Embedded Files
Chapter Three
Chapter Three
The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court
Chapter Outline
Chapter Outline
A. History and Origins of the Court
B. Influential Justices and Eras
C. Structure of the United States Court System
D. Judicial Interpretation
E. How the Court Selects and Processes Cases
F. Criticisms and Controversies
A. History and Origins of the Court
The federal court system of the United States was established in the United States Constitution. Article III begins with, "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The First Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created 13 federal district courts allocated among the states based on size and population. The Act also established 3 circuit courts and a Supreme Court made up of one Chief Justice and five Associate Justices.
In the early years, Supreme Court justices were required to “ride the circuit,” which meant traveling to preside over the regional circuit courts together in panels of two Supreme Court justices and one district judge. As a result, serving on the Supreme Court was not originally viewed as a highly prestigious role. Congress eventually replaced this system by creating dedicated circuit judge positions to manage those cases.
Over time, Congress expanded and reorganized the federal court system to meet the needs of the growing nation. The number of justices on the Supreme Court fluctuated in the 19th century, but since 1869 it has been set at nine. Congress also created more lower courts as new states entered the Union and the caseload grew. Today, the federal judiciary consists of 94 district courts (trial-level courts), 13 circuit courts of appeal (intermediate appellate courts), and the Supreme Court of the United States at the top (United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, n.d.).
Timeline of the Federal Judiciary
Timeline of the Federal Judiciary
1789 – Judiciary Act of 1789 establishes 13 federal district courts, 3 circuit courts, and 6 Supreme Court Justices.
1801–1869 – Number of Supreme Court Justices fluctuates between 5 and 10 during this time period.
1869 – Judiciary Act of 1869 limits Supreme Court to 9 Justices.
1891 – Evarts Act of 1891 creates United States Courts of Appeals.
1925 – Judiciary Act of 1925 gives Supreme Court control over its docket.
Today – 94 district courts - 13 Circuit Courts of Appeals - 9 Justices on the Supreme Court
Image 3.1
Image 3.1
(United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, n.d.)
(United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, n.d.)
A. History and Origins of the Court - continued
Additionally, the Constitution explains how Supreme Court justices are appointed and how long they serve. Supreme Court Justices are not elected, and they do not serve fixed terms. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution is known as the Appointments Clause. It says that, “[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint … Judges of the Supreme Court.”
In practice, the President selects a nominee, and the Senate must then vote to confirm that choice. Today, confirmation requires only a simple majority. Until 2017, however, Senate rules permitted a filibuster of Supreme Court nominees, meaning 60 votes were often needed to end debate before a final vote. The shift to allow confirmation by simple majority is informally known as the “nuclear option,” referring to the Senate’s reinterpretation of Rule XXII, the cloture rule (Congressional Research Service, 2017).
Article III, Section 1 further states that “The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” This language has long been understood to give Justices their appointments for life, a point of controversy discussed later in Section F of this chapter (Supreme Court Historical Society, n.d.).
B. Influential Justices and Eras
Students reading about constitutional law and civil rights will often see historians write about “The Jay Court” or “The Warren Court”. These historians are referring to the period of time when a particular Chief Justice presided over the Supreme Court. Additionally, the name of each “Court” reflects the composition of Justices serving at the same time, the kinds of cases the Court decided, and the historical context of the time period. For example, the Marshall Court (1801–1835) is remembered for establishing the Court’s authority through Marbury v. Madison, while the Warren Court (1953–1969) is known for landmark civil rights and liberties rulings like Brown v. Board of Education. The names of the Courts listed below in Image 3.2 show the different eras (or "Courts") in Supreme Court history. This list is not comprehensive; it highlights only the most well-known eras (Supreme Court Historical Society, n.d.).
Judicial Eras In The United States
The Jay Court (1789–1795) – The nation’s first Supreme Court, which helped establish the judiciary’s basic operations but decided few major cases.
The Marshall Court (1801–1835) – Asserted the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review (Marbury v. Madison) and strengthened federal authority over the states.
The Taney Court (1836–1864) – Known for the controversial Dred Scott v. Sandford decision, which denied citizenship to African Americans and deepened sectional divides.
The Chase Court (1864–1873) – Presided over the tumultuous Reconstruction era, addressing legal questions about civil rights and federal authority after the Civil War.
