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Title: Human Capital Accumulation and the Long-Term Effects of Temporary Sectoral Shocks
Presenter: Ekaterina Gurkova
Affiliation: University of California, Los Angeles
Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of temporary sectoral shocks on human capital accumulation and introduces a structural model to quantify their long-term general equilibrium effects. I use Spain’s economic boom (1995-2007) as a case study, which represented a positive labor demand shock in construction and low-skill services, and show that it led to a persistent decline in educational attainment among young workers. To evaluate the general equilibrium implications of this shock during the transition, I construct a quantitative lifecycle model in which workers endogenously choose education and sectoral employment under imperfect human capital transferability. The model reproduces the observed decline in educational attainment and sluggish labor reallocation following the boom. The transition, which is driven primarily by new cohorts, entails a persistent decline in aggregate productivity, with cumulative losses of about 7% and convergence to the steady state over roughly 50 years. The findings demonstrate that positive sectoral shocks can generate adverse long-run aggregate outcomes and substantial distributional effects—cohorts born during the boom experience lifetime earnings gains of nearly 11%, while those born before or after incur losses—highlighting the scope for redistributive policy interventions.
*This session is part of the Job Market Seminar Series.
Title: Digital Divergence: Optimal Taxation, Payment Choice, and Policy Uncertainty in the Shadow Economy
Presenter: Talha Cakir
Affiliation: Purdue University
Abstract: This paper develops a search-theoretic model of money to analyze optimal fiscal and monetary policy when tax evasion is linked to payment methods. In a decentralized market, a sales tax is automatically collected on monitored electronic money (e-money) but can be evaded using unmonitored cash, subject to a detection probability. Buyers endogenously choose payment methods, determining the effective tax base. A benevolent Ramsey planner optimizes the sales tax, cash audit intensity, and fiat money growth rate, balancing revenue needs against evasion incentives and distortions. We then extend the model to include cryptocurrency as an untaxed alternative whose primary friction is its volatility. Crucially, volatility depends on a policy regime state Clear/Ambiguous x Friendly/Hostile, which evolves endogenously based on how policy actions of the government deviate from expectations. We set up the dynamic Ramsey problem and show that the planner balances current welfare gains against the future cost of inducing ambiguity when setting policies. The desire to maintain policy credibility disciplines deviations from expectations. The framework highlights the interplay between taxation, evasion technology, payment choice, policy credibility, and endogenous market volatility.
*This session is part of the Job Market Seminar Series.
Title: From the Shadows to the Spotlight: Analyzing the Heterogeneity and Formalization of Informal Waste Pickers in Bamako through a Mixed-Method Approach
Presenter: Moussa Coulibaly
Affiliation: University of Bordeaux (France)
Abstract: This study examines the socioeconomic characteristics of informal waste pickers in the city of Bamako, with a particular focus on the potential for formalizing their activities. Using a mixed-method approach, we combine both quantitative and qualitative data collected in the field between February and April 2021. The survey data allows us to develop a typology of waste pickers, highlighting the diversity of their profiles, while qualitative information from interviews with waste pickers and key stakeholders provides a better understanding of their experiences and perspectives. These qualitative findings help to contextualize and validate the trends observed in the quantitative data.
Our findings reveal a strong desire among waste pickers to transition to formal structures, particularly through the creation of cooperatives and associations. However, this transition requires targeted policy interventions, including the implementation of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR), in order to improve working conditions, strengthen social protection, and integrate waste pickers into the city's formal waste management system. By addressing these challenges, formalization could have positive socio-economic and environmental effects in the city of Bamako.
*This session is part of the Job Market Seminar Series.
Title: Friend-of-a-Friend in Production Networks: Micro Estimates and Macro Implications
Presenter: Hiroyuki Asai
Affiliation: The University of Tokyo
Abstract: The friend-of-a-friend effect is the idea that when two firms share a common trading partner, a new link between them is likely to form. We quantify this effect in production networks, where the shared partner acts as relational capital, facilitating new connections. First, we develop a general equilibrium (GE) model that endogenizes firms’ link formation and incorporates the friend-of-a-friend mechanism. We show that the GE model simplifies to a dyad‑level logit specification, enabling us to estimate the friend-of-a-friend effect using a quadruple‑based conditional logit that controls for buyer and supplier fixed effects. Analyzing a dynamic panel of Japanese firm‑to‑firm transactions provides strong evidence of the friend‑of‑a‑friend effect, with a magnitude comparable to other important factors like physical distance and sectoral proximity. Finally, we evaluate the macroeconomic impact through a counterfactual analysis within a calibrated GE model. Results indicate that removing the friend‑of‑a‑friend effect decreases welfare by 0.6% and changes the propagation of firm‑level shocks by altering the network structure.