Civil Rights Part Two:
Gender, Sexual Orientation, Age, Disability,
and Other Protected Classes
Chapter Outline
A. Overview
B. Gender
C. Sexual Orientation
D. Age
E. Disability
F. Other Protected Classes
A. Overview
Chapter Ten focused on civil rights as they pertain to race and national origin. This chapter examines civil rights as they relate to gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, and other protected classes. The material is divided into sections by topic because the policies and motivations behind the inequitable treatment of each group developed for different reasons. The topic of reproductive rights is uniquely complex and multifaceted, so it is addressed separately in Chapter Twelve.
When reading this chapter, it is important to resist the temptation to compare which group had the biggest struggle. For example, some might point out that formerly enslaved men obtained the right to vote 55 years before women did. Others might observe that women benefited from civil rights legislation before people with disabilities did. Such comparisons are not productive. The forms and sources of disparate treatment are complicated, and comparing across groups is rarely helpful or informative. As emerging scholar and political essayist Amen Gashaw notes, “Indeed, the ‘Oppression Olympics’ — the competition between people for the title of ‘most oppressed’ — attempts to identify one sole casualty of injustice, and consequently establishes an inefficient economy of reform, breeds intersectional resentment, and ultimately perpetuates the very oppression it vilifies” (Gashaw, 2021). Focusing on each group’s unique barriers, rather than comparing their struggles, leads to a more meaningful understanding of civil rights in the United States.
B. Gender
The status of women’s rights in early America is difficult to summarize. Before the founding of the United States, no unified legal system existed, and women lived under a mix of Indigenous governance, laws that legalized slavery, English colonial law, and local religious customs, all of which overlapped or conflicted with one another. Because these women came from diverse legal systems and experienced different levels of autonomy in their homelands, it is helpful to first consider the status of these women in the places from which they originated (Perdue, 1998).
Although the rights of Native American women differed significantly from one tribe or cultural group to another, those who were already living in the Americas generally had greater social, economic, and political rights than women in England during this time period. In many matrilineal Native societies, women controlled property, influenced political decisions, and exercised autonomy over marriage and family life (Perdue, 1998).
Likewise, prior to the transatlantic slave trade, many women living in West and West-Central African societies exercised more control over their daily lives than women living in England and Europe during the same time period. Although the rules and cultures they lived under differed widely across regions, women in these societies often worked their own farmland, participated in local markets, maintained strong family ties, and in some communities could even divorce or serve as leaders (Gates, 2014).
By contrast, women in early modern England (1500–1750) had few legal rights once they married because of coverture, a legal doctrine under which a married woman’s legal identity merged with her husband’s so she could not own property, make contracts, or control her own wages. Coverture effectively erased women as independent legal actors. It had limited exceptions that emerged through the courts, but these protections were inconsistent and benefited only a small number of women, usually those with wealth (Kamp, 2008). In most European countries during this period, married women’s rights were similar to or more restricted than those in England. Most legal systems in European nations treated wives as legally subordinate to their husbands, with some narrow exceptions (Merry, 2003).
After the American Revolution, neither the Articles of Confederation nor the U.S. Constitution mentioned women or their rights. Only New Jersey allowed some women, specifically property-owning women, to vote in the early republic (1776–1807). All other states restricted voting rights to men both before and after the Revolution. Other rights for women, such as property ownership, the right to divorce, the ability to enter contracts, and inheritance rights, varied by region. New England and Pennsylvania imposed strict limits in these legal areas, while Southern colonies and New York permitted women to enter into contracts before marriage or to hold “separate estates,” property kept legally distinct from a husband’s control (Salmon, 2006).
Divorce laws were inconsistent across states, a pattern that began in the colonial era and continued after the American Revolution. Widows received only limited economic protection through dower, a customary rule that guaranteed them use of a small portion of their husband’s property upon his death, which often left women dependent on relatives or public assistance. Single women generally retained basic property and contract rights. However, married women lost nearly all legal autonomy under coverture, the system described earlier that had already carried over from English law (Salmon, 2006).
Many scholars trace the origins of the “first wave” of the women’s rights movement to the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention, where activists publicly organized for women’s legal and political equality for the first time. Early feminists such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Mott, Martha Coffin Wright, Mary Ann McClintock, and Jane Hunt organized this gathering, launching the first coordinated effort to challenge women’s legal inequality. Frederick Douglass, a prominent abolitionist and advocate for African Americans, also attended and delivered a pivotal speech supporting women’s suffrage. The delegates drafted the Declaration of Sentiments, modeled on the Declaration of Independence, which detailed the many ways women were denied basic civil, political, educational, religious, and economic rights. Although largely symbolic at the time, the convention laid essential groundwork for later women’s rights activism. Married Women’s Property Acts that were passed after the convention gradually expanded married women’s rights to own property, enter contracts, and sue or be sued, but these reforms were slow, uneven, and they primarily benefited white women and those with greater economic resources, while women of color and poorer women often continued to face significant legal and practical barriers to exercising these rights (National Women’s History Alliance, 1998).
Satirical Engraving by George Cruikshank, Often Used to Illustrate
Mockery of Women’s Rights During the Seneca Falls Era
Image 11.1
(Cruikshank, G., ca. mid-19th century, Punch Magazine illustration)
Image 11.2
(Johnson, 2017)
B. Gender-continued
Over the next several decades, activists across the United States created regional and national coalitions dedicated to reforming existing laws to ensure women were treated as equal and to secure the right to vote, known as women’s suffrage. These activists, known as suffragettes, organized conventions and developed state and federal reform strategies. Unfortunately, the majority of these coalitions excluded African American women, even after the Civil War ended slavery, reflecting deep racial divisions within the movement. These reform efforts built on the momentum of Seneca Falls and started what many scholars call the "first wave" of feminism (National Women’s History Alliance, 1998).
Starting in 1878, leaders of the suffrage movement repeatedly pressured Congress to adopt a constitutional amendment by testifying before committees, organizing petition drives, meeting with lawmakers, and staging highly visible protests, including hunger strikes. Several of these demonstrations led to the arrest and imprisonment of suffrage activists. Even though the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment says that no state may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” it took forty years of sustained legislative activism before two-thirds of both the House and Senate finally voted to approve the suffrage amendment in 1919. Congress then sent it to the states, where three-fourths of state legislatures were required to ratify it before it could become part of the Constitution. Over the next fourteen months, suffragists campaigned state by state until Tennessee’s ratification on August 18, 1920, secured adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment (National Women’s History Alliance, 1998; National Archives, 2022).