The Waite Court (1874–1888) – Often deferred to state authority, limiting the scope of the Reconstruction Amendments in cases involving civil rights protections.
The Hughes Court (1930–1941) – Initially resisted New Deal economic reforms, but shifted after 1937 to uphold broader federal regulatory power.
The Warren Court (1953–1969) – Famous for landmark rulings on civil rights, civil liberties, and criminal procedure, such as Brown v. Board of Education.
The Burger Court (1969–1986) – Issued significant decisions including Roe v. Wade but also began moving the Court in a more conservative direction.
The Rehnquist Court (1986–2005) – Strengthened states’ rights and limited federal authority, while also issuing key rulings on equal protection and election law.
The Roberts Court (2005–present) – Marked by a strong conservative majority, with landmark rulings on campaign finance, voting rights, abortion, and administrative power.
Image 3.2
(Supreme Court Historical Society, n.d.)
B. Influential Justices And Eras - continued
Court Era Spotlight:
The Marshall Court
The Marshall Court (1801–1835) was led by Chief Justice John Marshall. He turned the Supreme Court into a powerful and independent branch of government during a time of intense conflict between Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans. The defining moment came in Marbury v. Madison (1803). In the final days of his presidency, John Adams signed last-minute judicial commissions, including one appointing William Marbury as a justice of the peace. When Thomas Jefferson took office, his Secretary of State, James Madison, refused to deliver Marbury’s commission, effectively denying Marbury the job he was promised. Marbury then petitioned the Supreme Court to compel Madison to deliver the commission. Chief Justice Marshall agreed that Marbury was legally entitled to the commission; however, Marshall also stated the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 giving the Court jurisdiction to issue such an order contradicted the scope of jurisdiction spelled out in Article III of the United States Constitution. Marshall concluded that a portion of the Act was void. The ruling in this case resulted in the establishment of the principle of judicial review, which is the Supreme Court’s power to strike down laws that violate the Constitution. This power is not explicitly stated in the text of the Constitution but was firmly established in Marbury v. Madison.
Image 3.3
(Supreme Court Historical Society, n.d.)
Image 3.4
(Supreme Court Historical Society, n.d.)
B. Influential Justices and Eras - continued
The official Supreme Court photograph of the men who made up the Warren Court from 1962–1965 appears below as Image 3.5. The members of the Court in the photograph are, from left to right: top row, Byron R. White, William J. Brennan, Jr., Potter Stewart, and Arthur J. Goldberg; bottom row, Tom C. Clark, Hugo L. Black, Earl Warren, William O. Douglas, and John M. Harlan II. The Warren Court was known for several historic decisions advancing civil rights, most famously Brown v. Board of Education, which held that racial segregation was unconstitutional. The court also expanded the constitutional rights of the criminally accused in well-known cases like Miranda v. Arizona. The Warren Court spanned from 1953 to 1969 and included a number of justices over time, not all of whom are shown in the photograph below (Virginia Humanities, n.d.).
The Warren Court
Image 3.5
(Virginia Humanities, n.d.)
B. Influential Justices and Eras - continued
Most people know that Miranda v. Arizona requires police officers to inform individuals in custody of their rights before interrogation, but not everyone is familiar with the details of the case. An excerpt of this famous Warren Court decision appears below.
Landmark Case Spotlight:
Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
Case Excerpt (Not Full Case)
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
We dealt with certain phases of this problem recently in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). There, as in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible.
We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings. We have undertaken a thorough reexamination of the Escobedo decision and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution -- that "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," and that "the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel" -- rights which were put in jeopardy in that case through official overbearing. These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle. And, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, they were secured "for ages to come, and . . . designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it," Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 387 (1821).
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow, but, briefly stated, it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. In each, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of them, signed statements as well which were admitted at their trials.
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings, and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. We have concluded that, without proper safeguards, the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights, and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it -- the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator's imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation is itself damning, and will bode ill when presented to a jury. Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it.
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule, and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clear-cut fact. More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system -- that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among those who most require knowledge of their rights. A mere warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end. Prosecutors themselves claim that the admonishment of the right to remain silent, without more, "will benefit only the recidivist and the professional." Brief for the National District Attorneys Association as amicus curiae, p. 14. Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process. Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485, n. 5. Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires.
