Safest Plants are the ones you design, as if your son or daughter would be working one day in them
Topics
Wellheads & Flowlines
Safety Alerts: A few lines extracted from lengthy reports. Check and ensure your plant/design is safe. Excluded: Fabrication/ commissioning/ failure to follow SOP
“Organisations have no memory. Only people have memory and they move on”. “Accidents are not due to lack of knowledge, but failure to use the knowledge we have” - Trevor Kletz
Visit regularly
https://www.csb.gov/ Simulated incident videos
https://www.hse.gov.uk/ Incident Reports
https://aiche.informz.net/AIChE/pages/Beacon_Subscribe_Page Monthly Process Safety Beacon
https://www.icheme.org/membership/communities/special-interest-groups/safety-and-loss-prevention/resources/lessons-learned-database/ Reports
Read
Read ‘100 Largest Losses in Hydrocarbon Industry - Marsh’
BP Process Safety series (https://icheme.myshopify.com/collections/bp-process-safety-series)
Why Accidents Happen
Read: http://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/cep/20140728 Are There “Gorillas” in Your Plant?
Tasks that demand high attention, impairs our ability to recognize a rare, unexpected and potentially hazardous and catastrophic situation. Joggers and cyclists may wear bright jackets, yet you don’t “see” them if they turn-up at unexpected spots.
And the 3 AM syndrome. Someone wakes you up from deep sleep in LQ, hands you a walkie talkie and ask you to go fix something. You will start the wrong pump or close the wrong valve! (Thanks Natanael Bonicontro, for all the Petrobras-18 discussions!)
Marsh report: In the first 10 years, failures are operations related - learning curve. Once older than 30 years, steep rise in frequency and magnitude due to mechanical integrity - corrosion/ thinning. Thickness may not meet updated standards.
EPSC (European Process Safety Centre) 2019 incident route cause analysis attributes 14% to design; 35% to mechanical integrity - corrosion/ thinning and 51% to operations related. They recommend focus on 18 areas of operations, viz. Apply Double Isolation, Empty and De-energise before line-breaking, Monitor an open drain, Manage overrides of safety critical systems, Walk the Line, Verify leak tightness after maintenance work, Avoid working behind a single valve, Verify the condition of flexible hoses, Operate within safe limits, Control utility systems connected to a process, Report deficiencies on Safety Critical Equipment, Unplugging of equipment, Stay out of the Line of Fire, Control (Un)loading, Check atmosphere in fire box before igniting the burners, Avoid splash loading, Avoid run-away reaction, Report process safety incidents. See: https://epsc.be/Documents/EPSC+PS+Fundamentals/_/EPSC%20PS%20Fundamentals%20-%20English_website.pdf
Extracts from “What Went Wrong”, Trevor Kletz, Gulf Publications, are marked WWW. Extracts from BP Process Safety series are marked BP.
Design Engineers: You may like to update your P&IDs with notes and caution boxes. Some of the incidents are not caught by Hazop scenarios. E.g. Opening a sour service vessel results in Pyrophoric Fire.
Plant Engineers: You may also mark-up the P&IDs with notes and caution boxes. As people move on, their insight should not be lost. A well informed operation team is the Best Asset.
Wellheads & Flowlines
Choke Failure: P in/out =220/23 bar. Downstream check valve blocked with Ca(CO3)2 scale. High downstream pressure + 3 blocked piston balance ports inside choke. Actuator ejected. Fatal injury
Wax deposits in flowlines: Plan early line displacement/ flushing and/or heat tracing/ insulation
Water Injection lines: Hydrocarbon can backflow and bring H2S in sour fields. Injury and fatality. Show caution while opening/ breaking joints for maintenance
Remote waterflood facility pump plunger broke (blocked outlet?) releasing H2S laden water. H2S detectors were not regularly tested and didn’t alarm. Personal H2S detector was not used. Pumper fatally injured. Better ventilation of pump house or openair installation of pumps
Gas-lift: Small bore annulus PT tubing downstream of SDV failed and released HC. SDV closing was no use. Fittings, instrumentation and smallbore tubing on wells are subject to movement due to thermal growth or wave motion. Fit Wellhead SDVs close to wellheads. Shut SDVs with the same signal as SSVs
Riser ESDV Failure: 180 cases. 3 prime causes - corrosion, age and seizure/sticking. Analyse root causes before routinely bringing back Riser ESDV into service by cycling/ lubricating
Corrosion. Riser ESDV actuator bolting mechanism failed. Plate and spring impact on pipe and structure
HP Gas Well (3,000 psig). ⅜” SS tubing not tightened to manufacturer’s recommendation. Leaked. Instead of depressurising first, operator attempted to tighten. Tubing released HP gas. Lung damage
Gas well blow out: Natural gas with H2S gas released. 30m high gas cloud. 234 fatalities and 1,000+ injuries. Mountainous topography led to H2S in populated low level locations
Casing fluids bled into a plastic drum caught fire. Static build-up in the plastic drum. Read ‘HSE-RR804 Plastic Containers for Flammable Liquids, Hazardous Areas, Electrostatic Risks’
Hydraulic Oils are under pressure in small bore pipes, subject to rupture. Fire hazard (LinkedIn)
Updated October 2024 Next