Reproductive Rights
Chapter Outline
A. Overview
B. Procreation and Contraception
C. Abortion Laws and Cases Before 2022
D. Dobbs v. Jackson and Current Abortion Laws
A. Overview
In colonial America, women had minimal control over their reproductive health. They typically gave birth to an average of six to seven children over their lifetimes, though family size varied widely depending on race, legal status, region, and income, and not all infants survived to adulthood. It is not surprising, then, that Indigenous women, enslaved African women, and women in settler communities used herbal remedies and other non-surgical methods in attempts to control fertility, prevent pregnancy, and manage their menstrual cycles. These methods drew on cultural traditions and shared community knowledge reflecting the absence of formal reproductive healthcare. Because birth control methods often failed, women also used a variety of techniques to end pregnancies, some of which carried significant health risks (Demos, 1970; Planned Parenthood Action Fund, n.d.).
These risky practices took place within a legal system that treated early pregnancy differently than how it is treated today. From medieval times through the early 1800s, English common law treated abortion before "quickening", the stage when a woman first feels fetal movement, as legal. This standard carried over into the American colonies. Then, during the second half of the 1800s, states began passing laws that restricted or prohibited abortion. Historians believe these laws were created because the medical profession was becoming more authoritative, and cultural and religious beliefs were changing. Additionally, women had very limited rights. By 1910, nearly every state in the union had passed laws banning abortion at all stages of pregnancy (Planned Parenthood Action Fund, n.d.).
This historical background provides context for the laws and cases in this chapter that pertain to reproductive rights. This chapter will start by analyzing early decisions regarding procreation and contraception. Then, it will examine regulations regarding abortion. Before doing so, it is helpful to clarify the meaning of the phrase “right to privacy", a phrase used in dozens of Supreme Court cases.
When most people think about the phrase "right to privacy", they think about the right to live free from government intrusion and overreach, especially in situations where citizens interact with law enforcement. However, the term is also frequently used in court cases to describe rights that have nothing to do with police officers or criminal investigations. Over the past fifty years, courts have also used the term “right to privacy” to describe the ability to make personal decisions about reproductive health without government interference, although the current Supreme Court no longer recognizes this right at the federal level. This chapter examines how we arrived at this point and highlights other factors that have shaped laws on procreation and contraception.
B. Procreation and Contraception
A century ago, courts did not recognize the right to privacy (as it pertains to reproductive rights) at all, a fact demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Buck v. Bell. Carrie Buck was born in 1906 in Charlottesville, Virginia. Shortly after her birth, she was put into a foster home because her mother, Emma Buck, had been committed to the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded. Emma had been labeled “morally unfit” because she lived in poverty, had several children with different men, and was accused of prostitution. In her foster home, Carrie Buck attended public school for five years, performed as an average student, and reached the sixth grade. She was removed from school when her foster parents decided to keep her home to help with housework (Smith, 2020).
When Carrie was 17, she was placed in the same institution as her mother after being raped by her foster brother and getting pregnant. Instead of investigating the assault or protecting her, local officials claimed that her pregnancy showed she was “immoral” and “feebleminded". During this period, many states supported eugenics, a movement rooted in the belief that society could be improved by preventing people with hereditary defects from having children (Lombardo, 2008).
Imge 12.1
Carrie Buck (left) at the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded along with her birth mother Emma Buck.
Taken by A.H. Estabrook before the Buck v. Bell trial in Virginia, 1924
B. Procreation and Contraception-continued
Dr. Albert Priddy, superintendent of the Virginia State Colony, pushed Carrie Buck’s case through the Virginia trial court system, openly stating that his goal was to “test the validity” of the state’s sterilization law. The trial court upheld the statute and authorized her sterilization. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed that ruling, and the case eventually reached the United States Supreme Court (Smith, 2020).
In 1927, the United States Supreme Court upheld the rulings of the lower courts when it issued its decision in Buck v. Bell. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. accepted the state’s characterization of Carrie Buck and her family and wrote the infamous line, “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.” The decision provided legal support for forced sterilization programs nationwide and contributed to tens of thousands of people being sterilized without their consent. Carrie Buck was sterilized shortly after the Supreme Court's ruling (Lombardo, 2008).
Buck v. Bell has never been formally overturned, but it was seriously weakened by Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942). In Skinner, the Court struck down a statute that allowed the sterilization of habitual criminal offenders who repeatedly committed larceny, robbery, and burglary. The statute did not apply to those who violated other laws. The Court explained that the Oklahoma statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. They argued that the ability to have children is a fundamental right and the government should not be able to sterilize one group of individuals while leaving another group exempt. Some scholars have criticized the Supreme Court for imposing constitutional limits on sterilization only when the policy disproportionately affected men, noting that earlier laws targeting women remained unchallenged. Regardless, the principles in the Skinner decision sharply conflict with the reasoning in Buck v. Bell, leaving the earlier case widely discredited and viewed as one of the most harmful rulings in Supreme Court history (Lombardo, 2008).