The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant subsidiary functions, as well. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present, the likelihood that the police will practice coercion is reduced, and, if coercion is nevertheless exercised, the lawyer can testify to it in court. The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police, and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443-448 (1958) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount or circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right.
If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney. The financial ability of the individual has no relationship to the scope of the rights involved here. The privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to all individuals. The need for counsel in order to protect the privilege exists for the indigent as well as the affluent. In fact, were we to limit these constitutional rights to those who can retain an attorney, our decisions today would be of little significance. The cases before us, as well as the vast majority of confession cases with which we have dealt in the past, involve those unable to retain counsel. While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his poverty, they have the obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice. Denial of counsel to the indigent at the time of interrogation while allowing an attorney to those who can afford one would be no more supportable by reason or logic than the similar situation at trial and on appeal struck down in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system, then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent -- the person most often subjected to interrogation -- the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and of the general right to counsel, only by effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise it.
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point, he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have a "station house lawyer" present at all times to advise prisoners. It does mean, however, that, if police propose to interrogate a person, they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that, if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation. If authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating the person's Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time.
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n. 14. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and we reassert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation. Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place, and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders.
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney, followed closely by a statement, could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given, or simply from the fact that a confession was, in fact, eventually obtained. A statement we made in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962), is applicable here: "Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver."
The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to "admissions" of part or all of an offense. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely "exculpatory." If a statement made were, in fact, truly exculpatory, it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation, and thus to prove guilt by implication.
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is at this point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences, distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system recognized in some countries. Under the system of warnings we delineate today, or under any other system which may be devised and found effective, the safeguards to be erected about the privilege must come into play at this point.
Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492. When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such investigation may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the factfinding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations, the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.
In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment, and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.
To summarize, we hold that, when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that, if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
Because of the nature of the problem and because of its recurrent significance in numerous cases, we have to this point discussed the relationship of the Fifth Amendment privilege to police interrogation without specific concentration on the facts of the cases before us. We turn now to these facts to consider the application to these cases of the constitutional principles discussed above. In each instance, we have concluded that statements were obtained from the defendant under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege. (Note: Only the facts of the Miranda case are included in this excerpt. The companion cases are not included.)
On March 13, 1963, petitioner, Ernesto Miranda, was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a Phoenix police station. He was there identified by the complaining witness. The police then took him to "Interrogation Room No. 2" of the detective bureau. There he was questioned by two police officers. The officers admitted at trial that Miranda was not advised that he had a right to have an attorney present. Two hours later, the officers emerged from the interrogation room with a written confession signed by Miranda. At the top of the statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and "with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me." At his trial before a jury, the written confession was admitted into evidence over the objection of defense counsel, and the officers testified to the prior oral confession made by Miranda during the interrogation. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape. He was sentenced to 20 to 30 years' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda's constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the confession, and affirmed the conviction. 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 721. In reaching its decision, the court emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically request counsel.
We reverse. From the testimony of the officers and by the admission of respondent, it is clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner. Without these warnings, the statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had "full knowledge" of his "legal rights" does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights. Cf. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 512-513 (1963); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS).
In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not presume that a defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that any warnings have been given or that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing and intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record. Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing, the judgments of the Supreme Court Of Arizona in No. 759, of the New York Court of Appeals in No. 760, and of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 761, are reversed.
It is so ordered.
B. Influential Justices and Eras - continued
After reading the excerpt of the Miranda v. Arizona case above, some readers might think that it seems very long and verbose. However, the excerpt included above is relatively short. It would be approximately seven pages long if it appeared in a printed textbook. The full text of the actual case is over 100 pages long. Typical Supreme Court opinions are anywhere from 20-100 pages. It is useful when beginning the study of civil rights to compare reading an excerpt of a case with other ways of reviewing a case, such as looking at the full text of the entire opinion or skimming a brief summary.
Landmark Case Spotlight: continued
Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
To review the full text of the case, click here and
then select "Opinions and & Dissents".
