. The scale of these arrests has transformed everyday life and created fear among many Salvadorans.
Human Rights Violations Inside Prisons
Human Rights Violations Inside Prisons
Reports from international organizations, journalists, and former detainees describe severe overcrowding, inadequate food and medical care, and physical abuse. Indeed, there have been confirmed deaths in custody, as well as accounts of torture. Because many detainees have not had access to Due Process (lawyers or court hearings), it is difficult to know how many are actually guilty of a crime.
Persecution of Opposition
Persecution of Opposition
Opposition groups and journalists have faced harassment, online attacks, legal threats, fines, and even imprisonment. New laws make it more difficult to publish information about gangs or government abuses, and they also make it harder for people to organize against the Bukele administration. Together, these pressures create a climate where even regular people may feel unsafe speaking openly about their concerns or expressing opposition.
Erosion of Democratic Institutions
Erosion of Democratic Institutions
Over time, Bukele has weakened the independence of the judiciary, replaced judges who opposed him, and expanded executive authority. His 2021 self-coup, which involved removing and replacing the Constitutional Court, reduced the checks and balances that normally prevent any one branch of government from gaining too much power. When the court he installed later reinterpreted the Constitution to allow presidential reelection, it overturned what used to be a firm protection designed to prevent authoritarianism. As a result, many worry that Bukele’s concentration of power is dangerous.
Learn More...
Learn More...
Understanding why many believe Bukele is not just a strong leader but one who may be guiding the country toward full dictatorship will become clearer as you move through the myths.
If you would like to explore this complexity further, click on the myths below to learn more about who benefits from the Bukele Model, how support and opposition for Bukele exist, whether his model can be replicated in other countries, and the media landscape.
Sources:
Meléndez-Sánchez, Manuel, and Alberto Vergara. "The Bukele Model: Will It Spread?" Journal of Democracy 35, no. 3 (2024): 84-98. https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2024.a930429.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/08/el-salvador-sweeping-new-laws-endanger-rights
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/salvador/does-bukele-model-have-future
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