Debates over sterilization and eugenics were not the only controversies about morality and its intersection with the law in the early twentieth century. Across the country, state legislatures were enacting statutes aimed at prohibiting or restricting activities viewed as morally harmful, including prostitution, gambling, and the sale of alcohol. These laws later became known as vice laws. Reformers who sought to eliminate such behaviors pushed for some of the strictest regulations on human conduct in United States history. In the late 1800s, former U.S. postal inspector Anthony Comstock advocated for strict laws banning the mailing of obscene materials, efforts that led to the federal Comstock Act of 1873, which prohibited sending items related to contraception and abortion through the mail (Supreme Court Historical Society, n.d.).
Many states passed their own versions of the Comstock Act. In 1879, Connecticut enacted one of the strictest laws in the country, making it a crime not only to sell or distribute birth control, but even to use it. Advocates for reproductive health challenged the Connecticut statute multiple times, but the Supreme Court dismissed these cases for lack of standing in 1943 and again in 1961, leaving the law in place (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965).
Hours after the Court’s second dismissal in 1961, Estelle Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, announced her plan to directly challenge the statute. Within months, she and Dr. C. Lee Buxton opened a birth control clinic in deliberate violation of the law to prompt enforcement and create a test case that could be brought before the Supreme Court. A Connecticut resident filed a complaint against the clinic the day after it opened, triggering a police investigation. Griswold and Buxton were arrested on November 10, 1961, convicted shortly afterward, and their convictions were affirmed by the Connecticut Supreme Court before the case proceeded to the United States Supreme Court.
On June 7, 1965, the Supreme Court issued a 7–2 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut. It ruled in favor of Griswold, striking down Connecticut’s ban on the use of contraception by married couples. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the majority, acknowledged that the Constitution does not expressly mention a right to privacy, yet he argued that certain constitutional guarantees imply one. To explain this concept, he wrote, “The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.” The decision drew on precedent cases involving freedom of association, protections against unreasonable searches, and the Due Process Clause. Douglas concluded that these constitutional “zones of privacy” encompass the private and intimate decisions of married couples regarding contraception. In 1972, the Court extended access to contraception to unmarried couples and relied heavily on Griswold in the decision (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 1972).
In the decades following the Griswold decision, federal policies gradually expanded access to contraception. Title X of the Public Health Service Act was created in 1970 to fund voluntary family planning programs nationwide. Changes to Medicaid regulations throughout the 1980s and 1990s allowed states to use eligibility waivers to provide family planning services to more people. These developments, combined with greater demands for government-funded health coverage, eventually led to the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, which required most employer-sponsored health plans to cover contraceptive services (Britt, Meyer & Day, 2025).
Later legal changes undercut these expansions to the availability of contraception. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014), the Supreme Court ruled that closely held that corporations, which are small private companies not traded on the public stock market, may claim a religious exemption from providing contraceptive coverage required under the ACA. In 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13798 directing federal agencies to broaden such religious exemptions.
In response, federal agencies issued interim and then final rules that changed how the ACA’s contraceptive mandate was implemented by significantly expanding both religious and moral exemptions for employers who objected to providing contraceptive coverage. Although the Biden administration later reversed these regulatory changes, the Supreme Court’s decision in Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania (2020) upheld the federal agencies’ power to create these broad exemptions. The Court ruled that the agencies had acted within their lawful discretion when creating expansive religious and moral exemptions to the contraceptive coverage requirement (2018 Final Rules; Kessler, 2018).
C. Abortion Laws and Cases Before 2022
Although the three-judge District Court ruled that Texas’s abortion law was unconstitutional, it did not issue an injunction, meaning the law technically remained in effect. Under federal law at that time that governed three-judge district courts, the State of Texas was permitted to appeal the decision directly to the U.S. Supreme Court to defend its statute. The Court heard the case through this expedited process, bypassing the Circuit Court of Appeals. Even with an expedited path, the Court delayed moving forward with Roe until it first decided two cases, one clarifying that federal courts may intervene in ongoing state criminal prosecutions in limited circumstances and another holding that the phrase “health of the mother” was not unconstitutionally vague (Younger v. Harris, 1971; United States v. Vuitch, 1971).
Only after resolving those issues, and addressing reluctance among the justices about who should draft such a politically controversial abortion opinion, did the Court finally move forward and schedule oral arguments for Roe v. Wade. The first oral argument in the case occurred on December 13, 1971. Sarah Weddington began by presenting constitutional reasons to strike down Texas’s abortion law, not realizing that the justices were primarily focused on jurisdictional issues. As a result, she spent much of her time addressing procedural questions rather than the broader constitutional issues, which meant that the justices did not hear some of the plaintiff’s strongest substantive arguments. During this same argument, Texas’s attorney, Jay Floyd, opened by saying, “It’s an old joke, but when a man argues against two beautiful ladies like this, they are going to have the last word.” The remark was poorly received and created an awkward dynamic that was not conducive to serious legal analysis (Goluboff, 2010).
