Abstract:

Recent literature in the philosophy of physics has focused on the challenge of empirical incoherence: the threat that some theories would defeat the evidence in their favour. Since its initial introduction in reference to the so-called “bare theory” of quantum mechanics in the 90s (see Barrett 1996 and 1999, pp. 116–117), empirical incoherence has been discussed in relation to various domains of fundamental physics—from quantum gravity to a number of interpretations of quantum mechanics, from cosmology to thermodynamics. In Adlam (2025), the focus is extended to more general hypothesis in the philosophy of science such as objective chances, induction, fine-tuning, multiverses, superdeterminism, retrocausality, non-locality, contextuality, naturalness and the autonomy of scales. For each of these applications, the challenge follows from the specific ontological and epistemological implications of the theory or hypothesis under examination. In some cases, such as for proposals in quantum gravity and for wavefunction realism in quantum mechanics, the target is the so-called ‘disappearance of spacetime’; in others, as in observer-relative interpretations of quantum mechanics, the threat is of epistemic solipsism; in yet other cases, such as for many-worlds quantum mechanics, the theory potentially undermines the standard understanding of probabilities, and so on. Given such an internal variety to the debate, the question of how the different applications relate to each other arises. My proposal is to unify the discussion by letting formal epistemology inform our understanding of the challenge. By so doing, we can better specify the structural aspects of the problem, and its implications. In particular, one of the main distinctions internal to the family of epistemic defeaters, the one between rebutting and undercutting defeaters, carves out three three kinds of empirical incoherence: empirical theories can be self-rebutting, self-undercutting, or exhibit a combination of both kinds of self-defeat, giving rise to genuinely mixed cases. In my talk, I will introduce these three kinds of empirical incoherence and show how the main challenges of empirical incoherence put forward in the extant literature fall into each category. I will then look at some logical and pragmatical implications of adopting the distinction.

Pierce and Ray will begin by outlining math-first realism before speculating on what it might entail for philosophers of physics and raising concerns for its methodological viability. They will subsequently facilitate discussion of it. 

Suggested pre-reading: 

1. "Stating Structural Realism: Mathematics-First Approaches to Physics and Metaphysics" (David Wallace, 2022) 

2. "Stating math-first realism: some tentative proposals" (Caspar Jacobs, 2024) 

Abstract:

It has been argued, since its first formulation in 1905, that the Special Theory of Relativity shows that simultaneity is conventional. Call this thesis, which holds that within Special Relativity there are no facts of the matter about whether two distant events are simultaneous, the Conventionality of Simultaneity Thesis (CST). In this talk, I will first clarify the CST by identifying three senses in which simultaneity may be said to be conventional, only one of which would confirm the CST. I will then show that while there is no good reason to believe the CST is true, there is some reason to believe it is false. The CST is most often motivated by demonstrating that it is impossible to empirically determine whether two events are simultaneous. I grant this epistemic premise but deny the usual inference to an ontological conclusion that simultaneity is conventional in a non-trivial sense. This step distinguishes my approach from that of past anti-conventionalist arguments, whose strategy has often seemed to involve providing a proof that identifies which simultaneity convention is the correct one. Having thus shown that the usual argument for the CST is insufficient, I will proceed to offer two direct arguments against the thesis. One shows that the metaphysical picture CST theorists must endorse is conceptually problematic. The other, which assumes a neo-Kantian view of physical theories, argues that simultaneity might best be understood as a constitutive a priori principle of special relativity—a presupposition required for the theory to be capable of making sense of our sensory experience. In the course of developing both of these arguments, I will consider and reject possible objections an advocate of the CST might seek to press. My conclusion will be that, given the current state of play, there are compelling reasons to reject the CST.

Abstract:

While one might hope that the transition from quantum mechanics to quantum field theory preserves an intuitive picture of localised physical entities, this expectation quickly breaks down. In relativistic quantum field theory, the notion of a spatially localised particle is far from straightforward. The standard construction proceeds by selecting a positive-frequency subspace of classical solutions to ensure a Hamiltonian bounded from below. However, within this framework, there is no well-defined position operator with sharply localised eigenstates; at best, one obtains unsharp or approximately localised states. This undermines the familiar quantum-mechanical picture of particles as entities with definite spatial localisation.

This motivates alternative localisation schemes, most notably the Newton–Wigner (NW) construction, which restores a sharp notion of position. NW localisation provides well-defined position operators and localised states, but this comes with significant costs: it is frame-dependent, fails to transform covariantly under Lorentz boosts, and permits superluminal propagation. As such, it sits uneasily with the relativistic structure that quantum field theory is meant to respect.

