REFERÊNCIAS
Abreu, D. 1986. “Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames”. Journal of Economic Theory. 39: 191-225.
Abreu, D. 1988. “On the Theory of lnfinitely Repeated Games with Discounting”. Econometrica. 56: 383-96.
Abreu, D., Pearce, D.P. e Stacchetti, E. 1986. “Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Monitoring”. Journal of Economic Theory. 39: 251-69.
Adams, W.R. e Yellen, R.L. 1976. “Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 90: 475-98.
Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R. Griffith, R. e Howitt, P. 2002. “Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship”. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9269.
Aghion, P. e Bolton, P. 1987. “Contracts as a Barrier to Entry”. American Economic Review. 77: 388-401.
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M. e Rey, P. 1998. “Agency Costs, Firm Behavior and the Nature of Competition”. Université de Toulouse: IDEI. Não publicado.
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M. e Rey, P. 1999. “Competition, Financial Discipline and Growth”. Review of Economic Studies. 66: 825-52.
Ahlborn, C., Evans, D.S. e Padilla, A.J. 2001. “Competition Policy on Internet Time: Is European Competition Law Up to the Challenge?” European Competition Law Review. 22: 156-67.
Amato, G. 1997. Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy in the History of the Market. Oxford: Hart. Anderson, S.P., de Palma, A. e Thisse, J.F. 1992. Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Arbix, G. 1996. Uma aposta no futuro. Os primeiros anos da câmara setorial da indústria automobilística. 1ª ed. São Paulo: Scritta.
Areeda, P.E. e Turner, D.F. 1974. “Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act”. Harvard Law Review. 88: 697-733.
Arrow, K. 1961. “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Research for Invention”. In: Nelson, R. (ed.). The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors. Princeton University Press.
d’Aspremont, C. e Racquemin, A. 1988. “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers”. American Economic Review. 78: 1133-7.
d’Aspremont, C. e Motta, M. 2000. “Tougher Competition or Lower Concentration: A TradeOff for Antitrust Authorities?”. In: G. Norman e Thisse, J.F. (eds.). Market Structure and Competition Policy: Game-Theoretic Approaches. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Athey, S. e Bagwell, K. 2001. “Optimal Collusion with Private Information”. Rand Journal of Economics. 32: 428-65.
Baily, M.N., Hulten, C. e Campbell, D. 1992. “Productivity Dynamics in Manufacturing Plants”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics. 187-267.
Baily, M.N. e Gersbach, H. 1995. “Efficiency in Manufacturing and the Need for Global Competition”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics. 307-47.
Bain, J. 1949. “A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly”. American Economic Review. 39: 448-64.
Bain, J. 1956. Barriers to New Competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Baker, J.B. e Bresnahan, T.F. 1985. “The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product Differentiated Industries”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 33: 427-44.
Baker, J.B. e Bresnahan, T.F. 1988. “Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 6: 283-300.
Barla, P. 2000. “Firm Size Inequality and Market Power”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 18: 693-722.
Barnes, M. e Haskel, J. 2000. “Productivity in the 1990s: Evidence from British Plants”. Queen Mary and Westfield College. Não publicado.
Barros, P.P. 2001. “Looking Behind the Curtain. Effects from Modernization of European Competition Policy”. Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Não publicado.
Baumol, W. 1996. “Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test”. Journal of Law and Economics. 39: 49-72.
Baumol, W., Panzar, J. e Willig, R. 1982. Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industrial Structure. Nova York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
Beggs, A. e Klemperer, P. 1992. “Multi-Period Competition with Switching Costs”. Econometrica. 60: 651-67.
Bellamy, C. e Child, G. 2001. European Community Law of Competition. Londres: Sweet & Maxwell.
Benoit, J.P. 1984. “Financially Constrained Entry in a Game with Incomplete Information”. Rand Journal of Economics. 15: 490-99.
Benoit, J.P. e Krishna, V. 1987. “Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities”. Review of Economic Studies. 54: 23-35.
Berges, F., Loss, F., E. Malavolti e Vergé, T. 2002. “Competition Policy and Agreements Between Firms”. Université de Toulouse: IDEI. Não publicado.
Berhneim, B.D. e Whinston, M.D. 1985. “Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion”. Rand Journal of Economies. 16: 269-81.
Bernheim, B.D. e Whinston, M.D. 1990. “Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior”. Rand Journal of Economics. 21: 1-26.
Bernheim, B.D. e Whinston, M.D. 1998. “Exclusive Dealing”. Journal of Political Economy. 106: 64-103.
Berry, S.T. 1994. “Estimating Discrete Choice Models of Product Differentiation”. Rand journal of Economics. 25: 242-62.
Berry, S.T., Levinsohn, J. e Pakes, A. 1995. “Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium”. Econometrica. 63: 841-90.
Besanko, D. e Perry, M.K. 1991. “Resale Price Maintenance and Manufacturer Competition for Exclusive Dealerships”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 39: 517-44.
Besanko, D. e Perry, M.K. 1993. “Equilibrium Incentives for Exclusive Dealing in a Differentiated Products Oligopoly”. Rand Journal of Economics. 24: 646-67.
Besanko, D. e Spulber, D.F. 1989. “Antitrust Enforcement under Asymmetric Information”. Economic Journal. 99: 408-25.
Besanko, D. e Spulber, D.F. 1993. “Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 9: 1-29.
Besen, S.M. e Farrell, J. 1994. “Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization”. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 8: 117-31.
Bishop, S.B. 1999. “Power and Responsibility: The ECJ’s Kali-Salz Judgment”. European Competition Law Review. 1: 38-9.
Bittlingmayer, G. 1985. “Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?”. Journal of Law and Economics. 28: 77-118.
Bolton, G. e Scharfstein, D. 1990. “A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting”. American Economic Review. 80: 93-106.
Bolton, P., Brodley, J. e Riordan, M. 2000. “Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy”. Georgetown Law Journal. 88: 239-330.
Bonanno, G. e Vickers, J. 1988. “Vertical Separation”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 36: 257-65.
Boone, J. 2000. “Competitive Pressure: The Effects on Investments in Product and Process Innovation”. Rand Journal of Economics. 31: 549-69.