Please click on the above to skim the full text of the actual case. While doing this, think about how different it looks compared to the excerpt. Not only is it over 100 pages long; it includes a lot more information about the judicial history of police interrogations. You will also notice that the full text of cases include the majority opinion, concurring opinions, and dissenting opinions, while the summary does not. Factual nuances, procedural and lower-court history, footnotes, the names of the attorneys on both sides of the case, and argument dates are other features that do not typically appear in summaries. They also omit dicta, which is judicial commentary not essential to the holding. It is not practical for undergraduate students in a one-semester survey course to read the full text of every case, which is why carefully curated excerpts play an important role in this resource.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
Click here for Oyez summary.
Please also click on the blue link above to read the Oyez summary of the Miranda case. These summaries are concise and straightforward, typically including a brief statement of the facts, the questions presented to the Court, and the case’s disposition, which is whether the Court affirmed, reversed, vacated, or remanded. Like other types of case summaries available online, they omit many details, but they can be useful for readers seeking a very basic understanding of a case. Oyez rarely provides enough information for a full analysis, but many times people find it helpful to skim a summary before reading the complete opinion. While some professors discourage students from relying on Oyez, most agree it can serve as a useful resource when used appropriately. In addition, the Oyez site offers audio recordings of the oral arguments presented to the Justices, and its summaries clearly indicate a visual representation of which Justices joined the majority and which ones issued separate opinions.
C. Structure of the United States Court System
As stated in section A of this chapter, today the federal judiciary consists of 94 district courts (the trial-level courts), 13 circuit courts of appeals (intermediate appellate courts), and the Supreme Court of the United States at the top. Image 3.6 below shows the current federal court structure. It is also beneficial to know the geographical boundaries of circuit and district courts, shown in Image 3.7 below.
The Federal Court System
Image 3.6
(United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, n.d.)
Geographical Boundaries
Image 3.7
(U.S. Courts, n.d.)
C. Structure of the United States Court System - continued
The Role of State Courts
At first glance, examining state courts doesn't seem like it should be a priority when studying constitutional law. After all, the United States Constitution does not contain many direct restrictions on, or references to, state governments. And when state governments are mentioned, the language seems very straightforward. The Supremacy Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, all of which were defined in the previous chapter, place clear limits on the authority of the states. Additionally, the provisions spelling out exclusive, concurrent, and reserved powers are explained in simple terms, at least for the time period when the Constitution was written.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember the role of state governments. Each state has its own constitution, and every state has its own court system. States also have their own executive branches led by their governors and their own legislative branches consisting of their state legislatures. It is important to understand the basic structure of state systems because complex or confusing issues can arise when federal and state authority overlap or conflict.
Please see Image 3.8, which illustrates how the federal and state judicial systems operate together in a dual court system. Image 3.9 shows the typical structure of a state court system, using Massachusetts as an example, and the seven courts in green are all trial courts.
Image 3.8
Dual Court System
(Saylor Academy, n.d.)
The Massachusetts Court System
Image 3.9
Massachusetts Court System
(Ballotpedia, n.d.)
C. Structure of the United States Court System - continued
The Role of State Courts - continued
While most states have a court system that resembles that of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and ten other states have no intermediate appellate courts. In such states, cases that are appealed from the trial-level courts get appealed to their state supreme courts. Additionally, some states have different names for their courts. New Hampshire calls its trial courts “Circuit Courts” because in 2011 the state unified its District, Probate, and Family courts into one system organized by county-based circuits, streamlining administration under a single name (Ballotpedia, n.d.).
Other states, like New York, have a completely different naming system and call their main trial court the “Supreme Court”. Click here to see a diagram of the unique New York system (New York State Unified Court System, n.d.). Even though most states use a three-tier court structure, it is important to be familiar with variations in other states. Otherwise, it can be confusing when reading Supreme Court cases that came from those states' courts.
Image 3.10
New Hampshire Court System
(Ballotpedia, n.d.)
D. Judicial Interpretation
Judicial interpretation refers to the various ways judges apply and understand laws. Supreme Court Justices approach cases according to their own philosophies of how the Constitution should be understood. The best way to start examining this topic is to look at two commonly discussed approaches to decision making: judicial restraint and judicial activism. Although there are many ways to describe these approaches, a simple overview is provided here. Judges who practice judicial restraint have a philosophy that makes them likely to simply look at the plain meaning of a statute to determine whether or not it violates the Constitution. These judges tend to defer to precedent and other branches of government and are less likely to create new constitutional doctrines.