"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
The wording of this amendment is straightforward, but, like many others, it contains limitations that may not be immediately clear to modern readers. At the time of its ratification, Americans had to be 21 to vote, and the voting age was not lowered to 18 until the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was adopted in 1971. Additionally, African American, Native American, and other women of color continued to face discriminatory state laws that blocked their access to the ballot. Many white women encountered immense pressure from their families that discouraged them from voting. These factors limited the immediate impact of the Nineteenth Amendment (National Archives, 2022).
Image 11.3
B. Gender-continued
After women won the vote, former suffragists founded organizations such as the League of Women Voters to help them use their new political power. Other groups worked to expand women’s workplace rights by advocating for stronger labor protections for female workers, efforts that helped lead to the creation of the U.S. Women’s Bureau in 1920. During the 1930s and 1940s, women’s labor participation increased significantly, especially during World War II, when millions of women moved into industrial and wartime jobs. Many of these new economic roles were rolled back after the World War II ended because women were pushed out of factories to make room for returning soldiers (National Women’s History Alliance, 1998).
By the early 1960s, the women’s movement was revitalized in part because Eleanor Roosevelt and Esther Peterson, the Assistant Secretary of Labor and Director of the Women’s Bureau, persuaded President Kennedy to create the 1961 President’s Commission on the Status of Women. The Commission studied discrimination against women nationwide, issued the landmark American Women report, and recommended major reforms in employment, education, childcare, and legal rights. This momentum continued when in 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was passed. The Act prohibited employment discrimination based on sex for the first time in federal legislation, opening the door for women to challenge unequal pay, discriminatory hiring, job segregation, and workplace policies that excluded married women, pregnant women, or mothers (Associated Press, 2025, Timeline).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In its early years, it had limited power to pursue sex-discrimination cases. Later amendments to the law expanded the EEOC’s authority to investigate complaints, bring lawsuits, and require employer compliance. These strengthened protections helped women enter jobs previously closed to them, challenge workplace discrimination, and contributed to the emerging second wave of feminism (Associated Press, 2025, Timeline).
One notable paradox of this time period is the failed effort to pass the Equal Rights Amendment. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was a proposed amendment to the United States Constitution that would have guaranteed equal rights under the law regardless of sex. First introduced by Alice Paul in 1923, the ERA did not gain significant momentum until 1972, when both chambers of Congress approved it by the required two-thirds vote and sent it to the states for ratification. Congress set a seven-year deadline, later extended to 1982, but the ERA ultimately fell short, with only 35 states voting to ratify it. As of January 2026, the Equal Rights Amendment has not been ratified and therefore is still not part of the United States Constitution (Associated Press, 2025, Timeline).
Over the past 80 years, Congress has enacted numerous laws that have expanded women’s rights. Many historians speculate that these legislative changes have reduced public demand to ratify the ERA (Berry, 1986).
Federal Laws and Policies Advancing Women’s Rights
1946 – United Nations Commission on the Status of Women: The UN establishes the Commission on the Status of Women to safeguard women’s rights globally.
1961 - President Kennedy creates the 1961 President’s Commission on the Status of Women, which studied discrimination against women nationwide, issued the landmark American Women report, and recommended major reforms in employment, education, childcare, and legal rights.
1963 – Equal Pay Act: Congress passes the first federal law requiring equal pay for equal work regardless of sex.
1964 - Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on sex for the first time in federal law, opening the door for women to challenge unequal pay, discriminatory hiring, job segregation, and workplace policies that excluded married women, pregnant women, or mothers.
1964 - The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created to enforce Title VII. The EEOC began enforcing federal bans on employment discrimination, giving workers a formal avenue to file complaints.
1960s–1970s – State Civil Rights Enforcement Agencies Established: States create their own civil rights bodies, such as the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD), in order to investigate discrimination and enforce state laws.
1967 – Executive Order 11246 (Sex Discrimination Amendment): Federal contractors must take affirmative action to prevent sex discrimination.
1972 – Title IX of the Education Amendments: Bans sex discrimination in federally funded education and sports programs. Enforced by the Office for Civil Rights (OCR).
1974 – Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA): Makes it illegal to deny women credit, loans, or credit cards based on sex or marital status.
1975 – Women Gain the Right to Serve on Juries Nationwide: The Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana rules that excluding women from juries violates the Sixth Amendment.
1978: Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Amends Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
1981 – Supreme Court Upholds Male-Only Draft: In Rostker v. Goldberg, the Court holds that excluding women from military draft registration is constitutional.
1993 – Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA): Provides up to 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave for childbirth, adoption, caregiving, or serious illness.
1994 – Violence Against Women Act (VAWA): Creates legal protections, funding, and support programs to combat domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking.
2000 - The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA): The first comprehensive federal law to address human trafficking, it created a framework focused on prevention, protection, and prosecution. It defined both sex and labor trafficking under federal law and has been repeatedly reauthorized to expand services and strengthen protections for survivors.
2007–2009 – Ledbetter v. Goodyear and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act: The Supreme Court limited pay-bias claims to 180 days after the first discriminatory decision, and Congress overturned this by allowing each unequal paycheck to restart the filing deadline.
2013 – Ban on Women in Military Combat Roles Lifted: The Pentagon removes its 1994 restriction, allowing women to serve in combat positions.
2016 – Survivors’ Bill of Rights Act: Establishes statutory rights for sexual assault survivors regarding forensic exams, rape kit preservation, and notification.
2022 – Pregnant Workers Fairness Act: Requires reasonable accommodations for pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions.
2022 – PUMP Act: Part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023; expands pumping and breastfeeding protections to nearly all workers.
2025 – Record Levels of Women in U.S. Government: As of November 12, 2025, 126 women serve in the U.S. House of Representatives, 27 in the Senate, and 14 as governors, marking the highest levels of female representation in American history.
Image 11.4
B. Gender - continued
The second wave of feminism also saw the founding of the National Organization for Women in 1966, which mobilized activists to challenge employment discrimination, expand educational opportunities, and demand reproductive freedom. Leaders and community organizers likewise helped create grassroots institutions such as women’s health clinics, rape crisis centers, child-care cooperatives, and shelters for survivors of domestic violence. By the late 1970s, women had entered professions traditionally held only by men, voted at higher rates, ran for office in greater numbers, and helped shift long-standing social norms (National Women’s History Alliance, 1998).
Women also started seeing recognition in the court system. The Supreme Court first applied the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down a law discriminating against women in Reed v. Reed (1971) when it held that an Idaho probate statute that preferred men over women as estate administrators was unconstitutional. The court only used rational basis review, but it did strike down a law that treated women unequally.
Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson (1973), the Court again relied on the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a federal law that made it easier for male service members to claim their spouses as dependents for military benefits than female service members. The women won the case, but the Justices could not agree on the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. Justice Brennan wrote a plurality opinion, meaning an opinion that received the largest number of votes but not a majority of them. Brennan argued that sex discrimination should receive strict scrutiny. Justices Powell, Burger, and Blackmun, filed a concurring opinion, meaning an opinion that agrees with the result but not the reasoning, and in doing so, they declined to adopt strict scrutiny. Instead they relied on the Reed case and stated that sex based distinctions often reflect arbitrary legislative choices. Justice Stewart filed a separate concurrence stating that the statute created unconstitutional discrimination. Justice Rehnquist dissented. The Court did not overrule Reed, but they failed to define a level of scrutiny for sex discrimination until three years later.
In Craig v. Boren (1976), the Supreme Court issued a majority opinion and struck down an Oklahoma law that allowed women to buy 3.2 percent beer at age 18 but required men to wait until age 21, ruling that the sex-based distinction violated the Equal Protection Clause. In doing so, the Court formally established intermediate scrutiny, a legal standard requiring the government to show that sex-based classifications must serve an important governmental objective and be substantially related to achieving that objective. The Court applied intermediate scrutiny again in 1982 when it held that a state-run nursing school could not exclude men solely because of their sex, ruling that such a policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment (Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 1982).
The Court again had to decide which level of scrutiny to apply when evaluating whether one of the nation’s most prestigious military academies could restrict admission to men only. Please read the excerpt from United States v. Virginia (1996) below.
Landmark Case Spotlight:
United States v. Virginia, (1996)
Case Excerpt (Not Full Case)
Click here for full text.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
Founded in 1839, VMI (Virginia Military Institute) is today the sole single sex school among Virginia's 15 public institutions of higher learning. VMI's distinctive mission is to produce "citizen soldiers," men prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service. VMI pursues this mission through pervasive training of a kind not available anywhere else in Virginia. Assigning prime place to character development, VMI uses an "adversative method" modeled on English public schools and once characteristic of military instruction. VMI constantly endeavors to instill physical and mental discipline in its cadets and impart to them a strong moral code. The school's graduates leave VMI with heightened comprehension of their capacity to deal with duress and stress, and a large sense of accomplishment for completing the hazardous course.
VMI has notably succeeded in its mission to produce leaders; among its alumni are military generals, Members of Congress, and business executives. The school's alumni overwhelmingly perceive that their VMI training helped them to realize their personal goals. VMI's endowment reflects the loyalty of its graduates; VMI has the largest per student endowment of all undergraduate institutions in the Nation.
Neither the goal of producing citizen soldiers nor VMI's implementing methodology is inherently unsuitable to women. And the school's impressive record in producing leaders has made admission desirable to some women. Nevertheless, Virginia has elected to preserve exclusively for men the advantages and opportunities a VMI education affords.
From its establishment in 1839 as one of the Nation's first state military colleges, VMI has remained financially supported by Virginia and "subject to the control of the [Virginia] General Assembly'.
VMI today enrolls about 1,300 men as cadets. Its academic offerings in the liberal arts, sciences, and engineering are also available at other public colleges and universities in Virginia. But VMI's mission is special. It is the mission of the school,"to produce educated and honorable men, prepared for the varied work of civil life, imbued with love of learning, confident in the functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing a high sense of public service, advocates of the American democracy and free enterprise system, and ready as citizen soldiers to defend their country in time of national peril".(Va. 1991)
In contrast to the federal service academies, institutions maintained "to prepare cadets for career service in the armed forces," VMI's program "is directed at preparation for both military and civilian life"; "[o]nly about 15% of VMI cadets enter career military service." VMI produces its "citizen soldiers" through "an adversative, or doubting, model of education" which features "[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values." As one Commandant of Cadets described it, the adversative method "dissects the young student," and makes him aware of his "limits and capabilities," so that he knows "how far he can go with his anger, . . . how much he can take under stress, . . . exactly what he can do when he is physically exhausted."
VMI attracts some applicants because of its reputation as an extraordinarily challenging military school, and "because its alumni are exceptionally close to the school." "[W]omen have no opportunity anywhere to gain the benefits of [the system of education at VMI]." In 1990, prompted by a complaint filed with the Attorney General by a female high school student seeking admission to VMI, the United States sued the Commonwealth of Virginia and VMI, alleging that VMI's exclusively male admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Trial of the action consumed six days and involved an array of expert witnesses on each side.
The District Court ruled in favor of VMI, however, and rejected the equal protection challenge pressed by the United States. That court correctly recognized that Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan was the closest guide. There, this Court underscored that a party seeking to uphold government action based on sex must establish an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification. To succeed, the defender of the challenged action must show "at least that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
The District Court reasoned that education in "a single gender environment, be it male or female," yields substantial benefits. VMI's school for men brought diversity to an otherwise coeducational Virginia system, and that diversity was "enhanced by VMI's unique method of instruction." If single gender education for males ranks as an important governmental objective, it becomes obvious, the District Court concluded, that the only means of achieving the objective "is to exclude women from the all male institution--VMI."
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and vacated the District Court's judgment. The appellate court held: "The Commonwealth of Virginia has not. . . advanced any state policy by which it can justify its determination, under an announced policy of diversity, to afford VMI's unique type of program to men and not to women." The appeals court greeted with skepticism Virginia's assertion that it offers single sex education at VMI as a facet of the State's overarching and undisputed policy to advance "autonomy and diversity." Furthermore, the appeals court observed, in urging "diversity" to justify an all male VMI, the State had supplied "no explanation for the movement away from [single sex education] in Virginia by public colleges and universities." In short, the court concluded, "[a] policy of diversity which aims to provide an array of educational opportunities, including single gender institutions, must do more than favor one gender."
…….The cross petitions in this case present two ultimate issues. First, does Virginia's exclusion of women from the educational opportunities provided by VMI--extraordinary opportunities for military training and civilian leadership development--deny to women "capable of all of the individual activities required of VMI cadets," 766F. Supp., at 1412, the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment? Second, if VMI's "unique" situation as Virginia's sole single sex public institution of higher education--offends the Constitution's equal protection principle, what is the remedial requirement?
In 1971, for the first time in our Nation's history, this Court ruled in favor of a woman who complained that her State had denied her the equal protection of its laws. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 73 (holding unconstitutional Idaho Code prescription that, among " `several persons claiming and equally entitled to administer [a decedent's estate], males must be preferred to females' "). Since Reed, the Court has repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizenship stature--equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities. In post-Reed decisions, has carefully inspected official action that closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or to men).
To summarize the Court's current directions for cases of official classification based on gender: Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must determine whether the proffered justification is "exceedingly persuasive." The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State. The State must show "at least that the [challenged] classification serves `important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are `substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' "
We therefore affirm the Fourth Circuit's initial judgment, which held that Virginia had violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Because the remedy proffered by Virginia--the Mary Baldwin VWIL program--does not cure the constitutional violation, i.e., it does not provide equal opportunity, we reverse the Fourth Circuit's final judgment in this case.
