0.1 What is Personnel Economics? Selection and Motivation
0.2 Who Studies Personnel Economics?
0.3 What Personnel Economics is NOT
1.1 Elements of the Principal-Agent Model
1.2-1.7 Structure of the Principal-Agent Model
2. Solving the Agent's Problem
3.1 Solving the Principal's Problem when a=0
3.2 Solving the Full Principal-Agent Problem
3.3 Is it Crazy to Sell Jobs to Workers?
4 Efficiency and Distribution
5.1 Which Assumptions Matter?
5.2-5.4 Uncertainty and Risk Aversion in the Principal-Agent Problem
5.5(1) Multi-Task Principal-Agent Interactions: Examples
5.5(2) Multi-Task Principal-Agent Interactions: Theory
5.6 Nonlinear Incentives and Timing Gaming
8.1 Incentives at Safelite Auto Glass: Theory
8.2-8.5 Incentives at Safelite Auto Glass: Evidence
9.1 Effects of Small Stakes on Agents’ Effort Choices
9.3-9.4 Effects of High Stakes on Agents’ Effort Choices
9.5 Reference Points: Theory and Laboratory Evidence
9.6 Reference Points: Field evidence
9.7(1) Procrastination and Present Bias: Theory
9.7(2) Procrastination and Present Bias: Evidence
10.7 Fairness Between Workers
13.0 The Value of a Stock Option
13.1 Risky Workers: A Base Case Calculation
13.2 Risky Workers: Changing the Assumptions
17.1 Monopsony Models: Optimal Exploitation
17.2 Does it Matter How Much You Pay?
20 .1-20.2 Elements of a Two-Player Tournament
20.3-20.6 The Optimal Tournament and Equivalence
20.7 Extensions to the Basic Tournament Model
20.8-20.9 Risk Aversion in Tournaments
21.1 Helping and Sabotage in Tournaments
21.2 Collusion in Tournaments
21.3 Risk-Taking in Tournaments
22.1-22.2 Ability Differences in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence
22.3 Ability Differences in Tournaments: Remedies
24.1 The Team Production Problem
24.2-24.3 Efficient and Actual Effort in Teams
24.4 Remedies to Free Riding
25.1 "Altruistic" Punishment
25.3 Teams in a Garment Factory