Aristotle
(384–322 B.C.E.)
(384–322 B.C.E.)
Aristotle is one of the greatest philosophers of all time. Together with Plato, he shaped Western philosophy for two millenia, and his ideas and concepts are still discussed today. He wrote about two-hundred treatises, but we currently know only about 31. He writes about logic, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, ethics, political theory, aesthetics and rhetoric.
The following short biography is quoted from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
(Shields, Christopher, "Aristotle", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/aristotle/>.)
Aristotle's Life
Born in 384 B.C.E. in the Macedonian region of northeastern Greece in the small city of Stagira (whence the moniker ‘the Stagirite’), Aristotle was sent to Athens at about the age of seventeen to study in Plato's Academy, then a pre-eminent place of learning in the Greek world. Once in Athens, Aristotle remained associated with the Academy until Plato's death in 347, at which time he left for Assos, in Asia Minor, on the northwest coast of present-day Turkey. There he continued the philosophical activity he had begun in the Academy, but in all likelihood also began to expand his researches into marine biology. He remained at Assos for approximately three years, when, evidently upon the death of his host Hermeias, a friend and former Academic who had been the ruler of Assos, Aristotle moved to the nearby coastal island of Lesbos. There he continued his philosophical and empirical researches for an additional two years, working in conjunction with Theophrastus, a native of Lesbos who was also reported in antiquity to have been associated with Plato's Academy. While in Lesbos, Aristotle married Pythias, the niece of Hermeias, with whom he had a daughter, also named Pythias.
In 343, upon the request of Philip, the king of Macedon, Aristotle left Lesbos for Pella, the Macedonian capital, in order to tutor the king's thirteen-year-old son, Alexander—the boy who was eventually to become Alexander the Great. Although speculation concerning Aristotle's influence upon the developing Alexander has proven irresistible to historians, in fact little concrete is known about their interaction. On the balance, it seems reasonable to conclude that some tuition took place, but that it lasted only two or three years, when Alexander was aged from thirteen to fifteen. By fifteen, Alexander was apparently already serving as a deputy military commander for his father, a circumstance undermining, if inconclusively, the judgment of those historians who conjecture a longer period of tuition. Be that as it may, some suppose that their association lasted as long as eight years.
It is difficult to rule out that possibility decisively, since little is known about the period of Aristotle's life from 341–335. He evidently remained a further five years in Stagira or Macedon before returning to Athens for the second and final time, in 335. In Athens, Aristotle set up his own school in a public exercise area dedicated to the god Apollo Lykeios, whence its name, the Lyceum. Those affiliated with Aristotle's school later came to be called Peripatetics, probably because of the existence of an ambulatory (peripatos) on the school's property adjacent to the exercise ground. Members of the Lyceum conducted research into a wide range of subjects, all of which were of interest to Aristotle himself: botany, biology, logic, music, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, cosmology, physics, the history of philosophy, metaphysics, psychology, ethics, theology, rhetoric, political history, government and political theory, rhetoric, and the arts. In all these areas, the Lyceum collected manuscripts, thereby, according to some ancient accounts, assembling the first great library of antiquity.
During this period, Aristotle's wife Pythias died and he developed a new relationship with Herpyllis, perhaps like him a native of Stagira, though her origins are disputed, as is the question of her exact relationship to Aristotle. Some suppose that she was merely his slave, others infer from the provisions of Aristotle's will that she was a freed woman and likely his wife at the time of his death. In any event, they had children together, including a son, Nicomachus, named for Aristotle's father and after whom his Nicomachean Ethics is presumably named.
After thirteen years in Athens, Aristotle once again found cause to retire from the city, in 323. Probably his departure was occasioned by a resurgence of the always-simmering anti-Macedonian sentiment in Athens, which was free to come to the boil after Alexander succumbed to disease in Babylon during that same year. Because of his connections to Macedon, Aristotle reasonably feared for his safety and left Athens, remarking, as an oft-repeated ancient tale would tell it, that he saw no reason to permit Athens to sin twice against philosophy. He withdrew directly to Chalcis, on Euboea, an island off the Attic coast, and died there of natural causes the following year, in 322.
This text was written around 325 BC. It's one of the classics of Western Philosophy. You can find the full text at the Internet Classics Archive, here.