The tension between these schemes reflects a deeper question about the ontology of quantum field theory: how, if at all, should we understand observables associated with a spacetime region O? In this talk, I will compare the field and NW localisation as competing schemes that encode different physical priorities. I will argue that the failure of NW localisation to respect microcausality undermines its candidacy as a fundamental localisation scheme. Instead, we should accept field localisation while revising our expectations of local operations. 

Abstract: 

Recent work by Dawid and Tibault (2014) claims that the Deutsch--Wallace theorem (DW) is, in the words of March (2024), `redundant' in high-weight branches of the wavefunction: we get everything we need to know from standard statistical inference. March (2024) challenges this claim by arguing that the Deutsch--Wallace theorem really gives us rational betting behaviour as a /prediction/ of Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM), which can be confirmed or falisified by experiment.

I will go further than this: I will argue that regarding DW as redundant is circular. Wallace (2012) has already pointed out that the problem in Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) also exists in general for stochastic theories. Indeed, the conclusion of DW is similar to the statistical postulate (SP), which states that large regions of phase space are more probable than small regions, in other words, that one should take it that the correct probability distribution over phase space is uniform. One can argue for SP in a similar fashion to how one derives DW, based on symmetry arguments. In statistical mechanics, a proof of SP is certainly not redundant: it prevents us from trying to make a circular argument like `high-entropy states are more likely because they take up more volume in phase space'.

To expand on this, I will look at what the above kind of claim tells us in both EQM and hidden-variables theories. Specifically, I will sketch a model of so-called `superdeterminism' and examine what inhabitants of a superdeterministic world would need to believe in order to reject SP. I will compare this to what inhabitants of high-weight branches would need to believe in order to reject DW. I will also show what inhabitants of low-weight branches would need to believe in order to accept DW. I will argue that in all of these cases the necessary beliefs would be incompatible with normal scientific reasoning: DW, then, far from being redundant, is in fact a necessary component of EQM.

Abstract: 

Recent work by Dawid and Tibault (2014) claims that the Deutsch--Wallace theorem (DW) is, in the words of March (2024), `redundant' in high-weight branches of the wavefunction: we get everything we need to know from standard statistical inference. March (2024) challenges this claim by arguing that the Deutsch--Wallace theorem really gives us rational betting behaviour as a /prediction/ of Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM), which can be confirmed or falisified by experiment.

I will go further than this: I will argue that regarding DW as redundant is circular. Wallace (2012) has already pointed out that the problem in Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) also exists in general for stochastic theories. Indeed, the conclusion of DW is similar to the statistical postulate (SP), which states that large regions of phase space are more probable than small regions, in other words, that one should take it that the correct probability distribution over phase space is uniform. One can argue for SP in a similar fashion to how one derives DW, based on symmetry arguments. In statistical mechanics, a proof of SP is certainly not redundant: it prevents us from trying to make a circular argument like `high-entropy states are more likely because they take up more volume in phase space'.

To expand on this, I will look at what the above kind of claim tells us in both EQM and hidden-variables theories. Specifically, I will sketch a model of so-called `superdeterminism' and examine what inhabitants of a superdeterministic world would need to believe in order to reject SP. I will compare this to what inhabitants of high-weight branches would need to believe in order to reject DW. I will also show what inhabitants of low-weight branches would need to believe in order to accept DW. I will argue that in all of these cases the necessary beliefs would be incompatible with normal scientific reasoning: DW, then, far from being redundant, is in fact a necessary component of EQM.

Abstract: 

Algebraic methods in QFT can be used to study theoretical aspects of semiclassical quantum gravity. Recently, a framework has been proposed for formulating an algebra of observables along the worldline of an observer. By ‘gravitationally dressing’ the observables to the observer’s worldline, which defines the time evolution for the operators, the algebra can be formulated without specifying the background in which the observer propagates. Physicists therefore claim that this construction constitutes a truly background independent approach to quantum gravity. The goal of this talk is to connect this discussion to the philosophical literature on background independence in quantum gravity. We argue that existing notions of background independence are insufficient to fully capture the sense in which a theory can be background independent within a semiclassical framework. Instead, we propose a new notion of ‘perturbative background independence,’ which we argue is more appropriate for semiclassical algebraic approaches to quantum gravity.

This paper examines longstanding concerns about gravitational energy and asks what it takes to rule out perpetual motion machines in General Relativity (GR). The answer is subtle. GR resists familiar assumptions behind conservation: there is no gravitational insulator, and defining an isolated system typically relies on asymptotic flatness. While the covariant conservation of stress–energy always holds, it offers little dynamical insight. Generic spacetimes lack Killing vectors, and stress–energy pseudotensors are non-tensorial and non-unique. To clarify these difficulties, I distinguish energy conservation (a closed-system notion) from energy balance (an open-system relation). I then argue that gravitational-energy eliminativism associated with Hoefer (2000) and Duerr (2019, 2021) faces a pressure often missed: if energy balance is abandoned altogether, one loses any upper bound on extractable work in gravitational-wave processes, leaving room—in principle—for gravitational perpetual motion machines. Drawing on the asymptotic balance between ADM energy, Bondi energy, and radiative energy (Ashtekar and Magnon-Ashtekar 1979), I propose an account of energy balance as a constraint on maximal extractable work, compatible with gravitational-energy skepticism. 