Borenstein, S. 1999. “Rapid Price Communication and Coordination: The Airline Tariff Publishing Case (1994)”. In: Kwoka, J.E. e White, L.J. (eds.). The Antitrust Revolution. (3a ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bork, R. 1978. The Antitrust Paradox. Nova York: Basic Books.
Brander, J.A. 1981. “Intra-Industry Trade in Identical Commodities”. Journal of International Economics. 11: 1-14.
Bresnahan, T.F. 1989. “Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power”. In: R. Schmalensee, R. e Willig, R.D. (eds.). Handbook of Industrial Organization. Nova York: Elsevier Science.
Bresnahan, T.F. 1998. “New Modes of Competition. Implications for the Future Structure of the Computer Industry”. In: Eisenach, J.A. e Lenard, T.M. (eds.). Competition, Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace. Boston: The Progress & Freedom Foundation.
Bresnahan, T.F. e Reiss, P.C. 1991. “Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets”. Journal of Political Economy. 99: 977-1009.
Brock, W.A. e Scheinkman, J. 1985. “Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints”. Review of Economic Studies. 52: 371-82.
Bulow, J., Geanakoplos, J. e Klemperer, P. 1985. “Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements”. Journal of Political Economy. 93: 488-511.
Burnett, W.B. 1999. “Predation by a Nondominant Firm: The Liggett Case”. In: Kwoka, J.E. e White, L.J. (eds.). The Antitrust Revolution. (3a ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burns, M.R. 1986. “Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Costs of Competitors”. Journal of Political Economy. 94: 266-96.
Cabral, L. 2003. “Horizontal Mergers with Free-Entry: Why Cost Efficiencies may be a Weak Defense and Asset Sales a Poor Remedy”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 5: 607-23.
Caffarra, C. e Ysewyn, J. 1998. “Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: The Future of Collective Dominance after the Kali & Salz Judgment”. European Competition Law Review. 7: 470.
Caillaud, B., Jullien, B. e Picard, P. 1995. “Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation”. Econometrica. 63: 621-46.
Camesasca, P. 1999. “The Explicit Efficiency Defence in Merger Control: Does It Make the Difference?” European Competition Law Review. 1: 25-7.
Carlton, D.W. e Waldman, M. 2002. “The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries”. Rand Journal of Economics. 33: 194-220.
Caves, R.E. 1989. “Mergers, Takeovers and Economic Efficiency. Foresight vs. Hindsight”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 7: 151-74.
Caves, R.E. e Barton, D.R. 1990. Efficiency in U.S. Manufacturing Industries. Cambridge, MA e Londres: MIT Press.
Cestone, G. 2001. “Corporate Financing and Product Market Competition: An Overview”. Giornale degli Economisti. 58: 269-300.
Cestone, G. e Furnagalli, C. 2001. “Internal Capital Markets, Cross-Subsidization, and Product Market Competition”. Londres: CEPR Discussion Paper 2935.
Chandler, A.D. 1990. Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Chernla, G. 2003. “Downstream Competition, Foreclosure and Vertical Integration”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 12: 261-89.
Choi, J.P. 1996. “Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation and the ‘Leverage Theory’”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 110: 1153-81.
Choi, J.P. 2001. “A Theory of Mixed Bundling Applied to the GE/Honeywell Merger”. Antitrust. 16: 32-3.
Choi, J.P. e Stefanadis, C. 2001. “Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory”. Rand Journal of Economics. 32: 52-71.
Coase, R. 1972. “Durability and Monopoly”. Journal of Law and Economics. 15: 143-9. Comanor, W.S. 1990. “United States Antitrust Policy: Issues and Institutions”. In: W.S. Comanor et al. (ed.). Competition Policy in Europe and North America: Economic Issues and Institutions. Nova York: Harwood Academic. 43-72.
Comanor, W.S. e Frech, H.E. 1985. “The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements?” American Economic Review. 75: 539-46.
Cornpte, O. 1998. “Cornrnunication in Repeated Garnes with Irnperfect Private Monitoring”. Econometrica. 66: 597-626.
Compte, O., Jenny, F. e Rey, P. 2002. “Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion”. European Economic Review. 46: 1-29.
Connor, J.M., Rogers, R.T. e Bhagavan, V. 1996. “Concentration Change and Countervailing Power in the U.S. Food Manufacturing Industries”. Review of Industrial Organization. 11: 473-92.
Cooper, R., DeJong, D.V., Forsythe, R. e Ross, T.W. 1992. “Communication in Coordination Games”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 107: 739-71.
Cooper, T.E. 1986. “Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion”. Rand Journal of Economics. 17: 377-88.
Correia, E. 1998. «Joint Ventures: Issues in Enforcernent Policy». Antitrust Law ]ournal. 66: 737-71.
Cournot, A.A. 1838. Recherches sur les Príncipes Mathématiques de la Théorie des Richesses. Paris: L. Hachette.
Cramton, P. e Schwartz, J.A. 2001. “Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions”. Journal of Regulatory Economics. 17: 229-52.
Crémer, J., Rey, P. e Tirole, J. 2000. “Connectivity in the Commercial Internet”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 48: 433-72.
Crocker, K.J. e Lyon, T.P. 1994. “What Do Facilitating Practices Facilitate? An Empirical Investigation on Most-Favored Nation Clauses in Natural Gas Contracts”. Journal of Law and Economics. 37: 297-322.
Dansby, E. e Willig, R. 1979. “Industry Performance Gradient Indexes”. American Economic Review. 69: 249-60.
Davidson, C. e Deneckere, R.J.1986. “Long-Term Competition in Capacity, Short-Run Competition in Price, and the Cournot Model”. Rand Journal of Economics. 17: 404- 15.
Davidson, C. e Deneckere, R.J. 1990. “Excess Capacity and Collusion”. International Economic Review. 31: 521-41.
Deneckere, R.J. e Davidson, C. 1985. “Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand CompeTition”. Rand Journal of Economics. 16: 473-86.
Dierickx, I., Matutes, C. e Neven, D.J. 1991. “Cost Differences and Survival in Declining Industries: A Case for ‘Picking Winners’?” European Economic Review. 35: 1507-28.
Disney, R., Haskel, J. e Heden, Y. 2000. “Restructuring and Productivity Growth in UK Manufacturing”. Queen Mary and Westfield College. Não publicado.
Dixit, A. 1980. “The Role of lnvestment in Entry Deterrence”. Economic Journal. 90: 95-106.
