Chapter Thirteen

          Voting Rights  

Chapter Outline

A. Overview & Electoral Dynamics  

B. Voting & Constitutional Foundations

C. Expansion & Barriers

D.  Redistricting & Gerrymandering

E.   Money & Influence in Elections

A.  Overview & Electoral Dynamics

This chapter will examine the constitutional foundations of voting rights, the expansion of those rights to groups previously excluded, the barriers that continue to limit access to voting, the rules governing redistricting,  the prevalence of gerrymandering, and the influence of dark money in elections. Before examining these topics, it is useful to consider two often overlooked and related factors in discussions about voting rights: the role of nonvoters and the impact of the Electoral College. Concerns about voter participation and the structure of the Electoral College shape access to political power and provide important context for the rest of this chapter.

Many Americans do not exercise their right to vote. In the 2024 presidential election, only 64% of eligible adults of voting age cast a ballot.  In the 1996 presidential election, the turnout was just under 50%.  Between 1932-2024, voter participation rates for presidential elections have fluctuated between 49.8% and 63.5%.  Turnout for state and local elections is often lower. Depending on the state or municipality, 10-40% of eligible voters participate on election day, depending on the year.  Although analyzing voter turnout rates is an entirely separate field of study than civil rights, acknowledging that many people do not vote reveals a disconnect between the government and its citizens.  This disconnect results in many eligible voters having no input into the policies that govern our nation. The implications of these findings on civil rights are the subject of ongoing scholarly research and will be briefly examined at the end of this chapter (Pew Research Center, 2000; Pew Research Center, 2025).

Public perceptions of the Electoral College can influence whether people decide to vote. Many people who choose not to cast a ballot on election day feel their individual vote doesn’t matter.  The President of the United States is not chosen by popular vote. Instead the Electoral College system assigns each state a specific number of electoral votes based on how many members it has in the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the candidate who wins the majority of the popular vote in each state is awarded all of that state's electoral votes. Whichever candidate receives a total of 270 or more nationwide out of 538 electoral votes wins the presidency. (Brennan Center for Justice, 2023)  Five elections have produced a winner of the Electoral College who lost the national popular vote (University of Florida Election Lab, 2024).  Because millions of votes for the losing candidate in each state do not contribute to the national total, many people feel their vote does not matter (CIRCLE, 2023).

Electoral College Map

Image 13.1

(Scholastic, n.d.)

Results of the 2024 Election

Image 13.3

(270toWin, n.d.)

A.  Overview & Electoral Dynamics - continued 

Feeling cynical about whether one’s vote matters under the Electoral College is understandable, but this perspective overlooks several important points:

• First, even under the Electoral College, some presidential elections have been decided by extremely small margins. For example, the outcome of the 2000 Bush–Gore election came down to counting a few hundred votes in Florida, as discussed later in this chapter. Additionally, data from the 2024 presidential election shows that the outcome of that election would have been different if Democratic voters had turned out in numbers similar to Republican voters.  (CIRCLE, 2023) 

• Second, the popular vote still matters because it reflects the political preferences of voters. Elected and appointed officials use data from the popular vote to shape policy decisions. The data also influences public debate. Even though the Electoral College decides the winner, the popular vote affects the perception of political legitimacy and how leaders interpret their mandate. (Fleischmann, 2024)

• Third, this deterministic mindset can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If people assume their vote does not count and stay home, their preferred candidate and policies become less likely to succeed. This effect is even stronger when voters believe none of the candidates represent their views, which can discourage more suitable candidates from running for office. (Frank, 2015)

• Fourth, there is a growing movement to reform or even eliminate the Electoral College altogether. Many Americans support independent candidates, who are unlikely to win under the current system. Yet, this movement cannot succeed if people disengage from voting altogether and remove themselves from the decision-making process. (Pew Research, 2024)

• Fifth, not all elections are for the President of the United States. Municipal and state elections are decided directly by the popular vote and shape many of the important day-to-day issues that affect people’s lives. (Nonprofit VOTE, 2025)

This chapter will examine the topics typically covered in a civil rights discussion of voting rights. However, as you read about these issues, keep in mind that concerns about voting rates and the effects of the Electoral College matter because they shape who has a meaningful voice in our political system.

B. Constitutional Foundations

As in earlier chapters, each provision is presented first in italicized original text. A plain-English explanation follows in bold.

Article I § 2 of the United States Constitution says, "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." This means that qualified and registered voters elect their representatives in the House of Representatives every two years. 