We are not studying in order to know what virtue is, but to become good, for otherwise there would be no profit in it. (NE 2.2)
If there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake, clearly this must be the good. Will not knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what we should? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is. (I.1094a18)
It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs. (I.1094b24)
The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. (I.1096a5)
Piety requires us to honor truth above our friends. (I.1096a16)
For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the well is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. (I.1097b25)
If ... we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence ... human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete. (I.1098a13)
the Good of man is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or virtues, in conformity with the best and most perfect among them. Moreover, to be happy takes a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make spring. (I.7.1098a)
One swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy. (I.1098a18)
For some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. Now ... it is not probable that these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects. (I.1098b23)
For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant.... Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such... Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos: Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health; but pleasantest is it to win what we love. (I.1099a6)
Everything that depends on the action of nature is by nature as good as it can be, and similarly everything that depends on art or any rational cause, and especially if it depends on the best of all causes. To entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble would be a very defective arrangement. (I.1099b22)
Quoted in Oxford Dictionary of Scientific Quotations (2005), 21:8.
The truly good and wise man will bear all kinds of fortune in a seemly way, and will always act in the noblest manner that the circumstances allow. (I.1101a)
May not we then confidently pronounce that man happy who realizes complete goodness in action, and is adequately furnished with external goods? Or should we add, that he must also be destined to go on living not for any casual period but throughout a complete lifetime in the same manner, and to die accordingly, because the future is hidden from us, and we conceive happiness as an end, something utterly and absolutely final and complete? If this is so, we shall pronounce those of the living who possess and are destined to go on possessing the good things we have specified to be supremely blessed, though on the human scale of bliss. (I.1101a10)
For the things we have to learn before we can do, we learn by doing. (II.1103a33)
Oxford Dictionary of Scientific Quotations (2005), 21:9.
For legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one. (II.1103b4)
It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good. But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory and think they are being philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered to do. (II.1105b9)
Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of the unlimited ... and good to that of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way (for which reason also one is easy and the other difficult—to miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and defect are characteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue; For men are good in but one way, but bad in many. (II.1106b28)
The vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. (II.1107a4)
Variant: Some vices miss what is right because they are deficient, others because they are excessive, in feelings or in actions, while virtue finds and chooses the mean.
In cases of this sort, let us say adultery, rightness and wrongness do not depend on committing it with the right woman at the right time and in the right manner, but the mere fact of committing such action at all is to do wrong. (II.1107a15)
Any one can get angry — that is easy — or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy. (II.1109a27)
We must as second best, as people say, take the least of the evils. (II.1109a34)
Without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods. (VIII.1155a5)
When people are friends, they have no need of justice, but when they are just, they need friendship in addition. (VIII.1155a26)
After these matters we ought perhaps next to discuss pleasure. For it is thought to be most intimately connected with our human nature, which is the reason why in educating the young we steer them by the rudders of pleasure and pain; it is thought, too, that to enjoy the things we ought and to hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing on virtue of character. For these things extend right through life, with a weight and power of their own in respect both to virtue and to the happy life, since men choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful; and such things, it will be thought, we should least of all omit to discuss, especially since they admit of much dispute. (X.1172a17)
And happiness is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace. (X.1177b4)
Now the activity of the practical virtues is exhibited in political or military affairs, but the actions concerned with these seem to be unleisurely. Warlike actions are completely so (for no one chooses to be at war, or provokes war, for the sake of being at war; any one would seem absolutely murderous if he were to make enemies of his friends in order to bring about battle and slaughter); but the action of the statesman is also unleisurely, and-apart from the political action itself-aims at despotic power and honours, or at all events happiness, for him and his fellow citizens-a happiness different from political action, and evidently sought as being different. So if among virtuous actions political and military actions are distinguished by nobility and greatness, and these are unleisurely and aim at an end and are not desirable for their own sake, but the activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems both to be superior in serious worth and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the activity), and the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (so far as this is possible for man), and all the other attributes ascribed to the supremely happy man are evidently those connected with this activity, it follows that this will be the complete happiness of man, if it be allowed a complete term of life. (X.1177b6)
Life in the true sense is perceiving or thinking.
To be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to be conscious of our own existence.
With regard to excellence, it is not enough to know, but we must try to have and use it.
Young people are in a condition like permanent intoxication, because youth is sweet and they are growing.
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics addresses the character and the behavior of the individual (virtue ethics.) At the end of this book, he declares that the inquiry into ethics necessarily leads to politics, and his book Politics therefore deals with the “philosophy of human affairs” in the city. The city is for him a natural community, therefore he is not concerned with questions that were raised by later philosophers, like what is the basis of the “social contract.” Aristotle considers the city or the “political community” (koinōnia politikē) to be the basic unit of the social field, prior to the family, and prior to the individual, because “the whole must of necessity be prior to the part.” For him, the nature of the human being is to be “a political animal.” The political system or the state is for Aristotle not like a social machine, but more like a natural organism, that evolves and cycles through natural stages of transformation.