Abstract:

In 1939, Fritz London and Edmond Bauer published The Theory of Observation in Quantum Mechanics. In this ‘little book’, as Eugene Wigner called it, the authors gave an account of the measurement process in quantum mechanics. The work did not receive much attention from philosophers until recently, in a book by Steven French titled A Phenomenological Approach to Quantum Mechanics (2023), in which French claims that what was implicit in London and Bauer’s work was in fact a new approach to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, namely aphenomenological approach. Laced with historical narrative, French’s attempt to bring out exactly what such a position entails is unclear. In this talk, I aim to explicate French’s position and explore what such a phenomenological approach might entail for the ontology of quantum theory. I claim that insofar as an observer-system distinction can be drawn, phenomenology offers us a legitimate way of framing this distinction in a manner that allows us to escape the problem of macroscopic superpositions. I argue that despite such a success, it comes with a high metaphysical price-tag.

Abstract: 

Over the last decade, Richard Healey has developed a pragmatist approach to quantum theory which promises to solve the measurement problem without hidden variables, many worlds or collapse. In recent papers, Healey argues that, according to this interpretation, facts are relative. I argue this is mistaken: although there is a sense in which measurement outcomes are relative, facts themselves are not.

I will briefly outline the details of his interpretation, paying particular attention to his take on semantics in the light of quantum theory. I will argue that such semantics indicates that measurement outcomes are indeed relative to an agent-situation, but it does not suggest that facts themselves are. Finally, time-allowing, I will explain how Healey’s approach deals with the popular Extended Wigner’s Friend Scenarios.

This is work in progress.

Abstract: 

Generality is one of the cardinal virtues of science: general theories are better theories. The problem of quantum gravity is that our two most general physical theories - general relativity (GR) and quantum mechanics (QM) - are incompatible, undermining one another's foundations. It is normally assumed that some more general theory is waiting to be found, which will explain both GR and QM as its application to particular domains. In this talk I want to offer a different explanation: that the generalities of GR and QM are of different kinds, distinct extrapolations from an implicit dualism between viewer and view. This suggests that the problem of quantum gravity is philosophical, rather than scientific, and has its true source closer to home.

Abstract: 

Philosophical exchanges can go awry in a wide variety of ways.  One interlocutor may mistakenly assume that their interlocutor knows nothing. Interlocutors may not share the same set of hermeneutic resources, and may therefore talk past each other. Pairs of interlocutors might enter interactions seeking different outcomes. Aside from occasionally yielding frustrating outcomes, I argue that these conversational failings have a more damaging outcome: they contribute to the exclusion of philosophers who claim traditionally marginalized or excluded identities.

Following Hesni (2024), I take social scripts both to structure social interactions both  to better facilitate conversational cooperation and to serve as a mechanism to uphold social norms, including those that reinforce social hierarchies. I examine one social script familiar to anyone in academic philosophy: the one that begins with “What do you work on?” Depending on how each instance of this conversation evolves, it can lead one interlocutor to a double bind in which they either must cooperate and adopt a role in the conversation that is both passive and degrading while claiming a modest social benefit, or otherwise behave disruptively and incur social costs. With inspiration from O’Connor (2019), I model these interactions as a social coordination game played iteratively between pairs of interlocutors.  I then show how this game, when played iteratively by biased agents, counteracts efforts to diversify philosophical communities. If this game is an adequate toy model of social reality, this shows why it is that ordinary, non-resistant participation in academic philosophy is not neutral; it strengthens the structures of oppression that keep white men on top while simultaneously driving out those philosophers who claim traditionally marginalized or excluded identities.

References:

Hesni, Samia (2024). How to Disrupt a Social Script. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (1):24-45.

O’Connor, C. (2019). The origins of unfairness: Social categories and cultural evolution (First edition). Oxford University Press.

Abstract: 

This talk will primarily analyse the prediction and discovery of the Omega minus baryon. The confirmation of the particle's existence was a turning point for the acceptance of Gell-Mann and Ne’eman’s theory of the Eightfold Way, affirming its empirical success. As a result, it lay the groundwork for the quark model by providing confidence in the viability of Eightfold Way and turning physicists towards a deeper investigation of the scheme's SU(3) structure.