Ultimately, in 1970, "the most prestigious institution of higher education in Virginia," the University of Virginia, introduced coeducation and, in 1972, began to admit women on an equal basis with men. Virginia describes the current absence of public single sex higher education for women as "an historical anomaly." But the historical record indicates action more deliberate than anomalous.
In sum, we find no persuasive evidence in this record that VMI's male only admission policy "is in furtherance of a state policy of `diversity.' "A purpose genuinely to advance an array of educational options, as the Court of Appeals recognized, is not served by VMI's historic and constant plan--a plan to "affor[d] a unique educational benefit only to males." However "liberally" this plan serves the State's sons, it makes no provision whatever for her daughters. That is not equal protection.
Women's successful entry into the federal military academies, and their participation in the Nation's military forces, indicate that Virginia's fears for the future of VMI may not be solidly grounded. The State's justification for excluding all women from "citizen soldier" training for which some are qualified, in any event, cannot rank as "exceedingly persuasive," as we have explained and applied that standard.
Virginia and VMI trained their argument on "means" rather than "end," and thus misperceived our precedent. Single sex education at VMI serves an "important governmental objective," they maintained, and exclusion of women is not only "substantially related," it is essential to that objective. By this notably circular argument, the "straightforward" test Mississippi Univ. for Women described, see 458 U. S., at 724-725, was bent and bowed.
Virginia presented its remedial plan--maintain VMI as a male only college and create VWIL as a separate program for women. The plan met District Court approval. The Fourth Circuit, in turn, deferentially reviewed the State's proposal and decided that the two single sex programs directly served Virginia's reasserted purposes: single gender education, and "achieving the results of an adversative method in a military environment." Inspecting the VMI and VWIL educational programs to determine whether they "afford[ed] to both genders benefits comparable in substance, [if] not in form and detail,", the Court of Appeals concluded that Virginia had arranged for men and women opportunities "sufficiently comparable" to survive equal protection evaluation. The United States challenges this "remedial" ruling as pervasively misguided.
Virginia chose not to eliminate, but to leave untouched, VMI's exclusionary policy. For women only, however, Virginia proposed a separate program, different in kind from VMI and unequal in tangible and intangible facilities. Having violated the Constitution's equal protection requirement, Virginia was obliged to show that its remedial proposal "directly address[ed] and relate[d] to" the violation,the equal protection denied to women ready, willing, and able to benefit from educational opportunities of the kind VMI offers. Virginia described VWIL as a "parallel program," and asserted that VWIL shares VMI's mission of producing "citizen soldiers" and VMI's goals of providing "education, military training, mental and physical discipline, character . . . and leadership development."
VWIL students participate in ROTC and a "largely ceremonial" Virginia Corps of Cadets, but Virginia deliberately did not make VWIL a military institute. The VWIL House is not a military style residence and VWIL students need not live together throughout the 4 year program, eat meals together, or wear uniforms during the school day. VWIL students thus do not experience the "barracks" life "crucial to the VMI experience," the spartan living arrangements designed to foster an "egalitarian ethic." "[T]he most important aspects of the VMI educational experience occur in the barracks," the District Court found, yet Virginia deemed that core experience nonessential, indeed inappropriate, for training its female citizen soldiers.
VWIL students receive their "leadership training" in seminars, externships, and speaker series, episodes and encounters lacking the "[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, . . . minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values" made hallmarks of VMI's citizen soldier training. Kept away from the pressures, hazards, and psychological bonding characteristic of VMI's adversative training, VWIL students will not know the "feeling of tremendous accomplishment" commonly experienced by VMI's successful cadets. Virginia maintains that these methodological differences are "justified pedagogically," based on "important differences between men and women in learning and developmental needs," "psychological and sociological differences" Virginia describes as "real" and "not stereotypes." The Task Force charged with developing the leadership program for women, drawn from the staff and faculty at Mary Baldwin College, "determined that a military model and, especially VMI's adversative method, would be wholly inappropriate for educating and training most women." The Commonwealth embraced the Task Force view, as did expert witnesses who testified for Virginia.
As earlier stated, generalizations about "the way women are," estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them outside the average description. Notably, Virginia never asserted that VMI's method of education suits most men. It is also revealing that Virginia accounted for its failure to make the VWIL experience "the entirely militaristic experience of VMI" on the ground that VWIL "is planned for women who do not necessarily expect to pursue military careers."By that reasoning, VMI's "entirely militaristic" program would be inappropriate for men in general or as a group, for "[o]nly about 15% of VMI cadets enter career military service."
In myriad respects other than military training, VWIL does not qualify as VMI's equal. VWIL's student body, faculty, course offerings, and facilities hardly match VMI's. Nor can the VWIL graduate anticipate the benefits associated with VMI's 157-year history, the school's prestige, and its influential alumni network.
Although Virginia has represented that it will provide equal financial support for in state VWIL students and VMI cadets, and the VMI Foundation has agreed to endow VWIL with $5.4625 million, the difference between the two schools' financial reserves is pronounced. Mary Baldwin's endowment, currently about $19 million, will gain an additional $35 million based on future commitments; VMI's current endowment, $131 million--the largest per student endowment in the Nation--will gain $220 million.
The VWIL student does not graduate with the advantage of a VMI degree. Her diploma does not unite her with the legions of VMI "graduates [who] have distinguished themselves" in military and civilian life. "[VMI] alumni are exceptionally close to the school," and that closeness accounts, in part, for VMI's success in attracting applicants. A VWIL graduate cannot assume that the "network of business owners, corporations, VMI graduates and non graduate employers . . . interested in hiring VMI graduates," will be equally responsive to her search for employment.
More important than the tangible features, the Court emphasized, are "those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness" in a school, including "reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige." Facing the marked differences reported in the Sweatt opinion, the Court unanimously ruled that Texas had not shown "substantial equality in the [separate] educational opportunities" the State offered. Accordingly, the Court held, the Equal Protection Clause required Texas to admit African Americans to the University of Texas Law School. In line with Sweatt, we rule here that Virginia has not shown substantial equality in the separate educational opportunities the State supports at VWIL and VMI.
We have earlier described the deferential review in which the Court of Appeals engaged, a brand of review inconsistent with the more exacting standard our precedent requires. Quoting in part from Mississippi Univ. for Women, the Court of Appeals candidly described its own analysis as one capable of checking a legislative purpose ranked as "pernicious," but generally according "deference to [the] legislative will." Recognizing that it had extracted from our decisions a test yielding "little or no scrutiny of the effect of a classification directed at [single gender education]," the Court of Appeals devised another test, a "substantive comparability" inquiry, and proceeded to find that new test satisfied.
