Silver Medal (offered: accommodation + waiver of registration fee + publication of the article by Springer)  

Ana Flávia Silva Alves Pereira , Federal University of São João del Rei , "What is Artificial Intelligence?"   

The paper  “What is Artificial Intelligence?” deserves the silver medal of the first edition of the Brazilian Philosophy Prize — Wonderful Philosophy — for bringing together, in a rare and fortunate way, literary quality, conceptual density, and full alignment with the methodological spirit of the project “What is this? That is the question!”.

This is, above all, a text of excellent philosophical style. The author constructs an engaging narrative, beginning with an everyday scene—the cold coffee, the illuminated screen, the responding cursor, the scribbled napkin—and progressively transforms it into a philosophical investigation into the nature of Artificial Intelligence. This strategy is not mere literary ornamentation: it fulfills a precise philosophical function, showing that the question "What is Artificial Intelligence?" emerges from the concrete experience of our time, that is, from the daily encounter with machines that speak, respond, simulate reasoning, and force us to reconsider what we understand by intelligence, language, and comprehension.

The article's originality lies in treating AI not simply as a technical, computational, or instrumental problem, but as a normative mirror: a device that reflects the structure of our reason without actually inhabiting it. The author forcefully formulates the idea that contemporary AI masters syntax, manipulates patterns, simulates coherence, and mobilizes humanity's textual memory, but remains separate from lived experience, normativity, vulnerability, trauma, and the way of life that makes human meaning possible. This distinction between linguistic performance and effective participation in the space of reason constitutes the strongest philosophical core of the text.

The dialogue with Turing, Searle, Descartes, Wittgenstein, Brandom, McDowell, Heidegger, Borges, Ogden, and Richards is conducted with fluidity and relevance. The author does not accumulate references externally; on the contrary, she integrates them organically into the development of the issue. Turing appears in the context of the performance of thought; Searle, in the difference between syntax and semantics; Wittgenstein, in the notion of form of life; Brandom and McDowell, in the normative dimension of rationality; Heidegger, in the absence of a situated existence; Borges, in the image of a library without an internal reader. The result is a conceptually articulated and at the same time accessible reflection.

The methodological adequacy is exemplary. The article directly answers the question "What is Artificial Intelligence?" through various procedures valued by the project: definition, word analysis, typification, analogy, proverb, philosophical joke, Venn diagram, square of opposition, and metaphilosophical reflection. AI is examined not only as a technical object, but as a philosophical notion situated at the intersection of language, logic, consciousness, body, and normativity. The use of diagrams reinforces the clarity of the argument and shows how philosophical exposition can gain strength through conceptual images.

The essay's climax lies in the final inversion of the Socratic question. The author begins by asking the machine, "What are you?", but ends by showing that the real question may be directed at ourselves: "What am I?". In this way, the investigation into AI becomes a reflection on humanity itself. The machine becomes a mirror in which we recognize, simultaneously, the power and the limits of our reason.

For these reasons, the article deserves the silver medal: it is original, elegant, philosophically rigorous, and extremely relevant today. It shows that the question "What is Artificial Intelligence?" cannot be answered solely by engineers or computer scientists, but requires a philosophical investigation into language, meaning, normativity, and human life.

Bronze Medal (offered: registration fee waiver) 

Celso de Oliveira Vieira ,  Federal University of Minas Gerais , " What is helping?" 

The paper “What is helping?” deserves the bronze medal of the first edition of the Brazilian Philosophy Prize — Wonderful Philosophy — for its rare combination of philosophical originality, methodological rigor, and relevance to contemporary normative ethics.

The text stands out for addressing the question "What is helping?" from an innovative perspective: instead of seeking only an abstract definition of the concept, it attempts to empirically determine where acts of helping are situated within the taxonomy of moral actions. To this end, it examines whether helping should be understood as an imperfect obligation, a supererogatory act, or civic courtesy, also revisiting the related concepts of suberogation and imperfect permission. This approach gives the article a simultaneously ethical, metaethical, and metaphilosophical dimension.

The originality of this work lies primarily in the use of experimental moral philosophy in a field dominated by traditional conceptual analyses. The author operationalizes complex ethical-normative categories through the variables of cost and frequency, subjecting them to empirical tests with 120 participants. This is an uncommon procedure in normative ethics, but here it is applied in a clear, well-structured, and philosophically relevant way. The study does not abandon conceptual reflection; on the contrary, it seeks to enrich it through data on moral common sense.

The article also demonstrates methodological consistency. The discussion articulates specialized literature on supererogation, imperfect obligations, civic courtesy, and suberogation; presents well-defined experimental scenarios; uses careful statistical analysis; and draws relevant philosophical consequences from the results obtained. The conclusion that morally relevant helping belongs primarily to the realm of imperfect obligations—and should be performed “sometimes,” but not necessarily always—offers an original contribution to the debate on the moral requirement of beneficence.

Furthermore, the text perfectly aligns with the spirit of the prize and the congress “What is this? That is the question!”, as it transforms the question “What is helping?” into a conceptual, normative, and methodological investigation. The article not only answers a philosophical question; it also proposes a way to investigate moral concepts, showing how the Socratic question can productively engage with contemporary empirical methods.

For these reasons, the article deserves the bronze medal: it is original, well-founded, methodologically bold, and philosophically fruitful, offering a unique contribution to normative ethics and metaphilosophical reflection on how moral concepts can be analyzed.