The prediction of the Omega minus particle has been analysed by philosophers as a non-standard form of inference, primarily due to the involvement of group theory in making an existence claim. Prominent accounts include Bangu (2007), Ginammi (2015), Bueno and French (2018), and Tricard (2023). These authors present a variety of interpretations, but tend to treat the inference either as a heuristic in the context of discovery, or as relying on premises that lack justification. I will argue that the features of the Eightfold Way mean that the inference did feature heuristic arguments, but that they were justified precisely because of the group theory involved, alongside the explicitly tentative nature of Eightfold Way. In particular, I will propose a form of inference that I call possibility counting from symmetries (PCS), where the possibility space of certain theories are constructed based on group-theoretic tools, thereby justifying the prediction of new entities.  Finally, I will consider implications and limitations of PCS for theories beyond the Eightfold Way, such as the Higgs mechanism and supersymmetry.

Abstract: Things appear to be different from different perspectives. The standard reply to this perspectival variance is to claim that such differences are mere appearances and not part of reality. Lipman (2016) argues that special relativity (SR) radically extends this perspectival variance to most of the ways in which things appear to us. Given the wealth of properties subject to perspectival variance, Lipman argues that denying their reality is problematic. On the other hand, by adopting a picture of reality as fragmented, one can embrace the reality of such variant properties (Lipman 2018). I argue that in so far as such a fragmentalist metaphysics may be motivated, it is not motivated by SR. Instead, it is possible to understand SR within a single unified reality, and it is unclear whether the fragmentalist approach to SR delivers the advantages Lipman advertises.

I will start by explaining that SR does not establish the kind of perspectival variance envisaged by Lipman. As a consequence, Lipman's arguments are left severely weakened. I will then sketch an alternative to the fragmentalist account of SR, thus illustrating how one can can understand SR within a single, unified reality. A comparison between these two approaches shows that fragmentalism fails to deliver the advantages Lipman advertises.

Abstract: In a recent paper, Robertson and Prunkl (2023) - Is Thermodynamics Subjective? (Philosophy of Science, 90 (5)) - address a crucial concern with respect to thermodynamics: the claim that including epistemic factors - such as agents/observers and their varying degrees of credence - renders the theory subjective or anthropocentric, as it appears that fundamental thermodynamic distinctions (for instance, between heat and work) are observer-dependent. The authors contend that quantum mechanics can liberate thermodynamics from this issue as quantum probabilities are inherently objective; they allow for agent-independent assertions that are consistent with the thermodynamic description of a system, thereby establishing the objectivity of thermodynamics. However, contrary to what the authors argue, I argue that an observer's role is overstated and largely unnecessary for achieving objective thermal system descriptions. In typical states, thermal systems evolve toward their attractor distribution in an objective manner, independent of whether observers employ classical or quantum credences, indicating that the use of objective expectation values does not play a critical role in making objective thermodynamic statements. I further explain why factors such as coarse-graining, resource-relativity, and choice of measure - which although involve agent-dependent considerations - do not inject subjectivity into thermodynamics. The overall conclusion is that quantum considerations do not remove the anthropocentrism inherent in thermodynamics since there was none anyway.​​

Abstract: In this talk, I show that the Jarzynski equality implicitly contains an alternative method for deriving equations of state for thermal systems through processes that are far from being thermodynamically reversible.

The thermodynamic state of a system is characterised by a small number of parameters, known as state functions (e.g., total energy, temperature, pressure, and entropy), which are well-defined only in equilibrium. Finding the so-called equations of state, which relate state functions, provides thermal physics with predictive power. Deriving these equations necessitates equalities between thermal quantities, which typically hold only for the special case of thermodynamically reversible processes. Reversible processes are conceived as the limiting case of irreversible processes in which imbalances between thermal quantities tend to zero.

The fluctuation theorems are a family of results in statistical thermodynamics which enable the derivation of equalities between the probabilities of thermal quantities and hold irrespective of the nature of the process. I propose that Jarzynski's equality - a fluctuation theorem equating the expectation value of the exponentiated work with the exponential of the free energy difference between a pair of states at the same temperature - offers a practical method for deriving equations of state without invoking reversibility (Jarzynski 1997, 2011). For this, I outline additional steps that allow us to estimate the free energy difference (and hence the partition function) at different temperatures. This means that the equations of state can be derived by analysing sets of processes that are arbitrarily far away from equilibrium. Such a move is possible only if we take the statistical fluctuations seriously. Reversibility is recovered in the limit as the set of irreversible processes tends to infinity, although no assumption is made about the actual existence of  such a set.