A generation ago, "the authorities controlling Virginia higher education," despite long established tradition, agreed "to innovate and favorably entertain[ed] the [then] relatively new idea that there must be no discrimination by sex in offering educational opportunity."
VMI, too, offers an educational opportunity no other Virginia institution provides, and the school's "prestige"--associated with its success in developing "citizen soldiers"--is unequaled. Virginia has closed this facility to its daughters and, instead, has devised for them a "parallel program," with a faculty less impressively credentialed and less well paid, more limited course offerings, fewer opportunities for military training and for scientific specialization. VMI, beyond question, "possesses to a far greater degree" than the VWIL program "those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a . . . school," including "position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige." Women seeking and fit for a VMI quality education cannot be offered anything less, under the State's obligation to afford them genuinely equal protection.
A prime part of the history of our Constitution, historian Richard Morris recounted, is the story of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded. VMI's story continued as our comprehension of "We the People" expanded. There is no reason to believe that the admission of women capable of all the activities required of VMI cadets would destroy the Institute rather than enhance its capacity to serve the "more perfect Union."
It is so ordered. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
B. Gender - continued
In 1994, Congress had passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) after years of advocacy by the National Organization for Women. It was the nation’s first comprehensive federal law treating domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking as serious crimes, rather than private family matters. It created funding for shelters and victim services, strengthened law enforcement training, and required states to honor protection orders across state lines. Yet in United States v. Morrison (2000), the Supreme Court struck down VAWA’s civil rights remedy that allowed survivors of gender-motivated violence to sue their attackers in federal court for violating their civil rights, holding that Congress lacked authority under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Although this ruling invalidated one part of VAWA, the law has been repeatedly reauthorized. Even without VAWA’s civil rights remedy, survivors can still file civil lawsuits in state court under traditional state civil claims, such as assault, battery, or wrongful death. They may also bring federal civil rights lawsuits if the violence involves government actors (Jeelani Law Firm, 2025).
Congress has passed additional laws to protect crime victims, especially in areas where women are disproportionately affected. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 is the first comprehensive federal law to combat human trafficking. It defines specific forms of sex and labor trafficking and establishes a national framework focused on prevention, protection, and prosecution (National Human Trafficking Hotline, 2025). Likewise, the Survivors’ Bill of Rights Act of 2016 creates key rights for sexual assault survivors in federal criminal cases, including free forensic exams, preservation of rape kits, and timely notification before evidence is destroyed (Survivors’ Bill of Rights Act, 2016).
Further reforms reflected a growing focus on assaults that happen in the workplace. In 2017, this focus intensified after numerous women in Hollywood spoke out about sexual assault and harassment. The hashtag #MeToo became a viral cultural phenomenon when actress Alyssa Milano encouraged survivors to share “#MeToo” on social media in response to the Harvey Weinstein revelations, reviving a 2006 campaign started by activist Tarana Burke to support survivors of sexual violence. The movement marked a major turning point in national discussions about sexual harassment and assault. Some historians and political observers view this period as part of a broader new wave of feminist activism, often described as a “third wave” or the beginning of a renewed movement against gender-based violence (Burke, n.d.).
Congress soon enacted several reforms shaped directly by the #MeToo movement. The “Harvey Weinstein Provision” of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (2017) denies tax deductions for sexual harassment settlements covered by nondisclosure agreements. The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2022 allows survivors to pursue their claims in court rather than being forced into private arbitration, while the Speak Out Act of 2022 limits the use of nondisclosure agreements that prevent survivors from speaking publicly about sexual assault or harassment (Kantor & Twohey, 2017).
Additional protections for women soon followed that were focused on ensuring appropriate and fair workplace conditions for pregnant and nursing employees. The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (2022) requires employers with 15 or more employees to provide reasonable accommodations for pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions, such as modified schedules, light duty, extra breaks, or the ability to sit or drink water. The PUMP Act (2022) expanded federal protections for breastfeeding employees by requiring nearly all employers to provide break time and a private, non-bathroom space for expressing breast milk. Together, these laws significantly strengthened federal workplace protections for pregnant and lactating employees (U.S. Department of Labor, 2023).
No major federal laws expanding women’s rights have been enacted since 2022, other than congressional actions reauthorizing existing laws, and recent efforts to revive the ERA have failed. Even so, this does not mean there has been no recent progress. Women now hold the highest levels of political representation in American history. As of November 12, 2025, 126 women serve in the U.S. House of Representatives, 27 in the Senate, and 14 as governors. These are the highest numbers of political participation by women ever recorded (Center for American Women and Politics, 2025).
Progress for women has never been linear, and the nation is now experiencing what many describe as a “War on DEI,” referring in part to President Trump’s executive orders directing federal agencies to cancel funding for any programs deemed related to “diversity” or “equity” and requiring grant recipients to certify that they do not engage in DEI activities. The phrase also captures a broader cultural shift because these executive orders have chilled speech, dismantled long-standing civil rights initiatives, and threatened nonprofits that serve marginalized communities. These developments have prompted significant litigation that alleges the administration is unlawfully attempting to roll back critical protections for Americans (Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 2025).
C. Sexual Orientation
The acronym “LGBTQIA+” refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning, intersex, and asexual people, as well as other identities within the broader spectrum of sexual orientation and gender diversity. For clarity and consistency, further references to individuals and groups within this community will use the term “LGBT,” which is a widely recognized, concise, and commonly accepted term among advocates and educators. As with many other marginalized groups, the legal, political, and social recognition of their rights has not been fast nor linear (GLAAD, n.d.).
The modern movement for LGBTQIA+ rights grew out of decades, and even centuries, of discrimination and violence. Throughout the history of the United States, LGBTQ people have faced police harassment, social stigma, criminal penalties, and workplace discrimination. One clear example of this treatment is that homosexuality was classified as a mental disorder by the American Psychiatric Association until 1973, forcing many to live in secrecy (National Geographic, 2023).
As a result, members of the LGBTQ community often sought out safe places to gather, such as house parties, social clubs, coffeehouses, bathhouses, drag balls, and arts communities, but one of the most important and popular safe spaces remained gay bars. Although these spaces offered refuge and community, they were often disrupted by police raids. On June 28, 1969 patrons of the Stonewall Inn, many of whom were people of color, unhoused youth, and transgender individuals, refused to comply with a routine police raid (National Geographic, 2023).