Due to changes in the membership of the Supreme Court, both parties were given another opportunity to present their cases. At a second oral argument, which was scheduled for October 11, 1972, the jurisdictional issues were largely resolved, and the justices focused more directly on the core issues of privacy, substantive due process, and the extent of state power to regulate abortion. At this reargument, a new attorney, Texas Assistant Attorney General Robert Flowers, replaced Floyd and presented a more serious defense of the state law. Norma McCorvey did not attend either oral argument (Britannica, 2026).
The Court created the trimester framework to balance a woman’s right to privacy with the state’s interests in health and prenatal life. In the first trimester (0–12 weeks), states could not restrict abortion beyond basic medical requirements. In the second trimester (13–24 weeks), states could regulate abortion procedures to protect the mother’s health. By the third trimester (25+ weeks), once the fetus was viable, states could prohibit abortion entirely except when needed to protect the woman’s life or health.
Three justices wrote concurring opinions. Justice Potter Stewart agreed with the ruling but emphasized that the decision should have been based on substantive due process, which is the doctrine that the Due Process Clause protects certain fundamental rights beyond procedural fairness. Justice William O. Douglas supported the outcome, but he argued that the right to abortion should be grounded in the Ninth Amendment, which states that the people retain rights not specifically listed in the Constitution. Chief Justice Warren Burger stated that the decision did not create “abortion on demand” , and stressed that states could still require reasonable medical safeguards. In dissent, Justice Byron White accused the Court of creating a new constitutional right without historical basis and argued that abortion policy should be left to the states. Justice William Rehnquist's dissent criticized the majority’s use of substantive due process, and insisted that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to limit states’ authority to regulate abortion.
The decision generated considerable controversy. Abortion-rights groups praised Roe as a victory for women’s autonomy, while the Catholic Church and emerging pro-life organizations condemned it as morally and constitutionally wrong. Some abortion-rights supporters criticized the ruling’s reliance on the right to privacy and argued that a stronger constitutional foundation would have made it less vulnerable to reversal. Opponents quickly mobilized, organizing protests and pursuing state laws aimed at restricting abortion. Additionally, the Hyde Amendment was enacted in 1976 as a rider to the federal appropriations bill that funds Medicaid; the amendment prohibited the use of federal Medicaid dollars for nearly all abortions (Center for Reproductive Rights, n.d.).
In addition to parental-involvement laws and policies restricting abortion counseling, some states experimented with other forms of regulation. Pennsylvania amended its abortion law, the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, in 1988 and 1989. The new provisions required patients to give informed consent and imposed a 24-hour waiting period between receiving information and undergoing an abortion procedure. The provisions also required minors to obtain the consent of one parent, with a judicial-bypass option available. Lastly, a new provision required married women to certify they had notified their husbands of their intention to terminate the pregnancy.
In response to these new provisions, a group consisting of five abortion clinics and several physicians who provided abortion services filed suit against the state in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1990. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the District Court held that all of the challenged provisions were unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction preventing their enforcement. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the ruling in part and reversed in part, upholding all of the regulations except for the husband-notification requirement.
In 1992, Planned Parenthood v. Casey reached the Supreme Court, marking the first major reconsideration of abortion rights since Roe v. Wade. In a plurality opinion, the Court reaffirmed Roe’s central holding that women have a constitutional right to choose abortion before viability. However, the Court upheld all of Pennsylvania’s regulations except the spousal-notification requirement.
The Court also made two major changes to Roe’s framework. First, it abandoned the strict trimester system and instead emphasized viability, defined as the stage at which a fetus can survive outside the womb with medical assistance. Second, it replaced Roe’s strict-scrutiny standard with the undue burden test, under which a regulation is unconstitutional if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion. The opinion also included a significant discussion of stare decisis, which is the practice of following precedent cases and explains why the Court chose to uphold the core tenets of the Roe case. Many legal commentators noted that the shift to a viability-based standard reflected advances in medical technology that made the trimester framework less workable.
D. Dobbs v. Jackson and the Current State of Abortion Laws
Most Americans know that Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022) overturned both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It held that the Constitution does not contain a federal right to abortion or a general right to privacy, and it left all abortion regulation to the individual states. Before reading the excerpt of the Dobbs opinion below, it is important to understand what led to it. Otherwise, the decision may seem counterintuitive due to the common perception that Justices who have a conservative approach are firmly committed to stare decisis and that Justices who have a liberal approach are more willing to overturn precedent. However, the reality of Supreme Court jurisprudence is more complex than it seems. The Dobbs decision makes far more sense once shifts in Supreme Court membership and strategic political efforts to overturn Roe are viewed together.