Judicial activists, on the other hand, are more likely to deeply explore and analyze the meaning of a statute along with the text of the Constitution in order to promote justice and address social wrongs. Historically, politically conservative Justices were often labeled as practicing judicial restraint and liberal Justices were called judicial activists, but this distinction has faded in recent years because people have recognized these characterizations are often overly simplistic or simply inaccurate.
There are entire law school courses dedicated to the topic of judicial interpretation, but for the purpose of this OER, the main categories are listed below in Image 3.11 with very brief definitions. There is a considerable amount of overlap between these approaches due to the complex nature of judicial interpretation. Developing a basic familiarity with these terms is helpful before examining landmark cases so that students can appreciate the social commentary and legal criticism surrounding them from a more informed mindset (Congressional Research Service, 2021).
Numerous resources are available to study the philosophies and approaches of the Justices. Martin-Quinn Scores are a set of statistical measures developed by political scientists Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn that estimate and measure the ideological leanings of U.S. Supreme Court Justices. These scores come from analyzing Justices’ voting patterns to place them on a liberal–conservative spectrum, providing a widely used tool for tracking shifts in judicial philosophy and the Court’s balance over time (Martin & Quinn, 2002). Many legal scholars criticize the Martin-Quinn system for not being up-to-date and for oversimplifying judicial behavior by reducing it to a single liberal–conservative scale. The way scores are calculated treats all votes as equally ideological, and critics note that scores can be distorted by unimportant cases. This results in a risk of misinterpreting votes as significant changes or ideological shifts, meaning the scores lack contextual nuance (Farnsworth, 2007). Despite these limitations, Martin-Quinn scores remain one a widely used tool for understanding the ideological trends of the Supreme Court.
In addition to Martin-Quinn scores, scholars study judicial philosophies through resources like the Oyez Project, the Supreme Court Database, and law school research guides such as those from the Georgetown University Law Library, which track justices’ opinions, voting behavior, and interpretive approaches. LibGuides from law libraries, as well as numerous specialized databases, also provide additional expertise on this topic.
Image 3.11
(Supreme Court of the United States, 2025)
Overview of Judicial Interpretation Approaches
Judicial Restraint A belief that the Justices should focus on the plain text of the law and the Constitution. They want elected legislatures to make policy decisions and will only strike down a law if it clearly violates the Constitution, even if an injustice might result by not doing so. They believe it is the role of the legislature to address such injustices. Example: Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), opinion by Justice Henry Billings Brown. Famous quote: "Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them," Chief Justice John Roberts (Statement at Senate Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing, 2005).
Judicial Activism A philosophical approach in which judges interpret the Constitution and laws broadly, allowing for decisions that expand rights, address social issues, or adapt legal principles to changing circumstances. Example: Brown v. Board of Education (1954), opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren. Famous quote: "The genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs,” Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. ( Speech at Georgetown University, 1985).
Legalism An intellectual method, rather than a philosophical approach, that emphasizes applying legal rules strictly as written. It values consistency and predicability in legal decision-making, even when the result may seem unfair. Example: Caminetti v. United States (1917), opinion by Justice William Day. Famous quote: "Hard cases make bad law.” Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. (Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 1904)
Originalism The practice of interpreting the Constitution by giving its words the same meaning they had at the time they were adopted, focusing on the text’s original public understanding, rather than modern views or evolving standards. Example: District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia.
Textualism An intellectual approach, often considered a subcategory of originalism, that interprets laws and the Constitution by focusing strictly on the ordinary meaning of specific words in the text at the time they were written, without relying on outside sources like legislative history or policy goals. Example: Bostock v. Clayton County (2020), opinion by Justice Neil Gorsuch.
Living Constitutionalism An approach that views the Constitution as a dynamic document whose meaning can evolve over time to reflect contemporary values, circumstances, and societal progress. Judges applying this method are less bound by historical understandings and more willing to interpret constitutional principles in light of modern realities. There is considerable overlap with judicial activism. Example: Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy.
Polling Jurisdictions The practice of researching and analyzing how other courts, either state or foreign, have decided similar issues. Although these other sources only have persuasive authority and are not binding, they can inform the Justices. Example: Roper v. Simmons (2005), opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy.
Pragmatism This approach involves interpreting the Constitution from a practical standpoint, with attention to real-world outcomes and practical consequences. Example: Missouri v. Holland (1920), opinion by Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Stare Decisis The principle of following precedent to ensure stability and predictability in the law, which is the meaning of the Latin phrase that is used to label this approach. Example: Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), joint opinion by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter.
