Lecture 1: Introduction to Personnel and to the Principal-Agent Problem
Lecture 2: Solving the Principal-Agent Problem
Lecture 3: Selling Jobs, Efficiency vs Distribution, Which Assumptions Matter?
Lecture 4: Uncertainty and Risk Aversion; Examples of Multi-Task Problems
Lecture 5: Theory of Multi-Task Problems, Nonlinear Contracts and Timing Gaming
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Hong, Fuhai, Tanjim Hossain, John A. List and Migiwa Tanaka. “Testing the Theory of Multitasking: Evidence From a Natural Field Experiment in Chinese Factories”. International Economic Review Volume59, Issue2, May 2018. Pages 511-536
Jacob, Brian A., and Steven Levitt. “Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating” Quarterly Journal of Economics (2003) 118 (3): 843-877.
Larkin, Ian. "The Cost of High-Powered Incentives: Employee Gaming in Enterprise Software Sales," Journal of Labor Economics 32, no. 2 (April 2014): 199-227
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Chapter 1: Structure of the Principal-Agent Problem
Chapter 2: Solving the Agent's Problem
Chapter 3: Solving the Principal's Problem
Chapter 4: Best for Whom? Efficiency and Distribution
Chapter 5: Uncertainty, Risk Aversion, Multiple Tasks, and Nonlinear Incentives