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Electrical/UPS
Vapors from tanks or pumps have reached the main building via electrical cable conduits. LNG leaked through an inadequately tightened LNG pump electrical penetration seal, vaporized, passed through 60m of underground electrical conduit, and entered the substation. Ignited by arcing contacts of a circuit breaker
Vent: Gas migrated along structural beam into MCC. Subsequent actuation of a pump relay blew MCC
Temporary LQ on top of MCC + generator allowed CO laden gas engine exhaust enter LQ via AC intake. CO poisoning
Emergency DG was regularly tested. In an actual incident its relay connecting it to plant failed to operate as it was not part of regular test. WWW
Engine room fire. Radiant heat from an uninsulated and cracked exhaust bellows ignited insulation soiled with soot and hydrocarbons. Main FW pumps not available once generators were shut. Emergency FW pump couldn’t cut in as fire destroyed rig air line
Old battery bank was replaced but its charger was not removed. It was kept charged unknown to operation team, shorted and started platform fire
Battery powered tools in classified areas may provide the energy required to ignite flammable gases
Many cases of raised crane boom or piping carried touching overhead cables. BP
ESD System
SEE have identified operators routinely bypassing safety system, using “maintenance bypass” that stops the device from triggering the safety system across the entire 4-20 mA range and beyond, even if the device experiences a fault or loses power without proper documentation
BSSE: Document all safety device bypasses. Data history should be operational. Instead of maintenance bypasses, use standard or specific function bypass. For instance for start-up, bypass only PSL function of a PT; not both PSL and PSH functions. Avoid group bypasses. Limit bypasses to a shorter duration. Keep audit records of all bypasses. Human Machine Interface (HMI) should display all bypassed safety devices. Revert ladder logic changes used for construction on completion
Reactor: High pressure drop across an inlet globe type ESD did not allow it to close on TAHH. Test such valves against highest pressure and select a flow to assist closing type. WWW
HX Tube Rupture: RD operated when higher pressure water came in contact with heating oil on shell side. Inlet and outlet ESD valves on water and oil side were slow to close. Oil spray caught fire. WWW
Failure/degradation dual redundant 5V DC power caused ESD and Blowdown System into fault mode. Continuous 100s alarms/minute. Source A at 5V but B was at 3V. Fault occurred when A failed, leaving system with B at 3V only
ESD panels may bleed air via an orifice into ESD loop, to keep it topped up against small leaks and avoid spurious ESD. Some Hi-Pilots may have a small bleed port that can result in topping rate matching bleed-off. This may prevent ESD being activated. ESD loop may take a long time to bleed off. Review and add pneumatic quick opening to depressurize ESD loop
Fire Fighting
Gas Detection: Fail to work, due to internal deposits caused by UV-A induced decomposition reactions of materials inside the source unit assembly, especially in SS housings
Small leaks: Do NOT ignore. Indicates thinning of pipe or vessel wall. Usually leads to catastrophic failure
Inergen: System relied on F&G system triggering N2 release from a cylinder. N2 pressure fired off first Inergen cylinder + held open a spring-loaded valve to divert released Inergen to turbine enclosures. Released Inergen from the first cylinder was to operate the release mechanisms on the remaining bottles. Falling N2 pressure led its spring-loaded valve to close, as the valve had no latch to keep it open. Routine inspection checked only N2 triggering and not a full sequence
Dry Chemical Extinguisher: On activation of a gas cartridge type dry chemical powder filled extinguisher, its bottom failed. Corrosion. Extinguisher propelled up. Fatality. Check your units
Halon Cylinder: Dropped while handling. Sheared top threaded connection, resulted in cylinder flying off 400m like a projectile over a tank farm
CO2: Release failed to operate. Mismatched shipyard schematics Vs vendor manual on valve locations, control panel etc. Inoperable valve actuators and leaks inline. Check your units
Firewater Pumps: On manual start as divers were in the sea. Condensate fire prevented access to FW Pump switches; no alternative way to switch on pumps. Check for common cause failures
Diesel FW Pumps: 2 fuel injectors malfunctioned, allowing diesel into exhaust. Ignition in exhaust pipe resulted in excessive heat that ignited its insulation blanket
Compressor Fire: Water mist system didn’t work as N2 regulator was incorrectly set. Its outlet valve might have been closed. Water deluge didn’t work as CSO valve might have been closed. Several deluge system nozzles were blocked with rust and scale. GRE pipe failed as fire duration exceeded its rating. Foam system didn’t work as valves were wrongly installed
Hydraulic Oil
Hydraulic Oil Accumulator. Flammable atmosphere developed inside as hydraulic lubrication oil was being drained. Ignited by an electric heater within the accumulator
Water/ Air/ Oxygen/ Nitrogen
Water: Harmless water in many incidents (1) Cold hydrotest water ruptured a column (2) Emptying hydrotest water from a tank pulled in vacuum (3) Fast filling a tank with water for hydrotest blew its top (4) Weight of hydrotest water collapsed a tank on soft soil (5) Froth-Over or boiler over damages/ rupture due to water in hot oil or hot oil in water tanks (6) Bacterial decomposition of river water in producing flammable gas (7) Water entry - Bhopal and Flixborough (8) Static Electricity ~ high pressure cleaning water jet mist (9) Water accumulation on a floating roof (10) HC in Cooling Water (11) Water trapped in heater tubes (12) Water pump ‘explosion’ (13) Water hammer (14) Firewater that sank a FPSO (15) Steam condensing pulling vacuum (16) Water freezing, blockage and rupture of dead-legs, drain and vent lines
Water: In a tank’s sight glass, froze cracked SG. Leaked fuel. Flange gasket failure of gasoline tank. BP
Water: In a dead-leg froze, burst and sprayed liquid hydrocarbons. Ignited by a furnace. BP
Water: In a 2” dead-leg of a VDU, froze, cracked the pipe spraying naphtha. Fire. BP
Water: In Bitumen Blowing Column, flashed and blew its top cover, spraying bitumen. BP
Water: In an exchanger flashed and exploded when hot oil was introduced, killing two. BP
Water: Trapped between 2 block valves on the column bottom suction pump, steamed on contact with hot oil during start-up, lifted all the trays in a vacuum column that fell to column bottom. BP
Water: In Vacuum Column Accumulators flashed on establishing vacuum. Damaged trays. BP
Water: Accumulated in Coke Drum overhead line to a column flashed. Damaged tower internals. BP
Water: Accumulation on top of a block valve in a vertical line from Cat Cracker Reactor top feeding a column bottom. The column bottom was filled with gas oil at 240°C and heated by a pre-heat furnace. When the effluent valve was opened, the accumulated water fell into hot oil, blew out half of column trays. The backwards surge into the reactor and regenerator was violent and shut down the air blower. Valve relocated on reactor top. BP
Water: During startup, water trapped in vertical pipe above pump check valve entered a hot CDU column. Flashed. Column atmospheric RV released HC over fence area. Trays damaged. BP
Water: On a chimney tray was not drained. On hot oil introduction, it flashed. Top trays upset. BP
Water: From a leaky steam coil in hot asphalt tank foamed over and reached process area. Fire. BP
Water: In a wax emulsion flashed, bulged the tank roof and spouted wax, water and steam. BP
Water: vapor inflow from thermal breathing condensed on cold days in a vacuum bottoms tank. Violent froth over and blew the tank top. Oil mist spray. BP
Water: HP water cutting head in a Coke Drum exited the drum and fatally injured an operator. BP
Water: Underground Flare KOD in basin lifted and floated when rain water flooded the basin. BP
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