Abstract: I will discuss the relation between two important quantities in statistical mechanics: the coarse-grained Gibbs entropy and the phase-averaged Boltzmann entropy. These quantities (I will argue) are the best options for reducing thermodynamic entropy available to the Gibbsian and Boltzmannian frameworks respectively. Gibbsians must use the coarse-grained Gibbs entropy since the fine-grain version is a constant of motion, and makes the use of probability distributions hard to justify. Boltzmannians meanwhile ought to use the phase-averaged Boltzmann entropy, since this gives them access to probability distributions, which are an indispensable tool. They also ought not to have a problem with using these distributions, since Boltzmannian qualms with probability distributions fall flat if we are not committed to using the Gibbs entropy to reduce thermodynamic entropy. 

The coarse-grained Gibbs entropy and the phase-averaged Boltzmann entropy are related simply - the difference between them is equal to the Shannon entropy of the distribution over macro-states (i.e. the probabilities in the entropy function are probabilities of being in a certain macro-state, not in a certain micro-state). This means that disagreements between the two is much easier to quantify than in the case of the un-averaged Boltzmann entropy and the fine-grain Gibbs entropy; that debate usually requires argumentation around the concept of equilibrium, and the status of probabilities. Specifically, it means that the two frameworks agree to the extent that the distribution used is certain about the macro-state of the system. I will explore this consequence for a variety of ways we could interpret and set the probability function, namely, as a credence function, as the actual distribution of many systems, as the actual state of a single system, and as the distribution of a single system over a period of time.

Abstract: Approximate symmetries played a significant role in the development of particle physics during the mid-twentieth century. This talk will analyse the case of SU(3) flavour symmetry, also known as the Eightfold Way. Developed independently by Murray Gell-Mann and Yuval Ne'eman, the theory is usually presented as a mere stepping stone towards quantum chromodynamics, due to its approximate nature. Nevertheless, I argue that there are aspects of the theory that are philosophically significant. Focusing on Gell-Mann's 1961 Caltech Report, I will analyse four features of the scheme: (1) the issue of broken symmetries; (2) the application of group theory; (3) the use of false models; and (4) the role of formal analogies. I will consider their impact on our understanding of the Eightfold Way, with an emphasis on how they inform our understanding of Gell-Mann's prediction of the omega baryon, the empirical confirmation of which led to widespread acceptance of the Eightfold Way and to the development of the quark model.

Abstract: In the last two decades, the orthodox view that same-type particles in quantum mechanics are always indiscernible has been repeatedly challenged by proponents of anti-factorism, who argue that some same-type particles can be qualitatively discerned. However, the anti-factorist project faces a range of ambiguity problems - for example, basis-arbitrariness - which give rise to rival and partly incompatible criteria for individuation. This talk provides an overview of these ambiguity problems as they arise in both synchronic and diachronic individuation, and discusses strategies for managing them. These strategies, however, come at a cost: the anti-factorist must either accept that same-type particles are not uniquely discernible in many contexts, or abandon the particle picture altogether in non-relativistic quantum mechanics.

Abstract: Recent work in the philosophy of the semi-classical gravity has argued that certain paradoxes arise in the modelling of black hole evaporation. Ryder (forthcoming) has argued that canonical derivations of the Hawking effect involve a paradoxical use of stationary spacetimes, and Chua (2025) has argued that a class of derivations of the backreaction of Hawking radiation on the black hole involve problematic use of idealized asymptotically flat models. In this paper I 'deidealize' these apparently problematic models by justifying the idealizations used. This justification comes in two types: type A involves showing the models draw the correct conclusions despite the idealizations, while type B involves showing why the idealizations used don’t lead to the wrong conclusions. I argue that in all four cases (types A and B for separately backreaction and Hawking radiation arguments) the deidealization requires the large scale structure of induction, as discussed by Norton (2024). I discuss a sense in which this may generalise to an important form of scientific inference, which I call the large scale structure of deidealization.

Abstract: I provide a systematic exploration of one set of precise technical conditions under which matter fields might be said to be "adapted" to a relativistic spacetime geometry - namely, that the equations governing those matter fields be minimally coupled, quasilinear, and symmetric hyperbolic. In particular, I show that this class of theories necessarily satisfy (i) the dominant energy condition, (ii) the conservation condition, and (iii) the Geroch-Earman causality condition. (This suffices for them to satisfy a version of the geodesic principle, and closes the gap between Geroch-Earman causality and the dominant energy condition.) I also discuss the relationships between minimal coupling, the "strong equivalence principle", "local (approximate) Poincaré symmetry", and the "local validity of special relativity", thus clearing up issues in the geometry-dynamics debate about the meaning and status of those principles.