A good starting point is 2005, when Chief Justice John Roberts joined the Supreme Court. For many years, the Roberts Court had a 5–4 conservative majority. Justice Anthony Kennedy, although conservative, had joined the controlling plurality in Casey and was widely viewed as a likely vote to preserve the constitutional right to abortion. Other conservatives included Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas, the latter of whom openly rejected the doctrine of substantive due process as a “legal fiction.” Chief Justice Roberts also leaned conservative but was known for strongly valuing stare decisis and the Court’s institutional legitimacy (The Politics Teacher, n.d.).
At the same time, political developments in other branches of government affected the future of abortion rights. During the Obama presidency, conservative legal groups, like the Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) and the Federalist Society, began coordinating with Christian conservative lawmakers to pass increasingly restrictive state abortion laws designed as “test cases” to challenge Roe and Casey. In 2016, Senate Republicans, led by Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, blocked President Obama from filling the vacancy created by Justice Antonin Scalia’s death.
These efforts at test cases continued during the Trump administration. Meanwhile, on April 6, 2017, Senate Republicans expanded the “nuclear option", a procedural rule eliminating the filibuster for judicial nominations, so that Supreme Court nominees could be confirmed by a simple majority, rather than 60 votes. This allowed President Trump to appoint Justice Neil Gorsuch. In 2018, Justice Kennedy retired and was replaced by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who had criticized Casey, but had also suggested he respected precedent during his nomination hearings. In 2020, Justice Amy Coney Barrett, a staunch opponent to abortion, replaced Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, giving the Court a 6–3 conservative supermajority and its strongest opportunity in decades to revisit Roe and Casey. At the time Dobbs was decided, the liberal bloc consisted of Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and (after oral argument) Ketanji Brown Jackson (The Politics Teacher, n.d.).
By 2017, Mississippi had become the focus of these coordinated antiabortion efforts because it only had a single remaining abortion clinic, the Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which performed abortions up to 16 weeks. In March 2018, Mississippi enacted the Gestational Age Act, banning abortions after 15 weeks except in cases of medical emergency or severe fetal abnormality. The Act included no exceptions for rape or incest (Oberman & Lehmann, 2023).
Within a day of the Act's passage, Jackson Women’s Health sued to block the 15-week ban, and in 2018 a federal district court issued an injunction, finding that viability occurs at 23–24 weeks and that the state offered no valid justification for banning abortions earlier than that. The district court also rejected Mississippi’s fetal-pain evidence as inadmissible based on issues pertaining to scientific reliability. The Fifth Circuit affirmed this ruling in 2019 and again in 2020 when it struck down Mississippi’s separate 6-week “heartbeat” law for the same reason, which was that states cannot ban abortion before viability (Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 2019; Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 2020).
The state of Mississippi appealed to the Supreme Court in June 2020. Its petition, filed by Mississippi Attorney General Lynn Fitch, argued that the viability standard was inflexible and outdated and that states have a compelling interest in protecting fetal life from the beginning of pregnancy. Jackson Women’s Health argued that viability had been a clear, workable rule for 50 years and that Mississippi’s ban was unconstitutional “by any measure.”
The Supreme Court considered the petition at more than a dozen conferences, far more than usual, and granted review on May 17, 2021. After that, the case was briefed over several months, and oral arguments were heard on December 1, 2021. The case then moved through the Court’s lengthy internal drafting and revision process before the final decision was issued on June 24, 2022. (Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 2019; Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 2020).
Landmark Case Spotlight:
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022)
Case Excerpt (Not Full Case)
Click here for full text.
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court:
For the first 185 years after the adoption of the Constitution, each State was permitted to address this issue in accordance with the views of its citizens. Then, in 1973, this Court decided Roe v. Wade. Even though the Constitution makes no mention of abortion, the Court held that it confers a broad right to obtain one. It did not claim that American law or the common law had ever recognized such a right, and its survey ranged from the constitutionally irrelevant (e.g., its discussion of abortion in antiquity) to the plainly incorrect (e.g., its assertion that abortion was probably never a crime under the common law). After cataloging a wealth of other information having no bearing on the meaning of the Constitution, the opinion concluded with a numbered set of rules much like those that might be found in a statute enacted by a legislature.
Under this scheme, each trimester of pregnancy was regulated differently, but the most critical line was drawn at roughly the end of the second trimester, which, at the time, corresponded to the point in which a fetus was thought to achieve “viability,” i.e., the ability to survive outside the womb. Although the Court acknowledged that States had a legitimate interest in protecting “potential life,” it found that this interest could not justify any restriction on pre-viability abortions. The Court did not explain the basis for this line, and even abortion supporters have found it hard to defend Roe’s reasoning.