What followed was not actually a planned “riot” but a spontaneous, days-long rebellion, marked by crowds resisting arrests, shouting at officers, and pushing back against a system that had targeted them for years. The clashes energized LGBTQ people throughout New York City, convincing many that they could no longer return to silence. Within weeks, activists formed the Gay Liberation Front and embraced a more visible, confrontational approach to demanding civil rights. One year later, organizers commemorated the anniversary of Stonewall with Christopher Street Liberation Day, which was considered the very first Pride March (National Geographic, 2023).
Unfortunately, this momentum did not lead to victory the first time the Supreme Court addressed the rights of LGBTQ individuals. In Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) the Court upheld a Georgia law criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct. The Justices applied only rational basis review and decided the case under substantive due process, not Equal Protection. The court contended that there was no fundamental constitutional right to engage in same-sex intimacy and that the state’s moral disapproval was a sufficient justification for the law.
A decade later, the Court shifted its analysis when deciding Romer v. Evans (1996). In that case, Colorado voters adopted an amendment to their state constitution that banned the state legislature and local governments from passing any laws that would protect those in the LGBT community. The Court used a form of rational basis review and explained that the amendment failed even this lowest level of scrutiny because it singled out one group for unequal treatment without any legitimate government reason. For the first time, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of gay rights by holding that a law targeting LGBT people violated the Equal Protection Clause.
That same year, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA, 1996), a federal law that defined marriage as between one man and one woman and denied federal recognition of any same-sex marriage. As a result, same-sex couples were excluded from federal marital benefits for over twenty years. These benefits included tax advantages, Social Security payments, immigration sponsorship, and probate rights. Although DOMA was later struck down by the Supreme Court, it significantly limited legal protections for LGBTQ couples for decades, demonstrating that the policies of Congress and the Court are not always aligned (DOMA, 1996).
In 2003, two cases offered hope after the setback of DOMA. In Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the Supreme Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick, striking down sodomy laws nationwide and affirming the right to private, consensual same-sex intimacy. Later that year, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognized a state constitutional right to marry in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (Mass. 2003), holding that the Massachusetts Constitution’s Equal Protection guarantee required the state to permit same-sex marriage. This ruling applied only within Massachusetts, but it served as an example of expanding LGBT rights.
A decade later, in United States v. Windsor (2013), the Supreme Court struck down part of the Defense of Marriage Act, which had barred the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages. The Court held that Section 3 of DOMA violated the Fifth Amendment’s guarantees of due process and equal protection, explaining that the section imposed stigma and unequal treatment without a legitimate government reason. The Court ruled that once a same-sex couple was validly married under a state's law, the federal government had to treat them the same as any other married couple and provide full federal benefits.
The momentum from Windsor continued into 2015, when the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges. This case arose from challenges brought by same-sex couples who were denied marriage licenses or recognition of their marriages. The Court ruled that denying marriage equality violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, same-sex couples were guaranteed the fundamental right to marry under the Fourteenth Amendment, and all 50 states were required to license and recognize such marriages. Recent efforts in 2025 to overturn Obergefell have been unsuccessful.
The recognition of same-sex marriage did not automatically resolve all issues related to same-sex relationships. In Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018), the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a baker who refused to design a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple, holding that the Commission violated his Free Exercise rights by displaying hostility toward his religious beliefs during the administrative process. The Court issued a narrow ruling focused on the Commission’s biased statements and inconsistent treatment. The Court also noted that the baker had offered to sell the couple other baked goods, rather than a custom-made creation. As a result, the decision left broader questions about religious objections and anti-discrimination laws unresolved, although in a later decision the Court ruled that a web designer could refuse to create wedding websites for same-sex couples, if the refusal was based on First Amendment protections (303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 2023).
The Court next had to consider how federal law applies to transgender individuals. Aimee Stephens, a transgender woman who worked at a funeral home in Michigan, was fired after informing her employer that she would begin presenting as female at work. Her lawsuit became one of the key cases the Supreme Court reviewed as part of the consolidated Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) suit. The Court ruled that firing a person simply for being transgender violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Court also explained that such discrimination is specifically prohibited by the statute’s “because of sex” language. This ruling confirmed that federal employment law protects transgender workers from discrimination, and companion cases decided at the same time extended the same protection to gay and lesbian employees.
As with the rights of women, progress for LGBTQ individuals has not been consistent. The previously mentioned “War on DEI” has caused many Americans working in government agencies, public organizations, and educational institutions to curtail their speech out of fear of losing federal funding or facing legal consequences. Civil rights initiatives have been dismantled, and nonprofits that support LGBTQ communities have had funding cut or have engaging in "proactive compliance" by refraining from political speech. These developments have prompted significant litigation by civil rights and advocacy groups (Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 2025).
D. Age
Prior to the 1960s, age discrimination was not widely discussed or treated as a civil rights issue by Congress or the courts. As a result, age discrimination in public programs, education, employment, and health care went largely unregulated. This began to change near the end of the decade, when mounting evidence of age discrimination and citizen advocacy pressured Congress to pass legislation.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was passed in 1967, and it prohibits employers from discriminating against workers who are 40 years of age or older in hiring, firing, raises, promotions, job assignments, training, benefits, and any other terms or conditions of employment. The law only applies to employers with 20 or more employees, including private employers, state and local governments, employment agencies, and labor organizations. The ADEA also restricts mandatory retirement in most occupations and makes it unlawful for employers to publish job ads or use hiring practices that limit opportunities based on age (U.S. Department of Labor, n.d.).
Likewise, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 prohibits age discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, extending protections far beyond employment to areas such as education, health care, and public services. This includes public schools, hospitals, housing programs, social service agencies, and state agencies that use federal funds. These protections ensure that individuals of any age are treated fairly when accessing federally funded services such as Medicare-supported clinics, Head Start programs, public universities, and community health centers (Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6101).
After Congress passed these laws, the Supreme Court decided Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976). In the Murgia case, the Court upheld a state law requiring police officers to retire at age 50, ruling that age is not a protected or “suspect” classification under the Constitution. The Court applied only rational basis review and concluded that the state had a legitimate interest in maintaining a physically fit police force. The decision made clear that while Congress could create strong statutory protections for older workers, the Constitution itself offers far more limited safeguards against age discrimination.
Although the Supreme Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny to age discrimination, Congress continued to strengthen federal safeguards against age-based discrimination. The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (OWBPA) amended the ADEA to prohibit employers from denying or reducing benefits for older workers based on age. The Act also regulated how employers may obtain waivers of age-discrimination claims during layoffs or severance agreements. The law required that any waiver be knowing, voluntary, and in writing, and that employees be given sufficient time to review the agreement. Employees were also given the opportunity to revoke such waivers if they changed their minds (Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)).
In later years, the Supreme Court clarified that the ADEA protects older workers, not younger ones. In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline (2004), the Court held that so-called “reverse age discrimination” claims, in which younger employees argue that they were treated less favorably than older employees, are not covered by the ADEA. In that case, the plaintiff was too young to qualify for full retiree health benefits, and the Court explained that the ADEA was enacted specifically to address discrimination against older workers.