The argument for a need to write a treatise about politics can be found in the Nicomachean Ethics, chapter 9:
The Incompleteness of the Ethics (1179a33)
The Need for Legislation (1179b18)
The Need for Legislators (1180a24)
How to Become a Legislator: The Need for the Politics (1180b28)
Book One: The Primacy of the City
Chapter 1 The Primacy of the City (1252a1)
Chapter 2 The City and Its Parts. The Household (1252a24). The City (1252b27)
Chapter 3 Household Management and Its Parts (1253b1)
Chapter 4 Slavery The Definition of the Slave (1253b23)
Chapter 5 Slave and Master by Nature. First Proof (1254a17). Second Proof (1254b20)
Chapter 6 Slave and Master by Law. Against Those Who Altogether Condemn Slavery (1255a3) Against Those Who Altogether Approve of Slavery (1255a21) Summary (1255b4)
Chapter 7 Mastery as Rule and as Science (1255b16)
Chapter 8 Property. The Questions about Business (1256a1). The Science of Property and Household Management (1256a15)
Chapter 9 The Two Kinds of Business. The Science of Property and Exchange (1256b40)
The Emergence from Exchange of Another Kind of Business (1257a30)
Reason for Its Emergence (1257b40)
Chapter 10 Business as Part of Household Management (1258a19)
Chapter 11 The Practice of Business (1258b9)
Chapter 12 Husband and Wife, Father and Child (1259a37)
Chapter 14 Virtue as the Overall Concern of Household Management Virtue as the Overall Concern of Household (1259b18) How to Secure Virtue in the Household (1260a33)
Book Two: Regimes Said by Others to Be Best
Chapter 1 Reason and Order of the Examination (1260b27)
Chapter 2 The Regime of Plato’s Republic. Common Wives and Children (1261a10)
Failure to Qualify the Fundamental Supposition about Unity (1261a15)
Chapter 3 Unity as Appealed to in the Proof Is Impossible
The Word “All” (1261b16)
The Word “Mine” (1262a1)
Chapter 4 The Result Is the Opposite of That Intended (1262a25)
Chapter 5 Common Property (1262b37). Communism in General (1263b7)
The Regime as a Whole. Subjects (1264a11). Rulers (1264b6)
Chapter 6 The Regime of Plato’s Laws. From the Regime of the Republic to That of the Laws (1264b26). Presuppositions of the Regime (1265a10). The Regime as a Whole (1265b26)
Chapter 7 The Regime of Phaleas of Chalcedon. Phaleas’ Materialism (1266a31). Criticism of Phaleas (1266b8)
Chapter 8 The Regime of Hippodamus of Miletus. Hippodamus as Man and as Legislator (1267b22). Criticism of Hippodamus. Citizens and Land (1268a16). Jurors (1268b4). The Law about Discovering Something of Advantage to the City (1268b22)
Chapter 9 The Regime of the Spartans. Slavery (1269a29). Women (1269b13). Property (1270a11). Offices. The Ephorate (1270b6). The Senate (1270b35). Kings, Common Messes, and Admirals (1271a18). Supposition of the Regime and Finances (1271a41)
Chapter 10 The Regime of the Cretans. How It Is Like the Regime of the Spartans (1271b20)
How It is Better and Worse than the Regime of the Spartans (1272a12)
Chapter 11 The Regime of the Carthaginians. How It is Better than the Regime of the Spartans and Cretans (1272b24). Deviations in the Regime of the Carthaginians. Deviations in General (1273a2). Particular Oligarchic Deviations (1273a21)
Chapter 12 Other Legislators. Framers of Regimes (1273b27). Framers of Laws (1274b9)
Book Three: Definition and Division of Regime
Chapter 1 Definition of City and Citizen. Priority of Citizen (1274b32). Preliminary Definition of Citizen (1275a5). Precise Definition of Citizen and City (1275a34)
Chapter 2 Confirmation of the Definitions (1275b22)
Chapter 3 Resolution of Disputes. As Regard the City (1276a6)
Chapter 4 As Regard the Citizen. Virtue of Man and Citizen (1276b16)
That the Virtue of Both Cannot in Every Case Be the Same (1276b31)
That the Virtue of Both Can in Some Cases Be the Same (1277a13)
Chapter 5 Citizenship and Virtue of the Vulgar. Preliminary Discussion (1277b33) Determinative Answer (1278a13)
Chapter 6 Definition and Division of Regime. Definition of Regime (1278b6)