At the time of Roe, 30 States still prohibited abortion at all stages. In the years prior to that decision, about a third of States had liberalized their laws, but Roe abruptly ended that political process. It imposed the same highly restrictive regime on the entire Nation, and it effectively struck down the abortion laws of every single State.
Eventually, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court revisited Roe . . . . The opinion concluded that stare decisis, which calls for prior decisions to be followed in most instances, required adherence to what it called Roe’s “central holding”—that a State may not constitutionally protect fetal life before “viability”—even if that holding was wrong.
Casey threw out Roe’s trimester scheme and substituted a new rule of uncertain origin under which States were forbidden to adopt any regulation that imposed an ‘undue burden’ on a woman’s right to have an abortion. . . . The three Justices who authored the controlling opinion “call[ed] for the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division” by treating the Court’s decision as the final settlement of the question of the constitutional right to abortion.
As has become increasingly apparent in the intervening years, Casey did not achieve that goal. Americans continue to hold passionate and widely divergent views on abortion, and state legislatures have acted accordingly. Some have recently enacted laws allowing abortion, with few restrictions, at all stage of pregnancy. Others have tightly restricted abortion beginning well before viability. And in this case, 26 States have expressly asked this Court to overrule Roe and Casey and allow the States to regulate or prohibit pre-viability abortions.
Before us now is one such state law. The State of Mississippi asks us to uphold the constitutionality of a law that generally prohibits an abortion after the 15th week of pregnancy—several weeks before the point at which a fetus is now regarded as “viable” outside the womb. In defending this law, the State’s primary argument is that we should reconsider and overrule Roe and Casey and once again allow each State to regulate abortion as its citizens wish. On the other side, respondents and the Solicitor General ask us to reaffirm Roe and Casey, and they contend that the Mississippi law cannot stand if we do so.
We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That provision has been held to guarantee some rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution, but any such right must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”
The right to abortion does not fall within this category. Until the latter part of the 20th century, such a right was entirely unknown in American law. Indeed, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, three quarters of the States made abortion a crime at all stages of pregnancy. The abortion right is also critically different from any other right that this Court has held to fall within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “liberty.” Roe’s defenders characterize the abortion right as similar to the rights recognized in past decisions involving matters such as intimate sexual relations, contraception, and marriage, but abortion is fundamentally different, as both Roe and Casey acknowledged, because it destroys what those decisions called “fetal life” and what the law now before us describes as an “unborn human being.”
Stare decisis, the doctrine on which Casey’s controlling opinion was based, does not compel unending adherence to Roe’s abuse of judicial authority. Roe was egregiously wrong from the start. Its reasoning was exceptionally weak, and the decision has had damaging consequences. And far from bringing about a national settlement of the abortion issue, Roe and Casey have enflamed debate and deepened division.
It is time to heed the Constitution and return the issue of abortion to the people’s elected representatives. . . . We discuss [substantive due process] in depth below, but before doing so, we briefly address one additional constitutional provision that some of respondents’ amici have now offered as yet another potential home for the abortion right: the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. . . . Neither Roe nor Casey saw fit to invoke this theory, and it is squarely foreclosed by our precedents, which establish that a State’s regulation of abortion is not a sex-based classification and is thus not subject to the “heightened scrutiny” that applies to such classifications. . . . The regulation of a medical procedure that only one sex can undergo does not trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny unless the regulation is a “mere pretex[t] designed to effect an invidious discrimination against members of one sex or the other.” . . . And as the Court has stated, the “goal of preventing abortion” does not constitute “invidiously discriminatory animus” against women. . . .
With this new theory addressed, we turn to Casey’s bold assertion that the abortion right is an aspect of the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . We begin by considering the critical question of whether the Constitution, properly understood, confers a right to obtain an abortion. . . .The Constitution makes no express reference to a right to obtain an abortion, and therefore those who claim that it protects such a right much show that the right is somehow implicit in the constitutional text. . . . In interpreting what is meant by the Fourteenth Amendment’s reference to ‘liberty,’ we must guard against the natural human tendency to confuse what the Amendment protects with our own ardent views about the liberty that Americans should enjoy. That is why the Court has long been reluctant to recognize rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution. . . . Instead, guided by the history and tradition that map the essential components of our Nation’s concept of ordered liberty, we must ask what the Fourteenth Amendment means by the term “liberty.” When we engage in that inquiry in the present case, the clear answer is that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect the right to an abortion.
Until the latter part of the 20th century, there was no support in American law for a constitutional right to obtain an abortion. No state constitutional provision had recognized such a right. Until a few years before Roe was handed down, no federal or state court had recognized such a right. Nor had any scholarly treatise of which we are aware. And although law review articles are not reticent about advocating new rights, the earliest article proposing a constitutional right to an abortion that has come to our attention was published only a few years before Roe.