Structural Analysis Inferring constitutional meaning from the overall design and relationships within the Constitution, such as separation of powers or federalism. Example: McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall.
Image 3.12
(Congressional Research Service, 2018)
E. How the Court Selects and Processes Cases
The first place to look when examining how the Supreme Court selects and processes cases is to locate the relevant language itself in the Constitution. Section 2 of Article III reads, "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
The language in bold above explains the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which is its authority to hear certain types of cases. Sometimes the Court has original jurisdiction, which means it can hear a case first without it going through a lower court. Such cases involve disputes between two or more states, cases affecting ambassadors, cases affecting other public ministers and consuls, and cases in which a state is a party. Cases can also reach the Supreme Court through the certification process, which can occur when a federal court court of appeals formally asks the Supreme Court to resolve a legal question. However, the certification process has not been used in decades and is considered functionally obsolete. Original jurisdiction amounts to less than 5% of all cases the Court hears. Therefore, the remainder of this section will focus on the cases the Supreme Court hears via appeal (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2022).
Appellate jurisdiction involves reviewing decisions that have already been made in the lower federal courts and state courts. Most cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court come from the federal system, with roughly 70–80% originating in the federal courts of appeals. Only 15–20% come from state supreme courts when a federal question is involved. When someone loses their case in a lower state or federal court and wants to appeal their case to the Supreme Court to hear the case, they can petition the Court for a writ of certiorari. This is a formal request asking the Court to review the decision of a lower court. The Court receives thousands of these petitions each term but agrees to hear only a small fraction of them, less than 1% (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2022).
To decide which cases to take, the Justices follow what is called the Rule of Four. This means that if at least four of the nine Justices vote to grant certiorari, the case will be accepted for full review. This rule ensures that a minority of Justices can place a case on the docket, preventing the majority from controlling the Court’s entire agenda. Most of the Court’s cases arrive through this process, making the writ of certiorari and the Rule of Four central to how the Supreme Court manages its workload.
There are several factors that affect what might make the Court agree to hear a case. When deciding which cases to hear, the Supreme Court considers both official and unofficial factors. Officially, the Court looks for cases that raise important federal or constitutional questions, correct serious legal errors, or resolve conflicts among lower courts, known as circuit splits.
Unofficially, other dynamics play a role. The U.S. Solicitor General, a high-ranking attorney in the U.S. Department of Justice who represents the federal government, is often called the “Tenth Justice.” This attorney enjoys a high success rate when filing petitions because the Justices trust the federal government’s judgment. Likewise, a small group of elite lawyers with extensive Court experience also have higher odds of success when filing appeals. Amicus curiae briefs, or “friend-of-the-court” filings, are written arguments submitted by individuals or organizations that are not direct parties to the case but want to offer information, legal reasoning, or policy perspectives. These briefs can increase a case’s visibility by showing the Court that the issues have national importance beyond those directly involved in the case. Finally, political and ideological considerations sometimes shape the justices’ decisions because they may select cases strategically to advance or protect particular legal positions (Epstein & Walker, 2018).
Image 3.12 below shows that the Supreme Court’s annual term runs from October through late June. The Justices hear oral arguments two weeks per month from October through April, usually on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays, and these days are marked in red. On select Fridays, shown in green, they meet in private conferences to discuss petitions and cases. Blue days are non-argument sessions, when the Court issues orders or opinions without hearing arguments. From May through June the Court focuses on releasing decisions, often on Mondays. July through September is a time for the Court to be in recess, although the Justices continue reviewing petitions and preparing for the next term during this time (Supreme Court of the United States, 2025).
Supreme Court Calendar
Image 3.13
(Supreme Court of the United States, 2025)
F. Criticisms and Controversies
There are many criticisms of the Supreme Court, both past and present. These critiques target both the institution as a whole and individual justices. Four major concerns are highlighted here: (a) the appointment process and terms of the Justices, (b) the Court’s use of the shadow docket, (c) questions about the integrity of specific justices, and (d) a growing cynicism toward the Supreme Court as an institution.