Dobson, P.W. e Waterson, M. 1997. “Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices”. Economic Journal. 107: 418-30.
Dranove, D. e Gandal, N. 2000. “The DVD vs. DIVX Standard War: Network Effects and Empirical Evidence of Preannouncement Effects”. Northwestern University. Não publicado.
Eckbo, B.E. 1983. “Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth”. Journal of Financial Economics. 11: 241-73.
Ellison, G. 1994. “Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Cartel”. Rand Journal of Economics. 25: 37-57.
Elzinga, K.G. e Hogarty, T.F. 1973. “The Problem of Geographic Market Definition in Antimerger Suits”. Antitrust Bulletin. 18: 45-81.
Elzinga, K.G. e Mills, D.E. 2001. “Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory”. Georgetown Law Journal. 89: 2475-94.
Encaoua, D. e Jacquemin, A. 1980. “Degree of Monopoly, Indices of Concentration and Threat of Entry”. International Economic Review. 21: 87-105.
Eswaran, M. 1994. “Cross-Licensing of Competing Patents as a Facilitating Device”. Canadian Journal of Economics. 27: 689-708.
European Commission. 1996. XXV Competition Policy Report, 1995. Bruxelas: Commission of the European Communities.
European Commission. 2000. XXIX Report on Competition Policy, 1999. Bruxelas: Commission of the European Communities.
European Commission. 2001. XXX Report on Competition Policy, 2000. Bruxelas: Commission of the European Communities.
Evans, D.S. 2002. “The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets”. Não publicado.
Evans, W.N. e Kessides, I.N. 1994. “Living by the ‘Golden Rule’: Multimarket Contact in the U.S. Airline Industry”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 109: 341-66.
Fabra, N. 2001a. “Tacit Collusion in Electricity Markets: Uniform-Price versus Discriminatory Auctions”. Journal of Industrial Economies. No prelo.
Fabra, N. 2001b. “Collusive Behavior with Capacity Constraints over the Business Cycle”. Florença: European University Institute. Não publicado.
Farrell, J. 1987. “Cheap Talk, Coordination and Entry”. Rand Journal of Economics. 18: 34-9.
Farrell, J. e Katz, M.L. 1998. “The Effects of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law on Compatibility and Innovation”. Antitrust Bulletin. Outono/Inverno. 609-50.
Farrell, J. e Katz, M. 2000. “Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 48: 413-32.
Farrell, J. e Klemperer, P. 2001. “Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects”. Berkeley: University of California. Não publicado.
Farrell, J. e Rabin, M. 1996. “Cheap Talk”. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 10: 103-18. Farrell, J. e Saloner, G. 1985. “Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation”. Rand Journal of Economics. 16: 70-83.
Farrell, J, e Shapiro, C. 1990. “Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis”. American Economic Review. 80: 107-25.
Farrell, J. e Shapiro, C. 2001. “Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis”. Antitrust Law Journal. 68: 685-710.
Faulí-Oller, R. e Motta, M. 1996. “Managerial Incentives for Takeovers”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 5: 497-514.
Federal Trade Commission. 1999. A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Procedure. Washington, D.C.: Federal Trade Commission.
Fershtman, C. e Judd, K.L. 1987. “Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly”. American Economic Review. 77: 927-40.
Fingleton, J., Fox, E., Neven, D. e Seabright, P. 1996. Competition Policy and the Transformation of Central Europe. Londres: CEPR.
Fisher, F. 1985. “The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: Posner Reconsidered”. Journal of Political Economy. 93: 410-16.
Foster, L., Haltiwanger, J. e Krizan, C.J. 1998. “Aggregate Productivity Growth: Lessons from Microeconomic Evidence”. NBER Working Paper 6803.
Fox, E. 2002. “What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practises and Anticompetitive Effect”. Antitrust Law Journal. 70: 371-412.
Franco, G. 2010. Cartas a um jovem economista. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier.
Frank, J., Harris, R.S. e S. Titman. 1991. “The Postmerger Share-Price Performance of Acquiring Firms”. Journal of Financial Economics. 29: 81-96.
Fridolfsson, S.O. e Stennek, J. 2002. “Why Mergers Reduce Profits and Raise Share Prices: A Theory of Preemptive Mergers”. Stockholm: IUI. Não publicado.
Friedman, J. 1971. “A Noncooperative Equilibrium for Supergames”. Review of Economic Studies. 28: 1-12.
Froeb, L.M. e Werden, G.J. 1991. “Residual Demand Estimation for Market Delineation: Complications and Limitations”. Review of Industrial Organization. 6: 33-48.
Fudenberg, D. e Tirole, J. 1984. “The Fat Cat Effect, the Puppy Dog Ploy and the Lean and Hungry Look”. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. 74: 361-8.
Fudenberg, D. e Tirole, J. 1985. “Preemption and Rent Equilization in the Adoption of New Technology”. Review of Economic Studies. 52: 383-401.
Fudenberg, D. e Tirole, J. 1986a. “A Signal-Jamming Theory of Predation”. Rand Journal of Economics. 17: 173-90.
Fudenberg, D. e Tirole, J. 1986b. “A Theory of Exit in Duopoly”. Econometrica. 54: 943-60.
Fudenberg, D. e Tirole, J. 2000. “Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 48: 373-90.
Fumagalli, C., Karlinger, L. e Motta, M. 2003. “A Model of Physical Networks”. Florença: European University Institute. Não publicado.
Fumagalli, C. e Motta, M. 2000. “Buyers’ Coordination and Entry”. Londres: CEPR Discussion Paper 2908.
Fumagalli, C. e Motta, M. 2001. “Advertising Restrictions in Professional Services”. In: Amato, G. e Laudati, L. (eds.). The Anticompetitive Impact of Regulation. Edward Elgar Publishers.
Fumagalli, C. e Motta, M. 2002. “Exclusive Dealing and Entry, When Buyers Compete”. Londres: CEPR Discussion Paper 3493.
Galbraith, J.K. 1952. “American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power”. Reimpressão. Classics in Economics Series. New Brunswick, NJ e Londres: Transaction. 1993.
Gale, D. e Hellwig, M. 1986. “Incentive Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem”. Review of Economic Studies. 52: 647-64.
Gal-Or, E. 1991. “Duopolistic Vertical Restraints”. European Economic Review. 35: 1237-53.