Article I § 4 is known as the Elections Clause, which says, "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." This means that state governments control the administration and procedures of congressional elections, but the federal government retains the ultimate authority to change or replace those regulations. The Supreme Court confirmed this balance of authority in Moore v. Harper (2023). In that case, the Court rejected the Independent State Legislature Theory, which claimed that state legislatures have exclusive and unchecked power to set rules for federal elections without being limited by state constitutions or reviewed by state courts. By rejecting this theory, the Court clarified the interpretation of §4 and prevented state legislatures from gaining sweeping control over federal election rules. 

Article II, § 1 states in part, “Each State shall appoint… a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives… but no Senator or Representative… shall be appointed an Elector,” and “The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons… The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority….”  This language outlines the original Electoral College procedure, where electors used to cast two votes, resulting in one candidate becoming President and the runner-up becoming Vice President.  

Section 1 was later superseded in 1804 by the Twelfth Amendment, which provides in part, “The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President… they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President.”  This amendment established our modern Electoral College system, explained in the introduction to the chapter, in which voters cast a single ballot for a presidential ticket. The electors chosen by each state’s voters meet in December in their state capitals to cast separate ballots for President and Vice President. These electors cannot be current members of the House or Senate. They are pledged to vote for the candidates who won the popular vote in their state. After casting their separate ballots, the electors send their certified results to Congress. These results are then formally opened and counted during a joint session of Congress in early January, completing the constitutional certification of the presidential election.

Beyond the Twelfth Amendment, several other constitutional amendments specifically define and protect voting rights, and the Supreme Court has clarified their scope and enforcement:

• Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment says,“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws....The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”  The Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges & Immunities Clause have provided the constitutional foundation for major civil rights legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as well as for later Supreme Court rulings that struck down discriminatory voting laws.  

• The Fifteenth Amendment states, “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude…. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” This amendment recognized the right of formerly enslaved adult males to vote and also provided the foundation for major civil rights legislation.

• The Seventeenth Amendment reads in part, “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.”  This amendment fundamentally expanded voting rights by shifting the power to elect U.S. Senators from state legislatures directly to the people. Before 1913, ordinary citizens did not vote directly for their Senators because state legislatures selected them.

• The Nineteenth Amendment provides, "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." This amendment secured women’s suffrage nationwide. In Leser v. Garnett (1922), opponents argued that the amendment had not been ratified in a valid manner and should not bind the states. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and upheld the amendment’s validity, confirming that women could not be denied the right to vote.

• The Twenty-Fourth Amendment states, “The right of citizens of the United States to vote… shall not be denied or abridged by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.” This amendment abolished poll taxes in federal elections, removing a significant economic barrier to voting. 

• The Twenty-Sixth Amendment guarantees that,  “The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged… on account of age.” This amendment lowered the voting age from 21 to 18.  The catalyst for passing this amendment came from Oregon v. Mitchell (1970), in which the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional the portion of the Voting Rights Act that required all states to lower the voting age to 18. That decision prompted the rapid ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment within one year.  

C.  Who Can Vote? Expansion & Barriers

The passage of the Reconstruction Amendments after the Civil War was intended to provide equal rights for all citizens, including voting rights. This goal was undermined by Black Codes in the Southern states, which were laws that restricted the freedoms, movement, and labor of newly freed African Americans.  In response to widespread violence and voter suppression, Congress passed three enforcement laws. The Enforcement Act of 1870 made it a federal crime to interfere with someone’s right to vote and prohibited intimidation, threats, or discriminatory election practices. The Enforcement Act of 1871 expanded oversight by the federal government by allowing U.S. marshals and authorized supervisors to monitor congressional elections. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 targeted white supremacist groups by making it a federal offense to conspire to deny the constitutional rights of others and authorized the use of federal troops when local authorities failed to act (Teaching American History, n.d.).

When Reconstruction ended, these three enforcement laws were no longer effective at preventing efforts to roll back protections for Black Americans. Federal power was greatly reduced when federal troops left the South.  At the same time, the Supreme Court limited the enforcement of these acts, and Southern states regained control over their election laws. Additionally, the political will of the nation did not prioritize stopping racial violence. The result was that Black Codes were replaced with Jim Crow laws, which enforced racial segregation in nearly all areas of life and used literacy tests, poll taxes, and grandfather clauses to disenfranchise Black voters. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 was supposed to eliminate these barriers and promote voting rights, but it provided only limited protection due to lack of enforcement power (National Geographic Society, n.d.).