Abstract: I provide a systematic exploration of one set of precise technical conditions under which matter fields might be said to be "adapted" to a relativistic spacetime geometry - namely, that the equations governing those matter fields be minimally coupled, quasilinear, and symmetric hyperbolic. In particular, I show that this class of theories necessarily satisfy (i) the dominant energy condition, (ii) the conservation condition, and (iii) the Geroch-Earman causality condition. (This suffices for them to satisfy a version of the geodesic principle, and closes the gap between Geroch-Earman causality and the dominant energy condition.) I also discuss the relationships between minimal coupling, the "strong equivalence principle", "local (approximate) Poincaré symmetry", and the "local validity of special relativity", thus clearing up issues in the geometry-dynamics debate about the meaning and status of those principles.

Abstract: The combination of Mach's hypothesis concerning the material origin of inertia and Einstein’s equivalence hypothesis on the unity of inertia and gravity raises the intriguing possibility that gravity may be explained entirely as the dynamical part of a relativized law of inertia. Shortly after the development of general relativity, it became clear that Einstein’s general covariance based approach does not reduce inertia to mass interactions. While Einstein subsequently treated "Mach's principle" as a selection criterion for models of his theory, there is an alternative research program that implements Mach's idea explicitly in its foundations. The aim of my talk is to bring attention to some of the key 20th Century papers that (retrospectively) form part of this research program, focussing in particular on Reissner (1915) and Sciama (1953). 

Although the approaches of Reissner and Sciama are quite different, they are unified insofar as they both embody this intriguing hypothesis. By looking at the common feature of such models, I draw out some of the key implications of the hypothesis, including the epochal variability of the gravitational 'constant' and a potential guarantee of the critical density condition in cosmology.

Abstract: 

Abstract:  In this talk, I will give an overview of the debate on whether Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), according to which qualitative difference is necessary for numerical difference, is violated by similar particles (like, e.g., two electrons). According to so-called orthodox views, PII is always violated or, at best, valid in a weak sense only. According to heterodox views, however, (a strong version of) PII is valid for similar particles in at least some cases. The main motivation for heterodox views is that orthodox arguments for the violation of PII (tacitly) rely on a certain background assumption - called factorism - which can be questioned from a physical point of view. Factorism is a semantical view concerning the quantum mechanical formalism; more specifically, it is the view that indices within this formalism have physical (not just mathematical) meaning. However, factorism yields some implausible consequences; e.g., according to one prominent argument, it hinders quantum particles from becoming localized in the classical limit. Another important concept on which heterodox views rely is a certain understanding of entanglement - called GMW-entanglement, because it goes back to physicists Ghirardi, Marinatto and Weber - which is argued to fit better for similar particles than the usual understanding in terms of non-factorizability. Since heterodox views are relatively recent, they suffer from a problem - the so-called ambiguity problem - to which a complete and satisfying solution is yet to be found. The ambiguity problem shows that individuation via properties (i.e., what heterodox views want to accomplish on an ontological level) is not unique, i.e., ambiguous. I will discuss different aspects of the ambiguity problem and propose some potential solutions.

Abstract:  Émilie Du Châtelet (1706-1749) is perhaps equally well-known for her magnum opus, the Institutions de Physique of 1740, and for her later French translation of and commentary to Newton's Principia (first published posthumously in 1756, with the corrected edition in 1759). One of the few topics which Du Châtelet addresses in detail in both the Institutions de Physique (chapter 15) and the commentary to her translation is Newton's arguments for his law of gravitation in the Principia. To date, however, no systematic comparison of the two has been undertaken (and very little has been said on either of them separately). I reconstruct and compare these two accounts. This offers a new perspective on Du Châtelet's developing thinking on the justification of Newton's law of gravitation within the Newtonian system.

Abstract:  Recent trends in this literature can be broadly characterised by the way they begin either from the mathematics or the metaphysics. I take Weatherall (2018) as the primary example of the mathematical approach, in which he argues that if one is only to reflect on the correct use of the mathematics, one can block or undermine the hole argument. For the metaphysical approach, I focus on a line of argument I identify in Pooley and Read (2021) in which they claim that arguments from mathematical practice fail to eliminate the relevant space of metaphysical possibilities. Specifically, they maintain that the hole diffeomorphic manifolds can represent haecceitistically different spacetimes. In response to these trends, the primary aims of this research are twofold: first, I articulate a structuralist account of scientific representation, building on Van Fraassen's structuralist empiricism (2008), that answers the demarcation problems posed by Frigg and Nguyen (2022); second, I aim to use this account to diagnose the reasons for, and provide solutions to, the recent impasse in the voluminous literature on the hole argument. While I am sympathetic to the arguments from mathematical practice, I argue that without a structuralist account of scientific representation Pooley and Read’s counterargument cannot be defused. While I am conceding this point, however, I am doing so in a minimal way: no such representation can meet the criteria of being a scientific representation. Further, if the points p and p' in the hole argument are to represent different events in spacetime, it is merely by means of stipulation. If, as I argue, scientific representation is to be understood structurally, for a manifold to be considered a model of a spacetime, it needs to include a representation relation, understood as some variety of structural mapping. Moreover, an isomorphism acting on a model would also need to have a corresponding transformation on the representation relation, which is at least sensitive to the strongest notion of structure in the manifold being considered. I conclude that, while mathematical practice alone fails to exclude the possibility of the hole diffeomorphic models representing haecceitistic differences, a structuralist account of scientific representation excludes the possibility of these classifying as scientific representations.​