Genesove, D. e Mullin, W.P. 2001. “Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case”. American Economic Review. 91: 379-98.
George, K.D. e Jacquemin, A. 1990. “Competition Policy in the European Community”. In: Comanor, W.S. et al., (org.). Competition Policy in Europe and North America. Nova York: Harwood Academic. 206-45.
Gibbons, R. 1997. “An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory”. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 11: 127-49.
Gilbert, R. e Vives, X. 1986. “Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem”. Review of Economic Studies. 53: 71-83.
Gowrisankaran, G. 1999. “A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Horizontal Mergers”. Rand Journal of Economics. 30: 56-83.
Goyder, D.G. 1993. EC Competition Law. 2a ed. Clarendon: Oxford University Press.
Goyder, D.G. 1998. EC Competition Law. 3a ed. Clarendon: Oxford University Press.
Green, E.J. e Porter, R.H. 1984. “Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Competition”. Econometrica. 52: 87-100.
Green, A. e D. Mayes. 1991. “Technical Inefficiency in Manufacturing Industries”. Economic Journal. 101: 523-38.
Grossman, G.M. e Shapiro, C. 1986. “Research Joint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis”. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 2: 315-37.
Gual, J. 1995. “The Three Common Policies: An Economic Analysis”. In: Pierre Buigues, Alexis Jacquemin e Andre Sapir (eds.). European Policies on Competition, Trade and Industry: Conflict and Complementarities. Aldershot: Elgar. 3-48.
Haltiwanger, J. e Harrington Jr., J.E. 1991. “The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior”. Rand Journal of Economics. 22: 89-106.
Harberger, A.C. 1954. “Monopoly and Resource Allocation”. American Economic Review. 44: 77-87.
Harrington Jr., J.E. 1986. “Limit Pricing When the Potential Entrant Is Uncertain of its Cost Function”. Econometrica. 54: 429-37.
Harrington, J.E., Jr. 1989a. “Collusion among Asymmetric Firms: The Case of Different Discount Factors”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 7: 289-307.
Harrington Jr., J.E. 1989b. “Collusion and Predation under (Almost) Free Entry”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 7: 381-401.
Hart, O. 1983. “The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme”. Bell Journal of Economics. 14: 366-82.
Hart, O. e Tirole, J. 1990. “Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Edição especial 0: 205-76.
Hausman, J., Leonard, G. e Zona, J.D. 1994. “Competitive Analysis with Differentiated Products”. Annales d’Economie et Statistique. 34: 159-80.
Hay, D.A. e Liu, G.S. 1997. “The Efficiency of Firms: What Difference Does Competition Make?” Economic Journal. 107: 597-617.
Hay, G.A. 1999. “Facilitating Practices: The Ethyl Case (1984)”. In: Kwoka Jr., J.E. e White, L.J. (eds.). The Antitrust Revolution. (3a ed.). Oxford University Press.
Heide, J.B., Dutta, D. e Bergen, M. 1998. “Exclusive Dealing and Business Efficiency: Evidence from Industry Practice”. Journal of Law and Economics. 41: 387-407.
Hermalin, B.E. 1992. “The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior”. Rand Journal of Economics. 23: 350-65.
Holmström, B. e Tirole, J. 1997. “Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 62: 663-91.
Holt, C.A. e Scheffman, D.T. 1987. “Facilitating Practices: The Effects of Advance Notice and Best-Price Clauses”. Rand Journal of Economics. 18: 187-97.
Horn, H., Lang, H. e Lundgren, S. 1994. “Competition, Long-Run Contracts and Internal Inefficiencies in Firms”. European Economic Review. 38: 213-33.
Horn, H. e Persson, L. 2001. “Endogenous Mergers in Concentrated Markets”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 19: 1213-44.
Inman, R.P. e Rubinfeld, D.L. 1997. “Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism”. Texas Law Review. 75: 1203-99.
Irmen, A. 1998. “Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains”. Journal of Economic Surveys. 12: 333-59.
Jacquemin, A. 1990. “Mergers and European Policy”. In: Admiraal, P.H. (ed.). Merger and Competition Policy in the European Community. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Jacquemin, A. e Slade, M. 1989. “Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal Merger”. In: R. Schmalensee e Willig, R.D. (org.). Handbook of Industrial Organization. Nova York: Elsevier Science.
Joskow, P.L. e Klevorick, A.K. 1979. “A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy”. Yale Law Journal 89: 213-70.
Jovanovic, B. 1982. “Selection and the Evolution of Industry”. Econometrica. 50: 649-70.
Judd, K.L. 1985. “Credible Spatial Preemption”. Rand Journal of Economics. 16: 153-66.
Jullien, B. e Rey, P. 2001. «Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion». Université de Toulouse: IDEI. Não publicado.
Kamecke, U. 1998. “Vertical Restraints in German Antitrust Law”. In: Martin, S. (ed.). Competition Policies in Europe. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Kamien, M.I. e Zang, I. 1990. “The Limits of Monopolization through Acquisition”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 105: 465-99.
Kamien, M.I. e Zang, I. 1991. “Competitively Cost Advantageous Mergers and MonopolizaTion”. Games and Economic Behavior. 3: 323-38.
Kandori, M. 1992. “The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring”. Review of Economic Studies. 59: 581-93.
Kandori, M. e Matsushima, H. 1998. “Private Observation, Communication and Collusion”. Econometrica, 66: 627-52.
Katz, D. 1991. “Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments”. Rand Journal of Economics. 22: 307-28.
Katz, M.L. e Shapiro, C. 1985. “Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility”. American Economic Review. 75: 424-40.
Katz, M.L. e Shapiro, C. 1994. “Systems Competition and Network Effects”. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 8: 93-115.
Kim, H. e Singal, V. 1993. “Mergers and Market Power: Evidence from the Airline Industry”. American Economic Review. 83: 549-69.
Klemperer, P. 1987a. “Markets with Consumer Switching Costs”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 102: 357-94.
Klemperer, P. 1987b. “The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs”. Rand Journal of Economics. 18: 138-51.
Klemperer, P. 1987c. “Entry Deterrence in Markets with Switching Costs”. Economic Journal Conference Supplement. 1-17.
Klemperer, P.D. 1988. “Welfare Effects of Entry into Markets with Switching Costs”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 37: 159-65.