Division of Regime. First Part of the Division (1278b15)
Chapter 7 Second Part of the Division (1279a22)
Chapter 8 Confirmation of the Division against Certain Difficulties
First Difficulty: Whether the Deviant Regimes Are Rightly Defined (1279b11)
First Part of the Solution: Quantity and Quality in the Definition (1279b34)
Chapter 9 Second Part of the Solution: Despotism in the Definition
That Oligarchic and Democratic Justice Are Partial (1280a7)
Why Oligarchic and Democratic Justice Are Partial (1280a25)
Chapter 10 Second Difficulty: Whether Any of the Regimes is Correct. Statement of the Difficulty (1281a11)
Chapter 11 Partial Solution Specific to Polity. Statement and Illustration of the Solution (1281a39). Answers to Objections (1281b38)
Chapter 12 Complete Solution General to All Regimes. Who May Justly Make Claims to Rule (1282b14)
Chapter 13 Who May Justly Make Claims to Have Control of Rule. Preliminary Discussion (1283a23). The Case for Polity (1283b27). The Case for Aristocracy and Kingship (1284a3)
Chapter 14 Third Difficulty: Whether Kingship is a Correct Regime. The Kinds of Kingship (1284b35)
Chapter 15 Difficulties with Total Kingship. Arguments for Rule of Law Rather Than Rule by One Man (1285b33)
Chapter 16 Arguments against Total Kingship (1287a1)
Chapter 17 Answer to the Difficulties (1287b36)
Chapter 18 Transition to Investigation of the Best Regime (1288a32)
Book Four: The Best Regime[**see note below]
Chapter 1 Preface to the Discussion: The Best Way of Life. That the Life of Virtue Is the Best Life for Everyone (1323a14). That the Life of Virtue Is the Best Life for the City (1323a29)
Chapter 2 What the Life of Virtue Is. The Kinds of Virtuous Life (1324a13). That the Life of Virtue Is Not Despotic Rule over Neighbors (1324a35)
Chapter 3 That the Life of Virtue Is Both Practical and Philosophic (1325a16)
Chapter 4 Presuppositions of the Best Regime. The Amount and Sort of Material (1325b33). The Number of Human Beings (1326a8)
Chapter 5 The Amount and Sort of Territory. Amount and Quality (1326b26). Topology and Size of the City. As Regards the Territory (1326b39)
Chapter 6 As Regards the Sea (1327a11)
Chapter 7 The Sort of Human Beings (1327b18)
Chapter 8 The Disposition of the Material. The Classes of Human Beings Necessary in a City (1328a21)
Chapter 9 The Separation of the Classes from Each Other. Statement and Proof of the Separation (1328b24)
Chapter 10 Confirmation from Ancient Precedents (1329a40). The Division of the Territory. With Respect to Farming (1329b36)
Chapter 11 With Respect to the Site of the City. Health (1330a34). Military Action and Nobility (1330a41)
Chapter 12 Political Action and Nobility (1331a19)
Chapter 13 The Best Regime Itself. The Goal That the Regime Must Be Capable of Achieving (1331b24). That Achieving This Goal Requires Education (1332a28)
Chapter 14 The Education Required. Education Is to Train Both Ruled and Rulers (1332b12)
Education Must Follow the Division of the Soul. What the Division Is (1333a16)
Refutation of the Opposing View (1333b5)
Chapter 15 What Virtues Education Must Inculcate (1334a11). The Order of Education (1334b6)
Chapter 16 Preliminary Stages. Childbirth (1334b29)
Chapter 17 Infancy to Age Seven (1326a3). Education Proper. The Division of Education and Questions to Examine (1336b37)
Book Five: Education in the Best Regime [** see note below]
Chapter 1 That Education Is Necessary and Must Be Common (1337a11)
Chapter 2 The Content and Manner of Education. Review of Difficulties (1337a33). Solution to Difficulties. Education Must Be Liberal (1337b4)
Chapter 3 Education Must be for Noble Leisure (1337b21)
Chapter 4 Treatment of Particular Subjects. Gymnastics (1338b4)
Chapter 5 Music. Preliminary Discussion (1339a11). The Purposes of Music and Education in Music. For Play and Cultured Pursuits (1339b10). For Contribution to Character (1339b42)
Chapter 6 The Music the Young Should Be Taught. As Regards Performance (1340b20)
Chapter 7 As Regards Modes and Rhythms (1341b19)
