Court Cases -Historic

Steen v. County Council of Sussex County (1989)

https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/1989/576-a-2d-642-3.html 

Gibson v. Sussex Coucil (2005)

• MR Zone - Conditional Use for Townhouses (CU 1540)

https://caselaw.findlaw.com/de-court-of-chancery/1408670.html

(Provided by FindLaw for Legal Professionals.

Read the whole document to see why this case resulted in the opposite finding from Steen v. Sussex Council case of 1989.)

DNREC v. Sussex County, (No. 145, 2011)

 DNREC took the position that its regulations were complementary to the County’s rules and that they were not intended to preempt the Sussex County rules.  The Supreme Court disagreed.  It held that the DNREC regulations were not complementary and directly conflicted with the Sussex County zoning rules and DNREC thereby exceeded its authority to impose the regulations on Sussex County in a zoning matter.  The Court discussed both chapters 69 and 70 of Title 9, as well as chapter 75 of Title 7, but concluded that none of these statutes allowed the purported complementary DNREC regulation to preempt Sussex County’s authority in land use matters granted to it by the General Assembly.  

O'Neill v. Town of Middletown, et al. (2006)

https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2006/78830-1.html

https://casetext.com/case/oneill-v-town-of-middletown

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/59146ea5add7b0493433a233#

Date Submitted: July 5, 2006

Date Decided: July 10, 2006

Green v. County Council of Sussex County (1985)

Court of Chancery of Delaware, Sussex County.

Submitted: December 20, 1985.

Decided: March 19, 1986.

This explains the history of Sussex Comp Plan since 1970.

Hickman v. Workman (1982)

“The government of Sussex County, as established by this chapter, shall assume and have all powers which, under the Constitution of the State, it would be competent for the General Assembly to grant by specific enumeration, and which are not [otherwise] denied by statute, . . . including the power to set the tax rate upon the assessed valuation of all real property[,] but not including certain other powers not relevant to our discussion.  See 9 Del. C. § 7001(a).  Chapter 70 goes on to make it absolutely clear that, while broad in nature, the delegation of authority is not absolute:  “[a]ll powers of the County shall be vested in the county government, except as otherwise provided by this title or other laws of this State, and the county government shall provide for the exercise thereof and for the performance of all duties and obligations on the County by law.” (emphasis added).

Hartigan v. Sussex Board Of Adjustment (2018)

• AR-1 Zone - Special Use of Homeless Shelter

https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=270900

The court cited §115-15 Prohibited Uses that says :

"Unless the contrary is clear from the context of the lists or other regulations of this chapter, uses not specifically listed are prohibited. "

The BOA had approved the use of homeless shelter citing it is like a 'tourist home' that is allowed as special use in AR-1.

However, the court said a homeless shelter is not a tourist home and since homeless shelter is not listed as permitted special use circumstances in §115-23, it is not allowed!

Batson Creek Estates v. SUSSEX COUNTY COUNCIL and OA OAKS, LLC. (2020)

May 4, 2020

https://public.fastcase.com/Wl%2B2t%2BeVuI35%2FN70vAMFZh0xsArDMiddvbNEvPt1OdwVEsgruWMZ9c%2Fl9q6yv8322dpr1Smk6ilRnJrLzVn83w%3D%3D

D. The Rezoning Was Not Spot Zoning

 As what appears to me to be a final "Hail Mary," the Plaintiffs argue that the rezoning should be invalidated because it constitutes unconstitutional or impermissible spot zoning. At common law, the maximum development of real property was encouraged, and property owners' rights to develop were limited only by tort concepts such as nuisance and trespass. As zoning codes were adopted, states and municipalities began to limit the use to which owners could put property, in the interest of the perceived public good. However, regard for due process required that the property owners be free, at least, from arbitrary or discriminatory seizures of property rights. It is this concern that animates the requirement that rezoning applications not be acted upon arbitrarily or capriciously, and, before the widespread adoption of comprehensive development plans to guide zoning decisions, it animated the prohibition against spot zoning, as well.

        In McQuail v. Shell Oil Co.,220 the Delaware Supreme Court stated that spot zoning is "generally defined as an attempt to wrench a small lot or a small area from its environment and give it a new rating that disturbs the tenor of the community. Normally, spot-zoning benefits a private interest and has no relation to the general public interest."221 This Court observed in Scarborough v. Mayor and Council of Town of Cheswold222 that "[t]he hallmark of spot zoning is the extension of special treatment, usually preferential, to the owner of a small parcel of land which differs in no reasonable regard from that of his neighbors."223 In evaluating whether a rezoning alleged to be spot zoning is valid, several factors may be considered including "whether the differently-zoned land was unfit for the uses allowed in the surrounding lands or was inherently distinguishable from those lands" and "is whether the land whose zone differs from neighboring land, or the neighboring land itself, is host to a nonconforming use."224 Notably, my research indicates that spot zoning has never been employed to invalidate a zoning ordinance in Delaware.225