Klemperer, P. 1995. “Competition when Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview”. Review of Economic Studies.62: 515-39.
Klemperer, P. 2002. “What Really Matters in Auction Design”. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 16: 169-89.
Kolasky, W.J. 2001. “Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It’s a Long Way from Chicago to Brussels”. Washington, D.C. Não publicado.
Korah, V. 1994a. An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice. Londres: Sweet and Maxwell.
Korah, V. 1994b. “Exclusive Purchasing Obligations: Mars v. Langnese and Schöller». European Competition Law Review. 15: 171-75.
Korah, V. 1999. “Gencor v. Commission: Collective Dominance”. European Competition Law Review. 6: 337.
Kovacic, W.E. e Shapiro, C. 2000. “Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking”. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 14: 43-60.
Krattenmaker, T.G. e Salop, S.C. 1986. “Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rival’s Costs To Achieve Power Over Price”. Yale Law Journal 96: 209-93.
Kreps, D., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. e Wilson, R. 1982. “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma”. Journal of Economic Theory. 27: 245-52.
Kreps, D. e Scheinkman, J. 1983. “Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes”. Bell Journal of Economics. 14: 326-37.
Kreps, D. e R. Wilson. 1982. “Reputation and Imperfect Information”. Journal of Economic Theory. 27: 253-79.
Krueger, A. 1974. “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society”. American Economic Review. 64: 291-303.
Kühn, K.-U. 1997. “Germany”. In: E.M. Graham, E.M. e Richardson, J. (eds.). Global Competition Policy. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
Kühn, K.-U. 2001. “Fighting Collusion by Regulating Communication between Firms”. Economic Policy. 16: 167-204.
Kühn, K.-U. e Motta, M. 1999. “The Economics of Joint Dominance”. Florença: European University Institute. Não publicado.
Kühn, K.-U. e Vives, X. 1995. “Information Exchange Among Firms and their Impact on Competition». European Commission Document.
Kühn, K.-U. e Vives, X. 1999. “Excess Entry, Vertical Integration, and Welfare”. Rand Journal of Economics. 30: 575-603.
LaCasse, C. 1995. “Bid Rigging and the Threat of Government Prosecution”. Rand Journal of Economics. 26: 398-417.
Laffont, J.-J. e Tirole, J. 1994. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Boston: MIT Press.
Landes, W.M. e Posner, R.A. 1981. “Market Power in Antitrust Cases”. Harvard Law Review. 94: 937-96.
Leahy, D. e Neary, J.P. 1997. “Public Policy towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries”. American Economic Review. 87: 642-62.
Leibenstein, H. 1966. “Allocative Efficiency vs. X-Efficiency”. American Economic Review. 56: 392-415.
Levin, R.C., Cohen, W. e Mowery, D.C. 1985. “R&D Appropriability, Opportunity, and Market Structure: New Evidence on Some Schumptereian Hypothesis”. American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings. 75: 20-4.
Levy, D.T. e Reitzes, J.D. 1992. “Anticompetitive Effects of Mergers in Markets with Localized Competition”. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 8: 427-40.
Lin, P., B. Raj, M. Sandfort e D. Slottje. 2000. “The US Antitrust System and Recent Trends in Antitrust Enforcement”. Journal of Economic Surveys. 14: 255-306.
Lustgarten, S.H. 1975. “The Impact of Buyer Concentration in Manufacturing Industries”. Review of Economics and Statistics. 57: 125-32.
Lyons, B.R. 2002. “Could Politicians Be More Right than Economists? A Theory of Merger Standards”. Norwich: UEA. Não publicado.
McAfee, R.P. e Schwartz, M. 1994. “Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity”. American Economic Review. 84: 210-30.
McAfee, P. e Williams, M.A. 1992. “Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy”. Journal Industrial Economics. 40: 181-87.
McCutcheon, B. 1997. “Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?”. Journal of Political Economy. 105: 330-50.
McFadden, D. 1973. “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior”. In: Zarembka, P. (ed.). Frontiers in Econometrics. Nova York: Academic Press.
McGee, J. 1958. “Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ) Case”. Journal of Law and Economics. 1: 137-69.
McGuckin, R. e Nguyen, S. 1995. “On the Productivity and Plant Ownership Change: New Evidence from the Longitudinal Research Database”. Rand Journal of Economics. 26: 257-76.
Maggi, G. 1996. “Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Mode of Competition”. American Economic Review. 86: 237-58.
Malueg, D.A. e Schwartz, M. 2001. “Interconnection Incentives of a Large Network Facing Multiple Rivals”. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University. Não publicado.
Martin, S. 1993. “Endogenous Firm Efficiency in a Cournot Principal-Agent Model”. Journal Of Economic Theory. 59: 445-50.
Martin, S. 1995. “R&D Joint Ventures and Tacit Product Market Collusion”. European Journal of Political Economy. 11: 733-41.
Martinez Lopez, M. 2000a. “Commission Approves an Agreement to Improve Efficiency of Washing Machines”. Competition Policy Newsletter. 1: 13-14.
Martinez Lopez, M. 2000b. “Horizontal Agreements on Energy Efficiency of Appliances: A Comparison of CECED and CEMEP”. Competition Policy Newsletter. 2: 24-5.
Marvel, H.P. e McCafferty, S. 1984. “Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification”. Rand Journal of Economics. 15: 346-59.
Maskin, E. e Tirole, J. 1988. “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles”. Econometrica. 56: 571-99.
Mathewson, G.F. e Winter, R.A. 1983. “Vertical Integration by Contractual Restraints in Spatial Markets”. Journal of Business. 56: 497-517.
Mathewson, G.F. e Winter, R.A. 1984. “An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints”. Rand Journal of Economics. 15: 27-38.
Mathewson, G.F. e Winter, R.A. 1987. “The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment”. American Economic Review. 77: 1057-62.
Mathewson, G.F. e Winter, R.A. 1998. “The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance”. Review of Industrial Organization. 13: 57-84.
Matsusaka, J.G. 1993. “Takeover Motives during Conglomerate Merger Wave”. Rand Journal of Economics. 24: 357-79.
Merges, R.P. 2001. “Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools”. In: Dreyfuss, R., Zimmerman, D.L. e First, H. (eds.). Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property. Oxford University Press.
