The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

Although at Yalta Stalin had approved the idea of consultation between the Soviet and Allied military staffs, this had not led to easy contact. The Soviet military authorities continued to be slow in responding to requests or suggestions of co-operation, and when they did it was usually to evade or refuse. Stalin and his service chiefs seemed content with the general knowledge of campaign plans given and gotten at Yalta; to have the battle roll on in the East and West without more talk or ado.

Although victory was thus growing near, agreement on many important elements and aspects of the future of Europe was not: the treatment of Germany; occupation zones in Austria; the nature of the government of Poland and its future frontiers; the share to be accorded the United States and Great Britain in the control of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Negotiations over some of these questions were becoming set and shrill. The tide of trust that had flowed at Yalta was ebbing fast. Stalin was giving way to suspicion of the American-British conduct of the war and to resentment at their attempts to maintain influence in any region near Soviet frontiers. To the Western allies it seemed that the Russians were becoming indifferent to their wartime promises.

The American and British governments admitted that the Soviet determination to prevent hostile elements in the countries near its frontiers from gaining control was not without fair reason. Such precaution, within balanced measure, could be justified by the need to protect Soviet occupation forces. The American and British authorities were similarly keeping an alert watch over political developments in the liberated areas of the West – Italy, Greece, France and Belgium. But within the large area of remaining political choice, the American and British governments hoped that the Soviet government would be as willing as they were to respect the right of other peoples to choose the government under which they would live – as proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter and reaffirmed in the Declaration on Liberated Europe. This was an offshoot of the conception that the three great allies were to remain closely joined, and without fear of one another.

But Soviet actions showed an unwillingness to trust the outcome of the democratic political contest, and a ruthless will to make sure that all of Central and Eastern Europe was governed by its dependent supporters. This set purpose was not affected by cooperation in combat or by appeals to principle. The Soviet Union wanted space, satellite peoples and armies, additional economic resources, and a favourable chance for Communism to spread its influence. The American government was disturbed by the signs of these intentions and by the spirit of mistrust behind them. The British government, with its longer memory of the struggles in Europe, was less surprised but even more disturbed. Churchill, who had spoken as though he thought the Yalta Accords ended the need for anxiety, began now to experience ‘deep despond’, all the more so since he was failing to get the American government to realise, in his own words, that ‘Soviet Russia had become a mortal danger to the free world’, and thus the need for creating at once a new military front against its onward sweep. Such was the blight that fell upon the coalition just as, at long last, the evil that Hitler had summoned up was being destroyed.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]