Currently, older workers continue to face discrimination through debates over mandatory retirement and the actions of employers attempting to fit within the Murgia exception. Many job seekers also encounter age bias in the hiring process, including automated filtering by applicant-tracking systems and AI tools that may screen out older applicants. A 2022–2024 AARP research study found that age discrimination remains widespread among workers age 50 and older, with nearly two-thirds reporting that older employees face bias and many stating that they were denied jobs or asked improper age-related questions during hiring. Overall, the study shows strong public support for strengthening age-discrimination protections (Choi-Allum, 2024).
E. Disability
Prior to the 1970s, disability rights in the United States were limited, and laws protecting the disabled were shaped by assumptions that disabilities required treatment or charity, rather than legal protections. People with disabilities were often segregated in institutions, excluded from schools and workplaces, and even barred from public spaces in certain instances. Early federal programs focused solely on vocational rehabilitation for veterans, not on prohibiting discrimination or ensuring equal access. Inspired by the broader civil rights movements of the 1960s, disability activists began pushing lawmakers to make disability as a matter of equal rights, laying the groundwork for the first federal law to ban disability discrimination (Pelka, 2012).
Please refer to the chart below for a summary of the major federal disability laws and landmark Supreme Court cases that have shaped disability rights.
Major Disability Laws and Cases
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504 (1973) – The first federal civil rights law protecting people with disabilities, Section 504 prohibits discrimination in any program receiving federal financial assistance and laid the groundwork for the ADA (Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794). Section 504 was later strengthened by the 1998 amendments to Section 508 and the 2017 Section 508 Refresh, which expanded accessibility requirements to federal websites, digital documents, software, and electronic communication systems.
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DD Act) (1975) – Provides federal support for individuals with developmental disabilities, affirms their rights to appropriate treatment and services, and establishes state Developmental Disabilities Councils and Protection & Advocacy systems (Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-103).
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA) (1975) – Guarantees children with disabilities a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment (LRE) and requires individualized education programs (IEPs). Later renamed IDEA (Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-142).
Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) (1986) – Prohibits discrimination against passengers with disabilities in air travel and requires airlines to provide accommodations, assistance, and accessible services (Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 41705).
Protection & Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI) (1986) – Expands Protection & Advocacy agencies’ authority to investigate abuse or neglect of individuals with mental illness, including access to facilities and records (Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-319).
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (1990) – Comprehensive civil rights law prohibiting disability discrimination in multiple areas of public life: Title I (employment), Title II (state and local government services), Title III (public accommodations), Title IV (telecommunications), and Title V (miscellaneous provisions) (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336).
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (1990) – Renames and expands the earlier EHA, adding assistive technology, transition services, and autism as a disability category, while reaffirming the right to FAPE in the least restrictive environment (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-476). The IDEA was further updated through the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, which expanded access to accessible instructional materials, strengthened transition services, and improved accountability for student outcomes.
Protection & Advocacy for Assistive Technology Act (PAAT) (1994) – Authorizes Protection & Advocacy agencies to assist individuals in securing assistive technology devices and services needed for education, employment, and independent living (Protection and Advocacy for Assistive Technology Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-218). PAAT’s implementation has continued to evolve through updates to the Accessible Instructional Materials (AIM) and NIMAS standards, ensuring that students with print disabilities receive accessible digital textbooks and instructional materials.
Olmstead v. L.C. (1999) – The Supreme Court rules that unnecessary institutionalization violates the ADA’s integration mandate, requiring states to provide services in the most integrated setting appropriate (Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999)).
Tennessee v. Lane (2004) – The Supreme Court upholds Congress’s authority to apply Title II of the ADA to state courts, requiring states to provide accommodations to ensure individuals with disabilities have access to fundamental rights such as court proceedings (Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)).
ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) (2008) – Broadens the definition of “disability” after prior Supreme Court decisions had narrowed it, making it easier for individuals to qualify for ADA protections (ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325).
Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) (2015) – A federal education law that includes important accessibility mandates for students with disabilities. ESSA requires that educational assessments, digital learning platforms, and instructional materials be accessible, and reinforces the obligation of states and districts to provide accessible formats for students who need them (Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-95).
Tharpe v. Osseo Area Schools (2025) – A unanimous Supreme Court decision holding that students with disabilities do not need to prove “bad faith” or “gross misjudgment” to sue schools under the ADA, Section 504, or related laws. Instead, they must meet the same standard of proof as other discrimination plaintiffs, making it easier for families to obtain compensatory damages when schools fail to provide legally required accommodations (Decided June 12, 2025, U.S. Supreme Court).
Image 11.5
(Original Work, Heidi Getchell-Bastien)
E. Disability-continued
Currently disability rights advocates are concerned about federal actions that threaten programs for children with disabilities. Proposed changes to SSI eligibility could make it harder for families to qualify for benefits. Staffing cuts at the Department of Education weaken the oversight capabilities for enforcing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act at a time when more children than ever are being diagnosed as neurodivergent. Reductions to Medicaid and CHIP also jeopardize school-based health services that many students rely on. Together, these shifts in policy reduce stability for families and limit their childrens' access to essential therapies, equipment, and services (Bolt & Klam, 2025).
F. Other Protected Classifications
When it comes to protected classes, some might wonder if being economically disadvantaged makes one a member of a protected class. It does not. Under federal civil rights laws, protected classes include race, color, national origin, sex, religion, disability, age, genetic information, and, in some contexts, citizenship status. Socioeconomic status or poverty is not a protected class. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that poverty does not qualify as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause. As a result, laws affecting low-income individuals receive only rational basis review, a principle affirmed in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) and Harris v. McRae (1980).
Likewise, some wonder if intersectionality is a protected class. Intersectionality refers to how multiple identities, like race, gender, disability, or immigration status, overlap to create distinct forms of discrimination or disadvantage. Although intersectionality itself is not a protected class under federal civil rights law, courts recognize that discrimination can occur at the intersection of multiple protected characteristics. As a result, individuals may bring “intersectional discrimination” claims when the combined effect of protected identities leads to unequal treatment, as recognized in Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass’n (5th Cir. 1980) and Lam v. University of Hawai‘i (9th Cir. 1994).
The concept of intersectionality became more widely understood in the 1990s, as scholars, writers, and cultural critics such as bell hooks helped popularize the idea that systems of inequality are interconnected and cannot be understood in isolation. hooks, who intentionally wrote her name in lowercase to shift attention away from herself and toward her ideas, argued that race, gender, class, and power operate together to shape lived experiences, particularly for Black women. Although she was not directly involved in Supreme Court litigation, her work helped shape broader public and academic understanding of concepts that later informed discussions of intersectional discrimination in law (hooks, 1984). Interest in her writing surged during the racial justice movements of 2020, when her book All About Love: New Visions entered The New York Times bestseller list more than twenty years after its original publication (Burke, 2021).