Messerlin, P.A. 1990. “Anti-Dumping Regulation or Pro-Cartel Law? The EC Chemical Cases”. World Economy. 645-92.
Milgrom, P. e Roberts, J. 1982a. “Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis”. Econometrica. 50: 443-59.
Milgrom, P. e Roberts, J. 1982b. “Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence”. Journal of Economic Theory. 27: 280-312.
Milliou, C. 2001. “Vertical Integration and R&D Spillovers: Is There a Need for ‘Firewalls’?”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. No prelo.
Morais, R. e Salgado, L.H. 2011. “O porquê de Sadia-Perdigão e Colgate-Kolynos não serem decisões sequer comparáveis”. Suplemento da Revista do IBRAC, ano 2, número 7.
Morck, R., Schleifer, A. e Vishny, R. 1990. “Do Managerial Incentives Drive Bad Acquisitions?”. Journal of Finance. 45: 31-48.
Motta, M. 1992. “Cooperative R&D and Vertical Product Differentiation”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 10: 643-61.
Motta, M. 1996. “Research Joint Ventures in an International Economy”. Ricerche Economiche. 50: 293-315.
Motta, M. 2000. “EC Merger Policy and the Airtours Case”. European Competition Law Review. 21: 199-207.
Motta, M. e Onida, F. 1997. “Trade Policy and Competition Policy”. Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia. 56: 67-97.
Motta, M. e Polo, M. 1999. “Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution”. Florença: European University Institute. Não publicado.
Motta, M. e Polo, M. 2003. “Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 21: 347-79.
Motta, M., Polo, M. e Vasconcelos, H. 2002. “Merger Remedies in the European Union: An Overview”. Antitrust Bulletin. No prelo.
Motta, M. e Rönde, T. 2002. “Trade Secret Laws, Trade Mobility, and Innovations”. Londres: CEPR Discussion Paper 3615.
Motta, M., Thisse, J.F. e Cabrales, A. 1997. “On the Persistence of Leadership or Leapfrogging in International Trade”. International Economic Review. 38: 809-24.
Motta, M. e Vasconcelos, H. 2003. “Efficiency Gains and Myopic Antitrust Authority in a Dynamic Merger Game”. Florença: European University Institute. Não publicado.
Mueller, D.C. 1985. Profits in the Long-Run. Cambridge University Press.
Mueller, D.C. 1996. “Lessons from the United States’s Antitrust History”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 14: 415-45.
Nalebuff, B.J. 2002. “Bundling and the GE-Honeywell Merger”. Yale School of Management Working Paper 22.
Nash, J.F. 1950. “Equilibrium Points in N-person Games”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 18: 155-62.
Neven, D.J., Nuttall, R. e Seabright, P. 1993. Merger in Daylight: The Economics and Politics of European Merger Control. Londres: CEPR.
Neven, D.J., Papandropoulos, P. e Seabright, P. 1998. Trawling for Minnows. European Competition Policy and Agreements between Firms. Londres: CEPR.
Neven, D.J. e Röller, L.-H. 1996. “Rent Sharing in the European Airline Industry”. European Economic Review. 40: 933-40.
Neven, D.J. e Röller, L.-H. 2000. “Consumer Surplus versus Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control”. WZB Working Paper FS IV 00-15.
Neven, D.J. e Röller, L.-H. 2002. “Discrepancies between Markets and Regulators: Na Analysis of the First Ten Years of EU Merger Control”. Não publicado.
Nevo, A. 2000. “A Practitioner’s Guide to Estimation of Random-Coefficients Logit Models of Demand”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 9: 513-48.
Nevo, A. 2001. “Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry”. Econometrica. 69: 307-42.
Nickell, S. 1996. “Competition and Corporate Performance”. Journal of Political Economy. 104: 724-46.
Nickell, S., Nicolitsas, D. e Dryden, N. 1997. “What Makes Firms Perform Well?” European Economic Review. 41: 783-96.
Nöel, P.-E. 1997. “Efficiency Considerations in the Assessment of Mergers”. European Competition Law Review. 8: 498-519.
O’Brien, D.P. e Shaffer, G. 1992. “Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts”. Rand Journal of Economics. 23: 299-308.
Olley, G.S. e Pakes, A. 1996. “The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry”. Econometrica. 64: 1263-97.
Ordover, J.A. 1990. “Economic Foundations of Competition Policy”. In: W.S. Comanor, W.S., George, K. e J acquemin, A. (eds.). Competition Policy in Europe and North America: Economic Issues and Institutions. Chur: Harwood Academic.
Ordover, J. e Saloner, G. 1989. “Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust”. In: Schmalensee, R. e Willig, R. (eds.). Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Ordover, J.A. e Willig, R.D. 1993. “Economics and the 1992 Merger Guidelines: A Brief Survey”. Review of Industrial Organization. 8: 139-50.
Padilla, A.J. 1991. “Consumer Switching Costs: A Survey”. Investigaciones Economicas. 15: 485-504.
Padilla, A.J. e Pagano, M. 1997. “Endogenous Communication among Lenders and Enterpreneurial Incentives”. Review of Financial Studies. 10: 205-36.
Parker, R. e Balto, D. 2000. “The Evolving Approach to Merger Remedies”. Antitrust Report. 2: 2-28.
Parker, P.M. e Röller, L.-H. 1997. “Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multimarket Contact and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone Industry”. Rand Journal of Economics. 28: 304-22.
Peritz, R.J.R. 1999. “11 prodotto di marca e il suo prodotto derivato. Analisi economica e inquadramento giuridico”. Mercato Concorrenza Regale. 2: 195-221.
Perry, M.K. e Groff, R.H. 1985. “Resale Price Maintenance and Forward Integration into a Monopolistically Competitive Industry”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 100: 1293-311.
Perry, M.K. e Porter, R. 1985. “Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger”. American Economic Review. 75: 219-27.
Pesendorfer, M. 2000. “A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions”. Review of Economic Studies. 67: 381-411.
Pigou, A.C. 1920. The Economics of Welfare. Londres: McMillan.
Porter, R.H. 1983a. “Optimal Cartel Trigger Strategies”. Journal of Economic Theory. 29: 313-38.
Porter, R.H. 1983b. “A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886”. Bell Journal of Economics. 14: 301-14.
Porter, R.H. 1985. “On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 33: 415-26.