Not only was there no support for such a constitutional right until shortly before Roe, but abortion had long been a crime in every single State. At common law, abortion was criminal in at least some stages of pregnancy and was regarded as unlawful and could have very serious consequences at all stages. American law followed the common law until a wave of statutory restrictions in the 1800s expanded criminal liability for abortions. By the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, three-quarters of the States had made abortion a crime at any stage of pregnancy, and the remaining States would soon follow. . . .
This overwhelming consensus endured until the day Roe was decided. At that time, also by the Roe Court’s own count, a substantial majority—30 States—still prohibited abortion at all stages except to save the life of the mother. And though Roe discerned a “trend toward liberalization” in about “one-third of the States,” those States still criminalized some abortions and regulated them more stringently than Roe would allow. . . .
The inescapable conclusion is that a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions. On the contrary, an unbroken tradition of prohibiting abortion on pain of criminal punishment persisted from the earliest days of the common law until 1973 . . . .
We next consider whether the doctrine of stare decisis counsels continued acceptance of Roe and Casey . . . .
In this case, five factors weigh strongly in favor of overruling Roe and Casey: the nature of their error, the quality of their reasoning, the “workability” of the rules they imposed on the country, their disruptive effect on other areas of the law, and the absence of concrete reliance . . . .
[T]o ensure that our decision is not misunderstood or mischaracterized, we emphasize that our decision concerns the constitutional right to abortion and no other right. Nothing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion . . . .
We do not pretend to know how our political system or society will respond to today’s decision overruling Roe and Casey. And even if we could foresee what will happen, we would have no authority to let that knowledge influence our decision. We can only do our job, which is to interpret the law, apply longstanding principles of stare decisis, and decide this case accordingly.
We therefore hold that the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion. Roe and Casey must be overruled . . . .
We must now decide what standard will govern if state abortion regulations undergo constitutional challenge and whether the law before us satisfies the appropriate standard. . . . Under our precedents, rational-basis review is the appropriate standard for such challenges. . . .
We end this opinion where we began. Abortion presents a profound moral question. The Constitution does not prohibit the citizens of each State from regulating or prohibiting abortion. Roe and Casey arrogated that authority. We now overrule those decisions and return that authority to the people and their elected representatives.
Excerpt: Concurrence, Justice Brett Kavanaugh
Abortion is a profoundly difficult and contentious issue because it presents an irreconcilable conflict between the interests of a pregnant woman who seeks an abortion and the interests of protecting fetal life. The interests on both sides of the abortion issue are extraordinarily weighty.
The issue before this Court . . . is not the policy or morality of abortion. The issue before the Court is what the Constitution says about abortion. The Constitution does not take sides on the issue of abortion. . . . On the question of abortion, the Constitution is . . . neither pro-life nor pro-choice. The Constitution is neutral and leaves the issue for the people and their elected representatives to resolve through the democratic process in the States or Congress—like the numerous other difficult questions of American social and economic policy that the Constitution does not address. . . .
After today’s decision, the nine Members of this Court will no longer decide the basic legality of pre-viability abortion for all 330 million Americans. . . . But the parties’ arguments have raised other related questions, and I address some of them here.
First, is the question of how this decision will affect other precedents involving issues such as contraception and marriage—in particular, the decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut . . . , Eisenstadt v. Baird . . . , Loving v. Virginia . . . , and Obergefell v. Hodges . . . . I emphasize what the Court today states: Overruling Roe does not mean the overruling of those precedents, and does not threaten or cast doubt on those precedents.
Second, as I see it, some of the other abortion-related legal questions raised by today’s decision are not especially difficult as a constitutional matter. For example, may a State bar a resident of that State from traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? In my view, the answer is no based on the constitutional right to interstate travel. May a State retroactively impose liability or punishment for an abortion that occurred before today’s decision takes effect? In my view, the answer is no based on the Due Process Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Excerpt: Concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas
I write separately to emphasize a . . . more fundamental reason why there is no abortion right guarantee lurking in the Due Process Clause. Considerable historical evidence indicates that “due process of law” merely requires executive and judicial actors to comply with legislative enactments and the common law when depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. . . . [T]he Due Process Clause at most guarantees process. It does not, as the Court’s substantive due process cases suppose, “forbi[d] the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided.” . . .
[I]n future cases, we should reconsider all of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, including Griswold [v. Connecticut], Lawrence [v. Texas], and Obergefell [v. Hodges]. Because any substantive due process decision is “demonstrably erroneous” . . . , we have a duty to “correct the error” established in those precedents . . . . After overruling these demonstrably erroneous decisions, the question would remain whether other constitutional provisions guarantee the myriad rights that our substantive due process cases have generated. For example, we could consider whether any of the rights announced in this Court’s substantive due process cases are “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Substantive due process exalts judges at the expense of the People from whom they derive their authority. . . . In practice, the Court’s approach for identifying those fundamental rights unquestionably involves policymaking rather than neutral legal analysis. The Court divines new rights in line with its own, extraconstitutional value preferences and nullifies state laws that do not align with the judicially created rights.