Abstract:  The hole argument can be interpreted as a problem for the substantivalist. Weatherall (2018) argues that this argument derives from an incorrect use of the formalism of general relativity. It is in essence a charge of equivocation against the hole argument, as Pooley and Read (2021) have called it. Here, I present two criticisms of Weatherall's account. Firstly, interpreting the term 'sameness' or 'equivalence' as being used in different senses is unfair to the original presentation of the hole argument. Secondly, Weatherall's objection depends on an unwarranted identification of the metaphysical issue at stake with the identity map in mathematical practice. (I may also be able to present an attempt at reconciliation with Weatherall's insight.)

Abstract: This will be half presentation, half discussion about different notions of causality. I will go over the notions of what causality is in philosophic literature, statistical definitions of causality, and discuss whether a viable notion of causation exists in fundamental physics. Critics of fundamental causation, like Bertrand Russell, argue that fundamental physical laws are time-symmetric and describe correlations rather than causal mechanisms. They claim that causation is an emergent, high-level concept rather than an intrinsic feature of physical reality. This skepticism is supported by the time-reversal invariance of classical mechanics, quantum mechanics, and general relativity, which challenges the idea of a directional causal structure at a fundamental level. However, there are forms of time-directed processes in physics suggest a causal structure, like the cosmological arrow of time, entropy, or in the definition of initial conditions of systems. I will also discuss the interventionist account of causality, by Judea Pearl. I will add to this discussion that we can also use atemporal definitions of causality to describe certain phenomena, e.g. matter causes space-time to bend, which raises the question if causality, in principle, should be time-dependent if its definition can be broadened beyond temporal constraints. I would like to facilitate a discussion on what we deem to be correct notions of causality at the end.

Abstract: Minimal coupling is a heuristic used to construct dynamical equations for matter fields in general relativity. But as often been noted in both the physics and philosophy literature (since at least Trautman (1965), standard explications of 'minimal coupling' are either unclear, ambiguous, or 'hyperintensional'. In this talk (based on joint work with Jim Weatherall), I provide a precise explication of minimal coupling which avoids these problems. I also discuss how this explication can be used to resolve other puzzles about minimal coupling in the literature.​

Abstract: Under the semantic view of theories, structural accounts of representation that invoke the mathematical notion of isomorphism are prevalent. However, isomorphism accounts face significant objections, with the most problematic question being how the physical world can be placed in the mathematical relationship with abstract models.

I compare two accounts of representation presented by Bas van Fraassen and David Wallace. While van Fraassen's account is based on isomorphisms, he supplements it with an appeal to the intentions of scientists, indexically locating users in the logical space of the theory. On the other hand, Wallace's 'theories and theorizing' account attempts to forgo the aforementioned issues by arguing that any scientific theory in use already has its own theory of representation built in - and that this process is not viciously circular.

To evaluate these proposals, I will focus on the role of reference, indexicality and empirical grounding in these accounts. I will argue that, because of disanalogies between languages and scientific theories, Wallace's account is less persuasive than van Fraassen's despite strong thematic similarities - and that it may be insufficient for Wallace's metaphysical view of maths-first structural realism.

Abstract: Despite DeWitt’s claim that Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) offers its own interpretation, there is no consensus regarding EQM’s best ontology. I organize the possible ontologies according to the two following choice dimensions: one versus many concrete histories, and overlapping versus diverging histories. Accounts such as Conroy’s (2018) Everettian actualism, according to which there is one concrete world among many possible worlds that together form the branching structure, fail to account for precisely how our world earns the honor of being concrete. Regardless of whether the worlds themselves are diverging or overlapping, such an account requires the introduction of stochastic processes to EQM which would deprive EQM of its appealing deterministic nature. On the other hand, metaphysical accounts of EQM that posit many concrete worlds, such as Wilson’s (2020) quantum modal realism, face the serious objection over ontological extravagance, for they demand an infinite number of concrete worlds with identical initial conditions that just happen to together be governed by the global wave function. If one desires a parsimonious and genuinely deterministic account of EQM, one must entertain alternative options.

