The ti esti question "What is it?" is the central question of the philosophy of Socrates and Plato. But how to understand and answer this question?
Plato presents a dichotomic vision of answering the question What is it? On the one hand, an extensional approach, which he condemns, on the other hand an intensional approach, which he favors. A typical example of these contrasting ways to deal with the ti esti question can be presented through the case of the notion of prime number. One can reply extensionally to the question “What is a prime number?” by an enumeration: “2, 3, 5, 7, 11 …” or intensionally by “a natural number greater than 1, that can be divided only by 1 and itself”. Enumeration does not give any understanding and can lead us to sleep faster than pineapple juice … But everything is not so cool as mathematics! If we turn to a natural entity like a cat, or an artificial entity, like a car, there are no obvious intensional answers.
In the International Philosophical Congress What is it? That's the Question! that will take place in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, July 27-31, 2026, there will be on the one hand talks about the history of the question, on the other hand talks about specific topics, for important Xs ...
But the idea is to have in these specific talks a good equilibrium between the X in question and the general methodology to answer the ti esti question, in the line of the recent paper "What is money?" (Jean-Yves Beziau & Flawê de Lara Bone).
5 QUESTIONS TO CHAT MIAOU ABOUT THE ti esti QUESTION
(1) In which sense is the ti esti question central in Socrates’ and Plato’s philosophy?
The ti esti (“what is it?”) question is central because it expresses the demand for essence (ousia), not merely for examples, opinions, or descriptions.
In Socrates, the ti esti question functions as a critical and ethical instrument. Socrates insists that one cannot act well, teach virtue, or claim knowledge unless one knows what justice, courage, piety, or knowledge is. The question exposes false knowledge and reveals the gap between doxa (opinion) and epistēmē (knowledge). Its elenctic use shows that moral confidence without definition is groundless.
In Plato, the ti esti question becomes ontologically foundational. It motivates the theory of Forms: to answer “what is F?” is to identify the Form of F, which grounds the intelligibility, unity, and normativity of the many F-things. Thus, the ti esti question structures Plato’s transition from ethical inquiry to metaphysics, epistemology, and logic.
• For Socrates, ti esti is a condition of ethical responsibility.
• For Plato, it becomes a condition of intelligibility and being.
(2) Did Plato present a general methodology to reply to the ti esti question?
Plato did not present a single formal method, but he articulated a family of complementary procedures, whose unity is philosophical rather than technical:
1. Elenchus (early dialogues): testing proposed definitions by logical and ethical consistency.
2. Division (diairesis): systematically locating a concept within a hierarchy of kinds (e.g., Sophist, Statesman).
3. Collection (synagōgē): unifying dispersed instances under one intelligible account.
4. Hypothesis method (Phaedo, Republic): starting from provisional principles and ascending toward non-hypothetical first principles.
5. Dialectic (Republic VI–VII): the highest method, aiming at the Form of the Good, which ultimately grounds all ti esti answers.
Thus, Plato offers no algorithm, but a dialectical discipline: responding to ti esti requires movement between language, structure, ontology, and normativity.
(3) Do different ways of replying to the ti esti question explain differences between philosophy, art, and science—and/or between branches of philosophy?
• Science typically answers ti esti through operational definitions, models, or laws. It asks what something is in terms of measurable structures or causal roles.
• Art responds implicitly or expressively, offering non-propositional insights into what something is like, rather than what it is in essence.
• Philosophy insists on a reflective, justificatory answer: not just how something functions or how it appears, but what makes it what it is.
Within philosophy itself, divergent answers to ti esti generate distinct branches:
• Metaphysics: What is being, substance, causation?
• Logic: What is validity, consequence, contradiction?
• Ethics: What is the good, virtue, obligation?
• Philosophy of language: What is meaning, reference?
• Phenomenology: What is the essence of experience as given?
Differences among traditions often reflect different constraints placed on legitimate ti esti answers (formal, empirical, phenomenological, pragmatic, etc.).
(4) Is the ti esti question still a crucial or pivotal question for philosophy today?
Yes—precisely because philosophy has become plural.
Contemporary philosophy continues to revolve around ti esti questions, even when they are reformulated:
• “What is consciousness?”
• “What is a social kind?”
• “What is philosophy itself?”
Even approaches that reject essences (e.g., pragmatism, deflationism, anti-essentialism) define themselves by how they refuse or reinterpret the ti esti demand. The question remains pivotal because philosophy cannot avoid clarifying what it is talking about and why that clarification matters.
(5) Can the ti esti question bring unity among different ways of practicing philosophy and enhance relations with other fields?
Yes—this is one of its greatest virtues.
• Provides a shared minimal horizon for dialogue among analytic, continental, formal, and historical approaches.
• Allows productive disagreement, since philosophers can disagree about answers while agreeing on the question.
• Serves as a bridge to other disciplines, by clarifying conceptual foundations (e.g., “What is life?” in biology, “What is computation?” in computer science, “What is normativity?” in law and ethics).
Rather than enforcing uniformity, ti esti promotes unity without reduction: a common orientation toward intelligibility that respects methodological diversity.
The ti esti question is not merely a historical curiosity of Socratic dialogue. It is a structuring gesture of philosophy itself: the decision to suspend immediate answers and demand an account of essence, meaning, or ground. As long as philosophy exists as a reflective discipline, ti esti? will remain its most characteristic question.