When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was a victory for civil rights advocates because it  prohibited discrimination in public accommodations, education, federally funded programs, and employment. It  had enforcement power under the Commerce Clause of Article I, § 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution. Title I of the Act briefly addressed voting rights by prohibiting the unequal application of voter registration requirements. However, it did not eliminate major barriers such as literacy tests or poll taxes (Miller Center, n.d.).

The need for additional legislation to eliminate voting barriers was brought to the attention of the American public ten months after the Civil Rights Act was passed. In  Harman v. Forssenius (1965), the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia law that had created an “escape clause”,  allowing voters to avoid paying a poll tax if they filed a certificate of residence six months before an election. The Court struck down the law and made clear that states cannot impose substitute requirements that hinder voters who refuse to pay a poll tax. 

Three months after the Harman decision, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which banned discriminatory voting practices such as literacy tests and other methods used to disenfranchise Black voters. It also required federal “preclearance” for changes to voting laws in states and localities with long histories of racial suppression, ensuring that discriminatory rules could not be implemented without federal approval. This law dramatically expanded Black voter registration and is widely considered one of the most effective pieces of civil rights legislation in U.S. history (NAACP, n.d.).

Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that upheld the constitutionality and enforcement mechanisms of the Voting Rights Act. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966), the Supreme Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment authorized Congress to enact the Voting Rights Act, upheld the Act’s ban on literacy tests, and explained that the Fifteenth Amendment’s enforcement clause gave Congress the power to prevent racial discrimination in voting. In Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966), the Court held that Congress could use its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce §  4(e) of the Act , which banned literacy tests as a qualification to vote. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966), the Court ruled that state laws imposing poll taxes violated the Equal Protection Clause and held that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment extends to the states through the Equal Protection Clause, making all poll taxes unconstitutional.

Image 13.4

(Houldin, 2015)

Image 13.5 

(Original Work, Getchell-Bastien)

C.  Who Can Vote? Expansion & Barriers - continued 

Additional cases clarified voting rights in scenarios unrelated to racial discrimination. In Richardson v. Ramirez (1974), the Supreme Court ruled that California did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by disenfranchising convicted felons who had completed their sentences and paroles. The Court held that states may constitutionally ban individuals with felony convictions from voting. In Symm v. United States (1979), the Court invalidated a Texas requirement that only college students had to complete a special residency questionnaire before registering to vote. The Court determined that imposing extra requirements on young voters created an undue burden. 

Later years saw federal lawmakers working to increase participation and standardize election procedures across states. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993, often called the “Motor Voter Act,” required states to offer voter registration at the Department of Motor Vehicles, state public assistance agencies, and through standardized mail-in forms. It also established specific requirements for purging voter rolls, which includes sending proper notices to voters, observing required waiting periods before purging voters from lists, avoiding discriminatory practices during the purging process, and maintaining accurate registration records. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was passed to improve the accuracy and security of elections by requiring the replacement of outdated voting machines, the creation of statewide voter registration databases, the establishment of provisional voting requirements, and setting minimum standards for the administration and oversight of elections (Naifeh, n.d.).  

In 2000, the Supreme Court once again applied the Equal Protection Clause to a voting controversy, this time involving the disputed results of the presidential election. In Bush v. Gore (2000), the results of the election between George W. Bush and Al Gore was so close that the outcome in Florida would decide the winner of the Electoral College. The Florida Supreme Court had ordered a statewide hand recount of disputed ballots due to concerns about “hanging chads,” which were incompletely punched paper ballots that made it difficult to tell a voter’s intent.  The Supreme Court of the United States halted the recount after being petitioned to do so by Bush.  The Court concluded that different counties were using different methods to determine voter intent, resulting in what they determined to be unequal treatment of voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. This 5–4 decision left Bush in the lead and effectively determined the outcome of the election, making him the winner. One media consortium concluded that under the recount standards ordered by the Florida Supreme Court, Bush would have won by 598 votes, while other recount standards suggested Gore should have won. Although widely criticized as partisan, the ruling’s impact was narrow because the Court stated that its decision was limited to the specific circumstances of that case (Gregg, 2025).

While Bush v. Gore focused on equal treatment in how ballots are evaluated, a later case addressed the need for voters to have stable election rules. Purcell v. Gonzalez (2006) established that courts should avoid making abrupt changes to voting rules or election laws shortly before an election. The Court reasoned that late judicial interventions could confuse voters, burden election officials, and hinder the orderly administration of elections. This idea became known as the “Purcell Principle,” which is now frequently cited by courts to justify leaving contested election rules in place when an election is rapidly approaching, even if those rules are still being challenged on constitutional grounds. 