Posner, R.A. 1975. “The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation”. Journal of Political Economy. 83: 807-27.
Posner, R.A. 1976. Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Posner, R.A. 2001. Antitrust Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Raith, M. 1996a. “Product Differentiation, Uncertainty and the Stability of Collusion”. Londres School of Economics-STICERD. Discussion Paper Series EI/16: 49.
Raith, M. 1996b. “A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly”. Journal of Economic Theory. 71: 260-88.
Rasmusen, E.B., Ramseyer, J.M. e Wiley Jr., J.S. 1991. “Naked Exclusion”. American Economic Review. 81: 1137-45.
Ravenscraft, D.J. e Scherer, F.M. 1987. Mergers, Sell-Offs, and Economic Efficiency. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Rey, P. 2000. “Towards a Theory of Competition Policy”. Université de Toulouse: IDEI. Não publicado.
Rey, P. 2002. “Collective Dominance in the Telecommunications Industry”. Université de Toulouse: IDEI. Não publicado.
Rey, P., Seabright, P. e Tirole, J. 2001. “The Activities of a Monopoly Firm in Adjacent Competitive Markets: Economic Consequences and Implications for Competition Policy”. Université de Toulouse: IDEI. Não publicado.
Rey, P. e Stiglitz, J. 1988. “Vertical Restraints and Producers’ Competition”. European Economic Review. 32: 561-68.
Rey, P. e Stiglitz, J. 1995. “The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers’ Competition”. Rand Journal of Economics. 26: 431-51.
Rey, P. e Tirole, J. 1986. “The Logic of Vertical Restraints”. American Economic Review. 76: 921-39.
Rey, P. e Tirole, J. 1996. “A Primer on Foreclosure”. Université de Toulouse: IDEI. Não publicado.
Rey, P. e Vergé, T. 2002a. “Resale Price Maintenance and Horizontal Cartel”. Université de Toulouse: IDEI. Não publicado.
Rey, P. e Vergé, T. 2002b. “Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts”. Université de Toulouse: IDEI. Não publicado.
Riordan, M.H. e Salop, S.C. 1995. “Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach”. Antitrust Law Journal. 63: 513-68.
Ritter, L., Braun, W.D. e Rawlinson, F. 2000. European Competition Law: A Practitioner’s Guide. 2nd ed. The Hague: Kluwer.
Rochet, J.-C. e Tirole, J. 1999. “Cooperation among Competitors: The Economics of Credit Card Associations”. Londres: CEPR Discussion Paper 21O1.
Rochet, J.-C. e Tirole, J. 2001. “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets”. Université de Toulouse: IDEI. Não publicado.
Roll, R. 1986. “The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers”. Journal of Business.59: 197-216.
Ross, T.W. 1992. “Cartel Stability and Product Differentiation”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 10: 1-13.
Rotemberg, J.J. e Saloner, G. 1986. “A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms”. American Economic Review. 76: 390-407.
Rubinfeld, D.L. 1998. “Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network Industries”. Antitrust Bulletin. 43: 859-82.
Salant, S., Switzer, S. e Reynolds, R. 1983. “Losses from Horizontal Mergers: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 98: 185-99.
Salgado L.H. 1993. As políticas de concorrência (ou antitruste) um panorama da experiência mundial e sua atualidade para o Brasil. Rio de Janeiro (Texto para Discussão IPEA).
Salgado L.H. 1997. A economia política da prática antitruste. São Paulo. Singular.
Salgado L.H. 2004. “A defesa da concorrência no Brasil: Retrospecto e perspectivas”. In: Giambiagi, F., Urani, A. e Guilherme Reis, J. (orgs.). Reformas no Brasil: Balanço e agenda. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, v. 1, p. 359-383.
Salinger, M.A. 1988. “Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 103: 345-56.
Saloner, G. 1987. “Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information”. Rand Journal of Economics. 18: 156-86.
Salop, S.C. 1986. “Practices that (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Co-ordination”. In: Stiglitz, J. e Mathewson, G. (eds.). New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure, Basingstoke: MacMillan.
Salop, S.C. e Scheffman, D.T. 1987. “Cost-Raising Strategies”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 36: 19-34.
Scharfstein, D.S. 1984. “A Policy to Prevent Rational Test-Marketing Predation”. Rand Journal of Economics. 2: 229-43.
Scharfstein, D.S. 1988. Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack”. Rand Journal of Economics. 19: 147-55.
Scheffman, D.T. e Spiller, P.T. 1987. “Geographic Market Definition under the U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines”. Journal of Law and Economics. 30: 123-47.
Schelling, T.C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. MA: Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Scherer, F.M. 1980. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. 2a ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Scherer, F.M. 1994. Competition Policies for an Integrated Economy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Scherer, F.M. e Ross, D. 1990. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. 3a ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Schmalensee, R. 1979. “On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The Realemon Case”. University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 127: 994-1050.
Schmalensee, R. 1982. “Another Look at Market Power”. Harvard Law Review. 95: 1789-816.
Schmalensee, R. 2002. “Payment Systems and Interchange Fees”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 50: 103-22.
Schmidt, K.M. 1997. “Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition”. Review of Economic Studies. 64: 191-213.
Schnitzer, M. 1994. “Dynamic Duopoly with Best-Price Clauses”. Rand Journal of Economics. 25: 186-96.
Schumacher, U. 1991. “Buyer Structure and Seller Performance in U.S. Manufacturing Industries”. Review of Economics and Statistics. 73: 277-84.
Schumpeter, J. 1912. Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen, Entwicklung. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.
Schwartz, M. 1987. “The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment”. American Economic Review. 77: 1063-68.
Scott Morton, F. 1997. “Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879-1929”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 6: 679-724.
Segal, I.R. e Whinston, M.D. 1996. “Naked Exclusion and Buyer Coordination”. Harvard Institute of Economic Research. Não publicado.
Segal, I.R. e Whinston, M.D. 2000a. “Naked Exclusion: Comment”. American Economic Review. 90: 296-309.
Segal, I.R. e Whinston, M.D. 2000b. “Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investment”. Rand Journal of Economics. 31: 603-33.
Selten, R. 1975. “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games”. International Journal of Game Theory. 4: 25-55.
Selten, R. 1978. “The Chain-Store Paradox”. Theory and Decision. 9: 127-59.