Substantive due process . . . has harmed our country in many ways. Accordingly, we should eliminate it from our jurisprudence at the earliest opportunity.
Excerpt: Concurring in the Judgment, Chief Justice John Roberts
I would take a more measured course. I agree with the Court that the viability line established by Roe and Casey should be discarded under a straightforward stare decisis analysis. That line never made any sense. Our abortion precedents describe the right at issue as a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. That right should therefore extend far enough to ensure a reasonable opportunity to choose, but need not extend any further— certainly not all the way to viability. Mississippi’s law allows a woman three months to obtain an abortion, well be-yond the point at which it is considered “late” to discover a pregnancy… I see no sound basis for questioning the adequacy of that opportunity.
But that is all I would say, out of adherence to a simple yet fundamental principle of judicial restraint: If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more. Perhaps we are not always perfect in following that command, and certainly there are cases that warrant an exception. But this is not one of them. Surely we should adhere closely to principles of judicial restraint here, where the broader path the Court chooses entails repudiating a constitutional right we have not only previously recognized, but also expressly reaffirmed applying the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court’s opinion is thoughtful and thorough, but those virtues cannot compensate for the fact that its dramatic and consequential ruling is unnecessary to decide the case before us. . . .
Here, there is a clear path to deciding this case correctly without overruling Roe all the way down to the studs: recognize that the viability line must be discarded, as the majority rightly does, and leave for another day whether to reject any right to an abortion at all. . . .
The Court’s decision to overrule Roe and Casey is a serious jolt to the legal system—regardless of how you view those cases. A narrower decision rejecting the misguided viability line would be markedly less unsettling, and nothing more is needed to decide this case. . .
Excerpt: Joint Dissent, Justices Stephen Breyer,
Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor
For half a century, Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey have protected the liberty and equality of women. Roe held, and Casey reaffirmed, that the Constitution safeguards a woman’s right to decide for herself whether to bear a child. Roe held, and Casey reaffirmed, that in the first stages of pregnancy, the government could not make that choice for women. The government could not control a woman’s body or the course of a woman’s life: It could not determine what the woman’s future would be. Respecting a woman as an autonomous being, and granting her full equality, meant giving her substantial choice over this most personal and most consequential of all life decisions.
Today, the Court discards that balance. It says that from the very moment of fertilization, a woman has no rights to speak of. . . . O]ne result of today’s decision is certain: the curtailment of women’s rights, and of their status as free and equal citizens. Yesterday, the Constitution guaranteed that a woman confronted with an unplanned pregnancy could (within reasonable limits) make her own decision about whether to bear a child, with all the life-transforming consequences that act involves. And in thus safeguarding each woman’s reproductive freedom, the Constitution also protected “[t]he ability of women to participate equally in [this Nation’s] economic and social life.” . . . But no longer. As of today, this Court holds, a State can always force a woman to give birth, prohibiting even the earliest abortions.
A State can thus transform what, when freely undertaken, is a wonder into what, when forced, may be a nightmare. Some women, especially women of means, will find ways around the State’s assertion of power. Others—those without money or childcare or the ability to take time off from work—will not be so fortunate. Maybe they will try an unsafe method of abortion, and come to physical harm, or even die. Maybe they will undergo pregnancy and have a child, but at significant personal or familial cost. At the least, they will incur the cost of losing control of their lives. The Constitution will, today’s majority holds, provide no shield, despite its guarantees of liberty and equality for all.
And no one should be confident that this majority is done with its work. The right Roe and Casey recognized does not stand alone. To the contrary, the Court has linked it for decades to other settled freedoms involving bodily integrity, familial relationships, and procreation. Most obviously, the right to terminate a pregnancy arose straight out of the right to purchase and use contraception. . . . In turn, those rights led, more recently, to rights of same-sex intimacy and marriage. . . . They are all part of the same constitutional fabric, protecting autonomous decision making over the most personal of life decisions. . . .
The Court reverses course today for one reason and one reason only: because the composition of this Court has changed. Stare decisis, this Court has often said, contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process by ensuring that decisions are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals. Today, the proclivities of individuals rule. The Court departs from its obligation to faithfully and impartially apply the law. We dissent. . . .
Of course, the majority opinion refers as well to some later and earlier history. On the one side of 1868, it goes back as far as the 13th (the 13th!) century. . . . But that turns out to be wheel-spinning. First, it is not clear what relevance such early history should have, even to the majority. . . . If the early history obviously supported abortion rights, the majority would no doubt say that only the views of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers are germane. . . . Second—and embarrassingly for the majority—early law in fact does provide some support for abortion rights. Common-law authorities did not treat abortion as a crime before “quickening”—the point when the fetus moved in the womb. And early American law followed the common-law rule. So the criminal law of that early time might be taken as roughly consonant with Roe’s and Casey’s different treatment of early and late abortions.