        Spot zoning is most likely to occur in the absence of a formally-adopted comprehensive plan. In that case, rezoning decisions are essentially ad hoc, yet due process requires that zoning decisions are consistent with some overarching plan or design; otherwise, the rezoning represents an arbitrary exercise of power. Thus, our Supreme Court in McQuail stated that "[t]he requirement that there be a plan is satisfied if the change of zoning classification bears some reasonable relation to the scheme of zoning adopted in the basic zoning code."226

        But post-McQuail, Delaware has imposed a Comprehensive Plan on Sussex County, and I have found the rezoning here compatible with that plan.227 In such a case, to my mind, the spot zoning prohibition is subsumed within the requirement that the Council act consistently with the Comprehensive Plan. Such a reading comports with the review of spot zoning claims in sister states. While spot zoning is defined differently across states, generally the term refers to a rezoning of a tract of land that does not reasonably further the general welfare or that is not reasonably consistent with the overarching comprehensive zoning plan.228 Likewise, many states hold that zoning in accord with a comprehensive plan—that is, an inferred scheme of zoning regulations, not a formally adopted plan—cannot be spot zoning.229 In Green v. County Council of Sussex County,230 this Court held that to comply with the Federal Constitution, a zoning regulation must be in accordance with "a comprehensive plan," i.e., "ascribable to or consistent with some rational plan or purpose" and "it is this requirement that is violated when a zoning regulation is struck down as impermissible 'spot zoning.'"231 Green then continues that where a formal comprehensive development plan has been adopted, such as in Delaware, zoning regulations must not only be "ascribable to some rational scheme that seeks to achieve the public welfare"—that is, "non-arbitrary" and consistent with a comprehensive plan, per the above—but also "consistent with or in accordance with the particular scheme portrayed in the adopted comprehensive development plan."232 Green proceeded to review the zoning change solely under the more stringent standard of compliance with the Sussex County Comprehensive Development Plan.

        Thus, by stating that spot zoning occurs when zoning regulations are not "ascribable to or consistent with some rational plan or purpose" Green defines spot zoning for purposes of Delaware law as violating that lower standard of proof against which zoning regulations are examined where a formal comprehensive plan has not been enacted.233

        Because Delaware law mandates the adoption of a formal comprehensive development plan, it is unsurprising that McQuail's "reasonable relation" standard has fallen into desuetude; Green itself stated that McQuail's standard was "inapposite" when assessing conformity with a particular previously-adopted plan.234 I conclude that, where a zoning change has been found to be consistent with the particular adopted comprehensive plan and not arbitrary or capricious, it would be redundant to subject such rezoning to additional spot zoning review. That is because review under the particular comprehensive plan—under Green—is more searching than the McQuail standard. Additionally, any potential daylight for a spot zoning claim between the Green standard and a review under McQuail's "reasonable relation" standard is covered by a review of whether the rezoning is arbitrary or capricious.235 Therefore, since the rezoning here is both consistent with a formally adopted comprehensive plan and not arbitrary or capricious, it is not spot zoning under Delaware law.

Ashburn & Son v. Kent County Planning Com'n, 962 A.2d 235 (Del. 2008)

https://public.fastcase.com/waZtJvSA54UAurM2rmIZz0m3ZCp3yL9TnTOsEhsq2xT%2FlT3oC3rd%2BdRnwiA56LlaEgNAaPel%2FEWG26DDMIYp1w%3D%3D

(also note DiFrancesco v. Mayor and Town Council of Elsmere mentioned in [962 A.2d 241] )

"The reasoning of DiFrancesco is persuasive and we adopt it here. If the Commission is empowered to deny proposals that meet all applicable statutory and Code criteria, purchasers of land would be left unable to predict whether they can develop their land in accordance with the pertinent zoning ordinances, or whether instead the County may prevent development based upon non-Code related ad hoc determinations. Here, Ashburn purchased land zoned AC, a classification that permits the kind of subdivision development that Ashburn was proposing. Upholding a denial of Ashburn's plan even though it complied with all Kent County Code criteria, would upset Ashburn's reasonable development expectations when it purchased the land for development."

(also note JNK, LLC v. Kent County Regional Planning Commission )

 "a land owner submitted to the Commission a plan to subdivide property that, like Ashburn's property, was zoned AC and fell outside the Growth Zone.22 The Commission denied the application based on infrastructure, health, safety, and welfare concerns.23 Moreover, the Commission did not identify any aspect of the application that failed to conform to the requirements in the County Code. The Superior Court initially remanded the case to the Commission so that "the Commission can make its determination based on the subdivision regulations,

[962 A.2d 242]

the zoning regulations and any other pertinent regulations contained within the KCC."24 After the case returned to the Superior Court, the court instructed the Commission as follows:

        (1) [I]f the Commission finds that all the regulations are complied with, the plan is approved; (2) if the Commission finds that all the regulations are complied with, but the Commission has some concerns it desires to condition final plan approval on, the approval is made contingent on the completion of those requirements; (3) if the Commission finds that some regulation is not complied with, the plan is denied; or (4) if the Commission finds that in order to determine if the regulations have been complied with more information is required, the plan is tabled until the information has been provided.25"