Two years after the Purcell decision, Democrat Barack Obama was elected President of the United States. The midterm elections after his election followed a familiar trend. In American politics, the president’s party often loses seats in midterm elections because voters use these contests to either show concerns about the current administration or to shift the balance of power. As a result, the opposing party, the Republicans, gained significant ground in both Congress and state legislatures. Beginning around 2010, Republican-led states began enacting new voting restrictions.  State legislatures quickly passed laws that made voting more difficult. These measures are often described as forms of voter suppression, which are policies that make it harder for eligible citizens to register, cast a ballot, or have their vote counted (Economic Policy Institute, n.d..)  

One example of the new voting regulations was the rise of strict Voter ID Laws, which require voters to present specific types of government-issued photo identification at the polls. Although these laws aim to reduce voter fraud, research indicates they can disproportionately affect low-income voters, students, and older adults, who may lack the required documents, access to ID-issuing agencies, or the funds to pay for the ID.  States also conducted large-scale purges of voter rolls, sometimes removing eligible voters through controversial methods. Additionally, many states closed or consolidated polling places, often in predominantly Black, Latino, or rural areas.  This resulted in longer lines and reduced access to in-person voting (Economic Policy Institute, n.d.).  

In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008), the Supreme Court upheld Indiana’s law requiring voters to present government-issued photo identification at the polls.  The Court found that the law  applied the same requirement to all voters, that it was administered in an “even-handed” fashion, that it was a permissible way to protect election integrity, and that the burdens it imposed were not overwhelmingly severe or unjustified. In Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute (2018), the Supreme Court upheld a process in Ohio that removed voters who did not vote for two years, failed to respond to a confirmation notice, and then did not vote for an additional four years.  In both cases, the Supreme Court determined that the states’ voting regulations were permissible under federal law and did not violate the Constitution.

Debates over federal oversight of elections reached a critical moment in Shelby County v. Holder (2013).

C.  Who Can Vote? Expansion & Barriers - continued 

Since Shelby County v. Holder was decided, researchers have documented shutdowns of polling locations, an increase in voter ID laws, and changes in voter participation, particularly in states that had previously been subject to federal oversight.  A study by the Leadership Conference Education Fund found that former § 5 jurisdictions closed 1,688 polling places between 2012 and 2018, and that by the 2018 midterm election there were 1,173 fewer polling places in these jurisdictions compared to 2014. Texas saw 750 closures, Arizona 320, and Georgia 214, with some Georgia counties eliminating more than 80 percent of their sites. These reductions disproportionately affected communities with higher shares of Black, Latino, and rural voters (The Leadership Conference Education Fund, 2019). 

Additionally, many formerly preclearance states implemented voting restrictions that had previously been blocked, beginning with strict photo ID laws in states such as Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, Virginia, and North Carolina.  After the 2020 presidential election, seven former §5 states adopted new limits on mail voting, drop boxes, and voter-roll maintenance practices (Voting Rights Lab, 2023). 

Studies conducted by the Brennan Center show that the racial turnout gap has widened nationwide since the decision, increasing at roughly twice the rate in former preclearance states. By 2022, the white–Black turnout gap in former preclearance jurisdictions was about five percentage points higher than it likely would have been under pre-Shelby protections (Crayton, 2024; Morris & Grange, 2024).

Although Shelby County v. Holder eliminated the VRA’s preclearance system and contributed to reduced access to voting in many former §  5 states, § 2 of the Voting Rights Act remained fully intact, and a 2021 Supreme Court decision introduced new challenges for proving violations of §2.  In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee (2021), the Democratic National Committee challenged two Arizona voting laws that it argued created barriers to voting for minority communities. The first was Arizona’s “out of precinct” rule, which discards an entire ballot if it is cast in the wrong precinct, even when most races on the ballot were eligible for that voter. The second was H.B. 2023, a 2016 statute that made it a criminal offense for most individuals or organizations to collect and return another person’s early ballot, with ballot assistance disproportionately used by Native American, Latino, and Black voters who often face greater logistical barriers to returning ballots on their own. 

In a 6–3 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected these claims. Justice Alito held that neither policy imposed burdens beyond the usual burdens of voting, and he also concluded that any racial disparities in their impact were small in absolute terms. He further emphasized that Arizona had legitimate state interests such as preventing fraud and ensuring orderly election administration. Although the Court declined to create a definitive test for all § 2 cases, it outlined general guideposts that signaled a more limited interpretation of when disparate impacts on minority voters amount to a legal violation. Because Brnovich narrowed the practical standards for proving discrimination under §2, many scholars and civil rights groups view the decision as another significant restriction on the Voting Rights Act. 

