Mano dura policies, or tough-on-crime approaches, have been used since the early 2000s in countries like El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In response to rising insecurity (gang violence, crime, and homicides), these policies have typically relied on increased police and military surveillance, mass arrests and incarceration, and harsher penalties. Yet before Bukele, most mano dura efforts in the region had failed to meaningfully reduce crime. Bukele’s unprecedented results changed that narrative and quickly turned him into an international star, especially online. His approach now appeals to leaders facing insecurity in their own countries, some of them going beyond praise to vow imitation. People living in unstable countries often ask their leaders to be like Bukele. But is this possible? Can the Bukele Model be replicated successfully?
While the conditions that often drive people to beg their leaders to be like Bukele and those that ultimately push leaders to adopt them are often grave, the reality is that the Bukele Model cannot be exported, at least not with a great chance at success, because Bukele's El Salvador is truly a unique case.
Importantly, scholars Manuel Melendez-Sanches and Alberto Vergara have addressed these questions in their piece, "The Bukele Model: Will It Spread?" Information for this myth is largely based on their findings.
As mentioned above, mano dura efforts have historically failed in the region. But why?
When the state declares unconditional war on crime, criminal groups have strong incentives to “fight fire with fire” to defend themselves and pressure the state into backing down.
As such, these policies have historically resulted in escalating violence.
State crackdowns can unintentionally strengthen or transform criminal organizations. This is because when imprisoned gang leaders or cartel bosses are jailed together, mano dura can facilitate coordination, allowing fragmented groups to unify.
For example, in the mid-2000s, mano dura policies actually helped small, scattered cliques evolve into powerful gangs in El Salvador.
Mano dura policies remain popular in the region even though they usually fail because they speak directly to people’s fear and frustration. That is to say, in places where crime feels out of control and institutions seem weak or corrupt, voters want fast and forceful action.
Mano dura also creates the appearance of strength and control, which reassures the public emotionally, even when the data and history show these policies rarely reduce crime and often make violence worse.
If you need, revisit the Universal Myth for a refresher!
The crackdown in El Salvador was much larger and stronger than anything before
El Salvador arrested people at a rate far higher than other countries that tried similar anti-crime strategies. Most countries cannot carry out a crackdown this intense without causing immediate chaos or violent pushback.
Salvadoran gangs were not as powerful as organized crime in other countries, like in Mexico
El Salvador is geographically small, making it easier for the government to control
Bukele had already removed checks and balances before the crackdown
In 2021, Bukele used his supermajority in the legislature to remove the attorney general, replace top judges, weaken local governments, and take control of almost all institutions that could limit presidential power.
Because there were no real limits on him, he could launch a massive crackdown that would have been impossible in a full, functioning democracy.
Lastly, Bukele had a pact with the gangs before the crackdown
For years, the government and the gangs had an agreement that kept murders low. This deal weakened gang leadership and confused gang members about how to respond. When the pact collapsed, many gang members expected the government’s reaction to be temporary. Instead, the state moved quickly while the gangs were disorganized and unprepared. This unusual situation is unlikely to happen again in other countries.
Sources:
Meléndez-Sánchez, Manuel, and Alberto Vergara. "The Bukele Model: Will It Spread?" Journal of Democracy 35, no. 3 (2024): 84-98. https://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2024.a930429.