In addition to race, national origin, and other identity-based protections, federal civil rights law also provides protections based on religion. Many disputes involving religious discrimination, however, are analyzed under the First Amendment and whether government action violates the Free Exercise Clause. In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Supreme Court ruled that laws applying equally to everyone do not have to include exemptions for religious practices. Congress responded with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993, which restored heightened scrutiny for federal actions that burden religious practice.
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014), the Court ruled that closely held corporations may claim religious exemptions under the RFRA. The case involved a family-owned business that objected on religious grounds to providing certain contraceptive coverage under the Affordable Care Act. The Court held that enforcing the mandate would substantially burden the owners’ religious exercise and was not the least restrictive means of serving the government’s interest.
Other groups are not considered protected classes under federal civil rights law but still receive legal protections. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA, 2008) prohibits discrimination based on genetic information, and federal and state employment laws protect individuals based on veteran or military status. Similarly, political affiliation and marital status are not federally protected classes, but many states include them in their civil rights statutes.
Conclusion
As noted at the end of Chapter Ten, the history of civil rights in the United States has never followed a linear path. Women, members of the LGBT community, people with disabilities, individuals over the age of 50, and others in protected classes have all struggled to have their rights recognized, much like African Americans have. While the forms and sources of unequal treatment differ among these communities, examining each group’s experiences helps strengthen understanding of civil rights and shared strategies for collective action. The struggle for equal treatment is never static and always requires continued vigilance and engagement.
Sources
303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570 (2023).
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634.
Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101–6107.
Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 41705.
Associated Press. (2025, January 17). Timeline: Key dates in the century-long battle over the Equal Rights Amendment. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/women-rights-gender-biden-constitution-amendment-congress-7510b3d8517604e29e4d40a8dcabfa5f
Berry, M. F. (1986). Why ERA failed: Politics, women’s rights, and the amending process of the Constitution. Indiana University Press. https://iupress.org/9780253204592/why-era-failed
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020).
Bolt, S., & Klam, J. (2025). Analysis of proposed SSI and disability policy changes.
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/Updating-Social-Security-Disability-Programs.pdf
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Burke, T. (n.d.). Inception. Me Too Movement. https://metoomvmt.org/get-to-know-us/history-inception/
Burke, T. (2006). Unbound: Transgender men and the remaking of identity. Pantheon Books.
Center for American Women and Politics. (2024, November 13). Women in statewide elective executive office 2025. Rutgers University. https://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/election-watch/2024-election-results-tracker/women-statewide-elective-executive-office-2025
Choi-Allum, K. (2024). Age discrimination in employment. AARP Public Policy Institute. https://www.aarp.org/pri/topics/work-finances-retirement/employers-workforce/workforce-trends-older-adults-age-discrimination
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Cruikshank, G. (1849). Punch Magazine illustration [Illustration]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1849-Cruikshank-feminism-caricature-Queens-Bench.jpg
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–103.
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–142.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (n.d.). EEOC History: The Law. https://www.eeoc.gov/history/eeoc-history-law
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
National Archives. (n.d.). Equal Rights Amendment (proposed, 1923; congressional approval 1972). U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. https://www.archives.gov/women/era
Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015). https://www.ed.gov/laws-and-policy/laws-preschool-grade-12-education/every-student-succeeds-act-essa
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Gashaw, A. (2021). On the “Oppression Olympics”. https://harvardpolitics.com/in-the-oppression-olympics-dont-go-for-the-gold/
Gates, H. L., Jr. (Executive Producer & Host). (2017). Africa’s great civilizations [TV series]. PBS. https://www.pbs.org/show/africas-great-civilizations
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
Jeelani Law Firm, PLC. (2025, March 7). Understanding VAWA advocacy: A historical look at the law that changed survivor rights. https://www.jeelani-law.com/vawa-advocacy/
Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
Kamp, A. (2008). Rights most precious: Common law female property rights from early modern England to colonial Virginia (Senior honors thesis, Liberty University). Liberty University DigitalCommons. https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/honors/42
Kantor, J., & Twohey, M. (2017, October 5). Harvey Weinstein paid off sexual harassment accusers for decades. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html
Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. (2025, February 26). Civil rights groups sue Trump administration to challenge anti-DEI executive orders on behalf of nonprofit serving diverse group of women in the skilled trades. https://www.lawyerscommittee.org/civil-rights-groups-sue-trump-administration-to-challenge-anti-dei-executive-orders-on-behalf-of-nonprofit-serving-diverse-group-of-women-in-the-skilled-trades
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–2.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. 617 (2018).
Merriam-Webster. (n.d.). Affirmative action. In Merriam-Webster.com dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/affirmative%20action
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
Morrison, United States v., 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
National Archives and Records Administration. (2022). The Nineteenth Amendment. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/19th-amendment
National Geographic. (2023). History of LGBTQ rights in the United States: What was the Stonewall uprising? https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/stonewall-uprising-ignited-modern-lgbtq-rights-movement
National Human Trafficking Hotline. (2025). Trafficking Victims Protection Act overview. https://humantraffickinghotline.org/en/human-trafficking/federal-law
National Women’s History Alliance. (n.d.). Women’s rights timeline. Retrieved January 18, 2026, from https://nationalwomenshistoryalliance.org/resources/womens-rights-movement/detailed-timeline
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
Pelka, F. (2012). What we have done: An oral history of the disability rights movement. University of Massachusetts Press. https://www.umasspress.com/9781558499195/what-we-have-done
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–555.
Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–319.
Protection and Advocacy for Assistive Technology Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–218.
Perdue, T. (1998). Cherokee women: Gender and culture change, 1700–1835. University of Nebraska Press.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
Salmon, M. (2006). The legal status of women, 1776–1830. Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History. https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/essays/legal-status-women-1776-1830
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Speak Out Act, Pub. L. No. 117–224 (2022).
Survivors’ Bill of Rights Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–236.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
Timeline: Key dates in the century-long battle over the Equal Rights Amendment. (2025, January 22). Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/women-rights-gender-biden-constitution-amendment-congress-7510b3d8517604e29e4d40a8dcabfa5f
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386.
UN Women. (n.d.). Commission on the Status of Women. https://www.unwomen.org/en/how-we-work/commission-on-the-status-of-women
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
U.S. Department of Labor. (1967). Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/age-discrimination-employment-act-1967
U.S. Department of Labor. (2023). Providing urgent maternal protections for nursing mothers (PUMP) at work. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/pump-at-work