D. Redistricting & Gerrymandering

The United States Constitution requires a nationwide census every ten years to determine how many people live in each state. After the census, reapportionment occurs, which is the process of reallocating the 435 positions in the U.S. House of Representatives among the states based on population changes. Once these positions are reassigned, each state redraws its congressional and legislative district boundaries through redistricting in order to keep districts equal in population and maintain fair representation (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d..)

Historically, the redistricting process has been prone to political manipulation, a vulnerability that continues in modern elections. One outcome of this manipulation is gerrymandering, the intentional drawing of electoral district boundaries to benefit a particular party, group, or socioeconomic class. The term “gerrymandering” is a portmanteau, which is a blended word formed by combining parts of two different words. The term originates from an 1812 event in which Elbridge Gerry, the Massachusetts governor and later Vice President of the United States, approved the creation of a district in the Boston area that was highly irregular in shape and resembled a salamander. An 1812 political cartoon shown below mocked the shape of this district and the political manipulation behind it. The word gerrymandering is still used today to describe this practice and carries a negative connotation (Library of Congress, 2024).

Image 13.6

The original “Gerry-mander” cartoon drawn by Elkanah Tisdale 

and published in the Boston Gazette in 1812. 

(Library of Congress, 2024)

Image 13.7

D. Redistricting & Gerrymandering- continued 

Traditionally, the Supreme Court refused to hear challenges to legislative redistricting because it determined that these disputes were nonjusticiable political questions, meaning issues the Court believed were unsuitable for judicial review because they were tasks the elected branches of government should handle. In Colegrove v. Green (1946), the Court held that federal courts could not intervene in malapportioned districts because redistricting was a “political question” left to Congress and the states, cautioning that the judiciary should not “enter this political thicket.” Under this doctrine, even extreme population disparities between districts were immune from judicial review.

This changed when the Court decided Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960). In that case, the city of Tuskegee, Alabama, redrew its boundaries from a simple square into a strange shape with 28 sides that removed nearly every Black voter from the city limits. Black residents argued that this boundary manipulation violated the Fifteenth Amendment by intentionally disenfranchising them. Although Alabama tried to rely on the Colegrove case, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected that argument, explaining that the political question doctrine does not shield state action that blatantly violates constitutional rights. The Court held that states may not use redistricting to dilute or eliminate the voting power of racial groups, making racial gerrymandering constitutionally impermissible.

After Gomillion banned racially based gerrymandering, the Supreme Court expanded the ability of federal courts to get involved in redistricting disputes. In Baker v. Carr (1962), the Court held that redistricting claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause are justiciable.  The case arose after Tennessee failed to redraw its legislative districts for more than sixty years, despite dramatic population shifts. The Court’s ruling opened the door for federal courts to review and strike down redistricting claims alleged to be unfair, even if they did not involve racial discrimination.

The authority of federal courts to hear redistricting cases involving Equal Protection violations helped shape the modern standards for how districts must be drawn. In Reynolds v. Sims (1964), the Court examined Alabama’s districting scheme for their state legislature, where one district had 41 times as many eligible voters as another, severely diluting the voting power of residents in more populated areas. The Court ruled that states must make “honest and good-faith efforts” to achieve nearly equal district populations. This decision cemented the “one person, one vote” principle as a cornerstone of modern redistricting law. The Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause requires substantially equal legislative representation for all citizens because “legislators represent people, not places,” and weighting votes differently based on residency is unconstitutional.  Wesberry v. Sanders, decided the same year, held that the one person, one vote principle also applies to federal congressional districts.

The finer details of the one person, one vote rule were clarified in later cases where citizens claimed that states were engaging in vote dilution, a districting practice that weakens minority voting power by manipulating how voters are distributed across districts. Vote dilution can occur through cracking, which happens when minority voters are split across several districts so they cannot form a majority anywhere, or through packing, which concentrates minority voters into a single district at disproportionately high levels, limiting their influence in surrounding districts (UCLA Latino Policy & Politics Initiative [LPPI], n.d.).  

In Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), the Supreme Court addressed allegations of vote dilution in a situation that many scholars would describe today as cracking. Black citizens of North Carolina challenged the state’s use of multimember legislative districts, arguing that this arrangement dispersed Black voters across several districts in ways that prevented them from electing representatives of their choice. The Court interpreted § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to prohibit districting plans that result in minority voters having less opportunity to elect their preferred candidates, even without proof of purposeful discrimination. The Court also established a three-part test requiring plaintiffs alleging racial vote dilution to show 1) that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a district, 2) that it is politically cohesive, and 3) that the majority votes as a bloc in ways that usually defeat the minority’s preferred candidates.  The Court held that § 2 bans districting schemes that produce discriminatory results under the “totality of the circumstances,” and that plans meeting the Gingles preconditions may violate the statute even without intentional discrimination. A recent decision, Allen v. Milligan (2023), reaffirmed the Gingles framework and relied on it to strike down Alabama’s congressional map for diluting Black voting strength.

In the early 1990s, the Court had to shift away from vote-dilution claims and return to analyzing Equal Protection challenges to race-based districting, similar to the claim raised in the Gomillion case.  In Shaw v. Reno (1993)  the Court addressed a challenge to North Carolina’s creation of a majority–minority district, which is a district where minority voters make up more than half of the population. The district was drawn in an extremely irregular shape that indicated race was the predominant factor in its design. White voters, represented by the North Carolina Attorney General, argued that sorting citizens by race in drawing district lines violated the Equal Protection Clause, even when the goal was to enhance minority representation. The Supreme Court held that such race-based districting must survive strict scrutiny, establishing the rule that legislators may not use race as the dominant factor in redistricting unless the plan is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest. The case was remanded back to a lower court, which then rejected the plan. 

In Miller v. Johnson (1995), the Court used the strict scrutiny framework identified in Shaw to analyze several of Georgia’s proposed redistricting plans. The state’s population was 27 percent African American but formed a majority in only one of its eleven congressional districts. Georgia’s General Assembly drew the Eleventh District as a new majority-Black district to address this issue. However, the district lacked any coherent geographic structure and was described as a “geographic monstrosity” because it stretched roughly 260 miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. White voters brought an Equal Protection challenge, arguing that the district had been drawn predominantly because of race. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, declared the district unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, reaffirming the principles established in Shaw v. Reno (1993). The Court emphasized that a reapportionment plan may be “so highly irregular and bizarre in shape that it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters based on race,” and clarified that such race-based districting must survive strict scrutiny.

The Court applied this strict-scrutiny standard in Cooper v. Harris (2017), striking down two North Carolina congressional districts after concluding that race, rather than politics, had predominated when design them. The evidence showed that legislators, believing they were complying with the Voting Rights Act, intentionally increased the Black voting-age population in both contested districts to above 50 percent, even though such a racial threshold was not legally required. The Court held that the Act did not mandate creating majority-Black districts under those circumstances. The decision reinforced the Shaw and Miller framework and clarified how courts evaluate redistricting plans where racial and partisan motives overlap.

Building on the themes of race and intent in redistricting, the Court next considered a similar dispute out of Texas. Abbott v. Perez (2018) involved a challenge to Texas’s redistricting plans after minority groups argued that several districts were drawn with discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court upheld nearly all of the challenged districts, emphasizing that legislatures are entitled to a strong presumption of good faith when drawing maps. The Court held that plaintiffs bear the burden of proving intentional discrimination and that evidence of past discrimination does not automatically invalidate later maps. Only one district was struck down, and the Court made clear that allegations of racial gerrymandering or discriminatory intent require specific, district-by-district proof rather than broad assumptions about legislative motive. This approach reflects a more deferential stance toward state legislatures than in Cooper, illustrating that while strict scrutiny applies when race predominates, courts will not assume racial predominance without clear evidence.

Not all claims of unfairness in redistricting can be heard by federal courts, including the Supreme Court, because purely political gerrymandering is not reviewable in the federal system. In Rucho v. Common Cause (2019), the North Carolina legislature adopted new redistricting maps in 2016 that were drawn to secure a strong partisan advantage for Republicans, who publicly stated their goal of creating ten Republican districts and three Democratic districts. These maps were immediately challenged in federal court by several Democratic groups. The district court repeatedly struck the maps down as unconstitutional, but when the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court temporarily allowed their use in the 2018 midterm elections because the election was too close to change the maps without causing major disruption, a principle known as the “Purcell Principle.” After the 2018 midterm elections, the Court ruled that partisan gerrymandering claims raise political questions that federal courts cannot resolve. As a result, federal courts may not police partisan gerrymandering, leaving these disputes to state courts, state constitutions, and state legislatures unless Congress enacts new federal standards.