Book Six: Division and Description of the Other Regimes [** see note below]
Chapter 1 The Questions Political Science Must Study (1288b10)\
Chapter 2 The Questions Remaining to Be Studied and Their Order (1289a26)
Chapter 3 First Question: The Differences among Regimes. That There Are Several Kinds of Regime (1289b27)
Restatement of the Correct View against the Common View (1290a13)
Chapter 4 Falsity of the Common View (1290a30). Proof of the Correct View and Reason for the Common View (1290b21)
That There Are Also Several Kinds of Democracy and Oligarchy (1291b14). Kinds of Democracy (1291b30)
Chapter 5 Kinds of Oligarchy (1292a39)
Reason for These Kinds of Democracy and Oligarchy
Preliminary Clarification (1292b11)
Chapter 6 Relation to the Kinds of Populace and Notables (1292b22)
Chapter 7 That There Are Also Several Kinds of Aristocracy, Polity, and Tyranny. Kinds of So-called Aristocracy (1293a35)
Chapter 8 Kinds of Polity (1293b22)
Chapter 9 Reasons for These Kinds of Aristocracy and Polity (1294a30)
Chapter 10 Kinds of Tyranny (1295a1)
Chapter 11 Second Question: The Most Common and Most Choiceworthy Regime after the Best
That This Regime Is the Middle Sort of Regime (1295a25)
Why Most Regimes Are Not of the Middle Sort (1296a22)
That Other Regimes Are Better or Worse by Reference to the Middle (1296b2)
Chapter 12 Third Question: Which Regime Is Preferable for Whom. Democracies and Oligarchies (1296b13). Mixed Regimes. The General Case (1296b38)
Chapter 13 Particular Applications (1297a14)
Chapter 14 Fourth Question: How to Set Up These Regimes. By Means of the Deliberative Body (1297b35)
Chapter 15 By Means of the Offices. The Differences among Offices (1299a3). The Appointment of Offices (1300a9)
Chapter 16 By Means of the Law Courts (1300b13)
Book Seven: Destruction and Preservation of the Other Regimes [** see note below]
Chapter 1 Fifth Question: Destruction and Preservation of Regimes. Destruction of Regimes in General. The Starting Point of Change (1301a19). Kinds of Change and Which Regimes Suffer Them (1301b4)
Chapter 2 Beginnings and Causes of Change. Their Kinds and Number (1302a16)
Chapter 3 The Power of Their Operation (1302a16)
Chapter 4 Occasion and Means of Their Operation (1302b5)
Chapter 5 Destruction of Regimes in Particular. Destruction of Democracies (1304b19)
Chapter 6 Destruction of Oligarchies (130537)
Chapter 7 Destruction of Mixed Regimes (1306b22)
Chapter 8 Preservation of Regimes in Particular (1307b26)
Chapter 9 Preservation of Regimes in General (1309a33)
Chapter 10 Destruction of Monarchies. How Kingships and Tyrannies Are Like Regimes (1310a39). That They Are Destroyed in Similar Ways. In General (1311a22). In Particular (1313a34)
Chapter 11 Preservation of Monarchies. Kingships (1313a18). Tyrannies (1313a34)
Chapter 12 Durability of Tyrannies (1315b11). Refutation of the Rival Views of Socrates (1316a1)
Book Eight: Addendum on Setting Up the Other Regimes [** see note below]
Chapter 1 Reason and Order of the Addendum (1316b31). The Setting Up of Democracies (1317a18)
Chapter 2 The Features of Democracy (1317a40)
Chapter 3 How to Set Up the Kinds of Democracy. The First or Rhetorical Democracy (1318a3)
Chapter 4 The Other Democracies (1318b6)
Chapter 5 How to Make the Kinds of Democracy Endure (1319b33)
Chapter 6 The Setting Up of Oligarchies. How to Set Up the Kinds of Oligarchy (1320b18)
Chapter 7 How to Make the Kinds of Oligarchy Endure (1321a5)
Chapter 8 The Setting Up of the Combination of Regimes
The Elements of Rule Available for Combining (1321b4)
**Note: The order of chapters in this summary is adapted from Peter Simpson’s Translation of Politics. He reorders and renumbers the order of the Books of the Politics, This may cause some confusion in referring to other editions, so to clarify things please note that:
Simpson’s Book Number The Traditional Order
Book 1 Book 1
Book 2 Book 2
Book 3 Book 3
Book 4 Book 7
Book 5 Book 8
Book 6 Book 4
Book 7 Book 5
Book 8 Book 6