Shaffer, G. 1991. “Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices”. Rand Journal of Economics. 22: 120-36.
Shaked, A. e Sutton, J. 1982. “Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation”. Review of Economic Studies.49: 3-13.
Shaked, A. e Sutton, J. 1983. “Natural Oligopolies”. Econometrica. 51: 1469-84.
Shaked, A. e Sutton, J. 1987. “Product Differentiation and Industrial Structure”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 36: 131-46.
Shapiro, C. 1989. “Theories of Oligopoly Behavior”. In: Schmalensee, R. e Willig, R.D. (eds.). Handbook of Industrial Organization. Nova York: Elsevier Science.
Shapiro, C. 2000. “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting”. University of California, Berkeley. Não publicado.
Shapiro, C. 2001. “Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion?” In: Dreyfuss, R.C., Zimmerman, D.L. e First, H. (eds.) Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society. Nova York: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, C. e Varian, H.R. 1999. Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Shelling, T. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sherwin, R.A. 1993. “Comments on Werden and Froeb: Correlation, Causality, and All that Jazz”. Review of Industrial Organization. 8: 355-58.
Shubik, M. e Levitan, R. 1980. Market Structure and Behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Shy, O. 2001. The Economics of Network Industries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Singh, N. e Vives, X. 1984. “Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly”. Rand Journal of Economics. 15: 546-54.
Sklivas, S. 1987. “The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives”. Rand Journal of Economics. 18: 452-58.
Slade, M.E. 1986. “Exogeneity Tests of Market Boundaries Applied to Petroleum Products”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 34: 291-303.
Snyder, C. M. 1996. “A Dynamic Theory of Countervailing Power”. Rand Journal of Economics. 27: 747-69.
Spagnolo, G. 1999. “On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion”. Journal of Economic Theory. 89: 127-39.
Spagnolo, G. 2000. “Optimal Leniency Programs”. Milão: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro 42/2000.
Spence, A.M. 1977. “Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing”. Bell Journal of Economics. 8: 534-44.
Spengler, J.J. 1950. “Vertical Integration and Anti-Trust Policy”. Journal of Political Economy. 58: 347-52.
Spratling, G.R. 1999. “Making Companies an Offer They Shouldn’t Refuse”. Discurso do Subprocurador-Geral na Ordem dos Advogados do Distrito de Columbia. 16 de fevereiro de 1999.
Staiger, R.W. e Wolak, F.A. 1992. “Collusive Pricing with Capacity Constraints in the Presence of Demand Uncertainty”. Rand Journal of Economics. 23: 203-19.
Staiger, R.W. e Wolak, F.A. 1994. “Measuring Industry-Specific Protection: Anti-Dumping in the United States”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics. 51-118.
Stigler, G.J. 1964. “A Theory of Oligopoly”. Journal of Political Economy. 72: 44-61.
Stigler G.J. e Sherwin, R.A. 1985. “The Extent of the Market”. Journal of Law and Economics. 28: 555-85.
Sutton, J. 1991. Sunk Costs and Market Structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sutton, J. 1998. Technology and Market Structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Sylos Labini, P. 1979. Oligopolio e Progresso Tecnico. Torino: Einaudi.
Symeonidis, G. 1998. “The Evolution of UK Cartel Policy”. In: Martin, S. (ed.). Competition Policies in Europe. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Telser, L.G. 1960. “Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?” Journal of Law and Economics. 3: 86-105.
Telser, L.G. 1966. “Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse”. Journal o f Law and Economics. 9: 259-77.
Tharakan, P.K.M. e Waelbroeck, J. 1994. “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the E.C. and in the U.S”. European Economic Review, 38: 171-93.
Thisse, J.-F. e Vives, X. 1992. “Basing Point Pricing: Competition Versus Collusion”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 40: 249-60.
Tirole, J. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Boston: MIT Press.
Trebilcock, M.J. e Howse, R. 1995. The Regulation of International Trade. Londres: Routledge.
Tybout, J.R. 2000. “Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They Do, and Why?” Journal of Economic Literature. 38: 11-44.
UNCTAD. 2000. World Investment Report 2000. Genebra: UNCTAD.
von Ungern-Sternberg, T. 1996. “Countervailing Power Revisited”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 14: 507-19.
US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. 1992. “Horizontal Merger Guidelines”.
Utton, M. 2000. “Fifty Years of UK Competition Policy”. Review of Industrial Organization. 16: 267-85.
Varian, H. R. 1989. “Price Discrimination”. In: R. Schmalensee e Willig, R.D. (eds.). Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 597-654.
Vasconcelos, H. 2001a. “Entry Effects on Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee”. Florença: European University Institute. Não publicado.
Vasconcelos, H. 200lb. “Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries and Mergers”. Florença: European University Institute. Não publicado.
Vickers, J. 1995. “Entry and Competitive Selection”. Oxford University. Não publicado.
Viscusi, W.K., Vernon, J.M. e Harrington Jr., J.E. 1995. Economies and Regulation and Antitrust. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Werden, G.J. 1998. “Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview”. Antitrust Law Journal. 66: 701-35.
Werden, G.J. e Froeb, L.M. 1993. “Correlation, Causality, and All that Jazz: The Inherent Shortcomings of Price Tests for Antitrust Market Delineation”. Review of Industrial Organization. 8: 329-53.
Werden, G.J. e Froeb, L.M. 1994. “The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy”. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 10: 407-26.
Werden, G.J. e Froeb, L.M. 1998. “The Entry-Inducing Effects of Horizontal Mergers: An Exploratory Analysis”. Journal of Industrial Economics. 46: 525-43.
Werden, G.J., Froeb, L.M. e Tardiff, T.J. 1996. “The Use of the Logit Model in Applied Industrial Organization”. International Journal of the Economies of Business. 3: 83-105.
West Group. 1988. West’s Law and Commercial Dictionary. St. Paul, MN.: West Information Pub. Group.
Whinston, M.D. 1990. “Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion”. American Economic Review, 80: 837-859.
Whish, R. 2001. Competition Law. 3a ed. Londres: Butterworths.
Williamson, O.E. 1968. “Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-offs”. American Economic Review. 59: 954-59.
Willig, R.D. 1991. “Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics. 281-312.
Yamey, B. 1972. “Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments”. Journal of Law and Economics. 15: 129-42.