The first critique is that justices are appointed rather than elected. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this design was meant to ensure that justices could make fair and principled decisions, rather than ones driven by popular opinion, but not everyone supports this approach. A related criticism is that justices serve lifetime terms, which some argue allows them to hold power for too long. Despite ongoing debate and attempts to limit the terms of the Justices, changing imposing a fixed term would require a constitutional amendment, and no efforts to make such a change have made significant progress (Georgetown Legal Ethics Journal, 2024).
The second controversy involves the shadow docket. This term refers to Supreme Court decisions made outside the docket on the merits, frequently through brief, unsigned orders without the litigants submitting full briefs or oral arguments. While it was once used mainly for routine matters, it has increasingly been applied to high-stakes cases involving issues such as abortion, voting rights, immigration and vaccines. Between 2014 and 2024, the Supreme Court’s use of the shadow docket expanded sharply, with the 2024–25 term alone including more than 110 emergency decisions, which is over 150% more than in the preceding decade’s terms (Harvard Political Review, 2025).
Critics contend that this practice reduces transparency and creates an appearance that the Court is motivated by politics rather than the law because these rulings can significantly shape policy without the usual deliberative process. In response, legal scholars, members of Congress, and advocacy groups have called for reforms, including requiring fuller written opinions by the Justices, asking for clarification regarding the precedential value of shadow docket rulings, and urging the Court to limit the use of shadow docket decisions (Brennan Center for Justice, 2022).
Third, many Americans have wondered how to address the issue when certain Supreme Court Justices engage in behavior that some label unethical. Article III states, in part, that the Justices "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour", but on occasion, the conduct of Justices has been problematic. Justice Abe Fortas resigned from the Supreme Court in 1969 after it was revealed he had accepted a $20,000 retainer from financier Louis Wolfson, who was under investigation for securities fraud. The financial tie raised serious concerns about conflicts of interest and pressured him to resign (Liptak, 2006). Justice Clarence Thomas has faced extensive criticism for failing to disclose numerous luxury trips, lucrative real estate deals, and complex financial ties with billionaire Harlan Crow, raising concerns about conflicts of interest and the adequacy of Supreme Court ethics rules (ProPublica, 2023).
Currently, the only way to remove a Supreme Court Justice is through impeachment in the House and conviction in the Senate under Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution. This process has only been attempted one time against Justice Samuel Chase in 1804, but the Senate declined to remove him. Several reforms have been proposed, but no laws have been passed to clarify what specific behavior should cause a Justice to be removed, leaving the Court governed only by its own recently adopted Code of Conduct for Justices (2023), a self-imposed document that requires justices to avoid impropriety, disqualify themselves in cases of conflict, and maintain integrity. These rules lack any mechanisms of external enforcement.
The last type of criticism focuses on specific Courts, rather than individual Justices. For example, the Warren Court (1953–1969) was frequently criticized for “legislating from the bench” due to its landmark decisions expanding civil rights and liberties, which opponents described as examples of judicial activism. More recently, the Roberts Court, which has existed since 2005, has been scrutinized by political scholars. It consists of the current sitting Justices and is composed of six conservative-leaning members and three liberal-leaning members. Three of the conservative Justices were appointed by President Donald Trump. The Roberts Court has consistently handed down decisions that most scholars deem conservative. Furthermore, even though conservatives on the Court have historically emphasized judicial restraint and a strong commitment to precedent, recent decisions have led many observers to argue that the Roberts Court is engaging in judicial activism instead. A prime example is Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (2022), which overturned Roe v. Wade and nearly fifty years of precedent on abortion rights.
Prior to Dobbs, in Janus v. AFSCME (2018), the Roberts Court overturned Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977), holding that public employees do not have to pay union agency fees because doing so violated the First Amendment, thereby overturning precedent. These two rulings and several others like them have fueled accusations that the Roberts Court is less anchored in precedent and more willing to reshape constitutional law to reflect the majority’s political philosophy. This has contributed to debates about the Court's legitimacy and has sparked proposals by some progressives to expand the number of Supreme Court Justices to 13 members to align with the federal circuits.
Conclusion
By examining the Supreme Court’s history, structure, case-selection process, and methods of interpreting the Constitution, as well as the controversies surrounding the Court, helps students gain a stronger foundation for understanding the civil rights issues discussed in the chapters ahead.
Sources
Please note that the URLs listed below are presented as plain text rather than active hyperlinks in order to avoid triggering automated security filters.
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