More recently, the Supreme Court has had to examine whether a redistricting plan constituted racial gerrymandering or partisan gerrymandering, as well as the evidentiary standard for making that distinction. In Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP (2024), South Carolina’s Republican-controlled legislature adopted a new congressional map that moved tens of thousands of Black voters into another district, effectively turning the district into a safe Republican seat. The South Carolina chapter of the NAACP sued, and the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina concluded that the contested district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The legislators appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that the map constituted partisan gerrymandering, which is permissible according to the Rucho case. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority, overturned the lower court’s finding and ruled that the plaintiffs had not met the evidentiary burden needed to prove racial gerrymandering or vote dilution. He also clarified the evidentiary standards for such claims: When plaintiffs allege racial gerrymandering, they must show that race was the predominant factor in drawing district lines, meaning that racial considerations outweighed and displaced traditional, race-neutral criteria. Justice Alito's opinion also contended that, because partisanship and race often correlate, it is difficult to distinguish whether mapmakers acted for political reasons or racial ones, requiring courts to begin with a presumption that legislatures acted in good faith. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs presented only weak circumstantial evidence for their claims and failed to provide an alternative map showing that South Carolina could have met its political objectives with significantly less racial imbalance.

The questions raised in Alexander resurfaced almost immediately in another state, this time in Texas. In Texas State Conference of the NAACP v. Texas (2025), the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas ruled that Texas’s new congressional map for the 2026 elections was likely drawn with discriminatory intent and unlawfully diluted the voting power of Black and Hispanic voters. The case was filed by the Texas State Conference of the NAACP, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), and several individual voters who argued that the map intentionally weakened minority voting strength in violation of the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act.  Texas appealed, and on December 4, 2025, the Supreme Court granted the state’s emergency request for a stay, allowing Texas to use the challenged map while the appeal proceeds. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority, stated that Texas was likely to succeed on the merits because the district court committed “serious errors,” including failing to honor the presumption of legislative good faith and failing to draw an adverse inference against the plaintiffs for not producing an alternative map capable of achieving Texas’s partisan goals without relying on race. The Court also emphasized that changing the map so close to the 2026 election risked voter confusion and violated the Purcell Principle, which cautions courts against altering election rules shortly before an election. As a result, the challenged map will remain in place for now, and the Supreme Court will consider the case on appeal. Meanwhile, the dissent criticized the majority for overturning an extensive factual record based on only a brief review.  The appeal is now fully docketed at the Supreme Court, where the justices will decide the case on the merits during the current Term.

E.  Money & Influence in Elections

Campaign finance laws are important because they are designed to prevent wealthy individuals, corporations, and special-interest groups from exerting an unfair influence over elections or “buying” access to public officials. These rules aim to promote fairness, transparency, and public trust by ensuring that elected representatives are accountable to voters rather than major donors (FEC, n.d.).

As early as 1901, concerns about undue corporate influence in federal elections led Congress to begin regulating campaign money, culminating in the Tillman Act of 1907, the first federal law to ban corporations from making direct financial contributions to federal candidates. The law prohibited national banks and federally chartered corporations from donating to any campaign for federal office, marking the beginning of federal efforts to separate corporate treasury funds from electoral politics (Library of Congress, n.d.).

As campaign finance regulation evolved throughout the twentieth century, Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, later strengthened by sweeping amendments in 1974, 1976, and 1979 that created contribution limits, expanded disclosure requirements, and established the Federal Election Commission. As a result of these reforms, modern campaign finance laws came to distinguish among several different types of political spending.  One important rule is that ender federal law, candidates and political committees must disclose the identities of individual donors who contribute more than $200 in an election cycle, including their occupation and employer (FEC, n.d.).

Once the basic disclosure rules are established, campaign finance law classifies political contributions into different categories, each governed by its own rules. Hard money refers to contributions given directly to a candidate’s campaign. These contributions are subject to strict limits, such as the current cap of $3,500 per election from an individual to a federal candidate and $5,000 per year from a multi-candidate Political Action Committee, which is an organization formed by interest groups, unions, corporations, or individuals to raise and contribute money within these legal limits. Soft money, by contrast, consists of funds raised by political parties for general “party-building” activities, such as voter registration or get-out-the-vote drives. These contributions historically had no federal dollar limits, although they could not be used to support a specific federal candidate. A third category, independent spending, includes money spent by individuals or groups to advocate for or against a candidate without coordinating with the candidate or their campaign. For example, an individual could spend $50,000 to print and mail flyers saying “Support Senator Williams on Election Day,” as long as the effort was planned and carried out independently. Independent expenditures are not subject to contribution limits, but they must be reported to the Federal Election Commission (FEC, n.d.).