Fortunately, in my taxonomy, one type of ontology remains: many overlapping concrete worlds. This resembles early metaphysical readings of EQM, such as that of Dewitt (1970) and what Wallace (2014) calls the hydra view. Initial versions of the hydra view, however, cannot withstand the identity problem: post-branching, if there are now multiple agents where there once was one, which agent is really the original agent? How can one possibly make sense of the identity of objects on such an account? To dissolve this issue, I argue for one dendritic world. To any observer within the branching structure, it appears that measurements yield determinate outcomes, and this novel approach demands a new mereological account of the universe and the objects within it. In addition to material parts and temporal parts, I propose branch-like parts (BLiP). Each object in this singular branching world is the mereological sum of its BLiPs; when an agent-BLiP undergoes decoherent branching, it is simply the case that they split into additional agent-BLiPs. This new mereological relation allows one to avoid common objections against one world metaphysics of EQM by increasing the structure of our world, while simultaneously decreasing the number of worlds that we must posit from an infinite number to only one.

Abstract: I argue that both dark energy and inflationary cosmology represent cases of so-called 'permanent underdetermination' of theory by evidence. I then present (a) a taxonomy of possible responses to underdetermination, and (b) an understanding of both dark energy and inflationary cosmology from an effective field point of view, in order to argue that while there is a response that can partially alleviate some of the concerns about underdetermination in the dark energy sector, these concerns persist in the inflationary sector.

Abstract: Science typically operates under the assumption that with more research, regular and predictable patterns will be discovered in areas where regularity is not yet evident. When scientists encounter a complicated pattern, they often search for underlying periodicities that may be obscured by random noise. 

Chaotic systems are characteristically hard to predict despite being governed by deterministic dynamics. They appear random due to their non-periodicity and exhibit sensitive dependence on initial conditions; a small change in the initial state of a deterministic nonlinear system can result in large differences at a later time. This suggests the critical importance of precise measurements for making accurate predictions. In practice, the reliability of predictions is compromised by three principal factors: i) the inherent inaccuracies in measurements; ii) the limitations in computational capacity; iii) the necessity of approximating continuous dynamics using discrete time series. These factors result in uncertainty about the state of the system, leading to a form of underdetermination of theory by data. Following Li and Yorke's (1975) definition of chaotic systems, I discuss the problem of building and testing faithful models of chaotic systems.

Abstract: I argue that the singular structure of spacetime is best conceptualised as a non-local, but localisable, property of spacetime regions, and that there is no unique, best definition of a singular region of spacetime (there is, however, a schema that any adequate definition instantiates). I also discuss to what extent, assuming the definition of singular structure in terms of b-incomplete curves, one can make precise sense of notions such as ‘x is close to singular structure’ and ‘x is closer to singular structure than y’, where x and y range over spacetime points.

Abstract: It’s been almost 30 years since the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics (RQM) was introduced by Carlo Rovelli (Rovelli, 1996) and, over time, the interpretation has changed and developed significantly. Still, I claim that current formulations of RQM do not solve the problem of measurement. Moreover, I argue that the prospects of articulating a version of RQM which both meets its own goals and solves the measurement problem are not promising. The problem is the following. All versions of RQM explain the world in terms of an ontology of systems and events, where an event consists of a variable of a system taking a value relative to another system. I argue that, in order to solve the problem of measurement, RQM needs to offer a specification of the circumstances in which events occur. Current formulations of RQM claim that events occur whenever interactions occur. However, no precise characterisation of the notion of interaction is given. I develop the most plausible ways of understanding the notion of interaction in the context of RQM, but I show that they fail to provide a satisfactory specification of the circumstances of the occurrence of events. In light of the failed constructive efforts, I conclude that the prospects for formulating a version of RQM which both satisfies its aims and solves the problem of measurement are dim.​​​​​​​

Abstract: In general relativity, spacetime is usually taken to be a (3+1)-dimensional Lorentzian manifold that is Hausdorff, paracompact, time-orientable, and so on. However, it seems that there are currently no known experiments that directly test all these spacetime properties. This raises the question of whether it is possible for our spacetime to have a different structure - for example, that of an orbifold, which is, roughly, a manifold quotiented by some group. In our talk, we will address two questions. First, is it possible to empirically verify whether one lives on a manifold or on an orbifold? Second, following up on Read and Bielińska (2022), can one identify the specific type of orbifold on which one is living; for example, is it globally or locally orientable? Our considerations begin with an examination of the topological and differentiable structures of orbifolds. We then discuss the possibility of defining field theories, such as general relativity or quantum field theory, on orbifolds. Finally, we conclude with broader philosophical reflections on epistemology of orbifolds. (Based on joint work with James Read.)​​​