Nowhere has that approach been more prevalent than in construing the majestic but open-ended words of the Fourteenth Amendment—the guarantees of “liberty” and “equality” for all. And nowhere has that approach produced prouder moments, for this country and the Court. Consider an example Obergefell used a few years ago. The Court there confronted a claim . . . that the Fourteenth Amendment “must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific historical practices”—exactly the view today’s majority follows. . . . And the Court specifically rejected that view. In doing so, the Court reflected on what the proposed, historically circumscribed approach would have meant of interracial marriage. The Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers did not think it gave black and white people a right to marry each other. To the contrary, contemporaneous practice deemed that act quite as unprotected as abortion. Yet the Court in Loving v. Virginia read the Fourteenth Amendment to embrace the Lovings’ union. If, Obergefell explained, “rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then received practices could serve as their own continued justification”—even when they conflict with “liberty” and “equality” as later and more broadly understood. The Constitution does not freeze for all time the original view of what those rights guarantee, or how they apply.
By overruling Roe, Casey, and more than 20 cases reaffirming or applying the constitutional right to abortion, the majority abandons stare decisis, a principle central to the rule of law. [In previous cases overturning precedent,] the Court found, for example, (1) a change in legal doctrine that undermined or made obsolete the earlier decision; (2) a factual change that had the same effect; or (3) an absence of reliance because the earlier decision was less than a decade old. . . . None of those factors apply here: Nothing—and in particular, no significant legal or factual change—supports overturning a half-century of settled law giving women control over their reproductive lives.
Now a new and bare majority of this Court—acting at practically the first moment possible—overrules Roe and Casey. It converts a series of dissenting opinions expressing antipathy toward Roe and Casey into a decision greenlighting even total abortion bans. It eliminates a 50-year-old constitutional right that safeguards women’s freedom and equal station. It breaches a core rule-of-law principle, designed to promote constancy in the law. In doing all of that, it places in jeopardy other rights, from contraception to same-sex intimacy and marriage. And finally, it undermines the Court’s legitimacy. . . .
With sorrow—for this Court, but more, for the many millions of American women who have today lost a fundamental constitutional protection—we dissent.
D. Dobbs v. Jackson and the Current State of Abortion Laws - continued
After the Dobbs decision, access to contraception and abortion worsened across many states. Although President Biden issued Executive Order 14076 directing federal agencies to protect access to abortion medication, expand access to contraception, and ensure hospitals comply with federal emergency care requirements, federal agencies cannot override state laws that restrict reproductive health care. (Exec. Order No. 14076, 2022; Guttmacher Institute, 2023).
Many Planned Parenthood clinics, which are major providers of contraception nationwide, closed as states restricted abortion services and withdrew funding, while deep cuts to Title X and Medicaid further reduced access to contraceptive care. In Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic (2025), the Supreme Court held that Medicaid recipients cannot sue states for excluding Planned Parenthood from Medicaid programs, effectively giving states broad authority to maintain these funding cuts. More than seventy clinics have closed nationwide since Dobbs. At the same time, growing parental-consent requirements, newly expanded “conscience” laws allowing providers to refuse reproductive services based on personal beliefs, and documented cases of pharmacists declining to dispense contraception have further restricted access to birth control (Tuerkheimer, 2025). Although the Supreme Court unanimously rejected an effort to sharply limit access to the abortion medication mifepristone, access to reproductive care overall continues to erode (FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 2024).
As expected, numerous states passed more restrictive abortion laws after the Dobbs decision. Please see Image 12.2 below for details. In addition to changes to state laws, on January 31, 2025, Executive Order 14182 reaffirmed the Hyde Amendment’s restrictions on federal funding for elective abortions (The White House, 2025).
The Gender Equity Policy Institute’s 2025 analysis of CDC data underscores how these new laws have affected maternal health. They found that mothers living in abortion-ban states are nearly twice as likely to die during pregnancy or childbirth as mothers in states that protect access to reproductive care, and that Black mothers in states that have abortion bans face a risk 3.3 times higher than white mothers. Based on a 2025 Gender Equity Policy Institute analysis of CDC maternal mortality data, Texas experienced a 56% rise in maternal mortality in the first full year of its ban, while states that support abortion rights saw a 21% decline (Gender Equity Policy Institute, 2025).
Conclusion
Congress, the President, the Supreme Court, and state legislatures have continuously shaped the laws governing our ability to make personal decisions about procreation, contraception, and pregnancy. Understanding how these laws evolved both before and after Dobbs helps students see how each branch of government influences civil rights and what changes have expanded or limited reproductive freedom. This knowledge also highlights the continuing work needed to protect and honor civil rights and liberties in this area.
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