These reforms set the stage for the Supreme Court’s first major campaign finance case, Buckley v. Valeo (1976). This case arose after Congress adopted sweeping post-Watergate amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act, reforms prompted by the Watergate scandal, in which illegal donations and secret funds were used to influence the 1972 presidential election. Challengers to these reforms argued that these new limits violated the First Amendment. The Court responded by upholding limits on direct contributions to candidates, finding that such caps help prevent corruption, but it struck down limits on independent expenditures, candidate self-funding, and total campaign spending because those rules directly restricted how the political speech of individuals and campaigns. Buckley therefore established the key distinction that contributions may be limited, but political expenditures generally may not. The Court also ruled that several Federal Election Commission officials had been unconstitutionally appointed, and because they exercised significant federal authority, they had to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, requiring Congress to restructure the agency.

After the FEC was restructured, Congress continued refining campaign finance laws in the decades that followed. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 addressed two major concerns in federal campaign finance law: soft money and issue advocacy.  Before 2002, national political parties routinely raised unlimited “soft money” contributions, which were supposed to be used for party-building activities but in practice often supported federal election efforts. BCRA prohibited national party committees, federal candidates, and federal officeholders from soliciting or receiving soft money in connection with federal elections. The law also restricted corporate and union spending on certain “issue advertisements,” defined as ads that name a clearly identified federal candidate within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election. These provisions aimed to close major loopholes that had allowed large, unregulated spending to influence federal campaigns. In McConnell v. FEC (2003), the Supreme Court upheld most of BCRA’s restrictions, concluding that Congress could constitutionally ban soft money and regulate certain forms of election-related advertising to prevent corruption, while striking down only a few narrower provisions such as the ban on contributions by minors. However, the durability of BCRA’s remaining restrictions was soon tested, leading to one of the most consequential campaign finance decisions in modern history, Citizens United v. FEC (2010).

E.  Money & Influence in Elections-continued

The influence of Citizens United quickly shaped another major case in the D.C. Circuit. In SpeechNow.org v. FEC (D.C. Cir. 2010), the court held that groups engaging solely in independent expenditures cannot be subject to contribution limits because, under the reasoning of Citizens United, independent spending does not corrupt candidates. The court concluded that individuals may give unlimited amounts to political committees that make only independent expenditures. This ruling, when combined with Citizens United, created what are now known as Super PACs, which may raise unlimited funds from individuals, corporations, nonprofits, and unions as long as they do not coordinate their spending with candidates or campaigns. Although SpeechNow was not a Supreme Court decision, the FEC accepted it as a nationwide rule, making it one of the most consequential campaign finance rulings of the modern era.

The Court soon confronted another challenge to federal campaign finance limits in McCutcheon v. FEC (2014). In that case, the Supreme Court struck down the federal aggregate contribution limits, which had capped the total amount an individual could donate across all federal candidates, party committees, and PACs during a two-year election cycle. The Court explained that although Congress may limit how much a person can give to any single candidate to prevent corruption, it cannot restrict how many candidates or committees a person chooses to support, because such limits burden political participation without meaningfully preventing quid pro quo corruption. As a result of the decision, individuals may now give the maximum base-level contribution to as many candidates and political committees as they wish, significantly expanding the potential influence of high-dollar donors.

Conclusion

When studying voting rights, it's important to understand the constitutional foundations for voting as well as the major court cases that have expanded or restricted these rights. Being knowledgeable about civil rights and U.S. history requires us to acknowledge both past and present inequities and to recognize the patterns that lead to them. Redistricting and gerrymandering remain significant concerns, especially in an era of heightened partisanship and increased litigation over racial gerrymandering.  Since Citizens United, some of the most heated public debates have centered on the influence of money in elections, and these concerns cut across party lines.

Because of these challenges, many Americans feel disconnected from the political system and choose not to participate at all, particularly younger voters. Although youth nonparticipation is often attributed to apathy, research shows the reality is far more nuanced. According to a CIRCLE report, many young people did not vote in 2024 because of structural and practical barriers, including lack of time, insufficient information to feel confident about voting, logistical challenges related to being away at college, registration or absentee ballot problems, and personal or financial hardships. Among those who did not vote, 24 percent disliked the candidates, 20 percent believed voting was unimportant, 17 percent were too busy or faced scheduling conflicts, and 14 percent reported lacking enough information. Overall, the findings show that lower youth turnout stems from inequitable access and systemic challenges, as well as frustration with institutional features like the Electoral College, rather than a lack of interest (CIRCLE, 2025). These findings should prompt Americans to reflect on why the people who will live the longest with the consequences of today’s policies often have the least political engagement, and how we can build a system in which elected officials truly represent people of all ages and incomes.

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