Theme: "Panpsychism in the Publich Sphere". First prize was awarded to Sam Kimpton-Nye (King's College London) for his essay "Can panpsychism make the world intelligible?" We are currently securing a venue for Sam's piece, after which it will be available.
A close runner up was Jordi Galiano-Landeira (Centro Internacional de Neurociencia y Ética) for his essay "Everything, Everywhere all at once: Spinoza's Panpsychism of Information." This will be published in the Institute of Arts and Ideas.
Abstract for "Can panpsychism make the world intelligible?"
This is an essay about panpsychism—the thesis according to which consciousness is a fundamental property of matter. The essay explores three different arguments for panpsychism, two contemporary and one historical (from Spinoza). It demonstrates that what unites these arguments is a commitment to the intelligibility of the world, which, it suggests, is allied with the idea that existence is ultimately infused with meaning. This commitment to intelligibility is sometimes called the Principle of Sufficient Reason. So, we see how panpsychism can be motivated, very broadly speaking, by a desire for understanding, reasons, meaning. The essay then raises the possibility that the pursuit of reasons for everything may be misguided and that there is value in embracing some absurdity, both in academic philosophy and in our personal lives. The overall aim, then, is to provide the reader with a better understanding of panpsychism and its motives in such a way as to also raise questions about the methods and aims of inquiry more broadly.
Abstract for "Everything, Everywhere all at once: Spinoza's Panpsychism of Information."
What if reality is not made of matter or thought, but of information itself? Using the panpsychist and information-integration aspects of the film Everything Everywhere All at Once, this essay weaves together panpsychism, Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Spinoza’s pantheistic metaphysics to propose a complementary synthesis. While panpsychism provides a conceptual foundation by positing consciousness as fundamental, IIT offers a mechanistic framework for how consciousness combines through information integration. Spinoza’s metaphysics supplies the ontological structure—a single substance expressed in two attributes: thought and extension. But what if these are just two sides of the same informational coin? This work argues that both thought and extension attributes are reflected on the two distinct dimensions of information: thermodynamic and information-theoretic dimensions. The result is a speculative yet coherent metaphysical synthesis in which the fundamental substance of reality is information itself—integrated, causally potent, and being everything, everywhere, all at once.