Lecture 12: A Simple Model of a Tournament
Lecture 13: Extensions, Risk Aversion and Contract Farming
Lecture 14: Sabotage and Collusion in Tournaments
Lecture 15: Risk-Taking and Ability Differences in Tournaments
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Brown, Jennifer. "Quitters never win: The (adverse) incentive effects of competing with superstars." Journal of Political Economy 119, no. 5 (2011): 982-1013.
Calsamiglia, Caterina, Jörg Franke, and Pedro Rey-Biel. "The incentive effects of affirmative action in a real-effort tournament." Journal of Public Economics 98 (2013): 15-31.
Carpenter, Jeffrey, Peter Hans Matthews, and John Schirm. "Tournaments and office politics: Evidence from a real effort experiment." American Economic Review 100, no. 1 (2010): 504-17.
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Chapter 20: A Simple Model of Tournaments
Chapter 21: Sabotage, Collusion and Risk-Taking